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THE ARMY QUARTERLY

With which is incorporated

The United Service Magazine

Edited by

Major-General G. P. DAWNAY
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O.

and

Lieut.-Colonel CUTHBERT HEADLAM, D.S.O., O.B.E., T.D., M.P.
(late Bedfordshire Yeomanry and General Staff, B.E.F.)

VOLUME XIII

(OCTOBER, 1926 and JANUARY, 1927)

London:
WILLIAM CLOWES & SONS, LTD.
94, Jermyn Street, St. James's, S.W.

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THE ARMY QUARTERLY

VOL. XIII. No. 1. OCTOBER, 1926

EDITORIAL

THE long delayed publication of the Report of the Committee on the "Amalgamation of Services common to the Navy, Army and Air Force," * which was presided over first by Lord Weir and then by Sir Alfred Mond, once again draws public attention to the difficulty that exists in effecting economies in the administration of the fighting Services so long as they are controlled by three separate Departments of the Government. Sir Frederick Sykes, in his article in this number of the *Army Quarterly* which deals with this Report and also with that of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Estimates † on the coordination of common services, brings out this point very clearly. Without unity of control it would appear to be almost impossible to effect any large savings in administrative expenditure, and yet it is fairly obvious that such unity of control is not easy of attainment and will be strenuously resisted by those who are responsible for the administration of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force.

* * * * *

The Reports of the two Committees are worthy of the close attention of all those who are interested in the more economic and the more efficient administration of our defence forces. They must be read in conjunction, and it should be carefully noted that

* Presented to Parliament by Command of His Majesty. Cmd. 2649. Printed and published by His Majesty's Stationery Department. The Committee made its Report in January, 1923, but the Report was not published until the summer of this year.

† *See* "Second Report from the Select Committee on Estimates (Coordination of Common Services)." Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 28th July, 1926. 119. Printed and published by His Majesty's Stationery Office.

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the Committee on the "Amalgamation of Services common to the Navy, Army and Air Force" based its Report on the findings of four sub-committees, "on which," as is pointed out by the Estimates Committee, "representatives of the three Fighting Services were asked to sit, and were in a majority." It is hardly unfair to suppose that the Service representatives were more immediately concerned with the needs and interests of their own particular Services than with the demand for economy and the more efficient working of our defence organization as a whole. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the Committee came to the conclusion that "in existing circumstances the complete or partial amalgamation of the common services of the three Fighting Departments is not advisable," or that it failed to see that "any substantial economies would thereby be effected." It considered that an amalgamation of the Chaplains' Department of the three Services was "undesirable"; that an amalgamation of the technical schools of the Navy, Army and Air Force was "inadvisable"; that an amalgamation of the Intelligence branches was "inadvisable"; that an amalgamation of the supply branches or of any section of those branches was "not warranted" in present circumstances; that an amalgamation of the transport services was "impracticable"; that an amalgamation of the recruiting services was "undesirable"; but that "to ensure close and constant cooperation between the various Works Branches, a joint Committee composed of representatives of the Works Branches of the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry and of H.M. Office of Works should be set up." The Committee, however, although it was opposed to the amalgamation of these various services, was "impressed with the need for establishing closer relations between the three Services in order to ensure cooperation, the free interchange of information on all matters of common interest and the use by each Department of the facilities and services provided by the others in cases where economies can thereby be effected." Its solution for the problem was the establishment of technical interdepartmental committees "to coordinate the work of some of the common services," and it expressly stated that measures must be devised "to ensure that these committees after they had been set up were fully and effectively used. How many of these committees have actually been constituted is uncertain outside the Departments concerned, but it is worth noticing that in regard to one such committee—the Joint Medical Committee—the Estimates Committee in its Report points out that it has only met eight times in three years, and that some

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attempt which it made to bring about the standardization of the medical returns for the three Fighting Services only resulted in the combination of two of the forms used by the Army and the Air Force. If the other coordinating committees meet as seldom as the Joint Medical Committee meets, it is difficult to see how their labours can do much to bring about the coordination and simplification in administration which is admittedly so necessary in the interests of economy.

In a recent debate on National Defence, in the House of Lords,* the Earl of Balfour, speaking on behalf of the Government, had the courage to maintain that the work of administrative coordination between the three Fighting Departments was being carried out with the "happiest results," and seemed to consider that, because the Government had agreed that there should be a debate in the House of Commons on the Service Estimates as a whole before those of each Department were taken separately, critics of existing conditions should be perfectly satisfied. But it is improbable that such will be the case. The Report of the Estimates Committee makes it tolerably plain that the coordinating committees scarcely fulfil their object, and that, even under existing conditions, larger savings in administrative expenditure might be effected if there were only more give and take between the three Departments. There is undoubtedly a feeling among Service members in the House of Commons—a feeling which the publication of the Reports of the Amalgamation Committee and of the Estimates Committee has increased rather than diminished—that some greater unity of control of expenditure is required if the country is to get the full value of the money annually expended upon its defence organization. It is to be hoped that the Government will do its best to allay this anxiety, which is felt on both sides of the House, by the appointment of a strong Royal Commission to examine into the whole question.

* * * * *

The announcement made by Lord Balfour, in the speech to which reference has already been made, that the Government is in process of establishing a College of Imperial Defence is highly satisfactory. It is to be hoped that the establishment of this College, in which presumably senior officers of all three Services will be taught a common military doctrine and will get to know each other personally, will be the first step towards the

* *See* Parliamentary Debates—House of Lords, Vol. 64.—No. 43.

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establishment of a Joint General Staff.* The announcement also made by Lord Balfour of the Government's decision to issue a special Warrant enumerating the duties of the three Chiefs-of-Staff, and stating that these officers are " singly and collectively responsible for the policy which they recommend," is another step in the right direction. It is true that Lord Balfour was careful to insist that the institution of this Warrant would make no change in the system of cooperation between the Chiefs-of-Staff recommended by the Salisbury Committee which has been adopted by the Government and is already in operation. But, nevertheless, a definite instruction is always worth more than a pious aspiration, and, as Lord Balfour himself stated, any officers who in the future accept " the position of Chief of Staff in the Army or First Sea Lord in the Admiralty or Chief of Staff in the Air Force do so with the full consciousness that one of their duties, as clear a duty as any other thrown upon them by their office, is individually and collectively to work to the common end."

Is it too much to hope now that the cooperation between the Chiefs-of-Staff has thus been recognized with due formality, that in course of time the desirability of the establishment of a Joint Staff to assist them in their duties will also receive official recognition ?

* * * * *

In this same debate in the House of Lords on National Defence, in which only four peers, Lord Thomson, Lord Balfour, Lord Haldane and Lord Cavan took part, it was agreed that the establishment of a Ministry of Defence was entirely impracticable. These four noble Lords, who are admittedly men of great experience, stated their conviction that a superman would be required to fill such an office, and presumably they despaired of ever being able to find such a person. With the exception of Lord Thomson, who suggested that to ensure greater economy the Cabinet should be made more immediately responsible for the coordination of our defensive policy, the participants in this debate appeared to be satisfied that the existing system by which the Committee of Imperial Defence is charged with advising the Cabinet on defence matters was satisfactory, although it should be noted that there was not a

* It is reported that Rear-Admiral Herbert W. Richmond, C.B., until recently Commander-in-Chief East Indies Station, is to be the first Commandant of the College of Imperial Defence. Probably no better appointment could be made, for Admiral Richmond, in addition to being an able naval commander with wide experience, is also a close student of combined strategy, and is the author of several notable works on naval history. Under his guidance the College should be given a good start, and its work and organization laid down on the right lines.

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unanimity of opinion as to what were the actual functions of that body. Lord Balfour was not quite sure of the number of its sub-committees, but he led his audience to understand that there were about thirty of them and that they were " doing the most laborious work with the same secretariat and under conditions which make the coordination of their labours not merely a something that may be done but a question of something that must be done in the ordinary routine of the Committee of Imperial Defence work."

With this somewhat cryptic description of the work of the Committee of Imperial Defence, we must, for the time being, be satisfied. Few people who take the trouble to reflect upon our existing defence organization are satisfied that it is either efficient or economic, but it is obvious that there is no intention in the minds of those now in authority to alter or to reform it to any material extent. The Government undoubtedly considers that the Committee of Defence, as at present constituted, provides an adequate machinery for the work for which it was designed. It would be interesting to know exactly how often this important body meets, who attends it, what it does, and what becomes of the endless reports and recommendations which presumably are made by its numerous sub-committees. But these matters are wrapt in mystery, and so presumably we shall have to " wait and see " until another war is upon us. Then once again no doubt, as in 1914, we shall have to improvise armies and to devise strategic plans to meet emergencies which have not been foreseen. After all, this is the English way of doing things, and, so far, we have always " muddled through."

No one, as has more than once been pointed out in these notes —not even the most ardent advocate of a Ministry of Defence— has ever been so foolish as to suggest that such a Ministry should be constituted in the twinkling of an eye. Until a common doctrine of war has been established in the three Services and a far closer liaison between them than exists to-day has been arrived at, it would be futile to attempt to combine their control under a single political chief. Such a policy would be doomed to failure and a Ministry of Defence set up in such a manner would be open to all the objections brought against it in the recent debate in the House of Lords. But when once there is a body of officers in existence who have been taught a common school of thought and are familiar with the views of the Services to which they do not themselves belong, there is no apparent reason why they should not be able to cooperate together and to coordinate the naval, military and air defence of the nation under a single political chief. Such an arrangement need not

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offend the traditions or wound the natural susceptibilities of the three Services, nor would it be necessary for the Minister in Charge of Defence to be so much overburdened with work as Lord Balfour seems to imagine. From his remarks in the House of Lords it might be supposed that a First Lord of the Admiralty to-day must understand thoroughly all the intricacies of naval warfare, that a Secretary of State for War must be a master of military strategy and tactics, and that the Secretary of State for Air must be an air expert. Such a supposition is ridiculous. A Minister in charge of one of the Fighting Departments is dependent upon the advice of his Service experts; if he were not so guided, he would be a public danger. A Minister of Defence would be advised exactly in the same way by a Staff representing the views of the three Services. It should not really require a superman to carry out the duties of such an office, more especially when it is remembered that under our form of Government the actual decisions to be made would still rest with the Cabinet.

* * * * *

In October last year attention was drawn in these notes to the difficulty that was then being found, in some parts of the country at any rate, in obtaining suitable officers and men for the Territorial Army. To judge from articles and correspondence which have recently appeared in *The Times*, this difficulty still continues. "At present the functions of the Territorial Army and the reasons for its existence are almost unknown to vast numbers of young men who might be serving in its ranks, and especially to those who are fitted for commissioned rank." * Such a statement would appear to be absurd only a few years after the greatest war in history, and when it is remembered that there is no longer any Special Reserve and that the Territorial Army has now been officially declared to be our Second Line of defence. But in this country where the custom of the people is to forget anything unpleasant as soon as possible and to neglect to inform themselves of laws and regulations until they are forced upon their notice, it is not unlikely that the great bulk of the community is ignorant of the new responsibilities of the Territorial Army, and, consequently, that young men do not as yet fully realize the patriotic obligation of joining it. Be this as it may, the Territorials are still over 33,000 officers and men under establishment, and it is more or less obvious that unless some means can be found to make service in the citizens' force more popular, this

* *See* a leading article in *The Times*, 30th of August, 1926.

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deficiency in strength is likely to continue. It remains to consider what those measures should be. Upon this important point there is considerable divergence of opinion. Some people seem to imagine that the more the Territorials can be converted into Regulars the more popular service in the Territorial Army is likely to become. Others hold exactly the contrary view and recommend that the Territorial Army requires constant amusement and as many social clubs and recreation grounds as can be supplied at the public expense. The truth, as usual, probably lies somewhere between these two extremes. The new Chief of the General Staff, Sir George Milne, in a recent speech expressed a wish that " we could get rid of the word ' Territorial ' Army, and just talk of the Army as one." " There is no difference," he stated, " between the two branches except that the Regulars are ' whole-timers ' and the so-called Territorial Army give as much time as they possibly can." In the sense in which it was probably meant, this view of the case is a sound one ; it is right and proper that the military forces of the Crown should be regarded as an Army as a whole ; but, as *The Times* explained in a leading article,* " it must not be forgotten that the problems of a ' whole-time ' professional force, and of a voluntary army composed of men whose first preoccupation is the earning of their living in civil life are totally different." The main strength of the Territorial Army lies in its civilian character and in the local identity of its various units, and any attempt to bring these citizen troops into a closer community with the " whole-time " forces or to make them too military would probably defeat the object for which it was intended. Territorials in time of peace—although at the present time they probably include among their numbers far more men who have had experience of active service than does the Regular Army—can never hope to be compared either in discipline or in training with Regular troops. Nor is there any reason why they should be so compared. All that is required is that as many young men as possible of good character and good physique representing all classes in the community should pass through the Territorial Army and obtain thereby a working knowledge of military matters which, in the event of a national crisis, would enable them to be of some assistance to their country. The present training of the Territorial Army should be amply sufficient for this purpose if it is carried out according to the regulations and the officers and non-commissioned officers can be depended upon. The success or failure of training in the Territorial as in the Regular

* *See The Times*, 17th of August, 1926.

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Army really depends upon the officers, and the most ominous sign of the times is the difficulty in finding Territorial officers of the right type. It is said that the Officers Training Corps of the public schools and universities are not as yet contributing their proper quota to the commissioned ranks of the Territorial Army, and there is reported to be little or no liaison between these bodies and the County Associations. If this state of things really exists—and the writer of these notes has reason to believe that it does exist—it should not be difficult for energetic secretaries of County Associations to get in touch with the authorities of the public schools within their areas and to explain to them and to their boys the needs of the Territorial Army. Continuous and intelligent propaganda directed to emphasize the importance of young men from the public schools and universities giving a lead to others by becoming Territorials cannot fail to bring about good results. " What is needed," as *The Times* very truly points out, " is that public opinion should be so guided, both officially and unofficially, by political and military leaders as well as by leaders of society and industry, that a day will arrive when it is accepted as ' the normal course ' for a young man leaving public school or university to take a commission or serve for a few years in the ranks, and for every able-bodied and self-respecting young man to undergo some training in the Territorial Army or in the corresponding Reserves of the Naval and Air Services." *

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The speech on the subject of disarmament recently delivered by Mr. Kellogg, the United States Secretary of State, is of interest not only because it may be presumed to represent the views of the American Government on this important subject, but also because it touches upon some of the difficulties which are now being faced at Geneva by the Naval, Military and Air Sub-Committee of the League of Nations Disarmament Committee. Mr. Kellogg's speech was made on the occasion of the unveiling of a monument in memory of an American naval officer who in 1814 beat off a British attack —the last hostile naval action in which this country and the United States have been engaged. It was only fitting that the Secretary of State should seize this opportunity of pointing out to the world in general " the inestimable value to civilization of the long peace and friendship of the two great English-speaking nations." " It is inconceivable," he went on to say, " that anything can bring

* *See The Times'* leading article, 30th of August.

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these nations again into the conflict of war. Differences will arise as they have in the past, but they can and will be settled without the arbitrament of war. Two peoples who have to a great extent the same historical background, the same respect for law and love of justice, the same ideals of government and of international conduct, cannot again imperil the world by going to war with each other." Mr. Kellogg then proceeded to explain generally the views of his Government on world disarmament. He maintained that the most practical approach to the problem was the devising of some scheme to prevent a competition in armaments, because such competition " is the factor which, more than any other, leads to mutual distrust and fear, and is therefore the greatest threat to peace." As regards land armaments, he considered that the adoption of regional agreements would strike at the root of the problem " by removing from a nation the fear of aggression from its immediate neighbours." He considered that such an arrangement, if it could be devised, would provide a more practicable and likely way of bringing about disarmament than an attempt to formulate some universally applicable scheme. As regards naval armaments, Mr. Kellogg pointed out that regional agreements could not be so effectively employed, but he declared the willingness of his Government to extend the principle of doing away with competition in naval construction already inaugurated at the Washington Conference. He believed that a proposal which has been put forward by certain Powers at Geneva to deal with the limitation of land, sea and air armaments " as a part of an inseparable whole on the ground that reduction in one branch must be contingent upon reductions in the other two branches of armaments," was a mistake because it would tend to complicate the problems at issue, and in this contention Mr. Kellogg is probably right. The measure of agreement that was secured at the Washington Conference was largely due to the fact that certain concrete and definite proposals were put forward regarding one particular form of armaments with the production and maintenance of which all the Powers represented at the Conference were vitally concerned. At Geneva the conditions are entirely different. Nations with little or no sea-power are represented on the League of Nations Disarmament Committee, and it would inevitably lead to misunderstandings and disagreements if such States were to attempt to lay down regulations for the limitation of naval armaments.

Mr. Kellogg, while denying that there was any intention of withdrawing the American representatives from the Committee, took

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the opportunity, nevertheless, of referring to some of the divergencies of opinion which have arisen in that body. He made it quite clear, for instance, that his Government would not agree with a scheme that apparently finds favour with some Powers at Geneva, by which a country's scale of armaments should be based on its national economic resources " on the ground that the possession of such resources would justify the reduction of the peace-time armaments of a State." Such an arrangement might place the greater Powers in a somewhat curious position *vis-a-vis* the lesser Powers. The United States, for example, as Mr. Kellogg pointed out, " having great natural resources, might be deprived of any army or navy at all if such a theory were applied." It is improbable, therefore, that a disarmament policy based on these lines would be likely to commend itself to the statesmen of the Great Powers—and yet, as was suggested in these notes last July, it is just as well to remember that in the future the foreign policy of an ambitious or aggressive nation will be based not so much on the strength of its " peace armament " as upon its commercial and industrial capacity for rapid military expansion in the early stages of a war.

With regard to the proposal, which was put forward by the French representatives on the Geneva Committee, that there should be a permanent committee of experts to compile and to publish reports in order to see whether States were really carrying out their disarmament agreements, Mr. Kellogg stated distinctly that the American Government would never submit to any such international supervision of its armaments. " So far as the United States is concerned," he said, " the execution of any international agreement must depend upon good faith and respect for treaties." And with this view of the case it is to be hoped that British statesmen are in full agreement.

* * * * *

The need for economy and the general dislocation of traffic arrangements due to the industrial troubles have interfered with military training this year. It has been found necessary to confine the field training of the Regular Army to exercises in the immediate vicinity of the garrisons in which the troops were located, and to cancel many of the Territorial camps.* Although it is always to be regretted when manœuvres on a large scale cannot be carried out, there is no doubt that the limited form of training adopted this year has its advantages. It enables divisional and brigade com-

* All Territorial camps arranged for up to and including the 14th of July were cancelled.

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manders to watch more closely than is possible in larger manœuvres the handling of troops in the field by regimental officers, and it also gives to the divisional and brigade staffs an excellent opportunity of working out particular problems with regard to the employment of the various arms within the division.

To judge from the reports of the military and quasi-military experts who have attended these exercises, there is still the same divergence of opinion among them as existed last year as to the correct method of using tanks in the attack, as to the value of cavalry in modern warfare, as to the degree of "mechanicalization" required in the Army, and as to the methods of cooperation between aircraft and infantry. One correspondent has definitely made up his mind that the day of the infantry soldier is nearly over, and that in the wars of the future all the man-power that will be required to win battles will be carried in tanks and armoured cars. Another, whose opinion probably is just as worthy of attention, is convinced that the recent operations of the 1st Division at Aldershot, "support the view that it is by man-power that the next and every succeeding war will be won." Some writers maintain that the commanders, who during the last few weeks have been studying different aspects of reconnaissance and mobility, have been puzzled by the unexpected failure of tanks on ground where their success was anticipated, and have been disappointed because aeroplane observation has not been possible in a mist. But although the great majority of these reports appear to throw little or no new light on the development of military knowledge, they illustrate well enough the difficulties which are now being faced by those who are responsible for the refashioning of the Army to meet the requirements of modern war. They have to maintain a small well-trained army which can be used at any moment. Such a force must have plenty of hitting-power and great mobility, but it may have to be employed in almost any part of the world. The arms and transport, consequently, which can be used effectively in Europe might well be unsuitable on the outposts of the Empire. In these circumstances any unthinking precipitation in the reduction of man-power, or in the remodelling of transport would be a mistake which, instead of making for economy and efficiency, might well lead to much wasteful expenditure. Optimistic theorists, therefore, who would have us believe that an invading army could to-day be blown off the Hindu Kush from the air, must be held in check, and scientific enthusiasts who urge the immediate "mechanicalization" of the entire Regular Army must also be severely restrained.

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If we were certain that we should always be called upon to fight in countries in which the ground and the climate were suitable for tanks, there might be something in this latter suggestion. But in mountainous or thickly wooded country, or in desert regions, the employment of tanks and mechanical transport is not as yet a practical proposition. So long as we are responsible for the defence of the North-West Frontier of India, where infantry is the only arm to be relied upon, we cannot afford to cut down our man-power or to rely solely upon mechanical transport.

* * * * *

In view of their anxiety to bring about economies in the Estimates, the authorities at the War Office are presumably now racking their brains as to what further sacrifices they can make in order to satisfy the exigencies of national finance. It is much to be hoped that they will see fit to spare the Senior Officers School. There is now almost universal agreement in the Army as to the great value of this School to regimental officers. It enables senior officers belonging to all arms of the Service to meet and so to get to know each other personally. The School is thus an invaluable centre for the interchange of opinions and for enabling officers in one arm of the Service to acquaint themselves with the work of other arms. It also brings regimental officers into close touch with the Staff, and in some ways acts as a very useful balance to the Staff College. The cost of the School is only about £16,500 a year, and of this sum roughly a half is expended upon the pay of the instructors. If, therefore, the School were abolished, the total annual saving would not amount to much more than £9,000. When one bears in mind that the School of Equitation costs the country £31,700 a year, and that £21,760 is the annual expenditure upon the School of Electric Lighting, the sum we are now paying to increase the efficiency of our battalion commanders does not seem exorbitant, and it is certainly money well spent.

10th of September, 1926.

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REDUCTION OF DEFENCE COSTS: THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE AMALGAMATION OF SERVICES COMMON TO THE NAVY, ARMY AND AIR FORCE, 1926,* AND OF THE SECOND REPORT FROM THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ESTIMATES, 28TH OF JULY, 1926.†

By Major-General Sir Frederick H. Sykes, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.P.

The Report of the Committee, appointed in February, 1922, "to make definite proposals for amalgamating as far as possible the common services of the Navy, Army and Air Force, such as Intelligence, Supply, Transport, Education, Medical, Chaplains, and any other overlapping Departments, in order to reduce the cost of the present triplication," has at last been made public. The Committee was presided over by Lord Weir until the 20th of October, 1922, and then by Sir Alfred Mond, and made its recommendations to the Government in January, 1923.

Though unpublished, the Report has frequently been employed by Ministers in justification of a continuance of common services on a triplicated basis.

Publication now shows, however, that this opinion was qualified by its application to the existing system of a triplicated control of our defence forces, and that the Committee specifically reported amalgamation of common services to be practicable only if and when a unified executive control of defence policy was in being.

In spite of Ministerial silence in regard to this important reservation, the inherent probability of its inclusion in the views of persons of such experience as the successive chairmen of the Committee made it possible for critics of the present system of administration

* *See* Comd. 2649, His Majesty's Stationery Office.
† *See* 119, His Majesty's Stationery Office.

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to press for the publication of the Report in assurance that it would be found to support their views.

And, with the publication of the Report, it is found that the Committee's appreciation of this key to reform is shared by the Sub-Committees, each with a preponderatingly Service constitution, which examined the various aspects of amalgamation in detail.

The Committee set out directions in which economy could be anticipated under a unified control; economy in the purchase and the inspection of stores; in management; in *personnel*; in training facilities; and in elasticity of transfer of *personnel*. Others could be added, notably eradication of triplication of margins in defence-power and of competition in status. But the Committee had neither the powers, nor perhaps the constitution, to examine and to report upon the possibilities of instituting the single executive control of policy upon which these economies depend. And it was accordingly limited to recommendations of such opportunist measures as might palliate lack of economy without removing its prime cause. Coordinating committees of the three Services were set up as recommended in 1922. Yet, four years later, the outstanding feature of the House of Commons debates on Service estimates has been the widespread expression of belief that there was considerable lack of economy in the present defence organization and that it arose in major degree from triplication of services.

That there were good grounds for the view that this system of coordination by committee was a weak one is demonstrated by the Report from the Select Committee on Estimates which was published on the 28th of July, 1926. It states that the Air Ministry stationery store is handling only a quarter of the indents and tonnage handled by the War Office store and yet is employing a staff which is nearly the same in numbers; that the Joint Medical Committee has met only eight times in three years; that this committee's effort to standardize medical returns has resulted only in the combination of two of the forms used by the Army and Air Force, and that it has been unable to consider the relative costs of hospitals because the methods of costing are different in the three Services. The Estimates Committee also reports that no action has been taken in regard to the amalgamation of certain hospitals, because the Army considered a naval hospital to be fully employed on naval needs when in fact it had ample capacity for the combined needs. It states further that the Air Force works without any general fixed scale (in relation to establishment), even as a basis of calculation, in providing hospital accommodation, and that a

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hospital which in the opinion of the Air Council was understaffed was shown by comparison with Army hospitals to be overstaffed. It finds that the greater use of Army mechanical transport by the Navy and Air Force, specifically recommended by the Mond-Weir Committee, has been limited to some experiments in the standardization of ambulances which still continue; that more attention should be given to the overlapping of research work of the Admiralty, Air Ministry and Department of Scientific and Industrial Research; that, although the matter has been considered, the Contract committee has not been able to coordinate coal and coke purchases, with the result that prices paid by the three departments vary considerably. It also suggests that it is impossible to make accurate comparison of the supervision charges incurred by the various Works Departments owing to the different systems of preparing estimates for work in each Department, and that there is considerable overlapping in the works carried out for different Departments in the same area. Finally, the Estimates Committee considers that effective coordination is in many cases impossible, as the committees representing the three Service Departments, while functioning for a similar purpose, have always been anxious to maintain their independence, while it finds that many of the excuses put forward by Departments for apparently excessive expenditure prove on investigation to be untrue.

To meet this state of affairs the Government made four proposals in the debate in the House of Lords on the 16th of June last.* First, it proposes to continue the system of coordination by committees which in the words of the Lord President of the Council "is being pursued far in excess of anything of which our forefathers ever dreamed." This, in view of the crying need for simplicity, efficiency and economy in organization, is neither a very impressive nor a very pertinent criterion. Even the races which raise ancestor worship to the level of a religion would hesitate to accept the views of departed spirits in the solution of present-day problems of economic military organization. Of more importance are the views expressed by the Mond-Weir Committee that such committees cannot bring about the economies that would follow a unified control; that the Service estimates have revealed no material economies as the result of the four-year operation of these committees at a time when economy is a national need; and that the Estimates Committee has found the working of these coordinating committees in practice to be distinctly inefficient.

* *See* Parliamentary Debates—House of Lords, Vol. 64, No. 43.

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The second proposal by the Government is also a continuance of present practice, but with the addition, if one may so describe it, of a useless, however decorative, gilt frame. The existing responsibility, collective and individual (whatever that may mean) of the three Chiefs of Staff is to be published in a special Warrant by the Prime Minister, " couched in the stately language of a by-gone age." But, lest any fear of radical alteration in the defence system should arise in the conservative breast, the Lord President emphasizes that the Warrant will add nothing and subtract nothing from existing practice. Frankly, however stately the language employed, it is difficult to find how mere public definition can have any advantageous economical effect. Surely the Government does not suggest that Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, or individually and collectively, refrain from their utmost single or united efforts to make the present machinery effective because their responsibilities under it have not been couched in the stately terms of a Warrant! If that were so, how could we be expected to place any reliance on an organization in which so lightly-effected a reform could have material results on efficiency? And yet if this is not the motive, what can it be but pure eyewash?

The two proposals by which the Government does effect any change in existing practice are useful. But one cannot describe them as very much more when one has in mind the magnitude of the economic problem.

First, there is in future to be a debate on the question of defence, treated as a whole, as a preliminary to dealing with the estimates of each Service in its turn. This is a sound step in that it is a recognition that defence is a single and not a triple function. But as under present organization, the policies and the estimates of the three Departments are framed on what may be termed a zonal basis, the Navy looking to the Far East, the War Office primarily to India and the Air Ministry to Home Defence and to other geographical spheres in which it feels it can take the place of the older Services, there will be some difficulty in considering these policies as a coherent whole. And as the form of the estimates in which these policies are embodied might well have been designed for the express purpose of ensuring financial probity without affording any basis of comparison or cohesion of costs, little in the way of economical gain is to be anticipated from the proposal.

Second, a College of Imperial Defence is being established in which soldiers, sailors and airmen are to be made to understand " something of what their colleagues in the other two Services

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can and cannot do," and civil servants of unspecified duties are to acquire a knowledge of "the broader aspects of defence strategy." What does this really mean? It is as it should be if it means that the College is for the education of suitable senior officers of the three arms to form a supreme Joint Staff. Even then the vesting, as is proposed, of the command of the College in strict rotation between the Services is obviously fallacious. The Commandant and instructional staff should be selected from those officers, of whatever Service, who have the greatest breadth of practical and scientific knowledge of defence as a whole and who can best impart it. Of the proposed function of the College in regard to civil servants, it can only be said that it threatens the danger of the "little knowledge."

What is there left in the statement of policy made in the House of Lords on the 16th of June? Only the opinions on which has been based the decision to make no radical effort towards Service economy. These opinions bear the imprint of being what no doubt they are: the views of the Committee of Imperial Defence on suggestions which interfere with the present range of its responsibilities.

We are told that the Committee of Imperial Defence can do, and does, the coordination of which a Ministry of Defence would be quite incapable; that it can do, and is doing, the work of co-ordinating the civil and military resources of the country. And the conclusion is drawn that a single Defence Ministry is therefore impracticable. The need of this coordination is obvious. But why, if three Service Departments can collaborate with non-military policies, cannot one Department do so? The only answer I can see to the use of triplicating the expression of military opinion in these matters is the use Sir Percy Scott's midshipman had for the battleship, and the single expression of military opinion, which unified control would substitute for a present triple expression, should simplify this coordination.

Another argument used against unity of control is that the traditions of the three Services are so various that they would make efficient working under a single staff impossible. Does that mean that the ex-naval and ex-military officers of the Royal Air Force are not working together effectively owing to the traditions of their parent Services? And that the naval tradition which an ex-naval officer is instilling into Air Force boys at Halton can never blend with the military traditions with which an ex-Army officer is inculcating cadets at Cranwell? Or that the work of a seconded naval officer as Air Member for *Personnel* and of a seconded soldier

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as Director of Organization and Staff Duties at the Air Ministry has been a cause of chaos?

However one might welcome the suggestion that Service *personnel* have such devotion to their own staffs as to make control by a joint staff impossible, it would be impossible to accept it as a contribution to practical politics. Nor is there any value in the suggestion that staff officers themselves, approaching defence problems from entirely different and contesting standpoints, can (without friction) devise and effect coordinating plans on a committee, but that they could not do so on a joint executive staff with a scheme of education and an organization expressly designed to secure a unified standpoint.

The past usefulness of the Committee of Imperial Defence is also brought forward after the manner of a defendant with a weak case who relies on evidence as to past good character. We may have, indeed I think every one has, a deep appreciation of the work of the Committee before the war, though to put forward claims to a present all-sufficientness on grounds of work during the war, when for practical purposes the Committee ceased to exist, is neither in accord with facts nor does it recognize the changed circumstances which post-war appreciation of air-power should introduce in defence methods. But, even if the argument of past value had weight, it surely does not justify the Government in rejecting, without a searching and disinterested examination, the only form of closer working in defence under which material economies are admittedly possible.

What is needed is not a criticism by the Committee of Imperial Defence of a product of its own mental creation, but the drawing up, by an independent body experienced in the control of great undertakings, of a form of organization in which, however gradually the end is reached, defence may be secured with the least possible tax on national resources.

The view of the Mond-Weir Committee that by unity of control alone are the major economies possible, parliamentary dissatisfaction with the limited extent to which measures short of unity of control give economy, and confirmation of the grounds of that dissatisfaction by the Estimates Committee, should be followed by the appointment of a Royal Commission suitably constituted to plan reforms calculated to effect a greatly needed economy in the face of established interests.

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"THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL"

No. VI*

THE GERMAN DEFENCE OF BERNAFAY AND TRÔNES WOODS: 2ND–14TH OF JULY, 1916†

(With Map)

PART I

THE result of the opening British assault on the 1st of July, 1916, between the Somme and the Ancre was not altogether as anticipated. It had been hoped to press the offensive along the Thiepval—Pozières—Longueval ridge from the west, from the front La Boisselle—Thiepval, coming up eventually in a line with the French left about Hardecourt and thereby eliminating the Maricourt salient. The failure to make progress about La Boisselle and Thiepval, or even to capture the German front defences in that sector had, however, led General Haig to doubt the wisdom of continuing with his original scheme. On the other hand, the success of the British XIII and XV Corps, which had overrun the German front defences on a frontage of over three miles along the Montauban ridge, seemed to have prepared the way for an easier approach to the German second line on the Pozières—Longueval ridge. Although there would be considerable delay in transferring guns and supplies to this area, General Haig decided to take advantage of the break in the German line here instead of continuing to press the attack against the unbroken front defences between La Boisselle and Thiepval.

Immediately in front of the new British line along the northern slope of the Montauban ridge was Caterpillar Valley, the bed of a

* Previous articles in this series appeared in the *Army Quarterly*, January, 1924; April, 1924; July, 1924; January, 1925; and October, 1925.

† The following list of the principal German authorities used for this article may be of interest to any reader wishing to trace further details of the fighting in this sector of the Somme battle front: *Der grosse Krieg*, Vol. 2: Schwarte; *Geschicte des Krieges*, Vol. 3: Stegemann; Bavarian Official History (*Die Bayern im Grossen Kriege*); *Bataille de la Somme*; *Feld. Art. Regt. Nr.* 21: Jancke; *Feld. Art. Regt. Nr.* 57: Uebe; *Feld. Art. Regt. Nr.* 245: Heydenreich; *Res. Inf. Regt. Nr.* 104: Braum; *Res. Inf. Regt. Nr.* 106: Bamberg; *Inf. Regt. Nr.* 153: Schmidt; *Erinnerungsblatter der* 178*er*: Giesecke; *Inf. Regt. Nr.* 182: Pache.

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small winding brook rising in Trônes Wood and flowing westward to the Ancre. On the farther side of the brook the ground rises fairly steeply, 150 feet in 1,000 yards, up to the German second line trench that lay on top of the slope between Longueval and Bazentin le Grand. To the right Trônes Wood lay across the head of the valley, the German second line swinging round southwards from Longueval on the high ground beyond the wood, through Guillemont and thence towards Maurepas. It was now General Haig's intention to cross Caterpillar Valley and attack up the northern slope against the German second line on a front Longueval—Bazentin le Grand. Its capture would directly threaten the rear of the Germans still holding out about Ovillers and Thiepval, and thereby lead quickly, he hoped, to the clearing of the entire Pozières ridge.

The attack was to be made up the open grass slope of the chalk downland on a frontage of 300 yards between Trônes Wood on the right and Mametz Wood on the left, both of which covered the length of the slope from the valley almost to the top of the ridge. Large sectors of the attacking troops could be enfiladed from these woods, and General Haig therefore directed General Rawlinson, commanding the Fourth Army, to capture these woods as a preparatory measure to protect the flanks of the main attack.

The few roads leading back southward from the Montauban ridge made very great the difficulties of transport and ammunition supplies. Nevertheless, in spite of the change of plan it was hoped to launch the main attack on the German second line about the 14th of July, and to have captured the woods on the flanks by that date. The capture of Mametz Wood and Contalmaison village on the left flank have been described in a previous article, No. IV of this series,* and it was carried out concurrently with the advance through Bernafay and Trônes Woods on the right.

The German Counter-attack against the Montauban Salient, 2nd of July

By the afternoon of the 1st of July the remnants of the defenders of the German front trenches on the Montauban ridge, the left of the 28th Reserve Division and the right of the 12th Division, together with the 6th Bavarian Reserve Regiment (10th Bavarian Division), were back in the German second line (*Braune Stellung*) on the front Bazentin le Grand—Longueval—Guillemont, having abandoned a number of battery positions along Caterpillar Valley and in Bernafay

* *See* "Mametz Wood and Contalmaison, 9th–10th of July, 1916," *Army Quarterly*, January, 1925.

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and Trônes Woods. Had the British followed up their success at once, both those woods would have been found empty, and little resistance would have been met in the German second line, the only formed unit in the whole of that sector of over two miles being the 16th Bavarian Regiment (10th Bavarian Division) in reserve between Longueval and Flers.

During the evening, however, the opportunity passed, the 12th Reserve Division * arriving on the scene in great haste from Bapaume. It was the first of that great stream of German divisions that were to be put in to reinforce the battle front north of the Somme during the following months. It had entrained at Neuville les Cambrai at 9 a.m. (1st of July) as soon as the news of the yielding of the line on the Montauban ridge came through, and from Bapaume it marched south-eastward during the late evening and night to the Combles—Ginchy area. At 6.45 p.m. it came under the 28th Reserve Division and was ordered to advance eastward and to regain a footing on the Montauban ridge about Montauban and Favières Wood (the latter place held by the French). The troops were told that probably parts of the original front trenches were still held by isolated detachments, and that therefore continual reconnaissance would be necessary both to avoid surprise by the enemy and firing into their own troops in front. The advance was to be made with the right, the 51st Reserve Infantry Regiment, past the north of Combles and thence directed by north of Guillemont on the north-east corner of Montauban village; the centre, the 38th Reserve Infantry Regiment, was to attack Favières Wood, and the left, the 23rd Reserve Infantry Regiment, was to advance between Maurepas and Curlu, on the north bank of the Somme. The front lines were to cross the Ginchy—Maurepas road between 7 and 8 p.m., and as soon as the 51st Reserve Infantry Regiment had reached Guillemont, the two battalions of the 16th Bavarian Regiment (*see* above), in position in the second line between Waterlot Farm and Longueval, were to advance with it on its right into Caterpillar Valley, the objective of the 16th Bavarian Regiment being Montauban Alley, between Montauban (exclusive) and the Pommiers Redoubt, that of the 51st Reserve Infantry Regiment being Montauban (inclusive)—La Briqueterie—Dublin Redoubt.

The direction of the attack was thus against the eastern front of the new Montauban salient, and, if successful, would threaten the British hold gained along the Montauban ridge, but there was

* This Division was taken out of the line at Verdun in the middle of May after losing very heavily (71 per cent. of its infantry), and moved into reserve in the Cambrai region at the beginning of June.

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great delay in getting forward, and it was nearly midnight before the Ginchy—Maurepas road was reached. The British had thus time to get settled in their new position. In the darkness the further advance through Guillemont and past Trônes Wood was slow and difficult, and it was 3 a.m., and light, before the attack came up on either side of Bernafay Wood and approached the British position. North of the wood the leading companies of the 16th Bavarian Regiment moved up from Caterpillar Valley and stumbled against an advanced post of the 17th Manchester in Triangle Point, north of Montauban on the Bazentin le Grand road. This post they rushed and annihilated and about a hundred Bavarians made an entrance into Montauban Alley at that point, astride the road. An S.O.S. message was signalled back from Montauban to the British guns and this sector of the alley was heavily shelled, the majority of the Bavarians quickly withdrawing into the dead ground of Caterpillar Valley and the remainder being subsequently bombed out of the alley. South of the wood the 51st Reserve Infantry Regiment came up against La Briqueterie which was held by a company of the 20th Liverpool. These Germans, however, were completely exhausted, having been on the move since the previous afternoon without food or water, so much so, that as they came forward in close disorganized formation they appeared like a mass of drunken men. A heavy machine-gun and rifle fire was opened on them and they at once fell back into the shelter of Bernafay Wood or back into the dead ground between the wood and Maltz Horn Farm. The attack of the centre and left of the Division was also repulsed by the French at and south of Favières Wood and a number of prisoners taken.

The counter-attack had cost the 12th Reserve Division heavy losses. It had been made on a very wide front, nearly four miles, and with the troops in an exhausted condition, and they were now withdrawn into the intermediate position (*Grüne Stellung*), a line of trench, the Maltz Horn Trench, between Trônes Wood and Hardecourt, some 1,000 yards in front of the main second line position, Guillemont—Maurepas.

The British Advance through Bernafay Wood, 3rd of July

During the 2nd of July, a few hours after the failure of the German counter-attack, patrols sent out by the 20th Liverpool (British 30th Division) into Bernafay Wood found that it was not held and brought back about twenty prisoners, men of the 51st Reserve

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Infantry Regiment who had taken refuge there in the morning and now surrendered without opposition. As a result of the reports of these patrols Bernafay Wood was ordered to be occupied, and at 9 p.m., on the 3rd, the 27th Brigade (6th K.O.S.B.'s on the right and 12th R. Scots on the left) advanced from a front La Briqueterie—Montauban into the wood. By 11.30 p.m. they had reached its eastern edge, having met little opposition, taking some more prisoners still hiding in temporary dug-outs, and also four guns (6th Battery 57th F.A.R.), all that remained of the advanced batteries of the 21st and 57th Field Artillery Regiments; the other guns having been taken back by the Germans the previous night.

The Occupation of Trônes Wood by the 90th Brigade, 8th of July

The capture of La Briqueterie and Bernafay Wood made a still more pronounced salient in the British line, and this was to become the jumping-off place for the further operations. Leaving Bernafay Wood on its northern slope, the Mametz—Montauban ridge continues eastward to Guillemont. On its southern side is a great stretch of open country broken only by the head of a considerable valley that widens out as it falls away southward past Favières Wood to the Somme. Running up the bed of this valley was Maltz Horn Trench that eventually rises on to and crosses the Montauban ridge. On the crest of the high ground on the farther side of the valley stood the ruins of Maltz Horn Farm. The only covered approach from Montauban to this valley was past La Briqueterie and thence by a sunken road.

On the northern slope of Montauban ridge, about half-way between Bernafay Wood and Guillemont, is Trônes Wood, the southern edge of which overflows, as it were, the top of the ridge 100 yards or so west of where the Maltz Horn Trench crosses it. The centre of Trônes Wood, traversed by the Montauban—Guillemont railway, lies in the dip across the head of Caterpillar Valley and its northern end rises up reaching to a point towards Longueval. The actual shape of the wood is triangular, the base about 400 yards across on the Montauban ridge, and the length from the base to the apex on the Longueval slope about 1,400 yards. The wood itself was a dense thicket, and owing to its thick undergrowth, uncut for two years, it was all that an equipped man could do to force his way through it, and even then direction was most difficult to keep once inside. A German communication trench, Trônes Alley, ran roughly

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along the top of the Montauban ridge between Bernafay and Trônes Wood.

The further advance of the British right from Bernafay Wood was delayed owing to the need for support by the French on the right flank, on the high ground, Maltz Horn Farm and Hardecourt knoll, that overlooked the southern end of Trônes Wood. A combined attack was arranged for 8 a.m. on the 7th of July, but on the previous day a German counter-attack retook the northern end of Favières Wood and this delayed the French preparations for twenty-four hours, the attack being postponed till 8 a.m., 8th of July. The British XIII Corps was to occupy the southern end of Trônes Wood and the Maltz Horn Trench as far as Maltz Horn Farm (incl.). On the right the French were to occupy the remainder of Maltz Horn Trench (across Hardecourt knoll) and the general line Maltz Horn Farm (exclusive)—Hardecourt village. After a heavy bombardment of Trônes Wood and Maltz Horn Trench during the early hours the attack was launched. The wood and this trench were at this time held by two to three battalions, composed of companies of 51st and 38th Reserve Infantry Regiments with a few men of the 62nd Regiment (12th Division) that had held the original line before the arrival of the 12th Reserve Division.

In the British sector the assault was delivered by the 2nd Yorkshire Regiment. Moving through Bernafay Wood the companies deployed along its eastern edge and began to advance across the 400 yards of open ground separating it from the southern end of Trônes Wood. On topping the rise of ground between the two woods, however, a heavy machine-gun and rifle fire was opened from a trench at the south-west corner of Trônes Wood and caused heavy loss. Further efforts to get forward were met by the same fire and eventually a withdrawal was ordered to the cover of Bernafay Wood. Efforts were made by bombers to move into the German position by Trônes Alley, a communication trench that lay along the line of advance, but without success.

The French, however, had meanwhile succeeded in capturing Hardecourt knoll and the sector of Maltz Horn Trench there, with the result that their left flank was now exposed to the still unoccupied sector of the trench north of Maltz Horn Farm. Another attack was therefore organized by the British 21st Brigade, and after a heavy bombardment of the trench along the south-western edge of Trônes Wood an attack against it was made by the 2nd Wiltshire at 1 p.m. The bombardment had driven the Germans from the trench and the wood was entered with few casualties. A company

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of this Battalion had at the same time advanced from La Briqueterie along the sunken road towards Maltz Horn Farm to connect up with the French left. Much of the way was able to be covered in dead ground, and when approaching the German trench in front of the farm the French bombed northward along it, thereby attracting the Germans, and the sector of trench was rushed and occupied, a weak counter-attack from Maltz Horn Farm being repulsed shortly afterwards. A counter-attack on the south part of Trônes Wood from the northern part during the evening had a similar fate.

Maltz Horn Trench lay on the forward slope of the Hardecourt knoll, and the Germans spent the night digging a fresh line of shelter pits in the hard chalk on the reverse slope, about 300 yards beyond. At 5 a.m., on the 9th, the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, who had reinforced a company of the Wiltshires during the night, rushed and occupied Maltz Horn Farm that now lay between the two lines, and the same Battalion bombed the Germans out of the remainder of Maltz Horn Trench as far as Trônes Wood, including the strong point where the Guillemont road enters the wood.

During the night also the 18th Manchester had reinforced the three companies of the 2nd Wiltshire in the southern edge of Trônes Wood, and at 6.40 a.m. (the 9th) the 17th Manchester moved out from Bernafay Wood on either side of the Guillemont light railway against the central and northern part of Trônes Wood. Here, along the western edge of the wood, there was no trench and it was undefended, the 17th Manchester entering it without loss. Central Trench that lay through the middle of the wood, from north to south, connecting three vacated battery positions within it, was rushed, a few Germans there being taken prisoners, and by 8 a.m., after great difficulty in getting through the dense undergrowth, the eastern edge of the wood was reached. From that hour until about 2 p.m. the whole of Trônes Wood was in British possession.

The First German Counter-attack on Trônes Wood, 9th of July

The German units engaged up to now in this sector of the battle-field had been the battalions of the 51st and 38th Reserve Infantry Regiments (12th Reserve Division) and the remnants of the 62nd Regiment (12th Division) and a few Bavarian detachments. During the 9th, however, the 123rd Division began to arrive in the battle line between Guillemont and the Somme.

The 123rd Division, after a period of rest in Flanders as reserve

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to the Sixth Army, had entrained on the 5th of July in the area Thorout—Beernem and came by way of Lille and Cambrai to the Second Army zone, detraining during the 6th–7th at Epehy and Gouzeaucourt behind the Somme battle front and 15 miles east of Trônes Wood. It was the intention of the Second Army at this time to employ the division as a whole for a counter-attack on the front Longueval—Hardecourt with similar objectives as those given to the 12th Reserve Division on the 1st of July, but the offensive of the French and British on the 8th against Trônes Wood and Maltz Horn Trench had brought the 12th Reserve Division, which had been seven days in the fighting line, to the end of its tether. On the morning of the 9th two of the three regiments of the 123rd Division, the 182nd and 178th, were therefore rushed up in motor lorries to relieve the survivors and take over the defence of the line, its remaining regiment, the 106th Reserve, moving to Nurlu in reserve.

The 182nd Regiment was the first to be put into the line; the 3rd Battalion reinforced the 11th Reserve Division, hard pressed by the French, about Hem and Clery on the north bank of the Somme, the 1st Battalion relieved the 23rd Infantry Regiment (the left regiment of the 12th Reserve Division) between Maurepas and Hardecourt, also opposite the French, and the 2nd Battalion moved into the Trônes Wood sector opposite the British. The latter, the only battalion of the three which concerns this article, arrived in Morval at 3 a.m., on the 9th, and thence marched towards Ginchy. Here, at 11 a.m., it was placed at the disposal of the 51st Reserve Infantry Regiment (the right regiment of the 12th Reserve Division) whose commander ordered it to attack and retake Trônes Wood, the bombardment to begin at 12.30 p.m. and the infantry assault at 3.30 p.m. (British time).

The bombardment was carried out by all available artillery, that of the 12th Reserve Division and the 3rd Guard Division behind Guillemont and Longueval respectively. Disposed to east, north-east and north of the wood, they were able to concentrate a converging fire on it with such intensity that life within it became insupportable. The 17th Manchester, the Battalion, it will be remembered, which had occupied the eastern edge during the morning, endured this shelling for over an hour, when the battalion commander sent back messages by carrier pigeon asking for artillery fire against the German battery positions to silence them, but the range was too great to be effective, and at 2 p.m. the commander ordered a withdrawal from the wood, along Trônes Alley to Bernafay

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Wood. The withdrawal of the 17th Manchester uncovered the left and rear of the 18th Manchester, holding the southern end of the wood, and this Battalion was then ordered to withdraw to La Briqueterie. The 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers, however, continued to hold on to Maltz Horn Trench, though the withdrawal of the Manchesters necessitated the evacuation of the part of the trench by the Guillemont road as far as level with the southern end of Trônes Wood.

In the meantime the 182nd Regiment (2nd Battalion) was moving forward from Ginchy to the assaulting position in the second line trench, the left at Guillemont and the right on the Sugar Factory (Waterlot Farm). This advance was seen by some British aeroplanes flying over Ginchy, and shortly afterwards the artillery laid a barrage along the east side of Guillemont. Two of the companies were unable to get through this, and in order to take their place in the assault the remnants of the 51st Reserve Infantry Regiment in the second line trench were formed up into two composite companies and disposed between the other two companies of the 182nd Regiment that had passed through the barrage. Two companies, one of each Regiment, was to attack the northern part of the wood, north of the railway, and the other two companies the southern part, the whole then pressing through to the western edge.

"At 4 p.m.," so runs an extract from the History of the 182nd Regiment, "came the order to prepare for assault. Our packs were to be left in the trench owing to the difficulty of moving through the wood with them on. That strange and uncomfortable hot and cold feeling down the spine came over us all as we stood up in the trench and tested the hand grenades. At 4.15 the order to advance '*Alles raus*' was shouted along and we clambered out of the trench into the opening muttering '*Walt's Gott*' (God help us), and through the wire entanglement. Spreading out at once into a long firing line we moved on down the open barren slope towards the wood 500 yards away, expecting every moment a burst of machine-gun fire to open from the wood and sweep the line. To our amazement, however, even as we neared the edge of it not a shot was fired at us. The right reached the wood first and disappeared into it, followed by the remainder, all continuing to keep close touch in line. A number of English lay hidden in the dense undergrowth, and some of these as soon as we had passed by them opened fire from behind causing a number of casualties, but they were quickly rounded up or killed. At 5.10 p.m. the western edge of the wood was reached and white light signals were sent up to warn the artillery that now lifted to the eastern edge of Bernafay Wood. Only in the centre of the wood near the railway line was any prolonged resistance met, and here after a stubborn fight at close quarters 40 of the 16th and 17th Manchester Regiment * were

* It appears that a few of the 16th Manchester had gone into the wood in the morning to support the 17th Manchester.

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surrounded and taken prisoners. We then made what cover was possible along the edge of the wood."

The remaining two companies of the Battalion, held back east of Guillemont by the British barrage, now (5.20 p.m.) arrived and strengthened the position, the composite companies of the 51st Reserve Infantry Regiment completely exhausted and with little fight left in them being withdrawn. The right, on the northern side of the wood, gained touch with the 16th Bavarian Regiment about Longueval, and the left was thrown back in touch with the 38th Reserve Infantry Regiment (12th Reserve Division) that still confronted from about Arrow Head Copse southward the 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers in Maltz Horn Trench.

The Second British Attack on Trônes Wood, 10th of July

At 2.30 p.m. immediately on hearing of the withdrawal of the 17th Manchester from the wood, the 90th Brigade ordered the 16th Manchester, in support south of Montauban, to attack and hold the south edge of Trônes Wood. Forming up in the sunken road (*i.e.* the slight cutting in the Briqueterie—Hardecourt road) south of the wood, this attack, led by two companies, was delivered at 6.40 p.m., and the Germans who had apparently concentrated their attention on the defence of the western side of the wood, facing Bernafay Wood, were not prepared to meet it, so that although heavily shelled on the way the 16th Manchester were able to reach the southern edge with few casualties, their left in Trônes Alley. Owing to the constant interference by German snipers up trees and by bombers, it was not found possible to hold the actual edge of the wood, and during the night, therefore, a trench was dug and occupied about 150 yards in length parallel to and about 60 yards from the south-western edge. The dense undergrowth of the fallen trees made it impracticable to push on into the wood during the night, but the Battalion was ordered to prepare to advance through it early the following morning (the 10th), and to assist them a company of the 4th South African Regiment (South African Scottish) lent by the 9th Division was sent up at 12.5 a.m. After a preliminary bombardment of the wood the advance began at 4 a.m., companies being broken up into strong patrols of 20 men each of which was to press through the wood as best it could from south to north in order to clear it. These patrols could only see a few yards to right and left in the dense thicket, and, though some of them met no opposition and reported the wood clear of the enemy, others came up against German

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entrenched posts and never returned, being overcome or taken prisoner. As an example of the fate of one of these patrols an extract may be given from the diary of a German in the 6th Company (182nd Regiment):

"About 3 a.m. the enemy's artillery increased to drumfire strength and a terrific hail of shells burst upon us, making many gaps in our already thin line of defence. After an hour the artillery lifted and shortly afterwards the English infantry appeared here and there in the wood in strong parties. One of these parties rushed and captured the trench sector of our right company, and we, No. 6 Company, were at once ordered to go to the help of the defence of this gap in the line. As we crept back through the undergrowth a thick branch got caught between a heavy pair of wire-cutters and the entrenching tool in my belt, and before I could extricate myself four English rushed at me, caught me and dragged me along with them, joining a party of 20 others. My rifle was taken from me and we went on through the wood, now to the right and now to the left, backwards and forwards. The leader, who spoke German, asked me in what direction the Germans were. I said I didn't know. Then we went to the right and a machine gun fired on us, two of the English falling dead to the ground without a murmur. Then we went to the left and so on, completely lost. The leader then went off alone to the edge of the wood to find his direction, but came back and said he didn't know where we were. At this moment the German artillery fire increased, placing a barrage along the western edge of the wood. The leader asked me if the shells passing over were British or German. I saw my chance of getting nearer my own lines and told them they were British and he believed me, though I knew they came from our own guns behind Guillemont. We turned, therefore, and went towards the sound of the guns, and after some time we came to a large crater which I recognized near the eastern edge of the wood. In this we halted and I was given some bread and cigarettes. Suddenly I heard voices of men of my own company only 25 yards away. While my captors drank from their water bottles and smoked cigarettes I moved to the top of the crater and signalled, and within a few minutes we were surrounded. The British were ordered to hold up their hands and surrender, and they were taken back to Guillemont."

The Second German Counter-attack on Trônes Wood, 10th of July

At 3 a.m., as soon as the bombardment began, the two companies (182nd Infantry Regiment) holding the western edge of the wood withdrew hurriedly to the eastern edge to escape the shelling, the British guns generally confining their attention to the western side. There they waited for an hour, and at 4 a.m., when the fire slackened, they suddenly saw a number of their own Regiment retiring from the southern part of the wood on Guillemont, followed by other groups at intervals. Soon after, a retreat also began from the

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northern end and it appeared that the British infantry had entered both ends of the wood. In these circumstances it was impossible to hold the centre, and a withdrawal from the wood was ordered, taking up a position in a number of big shell craters 200 yards to the east of it north of the Guillemont road. Here the companies were to await the enemy and fight a rear-guard action, retiring gradually on to the second line. An hour passed and no enemy appeared at the edge of the wood, until at last from the southern flank two groups of British prisoners were seen being led across the open back to Guillemont. This seemed very strange, and patrols were sent forward again into the wood to find out the situation. About 8 a.m. Lieut. Blechschmidt came across from the southern part of the wood and said he was still holding there with 50 men, and had beaten off several British attacks and taken a number of prisoners. He said it would be foolish to abandon the wood yet, and it was decided, therefore, to gather together as many men as possible and to advance through it once more. Some 100 men who had withdrawn to the second line position early in the morning were brought forward again along the railway, and the whole, joining up into a long skirmishing line under Lieut Pache, keeping touch like a linked chain to right and left, advanced into the wood. To quote Lieut. Pache's account in the History of the 182nd Regiment :

" It was hard work in the hot sun forcing our way through the shell-torn undergrowth. Masses of intertwined briars and thorn bushes, great trees with their broken out-spreading branches felled by the bombardment, blocked and encumbered every step, in addition to stumbling into the scores of deep shell holes. Everywhere were dead British and Germans, in one place 5 British in a single heap, clearly all killed by the same shell, bits of equipment and rifles lying about everywhere, and dozens of British packs full of eatables which the men eagerly pounced upon. The line pressed on capturing on the way isolated British parties and individuals who appeared completely lost in the thicket. Crossing Central Trench which runs from north to south through the middle of the wood, we found some men of the 182nd still holding on there and in front of them several Scotsmen in their coloured kilts lay dead (probably South African Scottish). The western edge of the wood was reached and found occupied. Leaving a number of posts along the western edge, the majority of the line were now withdrawn to Central Trench and the prisoners who had been captured in the drive, in all 1 officer and 250 men, were sent back to Guillemont. Central Trench was in a terrible state ; tinned foods, razors, letters, brushes, spades, rifles, gas masks, steel helmets, thousands of rounds of ammunition, machine gun ammunition boxes—all in abject confusion, scattered everywhere, and mixed with blood-covered bits of uniform, torn boots and other remnants of shell-battered bodies. For the next four hours comparative quiet, however, reigned in the wood, the British artillery lifting its fire beyond on to the second line

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position and the village in rear. The men in Central Trench found sufficient tea and food in the British packs to make themselves a good meal. Trônes Wood was once again in German hands."

The British 90th Brigade diary writes on this affair :

"At 5.30 a.m. the Germans counter-attacked, probably coming from the direction of Guillemont, and reoccupied the southern part of the wood, cutting off some patrols of the 16th Manchesters who are missing. Continuous efforts were made during the morning to get into touch with the missing patrols, but they failed owing to the centre of the wood being strongly held by the enemy."

The troops in the line along the western and southern edge of the wood, south of the railway, were now organized into three new companies, called by name after the three commanders : v. Mosch its right on the railway ; Pache along the south-western edge of the wood ; and Lanzendorf at the southern edge of the wood ; also a sandbag block was made and garrisoned in Trônes Alley. North of the railway a composite company of remnants of the 51st Reserve Infantry Regiment was again brought forward from Guillemont and put into the line.

The Third British Attack on Trônes Wood, 11th of July

During the 10th, arrangements had been made for the relief of the British 90th Brigade by the 89th Brigade, which was to renew the efforts to capture Trônes Wood. To assist the relief and to distract the Germans in the wood, a company of the 17th Liverpool from Bernafay Wood was to rush the German post blocking Trônes Alley and hold on there. This was to be preceded by a heavy bombardment on the southern part of the wood, and a few British parties still occupying posts along the southern edge were withdrawn to the trench 60 yards outside it, dug by the 16th Manchester on the night of the 9th–10th (see above). The attack which, according to the History of the 182nd Regiment, came up against the company v. Mosch and the garrison of the advanced hand-grenade post in Trônes Alley, was repulsed with considerable casualties, including the company commander.

Actually during the night of the 10th–11th there were, therefore, no British troops in Trônes Wood, the southern and western edges of which were now held by the three re-constituted companies of the 182nd Regiment and the northern part by a composite company of the 51st Reserve Infantry Regiment. Small posts held the edge of the wood, with the main body at various points along Central Trench in the middle of the wood.


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At 1 a.m. the two front battalions of the British 89th Brigade formed up along the sunken road immediately east of La Briqueterie for the renewed attack on the wood. At 3.27 a.m., after 50 minutes' heavy bombardment, the advance began; the 20th Liverpool on the right was to attack the wood south of Trônes Alley and relieve the 2nd R. Scots Fusiliers in Maltz Horn Trench, the 2nd Bedford on the left was to move on that part of the wood between Trônes Alley and the railway, and push through to the eastern edge. It was only just beginning to get light as the attacking companies crossed the open from the sunken road, and they were not observed by the Germans until within 400 yards of the wood. Machine-gun fire was then opened on them from the Trônes Alley block and many casualties were suffered, this fire also causing much of the attack to be diverted southward, forcing half the Bedfords against the southern edge of the wood, and most of the Liverpools into Maltz Horn Trench. Nevertheless, the wood was entered; two companies of the Bedfords gaining a footing at the southern edge and the remaining two companies at the western edge, south of the railway. The History of the 182nd Regiment describes this attack:

"During the night the bombardment of the wood by the British artillery continued without ceasing, but at about 2.30 a.m. it increased to a great intensity; it became in fact the most fierce and destructive *Trommelfeuer* that had yet been experienced, even surpassing any that the regiment had recently experienced at Verdun. As many as 50 heavy shells a minute burst in the southern part of the wood alone, sending up great masses of earth, trees and scrub. The air pressure of the shell-bursts crushed one to the ground and took all breath away, the mind and nerves being tortured in a manner indescribable and unforgettable to all that survived it. At times phosphor-shells came with the others and burst among us into countless pieces of burning sulphur covering us with flecks of flame and setting fire to some of the trees. This almost intolerable agony continued for a seemingly endless hour, the worst hour the Battalion had yet experienced in the war. At last, about 3.30 a.m., the barrage of such terrible memory moved on beyond the wood, but it had caused us heavy loss, especially in the wood near the railway where a number of small posts of the company v. Mosch had been wiped out leaving a considerable gap in the line of defence. The British infantry attack now developed and broke into the wood at this place, the survivors of the company there, threatened with isolation, retiring through the wood and assembling in the second line at Guillemont. They left exposed the right flank of the two companies, Pache and Lanzendorf, in the southern part of the wood. But at this most critical stage reinforcements arrived."

(To be continued)

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THE ALHUCEMAS OPERATIONS, SEPTEMBER, 1925

(With Map)

By Charles Petrie

Spanish interest in the Riff coast and the surrounding country dates from the end of the seventeenth century, for it was as long ago as August, 1673, that the Prince of Monte Sacro occupied the island of Alhucemas on behalf of his master Charles II. Since then, a disembarcation upon the mainland has often been under consideration, particularly within recent years, but it has always been dismissed as too hazardous an enterprise, and the only attempt made to occupy this part of the coast was that of General Silvestre in his advance from Melilla in 1921, which led directly to the disaster of Anual. In these circumstances it is not surprising that considerable opposition at once manifested itself when General Primo de Rivera put the plans for a landing in the neighbourhood of Alhucemas before his colleagues of the Spanish Military Directory in the summer of 1925.

The general situation in Morocco at that time was more than usually complicated. During the previous year the Spaniards had evacuated all the isolated posts still held by them in the interior of their zone, and had withdrawn behind the so-called " Estella Line," where it appeared to be their intention to remain permanently. Abd-el-Krim, however, flushed with victory, invaded the French zone during the spring of 1925, and met with so considerable a measure of success that throughout June and July the fall of Fez itself appeared imminent. This threat made it apparent both to the French and Spanish Governments, whose relations had up to then been none too cordial, that their interests in Morocco were identical, and, as a result, representatives of both countries met at the Conference of Madrid on the 17th of July. It was in consequence of the decisions taken at this meeting, and at a subsequent one between General Primo de Rivera and Marshal Pétain, that

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the Spanish landing at Alhucemas was made in the following September.

It is not difficult to understand why that particular spot should have been selected for the attempt. In the first place, the ground had been studied so often in the past with a view to a similar landing that it was quite familiar to the General Staff, while the proximity of the island of Alhucemas provided the Spanish forces with that advanced base of which the lack was such a handicap in the Gallipoli operations. Furthermore, Alhucemas Bay was only a few miles from Ajdir, the capital of Abd-el-Krim, and, in view of the long series of Moorish victories, it was felt that only a bold stroke at the rebel headquarters would have any chance of dispelling the legend of invincibility which had become associated with the Riff chieftain in the native mind. On the other hand, the British failure at Gallipoli was never far distant from the minds of King Alfonso and his advisers, and there can be little doubt that only the urgent necessity of scoring a decisive victory induced the King to give his consent to the landing. It is always easy in restrospect to minimize the risks of an operation which has been successfully carried out, and some writers have shown a tendency to commit that fault in this particular instance, but when it is remembered that the most careful aeroplane observation had failed to discover what degree of opposition might be expected, and that the only previous attempt of a similar nature, made by the greatest naval Power in the world, had ended in failure, it will be realized how grave a responsibility General Primo de Rivera felt when he saw the first landing-parties approaching the shore on the morning of the 8th of September.

Alhucemas Bay is one of the few points on the Riff coast where the mountains abate a little of their severity on meeting the sea, for save in the neighbourhood of Morro Viejo and Morro Nuevo there is almost everywhere a stretch of sandy beach before the first hills are reached, while these latter do not as a rule rise to a greater height than five hundred feet, and some are considerably less. Several small streams, of which the principal is the Nekor, run into the bay, and their courses make a breach in the hills which was of great advantage to attacking troops.

The Spanish preparations were made with the greatest possible care, and as the troops to be employed in the operation came from the widely separated bases of Ceuta and Melilla a very high degree of efficiency was required on the part of those responsible for their concentration at Alhucemas. It was decided to distract the attention of the enemy by attempting the landing in two separate places, and

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for this purpose the troops employed were divided into two columns under the command of Generals Fernandez Perez and Saro respectively. Their strength was as follows :—

Column of General Fernandez Perez

1 Battalion Marine Infantry	800 rifles.
2 *Banderas* Foreign Legion	1,200 „
3 *Tabors Regulares* de Melilla..	1,500 „
1 *Harka*	600 „
Detachment *Mehalla de Melilla*	600 „
1 Battalion *Cazadores de Africa*	800 „
1 Battalion 68th Regiment of the Line (Africa)	800 „
1 Battalion 59th Regiment of the Line (Melilla)	800 „
1—10·5 cm. and 2—7 cm. batteries.	

Column of General Saro

2 *Banderas* Foreign Legion	1,200 rifles.
3 *Tabors Regulares de Ceuta*	1,500 „
1 *Harka*	600 „
Detachment *Mehallas de Tetuan* and *Larache*	600 „
3 Battalions *Cazadores de Africa*	2,400 „
1—10·5 cm and 2—7 cm. batteries.	

In addition, each column had its own auxiliary services and its reserve of 1,500 rifles at Ceuta and Melilla respectively.

On the 5th of September the troops embarked at their bases, and the following day was spent in making feints at two separate points on the coast. The column of General Fernandez Perez from Melilla, escorted by French men-of-war, made a demonstration off Sidi Dris, which was heavily bombarded, and then broke off the engagement under cover of a smoke-screen and of night. Similarly, General Saro's force from Ceuta, with the Spanish *escuadra de instrucción* as escort, made a feint at the mouth of the Lau, and withdrew in the same manner. Both squadrons, with their transports, then steamed in the direction of Alhucemas, where the Commander-in-Chief, General Primo de Rivera, assumed control, with his headquarters in the battle-cruiser *Alfonso XIII.*

Up to midnight on the 6th, therefore, the Spanish movements had proceeded without a hitch, and there can be no doubt that the Moors were in complete ignorance as to the exact point at which the landing was to be made. Abd-el-Krim had the advantage of acting on interior lines from his headquarters at Ajdir, but he threw away his assets by rushing all his available reserves to Sidi Dris and the mouth of the Lau, as soon as he heard that those points were threatened ; had he kept them under his own hand at Ajdir until

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the Spaniards had actually landed, and then hurled them at the invaders, the result might have been very different. As it was, there were not more than twenty pieces of artillery engaged in the defence of Alhucemas Bay, and of these only two were 6-inch : a battery on Morro Nuevo, which should have inflicted heavy losses on the Spaniards, was without infantry support, and so was easily stormed when the time came, while the beach was innocent of wire and machine guns. In effect, Abd-el-Krim attempted to be strong everywhere, and so paid the inevitable penalty of being found weak at the vital point.

According to the original Spanish plan of campaign, General Saro's troops were to land at Cebadilla at dawn on the 7th, while those from Melilla were to make a demonstration against Morro Nuevo, and this last was to be followed by a landing as soon as it was clear that General Saro's disembarcation had been successfully accomplished ; in the event of any difficulty being experienced by the latter, his colleague was to come to his aid at once. As so often happens in operations of this nature, the best-laid plans went astray, and dawn of the 7th found General Saro still far out at sea. It was, indeed, eleven o'clock before the Ceuta force was ready to disembark, and as the day was so far advanced General Primo de Rivera decided to postpone the landing until the following morning. In the meantime he ordered General Fernandez Perez to repeat his demonstration of the previous day off Sidi Dris, and he sent the Spanish Dreadnoughts to shell the Moorish positions opposite the Island of Alhucemas, in the hope of still further diverting the enemy's attention from Cebadilla. The 7th was thus a day of great anxiety and of frustrated hopes, and the situation was not improved by the news that the French had been compelled to postpone their attack on Biban, an operation which was to have taken place simultaneously with the Spanish landing.

This delay caused a modification of the original scheme, for the attempt on Morro Nuevo was abandoned, and the Melilla forces henceforth constituted General Saro's second line. Once more the current carried the transports out to sea during the early hours of the morning, and it was ten o'clock before the men were ready to get into the boats. The guns of the Allied fleets thereupon opened a tremendous bombardment of the Moorish batteries, while the landing-parties slowly crept towards the shore. The Spaniards advanced in two lines : the first, commanded by the indomitable Colonel Franco, brother of the airman, consisting of two *Banderas* of the Foreign Legion, the *Harkas* and *Mehallas* of Ceuta and Tetuan,

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and a battalion of *Cazadores de Africa;* while the second, led by Colonel Martin, was formed by the *Regulares* of Ceuta, two battalions of *Cazadores de Africa*, and two 7 cm. batteries. A further mishap took place at this point, for the boats grounded some way from the shore, and the men had to wade the remainder of the distance, although in many cases the water was up to their necks.

The bombardment from the ships prevented the Moorish batteries from molesting the landing, and at first a somewhat desultory rifle-fire was the only opposition that faced the invaders, though the enemy soon brought a number of machine guns into action. In these circumstances Colonel Franco lost no time in seizing the foothills which rose from the shore, and in less than two hours the Spaniards were in possession of Morro Nuevo itself. While this fighting was in progress the remaining troops of General Saro's force were being disembarked, and so efficiently was this done that by nightfall nearly ten thousand men and over ten thousand tons of stores had been landed. The Spanish casualties in this operation did not exceed fifty, while those of the Moors are unknown.

The results of the landing at Alhucemas may be briefly stated. As soon as Abd-el-Krim realized that he had been taken by surprise, he ordered an offensive to be launched against the Spanish lines before Tetuan, and so serious did the threat appear to General Primo de Rivera that he at once sent part of General Fernandez Perez's division to stop the Riff advance in that quarter. Nor was this the only difficulty experienced by the Spaniards at this time, for from the day of the disembarcation until the 17th, the weather was so bad that it was only with the greatest difficulty that any supplies could be landed, and on the exposed beaches the men suffered very considerably. The Moors took full advantage of their opportunity, and their fire was so severe that the Spanish casualties reached the alarming figure of two hundred in one day. However, General Primo de Rivera's skilful leadership was soon to have its reward, for the attack on Tetuan was beaten back, and with a change in the weather an offensive at Alhucemas became possible. On the 23rd this movement began, and, to quote the *Times*, " it was the Foreign Legion who, by scaling the peaks of Malmusi, 1,000 feet high, fighting most of the way with bomb and bayonet from rock to rock over very rough ' terrain,' assured success for the whole movement. The Rifis were fairly and squarely beaten that day, and although the fighting cost the Spaniard some two hundred killed, it was a victory well won, for it established the supremacy of the Spanish attack over the Rifi defence." After this

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success the advance was rapid, and on the 2nd of October the Spanish cavalry was in Ajdir.

Before considering the lessons to be drawn from these operations it may be as well to give some account of the troops employed in them. During the year 1924 the Spanish African forces were completely reorganized, and, so far as circumstances would permit, were placed on a voluntary basis, though a certain number of conscripts—chosen by ballot—were every year drafted from Spain. It will have been noticed that very few Peninsular units were employed in the Alhucemas operations, and the bulk of the fighting was done by the Army of Africa. The Foreign Legion is, of course, analogous to the French corps of the same name, though the class of recruit it receives is infinitely higher. The *Regulares* are the native regiments, while the *Mehallas* are native levies enlisted for the campaign ; these latter bear the name of the town in which they have been recruited, but they are more popularly known by the names of the officers commanding them.

The cool and skilful generalship of the Spanish Commander-in-Chief was the outstanding feature in the Alhucemas operations. Not only did he show great courage in adopting the scheme in the first place, but his tenacity in adhering to it in spite of the opposition which it aroused required no ordinary firmness. At this point mention must be made of the support which he received from King Alfonso once the latter was convinced of the feasibility of the scheme, and there can be little doubt that the King's attitude recommended it to many who would otherwise have expressed disapproval. In execution General Primo de Rivera displayed the same quality of initiative, and there can be no doubt that the feints at Sidi Dris and the mouth of the Lau completely deceived the Moors as to the real landing-place. Then he resisted the temptation to land on the 7th, in spite of the consequent disarrangement of his plans, while to employ the time in a repetition of the feint of the previous day showed tactical ability of no mean order. Last of all, General Primo de Rivera displayed great tact in his difficult position as commander of a foreign naval division, especially when the continual friction between the French and Spanish authorities in Morocco is taken into account. In fact, he is the first Spanish general since O'Donnell to emerge from a Moroccan campaign with an enhanced reputation.

On the Moorish side the leadership of Abd-el-Krim was open to serious criticism ; indeed, it would not be too much to say that his conduct during these critical days first revealed his incapacity

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as a general. In the first place, he allowed himself to be deceived by a series of feints which he should have known would be made, and so scattered his forces along the coast, with the inevitable result that the spot at which the Spaniards did actually land was almost undefended. That the battery at Morro Nuevo was left without infantry support was a blunder of the first magnitude, but it is probably unfair to lay the blame upon Abd-el-Krim himself rather than upon some subordinate commander. The diversion against Tetuan was ably conceived, but it could only have averted the threat to Ajdir had it been accompanied by a violent attack upon the Spaniards who had landed at Cebadilla : a few night raids and even a heavy bombardment could not really effect the result. Just as in July, 1921, Abd-el-Krim failed to follow up his victory over General Silvestre by falling on General Berenguer, so once again he neglected his opportunity of destroying General Saro's force while the weather prevented the latter from being reinforced. It is true that the French were beginning their attack on Biban, but the threat to his capital was by far the more serious of the two, and a Spanish defeat at Alhucemas would have completely disorganized the plans of the Allies. Abd-el-Krim threw away his last chance on this occasion, and fortune never smiled on him again.

These operations have so frequently been compared with those at Gallipoli that it is not without interest to examine the parallel which is said to exist between the two landings. Each attack, of course, was made upon a hostile coast and in the hope of ending the war by the capture of the enemy's capital, but there the comparison ends. At Alhucemas the Spanish and French ships ran no risk from submarines or mines, and their command of the sea was absolute. Mudros was almost inaccessible when compared with the proximity of the island of Alhucemas, and the coast of Spain itself was only a few hours' steaming from the actual scene of operations. Furthermore, there was not a yard of wire on the beach, and the first resistance of the Moors was hardly worthy of the name. Above all, the Spanish staff officers had the experience of the Gallipoli landing to guide them, whereas in 1915 there was no precedent in modern times for such an attempt. It is, however, in no way disparaging to the Spanish forces to assert that there is no parallel between Gallipoli and Alhucemas, for in his whole conduct of the operation—and in particular in the feint landings—General Primo de Rivera showed that he had thoroughly assimilated the lessons of the past, and there can be no higher praise for a commander than that : the men, too, had no idea of what lay before them, and their

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courage was thus quite equal to that of our own soldiers in the Dardanelles. In no other respect, however, is it possible to trace a parallel between the two operations.

Two general considerations arise from the Alhucemas landing which are not without value to other armies likely to be engaged in similar warfare. The first is the difficulty of manœuvring two columns starting from different bases, and the second is the disappointing result obtained from the fire of ships even upon hastily improvised coast defences.

The first problem is as old as warfare itself, but it has always presented a special difficulty to the Spanish authorities in Morocco, for the two bases were Ceuta and Melilla, and the only communication between them until the surrender of Abd-el-Krim was by sea. In 1921 the attempt to advance simultaneously from both places led to the disaster of Anual, and since then such a plan had never been tried. General Primo de Rivera attempted by sea what had proved impossible by land; but, even with every circumstance in his favour, he was obliged to postpone the landing for another twenty-four hours: had Abd-el-Krim been quicker in perceiving his enemy's plans, or had the Spanish Commander-in-Chief shown less resource in repeating the feint off Sidi Dris, the delay might well have been fatal. In ordering such a concentration as to involve the simultaneous arrival before Alhucemas of forces based on Melilla and Ceuta, General Primo de Rivera was indulging in a gamble, and the fact that it succeeded cannot blind us to the risks to which an operation of this sort is always exposed.

In respect of the second problem there is a much greater diversity of opinion so far as the general question is concerned, and the Spanish experience at Alhucemas is thus the more interesting. The bombardment previous to the landing need hardly be taken into account, for the Moorish defences were little more than contemptible. On the other hand, from the 9th until the general advance began a fortnight later, the Spanish lines were heavily shelled as well as being subjected to a continuous rifle-fire. To this the Allied fleets never ceased to reply, but in spite of the twelve 12-inch guns of the French *Paris* and the eight guns of the same calibre carried by the Spanish *Jaime I.* and *Alfonso XIII.* respectively, the Moorish fire steadily increased in intensity, as is proved by the fact that the Spanish casualties were heaviest on the day immediately preceding the advance. Nor was this all, for when the soldiers of the Foreign Legion stormed the heights of Malmusi they found their opponents very far from being demoralized by the

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fire of the ships. In these circumstances it seems not unfair to draw the conclusion that, whatever may be the case with fixed forts, field entrenchments suffer comparatively little from the fire of ships at sea, and their artillery certainly cannot be put out of action by this means.

Above all else the Alhucemas operations avenged the disaster of Anual. They proved to the world that Spanish soldiers are second to none in courage, and that the qualities which for over a century made the infantry of Spain the masters of Europe are not lacking in their descendants. The subsequent capture of Ajdir more than restored the moral of the Spanish Army, and for that reason, if for no other, the landing at Alhucemas is a landmark in the history of Spain, while the lessons are invaluable for all troops likely to be engaged in a similar operation.

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AIR MANŒUVRES

By Major Oliver Stewart

The Navy and the Army in time of peace test the methods of warfare which they have developed theoretically by carrying out manœuvres. These manœuvres are designed to imitate, as closely as possible, the conditions of active service. Aerial warfare can be regarded, for purposes of training and discussion, separately from land and sea warfare. It has its own strategical and tactical problems in addition to the strategical and tactical problems in which air work is bound up inextricably with the work of the Navy or Army. Aerial fighting itself is in a very early stage of development. New theories are frequently being put forward, new fighting methods evolved, yet so far there has been no attempt to test these theories and methods by the only means possible in time of peace—that is, by staging a faithful imitation of aerial warfare. There have been no air manœuvres in the sense that there are naval and military manœuvres. The Air Force plays a comparatively small part in naval and military manœuvres, but it has never been given the opportunity to take a leading part.

The practical difficulties in the way of the organization of air manœuvres are not great. The benefits which would result would be immense. Instead of airmen being given the opportunity of practising on a full scale but one small part of their work, a mock air war which would embrace every part of their work should be arranged.

To be effective this mock air war would need to take into account the six vital factors of real air war. These are—concealment, surprise, machine performance, machine power of manœuvre, coordination and aerial gunnery. Let each of these factors be examined in this order so that a general view may be obtained of the chief objectives which must be held in view when organizing air manœuvres.

Concealment, the first factor, is of the highest importance, and any air manœuvres or sham aerial battles in which it is not given full consideration are useless for training airmen or testing theories

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of air fighting. Airmen conceal themselves and their machines from other airmen by employing distance, by using the blind areas of hostile machines, by flying between the sun and the hostile machines, by flying far over hostile territory where they would not normally be expected to fly and by keeping behind clouds.

In their endeavours to remain concealed from an enemy's airmen, airmen are assisted by the immensity of the space which must be watched. The airman, unlike the ground observer who is guided by the sound of the engine, must rely upon his eyes alone to pick up the other machine. Suppose he is flying a very small aeroplane and suppose an enemy is flying a very large bombing aeroplane, then if the two machines fly away from each other with their crews watching each other, the crew of the large machine will lose sight of the small machine first. There is no horizon to fly over for concealment because the aeroplane is out of sight long before it passes over it. The size of the machines therefore (assuming equal length of vision of the airmen) influences concealment very largely. If an airship with a small aeroplane flying alongside it approach an observer, the airship would come into view long before the aeroplane owing to its much greater bulk. This effect of the relative sizes of aircraft is forgotten when people wonder how it is possible, on a day when the sky is perfectly clear, for one aeroplane to conceal itself from another and at the same time for its crew to watch the other machine.

The airman is seated amidst struts, wings, wires and fuselage, and these, however adroitly arranged by the aeroplane designer, must shut out large areas of sky at a distance from the machine. The airman must wear goggles and face mask; he is strapped into his seat so that it is slightly awkward for him to turn round in order to scan the sky in all directions. Thus blind areas are formed which increase the difficulties with which the airman contends when he is searching for another machine. And while these blind areas are a disadvantage in keeping a look out, they are an advantage to an opponent in concealment. The trained fighting pilot, whether he be alone or whether he be leading a patrol, employs blind areas and distance in order that he may remain concealed until the last possible moment and may approach his quarry and attack it from a position of tactical superiority. He may also conceal himself by keeping his machine between the sun and his quarry. It is impossible to pick up an aeroplane when it is immediately between the observer and the sun.

Successful concealment makes possible the surprise attack, the second important factor among those enumerated which must

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be taken into account when planning air manœuvres. Surprise in the air has a vital bearing upon aerial combat. If in the initial stage he has succeeded in concealing his machine from the enemy, the airman can often join combat and fire the first shot before his presence is suspected. The silhouette of an aeroplane diving to the attack is not of large area. There is a small round blob, which is the fuselage, and there are also two thin lines, the planes, visible to the quarry. The approach to point blank range only occupies a few seconds, and so the surprise attack frequently occurs in actual warfare and must be made possible on manœuvres.

But, in order to make possible the concealment of one side or the other on manœuvres, it would be necessary to keep each side in ignorance so far as practicable of the types of machine sent out by the other side at any given period of the day or night and also of how many machines the other side has available. If one side knows the types and numbers of machines of the other side, it knows for what to look and, to some extent, where to look. Ideally neither side of an air force on manœuvres should know more of the other side than it would know of an opposing air force in time of war. To send up formations which know the time of departure, course and types of machine of each other would be to make concealment almost impossible for the pilots of either side and would eliminate the important element of surprise. If the two formations fought out a mock combat, the result would be of no value ; it might indeed be seriously misleading.

In real air warfare there is one other feature which affects concealment and therefore surprise: anti-aircraft fire. In air manœuvres it would be necessary to provide some substitute for the bursts of anti-aircraft shells. For example, machines could fire signal lights when they were flying over " enemy " ground where they might normally expect to be shelled.

The third and fourth factors among those enumerated to be taken into account when organizing air manœuvres are the performance of the aeroplanes and their power of manœuvre.

The performance of an aeroplane is its speed, rate of climb and radius of action. Its power of manœuvre is its obedience to its controls, the rapidity with which it answers its controls, its radius of turn at various speeds and the magnitude of the machine's response when the stick and rudder bar are used to the fullest extent.

Performance is bound up inextricably with this power of manœuvre, for, to some extent, every increase in performance implies an increase in manœuvring power. With a given radius of turn,

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if other things were equal, the faster machine would get round quicker. The performance and manœuvring power of an aeroplane are affected by the skill of the pilot.

Performance and power of manœuvre are tested by tactical exercises. If two machines come together and each pilot endeavours to place his machine in a certain position relative to the other one, positions which cannot be held simultaneously by both machines, then the resultant struggle will be a struggle of performance and manœuvre. The machines will twist and turn, climb and dive in the attempt to attain the desired positions. This kind of tactical struggle is seen in its simplest form when two single-seater fighters do combat together. Each one has two or more guns firing straight forward through the field swept by the airscrew. If one pilot, therefore, wishes to shoot at the other, he must point his machine at him. The machines would be unable to shoot simultaneously unless they were approaching each other nose to nose.

The best method so far evolved for testing the performance and manœuvring power of machines and the skill of pilots in time of peace is the mock combat with camera guns. All machines taking part in air manœuvres would need to be equipped with camera guns. The camera gun is mounted in the place of the machine gun with its lens pointing in the same direction as was the gun barrel. The camera shutter is connected with the gun trigger. When the pilot sights with his usual gun sights and pulls the trigger, he photographs the target machine. The camera gun has certain limitations which must be taken into account when results are being determined. The camera gun does not allow for the effects material and psychological, of the armour afforded by the engine, nor of the stream of bullets—allowing a margin of error—obtained from four or six " speeded " guns. It is especially misleading when multi-seater is pitted against single-seater. So far, however, the camera gun is the only means of indicating the results of sham air fights, but the photographs it takes must be interpreted in conjunction with observations of the manœuvres.

Performance and manœuvre are influenced by concealment and surprise as indeed is the whole course of aerial combat. If one machine succeeds in concealing itself from another, it can often climb above that other even though its performance is inferior, because the other may not be climbing at its fastest rate. If one machine surprises another, it attains a point-blank firing position without any tactical struggle and so without having put its power of manœuvre to the test.

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Coordination is the fifth factor which must be recognized and provided for when air manœuvres are being organized.

The machines in an aerial formation are disposed in a certain way and they go out to meet the enemy with definite plans of attack and defence. A formation may make a "centripetal" attack, approaching the target simultaneously from both sides, above and below; it may be disposed in layers or tiers for escort duty; it may be arranged in units of three or of single machines, or it may be under wireless control, acting according to the spoken orders of the patrol leader.

The most common formation for a patrol of aeroplanes is the V formation, with the machines at the back highest and the machines in front lowest. In side elevation this formation appears as a series of steps going upwards from front to rear. In front and plan elevations it appears as a V. A patrol might retain this formation during the process of concealment and initial attack. After the initial attack has been launched, however, the mass V formation might be too unwieldy if large numbers of machines were used. When machines are "dog fighting" some very simple method is required in order to coordinate the formation. In practice it has been found convenient to split up the patrol into a number of units of three machines each. By this method a balance is struck between independence and cohesion. The coordination of patrols could only be judged on air manœuvres by umpires in aeroplanes. The coordination of layer patrols would be determined by the observed rapidity and effectiveness of mutual assistance between layers when in action.

The sixth and last factor of those enumerated as being of importance in air warfare, and therefore as requiring imitation on air manœuvres, is aerial gunnery.

Already the camera gun has been mentioned as playing a part in the tactical exercises between machines. The camera gun also, though to a very limited extent, provides a means of testing individual pilots in aerial gunnery during manœuvres. There is at present no better method available.* The camera gun can assist air manœuvre umpires in determining the effectiveness of the concentration of fire employed by the formations on either side. A formation of aeroplanes when attacking another formation concentrates its fire upon two chief targets, one of them usually being the leader of the enemy's formation. Details of how this is done need not

* Apart from manœuvres there are many methods which provide accurate information about the marksmanship of airmen.

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be given here, because they do not affect the general organization of air manœuvres. It is sufficient to say that fire concentration in the air would be susceptible to the judgment of the umpires assisted by the photographs from the camera guns.

These then are the six factors which must be taken into account when air manœuvres are introduced: concealment, surprise, machine performance, machine power of manœuvre, coordination and aerial gunnery. And, from the above examination, it is clear that air manœuvres could be arranged which would take these six factors into account. A general outline of the way in which these manœuvres could be conducted will now be given.

The squadrons which were to take part would be divided into two air forces, a red and a blue force. Areas of ground would be marked off containing these two opposing air forces. It would be assumed that these areas were held by ground troops, unless it were decided that the Army should cooperate in the air manœuvres as the Air Force cooperates in the army manœuvres. If an imitation of mobile warfare were required, these areas would need to be a greater distance apart with a wide intervening area. Each air force, so far as anti-aircraft fire was concerned, would assume that hostile troops might be anywhere in that intervening area.

In the defined red and blue areas certain objectives would be marked out on the ground. The method of marking would have to be the subject of preliminary experiment. It would seem best to mark these objectives so that the airmen were presented with the same difficulty in finding them as they would have if the objectives were camouflaged. But, since the aim of the air manœuvres primarily would be to give airmen practice in aerial warfare, it might not be necessary to imitate too exactly the concealment of ground positions. Gun positions and ammunition dumps, however, could be concealed, while railway stations and similar targets which could not be effectively camouflaged on active service, could be marked with canvas strips laid in fields.

The red and blue air forces would start on their first flights over the enemy's country with no more information about it than would be supplied on active service by standard maps. Their task would be to discover gun positions and military objectives by reconnaissance and photography, and having discovered them they would endeavour to bomb them. And this reconnaissance, photography and bombing would provide the natural foundation for the sham air war.

Air manœuvres would begin when the red and blue forces undertook their preliminary reconnaissance. Each side would

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endeavour to prevent the other from reconnoitring and each would endeavour to carry out its own reconnaissance. A red reconnaissance patrol would go out escorted by red fighters. The red side would also send up offensive patrols as they are called. The offensive patrols would be ordered to fly over sections of the area of ground separating the territories occupied by the red and blue forces. Their duty would be to seek out and to destroy—that is to shoot down with their camera guns—all blue aircraft.

Directly a blue machine flew over red territory it would be required to fire signal lights at intervals in order to give red machines an indication of the presence of hostile craft similar to the indication which, in real war, is given by the bursts of anti-aircraft shells. In the same manner a red machine over blue territory would fire signal lights at intervals.

And now we have two air forces striving to pierce aerial protections and to effect certain work in the air over an enemy's country. The imitation of air war is passably good.

If the length of front were chosen according to active service conditions, there would be a possibility of a shortage of machines and of much reconnaissance and offensive patrol work being done without either side (the writer is speaking of the forces in the air) seeing the other. The difficulty of picking up machines from another machine is great. Air manœuvres, therefore, might have to be concentrated, and this could be done by shortening the front. The front should not of course be shortened to such an extent that the possibilities of concealment and surprise were too much reduced.

The searching for, and picking up of, other aircraft are among the most important and most difficult of the fighting airman's duties. Air manœuvres alone would give the airmen training in these things.

Umpires in distinctively marked machines should accompany formations when on patrol, because, from the ground it would be quite impossible to tell if a surprise had been effected or which of two formations had a tactical advantage over the other.

When red and blue formations found each other, they would do battle, and the umpires, assisted by the photographs taken by each side's camera guns, would judge the results. After landing, the pilots, as in actual warfare, would make out combat reports and these would assist the umpires in arriving at their decisions.

Night bombing could be simulated by cameras mounted in the bombing machines.*

* A means of night flashlight photography from the air was developed and found satisfactory in 1917.

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All the more important duties of airmen in aerial warfare could thus in the writer's opinion be practised in the suggested air manœuvres. The bomb, the machine gun and the anti-aircraft gun would each play its part. Opposing forces, working at great heights and in varied dispositions, would wheel in the sky endeavouring to break through aerial defences. Night and day the ground would be bombed, reconnoitred and photographed. Airmen would be trained in all the essentials of real aerial warfare.

The value of air manœuvres would be very great. Not only would they train airmen in a manner far more effective than any other, but they would also clarify the ideas of staff officers and would educate the nation in aerial defence.

It is quite useless, with a new arm like the air arm, to confine its manœuvres to cooperation with the Navy and Army. Such cooperation is performed under conditions which could never have a counterpart in real war. As became clear at last year's manœuvres the low-flying attack against troops and low-bombing are given an altogether false simplicity when they are carried out by airmen who do not have to worry about attack from other aircraft. Mock aerial battles also are worthless if the elements of concealment and surprise do not exist.

The writer believes that air manœuvres which would take into account all the important factors of real aerial warfare are possible. They are urgently needed; for the longer our airmen practise the various forms of attack under conditions totally divorced from those of real aerial warfare, the more false will be the conclusions drawn. And these false conclusions may be highly dangerous. They may lead to incorrect training of men and to unwise development of machine types. There is no possible way of determining, during peace time, the requirements of man and aeroplane save by as exact an imitation as possible of the conditions of a real war in the air.

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VON LETTOW'S ESCAPE INTO PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA, 1917

(With Map)

By Colonel G. M. Orr, C.B.E., D.S.O., Indian Army (Retired)

At the beginning of November, 1917, the situation in German East Africa was one of great interest and high hopes. The whole of the enemy's forces, though still in two groups 150 miles apart, was now in the extreme south-east corner of the colony, apparently hemmed in. The Lindi and Kilwa Force Columns were in touch with the Eastern, and main, Group under Lettow in the valley of the Lukuledi river; the Portuguese were concentrating in his rear on the Rovuma river. The enemy's Western Group, under Tafel, though it had evaded the concentric advance of the Belgians from the north and of General Northey's main columns from the west and was moving south, would still have to pass through two small columns on the line Liwale—Abdullah Kwa Nanga if its commander meant to join up with Lettow.

The lull in the operations, which the Lindi and Kilwa Forces had been so successfully prosecuting since July, and the reason for their respective positions at the beginning of November, require a brief explanation. It had been the intention of G.H.Q. that if, as a result of progress in October, the Lindi Force had opened the Lindi—Massassi road south of the Lukuledi river, the Kilwa Force on passing south of that river at Lukuledi Mission should change its line of supply to the Lindi line. The elasticity of the Kilwa Force transport had been stretched to breaking point in trying to maintain only Column I. at the Mission from the 18th to the 21st of October.

When the Lindi Force was definitely checked at Mahiwa after the severe fighting from the 16th to the 19th of October, Column I. had, perforce, to be brought back to Ruponda. A halt, therefore, had to be called to bring up reinforcing drafts to make good the

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heavy casualties in the Lindi Force, and to accumulate forward dumps of supplies for any further move of the Kilwa Force.*

The British information regarding the location of the enemy force under Lettow was that seven companies were on the Mahiwa front facing Lindi Force (Columns III., IV., and Nigerians), one or two companies at Mnacho,† twelve to fourteen companies on the line Nangoo—Lukuledi Mission, and two companies at Newala. The Kilwa Force had Column I. at Ruponda, where a Mounted Column was also forming, and Column II. about 15 miles north-east of Ruponda watching Mnacho. The advance of both the Lindi and Kilwa Forces was to be renewed on the 6th of November, and the Portuguese Commander-in-Chief had agreed to concentrate near Mocimboa ‡ with a supporting force at Chomba and a strong detachment at Ngomano. To the west, a battalion of Belgian infantry and cyclists had reached Liwale (some 70 miles north-west of Ruponda) on the 2nd of November, and headquarters and three companies of the 1st/4th King's African Rifles were at or near Abdullah Kwa Nanga (50 miles south of Liwale).

It is interesting to be able to turn to Von Lettow's own account § and see what his dispositions were and how he viewed the situation "on the other side of the hill." The British intelligence was fairly accurate; there were eight companies under Wahle at Mahiwa, one company at Mnacho, fourteen companies at or near Chiwata, and some small bodies of troops farther south.

On the 24th of October Lettow had had a conference with Governor Schnee, who, it would appear, thought the time had come to surrender; but Lettow was insistent that operations must be continued. The difficulties to be overcome were serious enough; the German supply depôt at Chiwata had under six weeks' supplies, and the result of a new harvest could not be expected until March. Hitherto he had stored supplies in dumps, and formed depôts, in areas on which he expected to fall back. This system, he says, had made their operations dependent to a great extent on the situation of the supplies and reinforcements and hindered freedom of movement, but it had enabled him to keep the troops in the field at great strength and to employ a great part of them in a small area for a considerable period. This was now no longer possible. The only way by which operations could be continued was to make Portuguese

* *See* General Van Deventer's despatch of the 21st of January, 1918, paras. 21, 22.

† About 20 miles east of Ruponda.

‡ South bank of Rovuma river, south-east of Newala.

§ *See* "My Reminiscencies of East Africa," chap. xii.

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East Africa the supply base and, if necessary, to invade it. Lettow, however, was not for retreating without striking a blow, if possible with his whole force. But on reviewing his ammunition supply he found that he could reckon only on using one-third of his available strength in action at the same time, and even then be very sparing with the ammunition. He gives some interesting details. His rifle strength was 2,500 with 50 machine guns. The ammunition amounted to 400,000 rounds, but most of it was of the smoky '71 type, and suitable only for one-third of his rifles: the rest of it was required for the machine guns. Of artillery he had left only one German and one Portuguese mountain gun with 300 rounds all told. He tells us he had heard nothing of Tafel since the beginning of October. Tafel's instructions were to try and join up with Lettow's main force when he was forced out of the Mahenge area. When Lettow heard that our column at Lukuledi Mission had withdrawn to Ruponda he thought the movement must be connected with Tafel's appearance, possibly on the upper Mbemkura river,* and his mind at once turned to how, if Tafel came south of the Lukuledi, he could strike at the Lindi Force.

During the first week of November our activity in front of Mahiwa and Mnacho brought home to Lettow the urgent necessity of covering the withdrawal of his supplies from Chiwata preparatory to a retreat on Portuguese East Africa. He, therefore, on the 6th of November, rode to Nangoo to reconnoitre ground on which to stem the advance of the Lindi Force. On the 7th of November, he says, on returning to Chiwata he heard that our troops were again at Lukuledi Mission. This is possibly a slip for the 8th of November, because it was not till the 8th of November that the Kilwa Force reached the Lukuledi; Column II. at the Mission, Column I. about 10 miles farther east. Meanwhile, Lindi Force had met with stubborn opposition, and it was not until the night of the 8th that Wahle began a slow withdrawal through thick waterless country admirably suited to rearguard action. On the evening of the 9th of November † Column III. was in contact with Wahle, at Hatias, some 21 miles from Chiwata; Columns I. and II. were across the Mahiwa—Massassi road facing east towards Chiwata, and distant 7 and 10 miles respectively from it; the Mounted Column was at the Mission with orders to move on Mwiti. Column I., however, was ordered to seize Ndanda the next day.

Criticism of the higher command is difficult to justify when one

* Halfway between Ruponda and Liwale.
† *See* sketch.

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does not know all the factors of the problem; but on the face of it, the stronger the force which could develop operations against the main enemy (then in the vicinity of Chiwata), the more chance there was of defeating it, or of preventing Lettow from either reinforcing Wahle or extricating him if the Lindi Force was successful in breaking his slow and deliberate retirement.

G.H.Q. may have had reason to believe that the track shown from Nangoo direct on Chiwata was too difficult for a force the size of Wahle's. Lettow himself only seems to have discovered its practicability when riding back from Nangoo by it on the 7th of November. The reason of the move of Column I. to Ndanda may have been, therefore, that G.H.Q. thought Wahle would have to retreat via Ndanda, and that his slowness in getting back from Mahiwa gave an opportunity of forestalling him at Ndanda. Further, if Wahle after all did retreat south through Nangoo, a column from Ndanda might still be able to get across eastwards and cut him off on the Makonde plateau. Lettow, who knew Wahle was going to use the Nangoo—Chiwata track, put this latter construction on our movement to Ndanda. Referring to the surprise of Ndanda on the 10th by "a strong force," he remarks "Liebermann's force, south of Ndanda, ensured the retreat of Wahle's Force, which ascended to the Makonde plateau—and escaped from the enemy's trap." The direction Wahle was to take from Nangoo was apparently still doubtful to G.H.Q. as late as the evening of the 10th of November, because Column I. was ordered merely to reconnoitre towards Chiwata and Nangoo on the 11th and be prepared to move against the enemy. As a matter of fact a strong reconnaissance E.S.E. from Ndanda drove back an enemy force, presumably Liebermann, along a very hilly track which was said to lead to the Nangoo—Chiwata road. However, on the night of the 11th–12th of November, G.H.Q. decided * to initiate a new series of movements with a view to attacking Chiwata from the north with Column III., from Ndanda with the Nigerians, and from the west with Colomn II., while Column I. and the Mounted Column operated by a southerly sweep against the enemy's line of retreat "towards Kitangari."

G.H.Q. Intelligence had information that Lettow would retire through Kitangari. Lettow says in his book that he had arranged for his retreat through it. Unfortunately Lettow's Kitangari was not the Kitangari shown as such on the maps in use. On the map

* Column III. entered Nangoo at 10.30 a.m. at the same time as a patrol from Column I., on the 11th, to find Wahle had retired hastily by the track to Chiwata.

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it was given as being near the source of the Kitangari river on the track which ran eastwards through Mwiti and Mkundi. Lettow's Kitangari was some 9 miles north-east farther down the river, and shown as Simbas on the map. This was not discovered till the 18th of November. Consequently, while G.H.Q. was planning to cut his retreat on to the Mwiti—Kitangari track, Lettow was arranging it by a track parallel to, and some 6 or 7 miles to the north of, it.

By the evening of the 14th of November Column I. had seized Mwiti,* and so blocked any movement southward from Chiwata through the defile between the Kitorombe and Miwale blocks of high hill; the Mounted Column was a little south of Mwiti and about to move round to Mkundi, having already sent forward the King's African Rifles M.I. Co. towards Kitangari; Column II. was about a mile west of Chiwata with the Nigerians a little to the north-west in a very hilly bit of country and having failed to get touch with Column II. owing to the misleading nature of the map;† Column III. was on the plateau north-east of Chiwata, but meeting with consistent opposition. The net seemed to have been drawn tight round Lettow.

Lettow tells how he thought the appearance of the Column at Mwiti had given him an opportunity of throwing a strong force against it and defeating it separately, but that he let the opportunity pass because he was too engaged with the arrangements for the withdrawal from Chiwata. Perhaps the failure of Liebermann to hold Mwiti beyond midday of the 14th had something to do with the lost opportunity! The retreat was carried out along two tracks which converged at a place called, by Lettow, Nambindinga, on the top of the edge of the plateau. Wahle continued along the top of the plateau; Lettow's main force, covered by a rearguard, kept to a track below the scarp which eventually ascended to it over a neck which joined the plateau on the north to the eastern end of Miwale Hill. As the track passed from the neck to the plateau it touched a group of habitations at the source of the Lutshemi stream. These habitations were called Lutshemi, but that name has been given to the adjoining Nambindinga in the dispatches. At the time of the operations the name Lutshemi was constantly used, but no one knew where it was.

* After a fight with three companies under Liebermann sent down by Lettow on the 13th (*see* "Reminiscences," p. 219).

† *See* "With the Nigerians in German East Africa," by Captain Downes, p. 246.

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On the 15th of November * Column III. continued to meet with opposition on the plateau, Wahle's rearguard giving ground very slowly and deliberately; Column II. and the Nigerians entered Chiwata, that place having been evacuated early; Column I. was held in Mwiti with orders to reconnoitre eastwards. There was no hint in the orders for the 15th that Lettow's main force might try and break through by Mwiti; in fact Column I. was told to send a detachment directly south to look for a reported enemy body in that direction. It would seem that G.H.Q. expected the main force to retire up on to the plateau under cover of Wahle if it did not stand to make its last fight at Chiwata. Even so, it would have drawn the net tighter if Column I. had been ordered to advance on Chiwata. It having become evident on the morning of the 15th that the main force was falling back south-east, and that it would pass between the scarp of the plateau and Miwale Hill, G.H.Q.'s orders for the 16th were for the Nigerians to pursue in a south-easterly direction below the plateau while Column I. moved over Miwale Hill on Lutshemi—which was as yet unplaced though believed to be between the eastern end of the hill and the plateau; Column II. was drawn back into reserve and sent round to Mwiti; the Mounted Column was directed to Lulindi to cut the communications between Kitangari and Newala. It was still thought that Lettow was making for the Kitangari of the map. There was an alternative hope that these movements might force Lettow north-eastwards down the Kitangari river towards the sea. On the chance of such an eventuality, Column IV., which had been left in the Nyangao area, was ordered to improve a track towards Luagala on the Kitangari river.

The situation which developed on the evening of the 17th as a result of these movements is shown on the sketch. Resistance to Column III. on the plateau had continued to be most stubborn; Column I. had had an arduous day on Miwale Hill on the 16th, and found it impossible to descend its precipitous northern bluff and eastern face, and had had to descend by its southern slopes in order to get round by the east, so that its advanced guard did not reach Lutshemi till just before nightfall, but was in time to deny the Lutshemi water to the enemy's rearguard retreating before the Nigerians; the latter had become involved in regular mountain warfare throughout the 17th. In the dusk the rearguard got away up to Nambindinga, where there was a hospital. Lettow with the main force must have arrived there very early in the day—probably

* For positions, *see* map.

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he had gone on ahead and reached it on the night of the 16th. He tells us that he had now to take the decision to abandon all useless mouths; the ammunition question, if not the supply situation, demanded a drastic reduction of his strength; there were signs, too, of a certain unwillingness among some of the Europeans to go any farther. He therefore abandoned 300 Germans and 700 native soldiers and continued on his way with a total of 2,000, having escaped a net that had never been so closely drawn round him. One cannot deny that Lettow's extrication of his force from Chiwata and Lutshemi was a notable achievement, in great measure due to the skilful work of his rearguard commanders. If the map, in its depiction of the features of the ground, had not been so misleading, or if local intelligence could have been obtained of the topography of the country and the real positions of Lutshemi or Nambindinga, probably G.H.Q. would never have committed Column I. to Miwale Hill, but would have moved it round by the south to Lutshemi, which it would have reached on the morning of the 17th of November. Referring to the events between the 15th and 17th of November Lettow says, " I wanted to make the enemy complete the concentric march of his columns advancing north-west and south so as to effect a junction; then, when the enemy's masses were helplessly crowded in a narrow area, I could march where I liked." This is a very curious statement; one cannot help wondering whether it was not written with the knowledge that comes after the event. The fact remains that the orders for the 18th led to what may fairly be described as a crowded situation. It was known on the evening of the 17th that Lettow's main force had got away and could not be making for Kitangari. The only portion of his force which could be cut off, if it, too, had not slipped away in the night, was the force opposing Column III. The advance of the Nigerians on the 18th in conjunction with Column III. should have been sufficient to deal with the situation. The effect of using Column I. to join in the movement was to waste a day during which it could have been moving to support the Mounted Column in the task of blocking Lettow's retreat on Newala, if Lettow elected to go that way. It so happened that Column I. commenced to carry out the orders to move up on to the plateau on the 18th, but was stopped before it got there and ordered to move on the 19th to support the Mounted Column. Subsequent events proved that it was exactly twenty-four hours too late.

On the 18th of November a most interesting bit of information came into the hands of Column II. at Mwiti. A German officer sent

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by Tafel to get communication with Lettow walked into one of the piquets and was captured. The information thus gained together with the news that, on the 16th, Tafel had broken through the small column which had tried to intercept him near Abdullah Kwa Nanga showed that Tafel would eventually have to be dealt with by Lindi and Kilwa Forces.

G.H.Q. therefore held back Column II. and the Nigerians, who concentrated at Massassi on the 23rd, by which time Tafel was reported on the upper Bangala river. Column II. and the Nigerians were then sent south-west to deal with him.

Meanwhile G.H.Q., from the 18th to the 20th, was in doubt in which direction Lettow meant to continue his retreat. Column III. was following him on the track to Simbas; Column I. was en route to Lulindi, from which place the Mounted Column was reconnoitring north-east and east; Column IV. was at work on the road towards Luagala. Lettow himself was not sure what he would do. He had arrived at Simbas on the 18th. The supplies gathered there would only feed his force, reduced though it was, for about ten days; the incessant rear-guard actions of the last week had almost depleted his small stock of ammunition. The only possibility of renewing his ammunition was by capturing it from the enemy. The only possible way of continuing to feed his force was by moving into new territory where he could live on the country. As he says, there was no time to be lost. He could get no reliable information about that portion of Portuguese territory which lay across the Rovuma to his south-east. But he remembered the reports which Major Stuemer had sent him of the result of his raid south of Ngomano early in the year. He decided to march at once up the Rovuma. He goes on to say that a determining factor in the choice of this direction was his wish to equip his force by a large capture of ammunition and other war material, and he significantly adds that in the neighbourhood of Ngomano something might be done. The reader will remember that a strong detachment of Portuguese had been posted at that place. On the 20th of November he reached Newala and the final reorganization of his force was carried out. Shedding all the sick and unfit he continued his march south to the Rovuma with 300 Europeans, 1,700 native soldiers and 3,000 porters on the morning of the 21st of November. At 4.30 p.m. on the 21st the advanced guard of Column I. entered Newala, twenty-four hours too late. If Column I. had been released from Lutshemi twenty-four hours earlier, whatever the fortunes of the fight which would certainly have taken place, it must have

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
had a marked effect on Lettow's further retreat and capability of action.

In the course of the movement to intercept Lettow at Newala an extraordinary inaccuracy in the map was brought to light and broadcasted by G.H.Q. on the 19th. Extraordinary, because Newala was a well-known place, with a mission station, and had been in the possession of the Portuguese earlier in the year before they had been evicted by the enemy, and yet it was not discovered till the 19th that the map position was 12 miles out. The map placed it about 15 miles S.S.W. of Lulindi and in the fairly open valley of the Rovuma. In reality it was 12 miles in a direct line eastward of its map position, and on the top of the edge of the pronounced scarp of the southernmost bulge of the plateau which went by the general name of Makonde. It was therefore 15 miles south-east of Lulindi, from which place the track abruptly ascended on to the plateau and continued along the top through dense bush. The real Newala was thus a day's march nearer for Lettow than the map Newala, and his onward route to the Rovuma lay some miles to the south-east of the track which ran past the map Newala to the Rovuma at its junction with the Bangala. It is quite possible that G.H.Q., ignorant of this inaccuracy on the night of the 17th, thought that there would still be time for a column moving from Lutshemi on the 19th to reach the vicinity of Newala before Lettow, who was committed to a much more circuitous route.

On the 21st of November, the day on which Lettow left Newala and reached the bank of the Rovuma at Mpili, the Mounted Column was at Luatala. It was unable, owing, it is believed, to its lack of supplies, if not to its losses in horseflesh, to act effectively against the retreating enemy, though a weak company of the King's African Rifles M.I. clung tenaciously to him. On the 22nd of November most of Column I. had returned by order to Lulindi, at first with the idea that a portion of it should be sent to Massassi against Tafel, but subsequently it was ordered to Luatala, where it was reconcentrated on the 23rd. On the same evening the Mounted Column moved down the track leading to the junction of the Bangala with the Rovuma.

There was little hope of catching Lettow now, but close attention was directed to the movements of Tafel. On the 23rd, Column III. recalled from Simbas had reached Mwiti en route for Massasi. Tafel was reported on the Bangala some 30 miles south-west of Massassi, from which place Column II. and the Nigerians were directed against him. Column I. was ordered to support the

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Mounted Column. The subsequent movements which ended in the surrender of Tafel's Force to Column I. on the 28th of November have already been told in these pages.*

Lettow had escaped. It only remains to be said that his hopes of re-equipping his force in the neighbourhood of Ngomano were duly fulfilled. On the 25th of November he overran the Portuguese detachment. From them he re-armed half his force with Portuguese rifles and obtained a quarter of a million rounds of ammunition, subsequently increased in December to one million. He obtained a large quantity of badly needed European supplies and valuable medical stores. "With one blow," he says, "we had freed ourselves of a great part of our difficulties." To solve his other difficulty—namely, of supplies for his natives—he moved south and split into three columns. There we will leave him.

* *See* "From Rumbo to the Rovuma," *Army Quarterly*, October, 1923.

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THE THIRD VOLUME OF THE GERMAN OFFICIAL WAR HISTORY

The Preliminaries of the Battle of the Marne, 1914

The third volume of the German official account of the war * deals with the nine days preceding the battle of the Marne, the 27th of August to the 4th of September, 1914. It includes, therefore, the German pursuit after Charleroi and Le Cateau, the battle of St. Quentin (Guise) and the advance across the Marne. Much that it contains is already common knowledge as the result of the revelations of Generals von Kluck, von Bülow and von Hausen, the three Army commanders on the right, of the Saxon General Baumgarten-Crusius, and of General Staff officers, like Tappen (Operations), Kuhl (First Army) and Krafft von Delmensingen (Sixth Army), besides the official monograph on the battle of St. Quentin, and the memoirs of Moltke, Helfferich and others. The narrative, however, pieces these skilfully together and provides a certain amount of new matter. Thus a very clear picture is presented in a succinct and easily intelligible form. The maps are not quite up to the standard of the text, showing only the lines reached on various dates, not every day, and they do not indicate the routes followed by the Armies.

No attempt is made to disguise the difficulties and mistakes of the German leaders; but, as a whole, the volume is an apologia for the Supreme Command; all the Army commanders, except Duke Albrecht of Württemberg (Fourth Army), come in for thinly disguised criticism, and, not perhaps unmerited, blame; but the troops receive unstinted praise.

The root of the whole trouble seems to have been the independence of the Army commanders, and the very poor system of communication between these officers and the Supreme Command, located in Coblenz to the 30th of August, and then at Luxembourg. Communication was normally by wireless—except with the head-

* *Der Weltkrieg* 1914–1918. *Bearbeitet im Reichsarchiv. Die militärischen Operationen zu Lande. Dritter Band. Der Marne-Feldzug. Von der Sambre zur Marne.* (*Berlin, Mittler*, 16 *mk.*).

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quarters of the Sixth and Seventh Armies, which being still in German territory had the benefit of permanent telephone lines—supplemented by very occasional visits of officers in motor cars. There was no regular motor car or motor cycle despatch service, though, as the farthest Army headquarters (Kluck's) were never much more than 125 miles from Luxembourg, and the nearest, counting the Sixth and Seventh Armies under Crown Prince Rupprecht as one, less than half that distance, there is no reason why there should not have been constant communication. As it was imperative to prevent the French from reading the wireless messages, some time was lost in enciphering and deciphering, and owing to interference from the Eiffel Tower, every message had to be repeated and checked several times to ensure complete accuracy. Most valuable hours were thus wasted. An air report sent to the First Army at 10.45 a.m. one day was not received and deciphered at the Supreme Command until 6 p.m. next day; quite simple messages took six to eight hours; yet 125 miles, if the roads are kept clear by good march discipline, can easily be covered by car in under three hours. Further, the Armies do not seem to have been over-zealous in forwarding situation reports and information; for instance, the events of the 31st of August in the First Army were not known at the Supreme Command until late next day. This ignorance of events was embarrassing enough for the Supreme Command, but, in addition, the three Armies of the right wing consistently deceived the Chief of the General Staff when they did report, being unanimous that the enemy was "fugitive," "fleeing in disorder," or "completely disbanded." The B.E.F. in particular was said to be making its escape in small groups. Kluck, and consequently Moltke, considered that from a strategic point of view the B.E.F. could be neglected, and that the French on its left (the nucleus of Maunoury's Sixth Army), after the fighting near Proyart and Amiens, had dissolved and disappeared. Thus all care for the right flank was overlooked, not a horseman or cyclist was sent to explore, and the air reconnaissances were directed south and south-east, never to the west.

As a result of lack of timely information, the few orders that the Supreme Command issued were behind the fair, and no longer applicable. Not until the night of the 2nd of September was Kluck given specific directions to take over the protection of the right flank then approaching the fortress of Paris, at a moment when, as is well known, he was committed to a forward movement south-eastward.

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Moltke could at best only agree with what his subordinates had done and try to adapt the situation, as they represented it to him, to the general plan. In recognition of the tails thus wagging the dog, the chapters on the action of the Supreme Command follow those which narrate the movements of the Armies in each sub-period, an arrangement unprecedented in military history. After an introductory chapter, which gives the Supreme Command orders of the 27th, the others are entitled :

II. The fighting [Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies] on the Meuse and Aisne [27th of August–1st of September].
III. The operations of the First and Second Armies to the Oise [28th–30th of August, including the battle of Guise].
IV. The German Supreme Command on the 29th and 30th of August.
V. The pursuit of the German right wing to the Marne, 31st of August–2nd of September.
VI. The German Supreme Command, 31st of August–2nd of September.
VII. The pursuit of the German right wing beyond the Marne, 3rd and 4th of September.
VIII. The operations of the Fourth and Fifth Armies, 2nd–4th of September.
IX. The attacks of the German left wing [Sixth and Seventh Armies] to the 4th of September.
X. The German Supreme Command on the 3rd and 4th of September.

Three other chapters deal with : the Capture of Maubeuge ; Events in Belgium to the 7th of September ; and the Railway Situation in Belgium and Northern France to the beginning of September. What the Germans knew at the time about their enemy's forces is given in the narrative, and the whole story of the Allied movements in a final chapter on " The operations on the enemy's side to the beginning of the battle of the Marne."

The orders of the 27th August instructed the right wing and centre to continue the great wheel of the original plan : the First Army directed on the Lower Seine, the Second on Paris, whilst the Third, Fourth and Fifth swung south-westward round Metz. On the left the Sixth Army was to force the passages of the Moselle between Toul and Epinal, and the Seventh protect Alsace. Thus the French Armies were to be caught between the two wings.

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There was one serious mistake in the orders: they assumed that the Fourth and Fifth Armies had secured the passages of the Meuse, which were still to involve heavy fighting and delay, and drew the Third Army to the assistance of the former two Armies. The First Army also left the course laid down for it, and inclined inwards to assist the Second and to exploit the supposed success of the latter Army at Guise. Thus two loose groups were formed: one of the Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies; the other of the First and Second, each without a controlling head, and both shaken clear of the control of the Supreme Command. So far from Kluck and Bülow marching on the Lower Seine and Paris, they pursued what they imagined to be the left flank of the Allied line, and what actually was the left of the French Fifth Army, and directed their march to the east of Paris. On the 4th September Moltke, realizing at last that Joffre was shifting troops westward, ordered the Third, Fourth and Fifth Armies to continue the pursuit to the Seine, and both the First and Second to remain facing Paris, as flank guard between Oise and Marne, and Marne and Seine, respectively. But by this time Kluck was beyond the Marne, actually ahead of Bülow instead of behind him. As for the Sixth and Seventh Armies, so far from crossing the Moselle, they were held up in trench warfare. The great theorists who had planned to envelop the French from both sides had walked straight into a trap between Verdun and Paris, and their Armies had offered themselves to the envelopment ready for them. At this stage the volume ends.

Naturally the enormous forces to be dealt with do not permit the compilers much space to go into detail. As the B.E.F. was "constantly evasive" in the period and comes in for small mention except on the 1st of September, it will answer the two purposes of indicating the nature of the narrative and giving what is said about the B.E.F., to translate some paragraphs with reference to that date, the day of Néry, Crépy en Valois and Villers Cottérêts. The text, translated, is as follows:—

"General-Colonel von Kluck at 9.45 p.m. on the 31st of August had ordered: 'The First Army will advance to-morrow in a southerly direction in order to attack the retreating foe.' No objectives, only the directions of march were therefore given to the three corps of the left wing, which were nearest to the enemy. Their heads were to cross the Aisne at 8 a.m.; the IX. Corps by Amblevy—Longpont; the III., Vic—Vivières and Attichy—Taillefontaine; the IV., Thourotte—Pierrefonds and Compiègne—Gilocourt. The II. Corps was instructed to advance via Remy and Estrées St. Denis, covering its right flank by reconnaissance, and to push its advanced troops over the Oise at Le Meux

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and Verberie. The IV. Corps was to march echelonned from the right to the neighbourhood of St. Just en Chaussée, so as to protect the right flank of the Army. The II. Cavalry Corps [v. d. Marwitz], whose swing to the south in the direction of Nanteuil le Haudouin was not yet known,* was to push on south of Villers Cottérêts against the French western flank, it being assumed that on its left the I. Cavalry Corps, in pursuance of an earlier request, would take the direction between Villers Cottérêts and Soissons. [Thus no information as regards the enemy was given.]

"The IX. Corps did not strike the enemy anywhere on the 1st of September. . . .

"The 6th Division of the III. Corps found the crossing at Vic clear, and in advancing through the wood south of Vivières encountered lively resistance, in parts from British infantry.† It was broken by Brandenburg Fusiliers in bayonet fighting. Villers Cottérêts was occupied late in the evening. The enemy withdrew in a south and south-west direction. The 5th Division advanced unhindered. . . .

"The IV. Corps made particularly long marches, up to thirty miles, on the 1st of September. In spite of this, it never came in contact with the enemy. . . .

"Before the IV. Corps reached the area south of Compiègne Forest, the II. Cavalry Corps had fallen in for fighting in which fortunes varied and which cost some parts of it heavy losses. The 4th Cavalry Division on its right marching on Gilocourt—Bethisy ran unexpectedly close up to a British bivouac on the heights west of Néry. The divisional commander, Lieut.-General von Garnier, decided on a fire surprise at dawn. A British battery was completely fought down, but the enemy's reinforcements which hurried up from various sides prevented the German cavalry, who were fighting on foot, from exploiting their success. Several shells having fallen among the horses and limbers in the thick fog, a temporary panic arose. Gradually the 4th Cavalry Division found that its north flank was being enveloped by further British forces of all arms. In the absence of ammunition wagons, a want of ammunition was experienced. Meantime Béthisy and Crépy en Valois were reported occupied by the enemy, and General von Garnier broke the fight off at 8 a.m. (British time). The divisions rallied east of Néry with the loss of a battery [actually two], which had become incapable of movement,‡

* On the evening of the 30th of August the II. Cavalry Corps had been ordered by Kluck to cross the Oise next day above Compiègne and advance against the French left wing, that is the left of the Fifth Army, ignoring the B.E.F. and Maunoury's troops. Soissons and Noyon were given as the directions. Soon after 7 a.m., on the 31st, General v. d. Marwitz received an air message that the enemy had reached Villers Cottérêts, and he decided, instead of continuing east, to strike south towards Nanteuil to Haudouin, in the hopes of getting in rear of the French. "In consequence the 9th Cavalry Division turned from Choisy au Bac towards Verberie. At 9 p.m. it ran into hostile fire at La Croix—St. Ouen and bivouacked for the night, completely exhausted, on the road. Behind the 9th was the 2nd Cavalry Division. . . . The 4th Cavalry Division from Offrement took the direction of Gilocourt." Its adventures follow in the text.

† Irish Guards and 2nd Coldstream. *See* "British Official History," Vol. I., p. 240.

‡ The gunners man-handling the guns back were shot down. *See* "British Official History," Vol. I., p. 238. The German account forgets to mention that the remaining battery was abandoned that night.

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and marched, as there was no pursuit, by Roquemont in a southern direction to Rosières, where there was a long halt. The main body then rested awhile at Droiselles and around Montagny le Felicité; parts, however, went farther south round the Forest of Ermenonville and west to La Chapelle on the great Senlis—Paris road. Thus the division found itself in the midst of the area through which the British Army was retiring, but had lost all connection with the corps commander. As it was extremely exhausted, had suffered heavy losses, and was out of hand [literally, no united leading existed any more], the division was not in a position to do the enemy serious harm.*

"The five Jäger battalions of the Cavalry Corps detached from Compiègne towards Crépy en Valois had a separate action north of the last-named place. The enemy made such an obstinate resistance that the Jäger could not capture Crépy.†

"On the right wing of the Cavalry Corps also the 9th and 2nd Cavalry Divisions were unable to continue the advance through the Forest of Compiègne that had come to a stop in the night, as the heights south-east of Verberie and at Néry were still held by strong enemy forces.‡ General v. d. Marwitz, in these circumstances, decided to await the assistance of the II. Corps which was approaching Verberie."

Kluck's message of 5 p.m. reporting this fighting cannot have helped the Supreme Command to realize the situation. It was:

"The French Fifth Army has withdrawn southward, its left flank through Soissons. The First Army has not reached this flank yet. At Verberie fight with the British. The First Army intends to reach the line Verberie—La Ferté Milon on the 2nd of September, where it will be available for future operations."

Then at 8 p.m. Kluck changed his mind. He suddenly realized from a captured order of the British I. Corps that he had the whole of the B.E.F. in front of him, and informed the Supreme Command (message received "shortly after midnight"). "Presence of three British corps established close in front of First Army. Army attacks to-morrow via Creil—La Ferté Milon, and after overthrowing them will be at your disposal." After making a blow in the air, for the B.E.F. had slipped off, Kluck again turned east to seek the supposed French flank.

All this time "the cavalry reporting nothing of the whereabouts

* According to General von Poseck's *Deutsche Kavallerie*, pp. 78–79, the survivors of the 4th Cavalry Division concealed themselves in the woods and saw the British columns pass through, but "from lack of ammunition, an attack by the isolated brigades on the numerically superior infantry columns was not possible."

† This attack was repulsed by the 1st Royal West Kent and a section of the 119th Battery R.F.A. *See* "British Official History," Vol. I., p. 240.

‡ The 1st Somerset L.I. and 1st Rifle Brigade covered the retirement and beat off the German attack with considerable loss. *See* "British Official History," Vol. I., p. 243. A French cavalry division and *Chasseurs Alpins* were also engaged.

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of the enemy, General v. d. Marwitz assumed that he had retired on Paris," and, to make Kluck's mind up for him, by " the independent decision of the commander of the IX. Corps " (General von Quast), this Corps without orders, pushed across the Marne, and the III. Corps followed suit.

During the whole of the period the Armies of the right wing—the Sixth and Seventh—hardly moved. They sat opposite the gap between Nancy—Toul and Epinal; whilst a junior officer of the Supreme Command, Major Bauer, of his own initiative, without instructions, it is stated—at least none can be found—incited Crown Prince Rupprecht to attack the Grand Couronné de Nancy.

The military art is certainly a very difficult one; because those who practise it have to deal under conditions of danger with very uncertain factors, *inter alia*, the unknown intentions, will, and situation of the enemy; but the troubles of the Germans seem to have been largely the result of a false doctrine founded on the easy successes of 1864, 1866 and 1870–1871, over weak and unready foes; the inadaptibility of German staff methods, founded on manœuvre practice, to the exigencies of warfare; and to the tendency of the commanders to underestimate their enemy.

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ENGINEERS AND THE ARMY

(With Plan)

By Captain G. MacLeod Ross, M.C., M.Eng., A.M.Inst.C.E., R.E.

The relationship between the Royal Engineers and other arms of the Service has been the subject of recent discussion and writing, and it is apparent from a perusal of the views of officers of all arms that the cooperation between the Royal Engineers and other arms, especially the infantry, is unsatisfactory both in peace and war

Theory

Two main characteristics of engineers and engineer work which are usually ignored are:—(1) Engineer units are entirely composed of skilled men. There is practically no work on which they can be employed economically without dilution of that skilled labour with unskilled labour. (2) Every engineering work requires tools, materials and, usually, transport.

Whilst modern doctrine recognizes that practically all field engineering must be a combined operation of skilled and unskilled workers, there is, nevertheless, a wide gap between the theory and the practice of this doctrine.

The failure of infantry and engineers to cooperate during the late war was very marked, and it was due mainly to an incorrect attitude of mind on the part of both arms. The doctrine was either unknown or was insufficiently assimilated. To improve the co-operation between the infantry and the engineers, the VIII Corps issued a memorandum (G.5103) in December, 1916. The main points noted were: (*a*) The infantry seldom does more than a third or a fourth of an honest task. (*b*) This small output is not due to physical incapability. (*c*) The work is often done grudgingly.

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The basis of the methods employed to effect a change were: (*a*) Phrases such as "R.E. fatigues" or "R.E. working parties" were abolished and disciplinary action was taken against any one using them. (*b*) Parties of infantry were detailed as units, not by numbers. (*c*) Definite jobs were allotted to definite units, which worked on them until completed. (*d*) The platoon or company commanders were responsible for the job. The Royal Engineers only assisted when required. (*e*) Battalion commanders were responsible for and visited the work of their companies. (*f*) Lectures were given to the infantry by infantry officers to explain the tactical value of the work to be done. Figures as to the cost of certain works were given to the men, and the saving to the nation consequent on speedy completion was thus explained to them.

In short, everything was done to ensure a proper understanding of the division of responsibility.

Field engineering, however, includes works, where a large amount of technical skill is required, measured by the number of skilled tradesmen necessary or, where the time required to complete the work is longer than that which an infantry unit can give. It is in works of this second category that the commander must be a Royal Engineer officer.

The principle governing the supreme command of a combined operation is that the predominant arm shall direct. It is considered no overstatement to say that the reason for the failure to achieve the greatest possible results in field engineering work in the past has been due to an ignorance of, or a failure to appreciate, the doctrine underlying the combined operation. It is first and foremost the duty of the staff to coordinate the various arms at its disposal. To this end, the staff must order what work shall be done. The Royal Engineers will advise as to how it shall be done. The staff will decide by whom it shall be done, and most important, who shall command the resulting combined operation. It is only as a result of coordination by the staff, the correct attitude of mind and recognition of their responsibilities respectively by the several arms engaged, that real economy of force can be attained in the combined operation which every engineering operation becomes.

To provide for works in the second category, where the skilled man was necessarily predominant, it became the practice during the war in France to allot to a field company for an indefinite period, 100 to 200 infantrymen, under their own officers and drawn from all the battalions of a brigade. When the same infantry was allowed to remain sufficiently long with the field company, cooperation

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became most effective. This is attributable to the following causes: (1) the infantry contingent was in no two minds as to its responsibility; (2) it became in a sense the guest of the field company, which saw to the bodily needs of the men; (3) there was close personal contact, which, with the lapse of time, became acquaintance not only of individuals but of methods of working; and (4) common responsibility for the work was automatically accepted by both infantry and engineers.

The main obstacle preventing infantry from producing a fair output of work on field engineering was psychological—the men had "come out to fight not to sling mud." Immediately the doctrine or policy was logically altered to show them that either: (*a*) theirs alone was the responsibility for field engineering, or that (*b*) the field engineering was their sole duty—so soon did their output of work increase, and so soon was cooperation effected.

Now the strength of a field company is greatly in excess of the requirement of work of the first category, *i.e.* advisory, and there will always be a large amount of work of the second category to be done. If this is not the case, it will mean that the majority of the field company is unemployed or is not employed in accordance with the dictates of the principle of economy of force.

It is now understood that the principle of a dilution of field companies with unskilled labour is an accepted principle in a war of maximum national effort, but this cooperation will be greatly facilitated if efforts are made in time of peace to educate all arms in the doctrine which governs engineering work.

Practice

It is proposed, by way of illustration of work of the first category, to give the detailed arrangements for a combined operation executed by the 39th Division during May, 1917, when assembly trenches were dug and revetted prior to the attack on St. Julien on the 31st of July, 1917.

The Divisional Programme

The first step was the issue of a programme of work by the Divisional Staff. This was prepared with the technical advice of the C.R.E., and its scope is clear from the following.

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39TH DIVISIONAL* PROGRAMME OF WORK

Technical Instructions

Simultaneously with the issue of this programme, the C.R.E. issued technical instructions to the field companies which gave: (1) the approximate line for the trenches; (2) the dimensions of the trenches; (3) the task per man; and (4) the information as to drainage required by the C.R.E. as a result of field company reconnaissance.

The next step was the Brigade conference.

The Brigade Conference.

A conference was held before each combined operation, at which were present, in addition to the Brigade Staff, the commanding officers and company commanders of the infantry units concerned, the field company commanders and the field artillery Brigade representatives. The C.R.E. and a Divisional General Staff officer also usually attended. The whole of the unskilled labour was found by the infantry units of one brigade. The Brigade commander explained the scope of the operation, and allotted the responsibilities to units, not only as regards the execution of the work, but also as regards preliminary reconnaissance by infantry and engineers. The conference was confirmed by a Brigade operation order. A typical order for the operation of the 28th–29th of May follows :—

Night 26–27th May

(*a*) Serial No	(*b*) Trench.	(*c*) Nature of work.	(*d*) Troops employed. R.E.	(*e*) Inf.	(*f*) Remarks.
1	ARMYTAGE TRENCH m. C28b85 to C22d13 n. C22d13 to C22c38	Reconnaissance	227 F. Co. 225 F. Co.	16 N. & D.R. 16 R.B.	
2	FINCH STREET C21d95 to C21c86 (not on map)	Reconnaissance	227 F. Co.		Infantry to be detailed.
3	GARDEN STREET C28a99 to C28a83	Reconnaissance	227 F. Co.		by 117 Inf. Bde.

* Details of sub-units shown in col. (*d*) are as decided by field company commanders and were not detailed in the actual Divisional programme.

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Night 27–28th May

(a) Serial No.	(b) Trench.	(c) Nature of work.	(d) Troops employed. R.E.	(e) Inf.	(f) Remarks.
4	Serial 1.				
	m.	Digging	1 sec.	3 coys.	Units as for Serial 1.
	n.		1 sec.	3 coys.	
7	Serial 1.				
	m.	Forming dumps of materials	227 F. Co.	1 coy.	Inf. detailed by 116 Inf. Bde
	n.		225 F. Co.	1 coy.	
10	HOPKINS TRENCH				
	o. C28b85 to C22d15	Reconnaissance	227 F. Co.	17 N. & D.	
	p. C22d15 to C22a12		225 F. Co.	17 K.R.R.C.	
5	Serial 2.	Digging	1 sec.	2 coys.	
6	Serial 3.	Digging	1 sec.	1 coy.	
8	Serial 2.	Forming Dumps of materials	227 F. Co.	1 coy.	Inf. detailed by 116 Inf.Bde
9	Serial 3.			1 coy.	

Night 28–29th May

11	Serial 1				
	m.	Revet and trench boarding	227 F. Co.	1 coy.	Inf. carrying parties detailed by 116 Inf. Bde.
	n.		225 F. Co.	1 coy.	
12	Serial 2		227 F. Co.	1 coy.	
13	Serial 3		227 F. Co.	1 coy.	
14	Serial 10				
	o.	Digging	1 sec.	3 coys.	17 N. & D.R.
	p.		1 sec.	4 coys.	17 K.R.R.C.
15	Serial 10				
	o.	Forming Material Dumps	227 F. Co.	1 coy.	Inf. detailed by 116 Inf. Bde.
	p.		225 F. Co.	2 coys.	

Night 29–30th May.

16	Serial 10				
	o.	Revetting and trench boarding	2 secs.	1 coy.	Inf. carrying parties detailed by 116 Inf. Bde.
	p.		2 secs.	2 coys.	

Night 30–31st May and 31st May–1st June

Brigade Relief and Rest Field Coys.

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Night 1–2nd June

(a) Serial No.	(b) Trench.	(c) Nature of work.	(d) Troops employed. R.E.	(e) Inf.	(f) Remarks.
17	HORNBY TRENCH (Not shown on map)	Recce.	225 F. Co.		Inf. detailed by 118 Inf. Bde.
18	FINCH STREET. Prolong C22d07 to C22c55	Recce.	227 F. Co.		Inf. detailed by 116 Inf. Bde.
19	GARDEN STREET. Prolong C22d33 to C22d10				
		Night 2–3rd June			
20	Serial 17		1 sec.	3 coys.	Inf. detailed by 116 Inf. Bde.
21	Serial 18	Digging	1 sec.	3 coys.	
22	Serial 19		1 sec.	3 coys.	
23	Serial 17	Forming material dumps	225 F. Co.		Inf. detailed by 117 Inf. Bde.
24	Serial 18		227 F. Co.		
25	Serial 19				
		Night 3–4th June			
26	Serial 17	Revetting and trench boarding	2 secs.	2 coys.	Inf. carrying parties detailed by 117 Inf. Bde.
27	Serial 18		2 secs.	2 coys.	
28	Serial 19		2 secs.	2 coys.	

Secret.

Copy No.

117 Infantry Brigade Operation Order No.

27.5.1917.

Ref. TRENCH MAP,
HILLTOP SECTOR.

1. HOPKINS TRENCH will be dug through from C28b.85 to C22a.12 on the night 28–29th May to a depth of 3′ 0″.

   Lieut.-Col. ——, commanding 17th Notts and Derby Regiment, will be "O.C. Operation." He will notify the position of his Headquarters to this Office.

2. Allotment of tasks and routes is as follows :

Unit.	*O.C. Party.*	*Task.*	*Route.*
(1) 3 Coys. 17th Notts & Derby Regiment 227th F. Coy., R.E.	Officer to be detailed by O.C., 17th N. & Derby R.	From C.28b.85 to C22d13	ST. JEAN Road.
(2) 17th K.R. Rif. C. (Less 1 Company). 225th F. Coy., R.E.	O.C., 17th K.R.R.C.	From C.22d. 13 to road at C22a.12.	BUFFS Road.

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3. (*a*) Covering parties will be provided by front line battalions concerned. Dividing line—Hedge at C.22.d.3.6. inclusive to centre battalion.
   (*b*) Covering parties will leave our front line trenches at the earliest moment at which they can do so unobserved by the enemy.
   (*c*) The necessary reconnaissance and wire cutting will be carried out to-night by field companies concerned.
4. O.C. " R " Group R.A. will detail a F.O.O. to assist O.C. Operation, and will definitely tell off one section 18-pounders to be at his disposal to deal with forward enemy machine guns.
5. After digging, HOPKINS TRENCH will not be manned. It will be patrolled nightly.
6. Detailed instructions for this operation are issued separately under B.M.1366 of May 25th.
7. The Password will be notified later.
8. Brigade headquarters remains at CANAL BANK.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

Captain.
Brigade Major,
117th Infantry Brigade.

Issued at 1200 hours
through Signals.
Distribution (omitted).

Reconnaissance and Preparation

If the night for the execution of the operation be known as Z night, then on Z-3 night the field company commanders and one section officer per company reconnoitred their section and definitely located a possible line for the trench. On Z-2 night the field companies taped the front cutting edge of their respective sections of the trench to be dug. The trench was then sub-divided by pegs into man tasks, and sappers were told off, one to each block of 8 tasks, which they would be called upon to supervise on Z night. The tape and pickets were mudded over to ensure that they would not be seen from the air.

On Z-1 night the trench was reconnoitred by the field company representatives, the infantry company commanders and their non-commissioned officers—one non-commissioned officer to every 8 tasks in parallel with the sappers. This ensured that :

(1) The company commander and his non-commissioned officers knew the approach to the trench and the tasks.

(2) The non-commissioned officers knew their sapper advisers and assistants.

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On this night the R.E. cut out any obstacles likely to impede digging.

The sappers' responsibilities on Z night were :

(1) To correct the size of the trench checked by prepared templates. (Necessary as trenches were to be revetted on Z+1 night with U frames, XPM panels and trench-boarded.)

(2) The cutting of any unforeseen obstacle such as roots, buried wire, etc.

On each night, except Z night, the reconnaissances and work were covered by front line troops by arrangement direct between the field company commanders and the infantry units concerned.

Execution


The main feature of interest in the operation order lies in the nomination of an " O.C. Operation," who established his headquarters in such a position that he could generally see both the line to be dug and the German front line to the immediate front. He was supported by a gunner F.O.O. and had a section of 18-pounders at his immediate disposal for the purpose of smothering any hostile machine-gun fire which might give trouble.

It should be noted that the constant stream of Verey lights from the German trenches opposite made seeing comparatively easy in spite of the absence of any moon. The programme was favoured by good weather throughout.

On Z night the covering troops took up their positions as early as possible. They were followed by the officers and men of the field companies concerned, who took station on the tasks—the men carrying wire cutters and felling axes. All R.E. *personnel* were distinguished by white tracing tape shoulder straps. The infantry digging parties came out from our front line, told off by blocks of 8 diggers under a non-commissioned officer, and led by their company commanders. They were met by the field company commander and section officer and conducted on to their tasks. When the tasks were completed, and checked by template, the O.C. Operation walked the length of the trench to ensure continuity before ordering the withdrawal. Meanwhile, on the same night the field company had dumped revetting materials in suitably located dumps for the revetment of the trench on Z + 1 night.


As a result of the trench being accurately dug to template on Z night, no unskilled labour was employed on actual revetting, the work being done by sapper labour alone. Infantry parties

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carried the necessary materials to the trench from the prepared dumps, the proportions and priority of materials being decided by the sappers supervising the dumps.

The revetting and trenchboarding undertaken on the third night in the cycle of work for each trench thus became an operation of the second category referred to under " Theory," since digging to template reduced the necessity for unskilled labour to that necessary for carrying material. With the predominance of skilled labour the third night's work was done under the command of a Royal Engineer officer.

On completion, the trenches were named after infantry brigadiers and the C.R.E. Casualties throughout the seven working nights were 3 other ranks wounded, of whom two were sappers. Work was usually commenced about 2100 hours and completed by 0230 hours the following day.

Application of the true doctrine produced the required attitude of mind with resulting cooperation, so that 5,324 yards of trench were dug, revetted and trenchboarded in seven working nights. Corps observers who had looked out over the lines for months rubbed their eyes, and pinched themselves.

In view of recent remarks on the subject, it is well to chronicle that the decentralization of responsibility for details of reconnaissance and execution ensured the requisite " port drinking " by the sapper and infantry units prior—and subsequent—to execution.

That the moral is to the physical as three to one is probably truer to-day than ever. The road to cooperation is knowledge—knowledge of the doctrine—knowledge each of his job—knowledge of the other man.

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THE ROYAL NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE

AN APPRECIATION

By Major T. A. Lowe, D.S.O., M.C., The Essex Regiment

I. Greenwich

"People who are old enough to write memoirs have usually lost their memory," writes Mr. Shane Leslie, as an opening to his fascinating book "The End of a Chapter," and I cannot think of a better excuse for this article. A period of nearly eighteen months as an officer of the Army attached to the Royal Navy, has left vivid impressions which, when recorded, may have some practical value to others who may follow. They are written primarily from a feeling of profound affection and admiration for the sister Service.

The Royal Naval Staff College occupies a portion of that delightful collection of historic buildings, which are still known to the public as Greenwich Hospital. The buildings themselves charm the eye from the moment the outer gates are passed, and they are "borne on the books" as H.M.S. *President*, a mythical "ship" in which the Admiralty and other naval establishments are included.

Greenwich Hospital (renamed the Royal Naval College in 1873) includes four separate buildings, built at various periods, and named according to the sovereigns in whose reigns they were built. A Royal Palace, Greenwich House, in which Henry VIII. and Mary and Elizabeth were born, originally stood on this site; and later, according to the Latin inscription which adorns a frieze in one of the halls, "The pious regard of Queen Mary dedicated this palace of Greenwich for the relief and maintenance, at the public expense, of those seamen who have protected the public safety in the reign of William and Mary, 1694." Thereafter the Palace was used as a home for seamen pensioners, but this was discontinued in 1869 when some enthusiastic bungler instituted a system of giving the pensioners, if they preferred it, a grant of money in lieu of board and lodging. If it had not been for this decision, Greenwich

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Hospital would have been for old sailors to-day what the Royal Hospital at Chelsea is for old soldiers.

However, one man's poison is another man's meat, and eventually the Palace became the College of the Royal Navy, a place in which innumerable courses are held. Sub-lieutenants attend for the compulsory subjects which they have to take for promotion, such as mathematics, chemistry, etc.; lieutenants and lieut.-commanders study intelligence and cypher work; captains pass through a war staff course (in some ways similar to the Army Senior Officers' School); and last, but not least, selected lieut.-commanders and commanders attend the Staff College, which, though occupying a portion of the same main building, is an entirely separate entity.

Before endeavouring to describe the Staff College in detail, I must refer again to the buildings now known as the Royal Naval College. The Naval Museum contains models of ships ancient and modern, which illustrate very clearly the stages of evolution which the Navy has passed through and the marvellous material progress of our own time; there are famous pictures of great actions which have been fought at sea; there are relics and trophies of a thousand battles. The curator, a retired naval officer, delights in taking people round the museum, and nothing pleases him more than to explain to Army officers the intimate links which used to exist between the two Services. A couple of hours spent in his company, from the historical point of view, is as good a preliminary to a written promotion examination as a couple of days with a crammer. This fact struck me during the occasions when I waylaid him in search of information, and when I told him I would advise my colleagues to seek him out as a preliminary to " B " and " D " examinations, he was as enthusiastic as could be, and volunteered assistance.

Unlike the Army, there is no entrance examination for the Naval Staff College, and an age-limit is not adhered to rigidly by reason of the demands of the Service. " Qualifiers " (they are not called students, as it is considered that the word savours too much of scholasticism) are selected entirely on their record and apparent capabilities, and during the course they are judged as much by the manner in which they conduct themselves, as by their written work, every individual being closely studied by one of a large staff of instructors. There are no organized games, for grounds at Greenwich are very scarce except in Greenwich Park, which lies to the south of the College. There one finds some excellent Rugby football grounds, but these are so extensively used by the sub-lieutenants that the Staff College " qualifiers " (most of whom have

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passed the Rugby age) do not compete. But the course is so organized that exercise in plenty can be obtained at week-ends, and squash racquet courts are always available in the winter, and splendid tennis courts in the summer. The daily exercise in the open which students at Camberley and Andover enjoy is an impossibility, nor is it possible for " qualifiers " to have a separate mess. There is one mess for the entire College, an enormous affair which seats several hundred officers at once. There were some who grumbled at this system, but to me, as an attached officer from another Service, it was a perpetual delight because of the opportunity it gave for interchange of ideas with men of various branches. Here one met engineers, paymasters, the medical branch, and a large number of youngsters qualifying for promotion, as well as one's own colleagues ; and the experience was very valuable, particularly at the end of the course when it was my privilege to go to sea for a period of three months with the Mediterranean Fleet. For then I found that many of my friends at Greenwich were back again at sea, and having known them even slightly before made a lot of difference in a strange atmosphere where everything was " foreign " to a soldier. There was another argument in favour of the communal messing system : it brought the embryo staff officer into close and constant contact with the " salt horse " (the naval equivalent for our regimental officer). A gulf between the two has never been apparent, and under the present system never can assert itself. This was particularly evident at the fortnightly debates held by the Staff College in their library after dinner, which were open to the whole College and usually well attended by other officers, many of the voluntary speeches being delivered by junior officers who had attended as a matter of interest.

These debates, indeed, were quite a feature of the Staff College, and had a unique bearing on the character of the officers who took part in them. We had a " Leader of the House," and a " Leader of the Opposition," and every " qualifier " had to take it in turn to be one or the other. Subjects were chosen which often meant considerable study beforehand, such as " Free Trade *v.* Protection," " Is the power of the English Press beneficial ? " or " Is the married officer as efficient in the Navy as the bachelor ? " and, of course, party warfare was waged with great enthusiasm by the back benchers, who were allowed to interrupt or conduct themselves in any of the ways which are passed as dignified in the House of Commons.

Speeches and discussions are encouraged in the Navy The

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" silent " tradition had been pushed too far, and often applied to circumstances when speech—and lucid speech at that—was essential to those who found themselves in a position to advise. Talking was supposed to be " not done." But we live in an age now when everybody talks, and the principal exponents of the art are usually those who know least of what they are talking about, so it has become essential for naval officers to be able to talk too. Each morning there was a discussion after the daily lecture, the leader's name being called without any previous preparation. It was a sure and certain way of ensuring attention to the subject on hand ; not that there was usually any desire to brouse through the lectures, for a more electrifying programme could not be imagined.

The lectures at the Naval Staff College are the principal feature, and looking back over the range and variety of subjects, one is amazed at their extent and at the subjects which they covered. They were held in the mornings mostly, usually at 9.30 a.m., and during the first two terms they are delivered by the Staff College instructors, together with outside lectures from officers from the Army and the R.A.F. The air, indeed, was very closely studied in relation to naval warfare, and though many of the points raised were controversial, there were signs that a common doctrine would evolve itself in the near future. Many officers of the R.A.F. came to Greenwich to give us of their best.

How shall I describe the lecture-room ? It was a large room screened in half (the remainder being used for a tactical table on which strategic plotting was done, and war games played), and furnished with a permanent blackboard and many maps, a lecturer's desk beneath the blackboard, and desks for the " qualifiers " arranged in rows opposite. It was a bare room, but it had an " atmosphere " entirely of its own by reason of certain scripts which forced themselves upon the attention. Over the blackboard was inscribed in large white letters the words, " Time and I against any Two," a quotation from Philip II., which seems to convey the solution of most of life's difficulties. Then there hung upon a wall a plaque with the words " Service, Loyalty, Modesty, Team Work, Cooperation," written on it, and another which enunciated the " Principles of War " in no uncertain manner. In time one found oneself reading and re-reading these things until they began to soak into the subconscious part of one's brain.

It is difficult for an Army officer to learn to think in ships instead of men. At first there is a feeling of freedom from the responsibility of men (in doing written schemes), which is totally erroneous

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because the men are in the ships, and they have to be fed and cared for all the same, and in practice the officer has just as much responsibility for them as an Army officer has for his men. But in the schemes the whole agony of feeding and marching men, and thinking of their clothes and their blankets and their boots, completely disappears. There is none of the anxiety over " Q " work, which is so much a part of Army written " schemes." A ship is victualled by the Admiralty before she starts her cruise, and that is the end of the business for a long time, probably long enough to see the work in hand satisfactorily completed. She is manned, too, according to complement, and casualties are not likely to be suffered in *personnel* to such an extent as to curtail the ship's sphere of action. In other words, a ship travels as a self-supporting unit, and travels quickly, and when situations are being " appreciated " on paper, you may take it that she can deal with any hostile ship she meets of the same or inferior armament and speed. But the question of fuel is quite a different matter.

A sailor may not have to march on his stomach as a soldier must, but his ship can only steam as far as the fuel stored in her tanks will allow her. This is probably the greatest problem the Navy has had to deal with since the sailing ship days, and it grows no easier with the introduction of oil fuel, because the supplies of oil are very inconveniently arranged at the source (though probably so far as the world is concerned, more convenient for us than for any other country), and the amount of labour and carriage in smaller vessels involved is enormous. This is a problem which figures very largely in the work of a naval staff officer, and most of the written schemes upon which we were engaged required what were called endurance charts. There is no real difficulty about evolving these because there are standard books published in which the capacity and endurance of every war vessel of every navy is given. The same rules apply to ports, anchorages, and bases, the very latest information about these being always available so far as accommodation is concerned. A naval tactical scheme is therefore a very much more concrete thing than a military one in which so much has got to be taken as abstract. Neither has the " nature of the ground " to be considered, unless, indeed, the location be such that navigation difficulties come into the picture.

For one week the R.A.F. Staff College appeared at Greenwich to play a strategical game, a combined exercise between the air and the sea. This was of the highest value in helping towards a mutual understanding of the difficulties of each, and many points were

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brought out in the discussions which took place at various stages of the game as it progressed.

It was at Camberley that the summit of effort seemed to be reached. The scheme, in which Navy, Army and Air were engaged, was one of vital interest to all, and preparation for it was begun about three weeks before we all packed up and went to Camberley. Each student had his allotted task in the scheme, and the conditions were almost the same as war conditions might be expected to be so far as the work was concerned, for it was never-ending until the war was over. The various directing staffs had an unenviable time in inspecting and supervising tasks, many of which were a mass of detail and had to be correct in every particular. But the thing was handled magnificently by General Ironside (Commandant at Camberley), Captain Astley-Rushton (then Director at Greenwich), and Air Vice-Marshal Brooke-Popham (then Commandant at Andover). One thing was apparent from the very beginning, viz. that of all operations of a military nature, a combined operation is far and away the most difficult. Many of us made mistakes on paper that would have re-acted throughout the whole war and led to possible failure in the end. But it is by mistakes that one learns, and in schemes such as this it is soon realized that those mistakes which occur between the Services engaged are caused by a lack of understanding of each other's methods. The day is rapidly approaching when there will be a common doctrine of staff work throughout, and when it dawns the Empire will be in a sounder state of defence than it has ever been before.

II. Visits and Demonstrations

Our first excursion was to the Gas School at Porton, a place which the writer (who was gassed in the war) approached with certain feelings of apprehension. These soon proved to be quite unfounded, however, for we were asked to do nothing more unpleasant than to walk through a cloud of " tear " gas, the remainder of the programme being of such absorbing interest that one entirely forgot the unsavoury experiences of the battlefield. The School is a joint affair between the Navy, Army and Air Force, and many interesting experiments are carried out there which are witnessed by large numbers of officers, and many civilians. They are chiefly from the point of view of defence, and it was comforting to hear that there are schemes devised by which the whole civilian population may be protected. One hears so much about gas, and the

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terrors which the next war will bring in the form of attacks upon the unprepared masses, that it is only fair to suggest there may be a counter for every kind of threat if it is diligently sought. And in this way the scientists who are employed at Porton seem to be doing a great work for humanity.

The use of smoke on land and at sea was also demonstrated, and the more one sees of this form of protection the more one is struck by the ordinary common sense of it. Smoke is cheap, and if used with discretion gives excellent results when weather conditions are favourable.

Our next visit was to Weymouth, where we embarked in destroyers for an exercise in conjunction with submarines. This may have been interesting, but it was the writer's first experience at sea in a destroyer during rough weather. I thought I was a tolerably good sailor, but in less than an hour after leaving harbour life had no further interest until the agony was completed. There is no doubt that destroyer officers have a terrible time in bad weather, from the point of view of sheer discomfort, and the strain that was imposed upon them during the war in the North Sea when screening bigger ships, can hardly be imagined by Army officers.

In passing I must mention one afternoon which the Royal Naval Staff College cricket team spent at Windsor. We were the guests of the " Blues " for a cricket match, and a very exhilarating match it turned out to be, the Navy just winning by a few runs. The ground was a small one, bounded on one side by the officers' mess and on two others by stables and barracks, and several batsmen hit the ball through windows and into the troopers' balconies, to the latter's great amusement. It was a Saturday afternoon and most of the troopers were off duty, but they preferred to stay in barracks and watch the match, although the two sides were almost entirely composed of officers. They cheered every run scored by their own officers very enthusiastically, and were equally generous to the Staff College side, and jokes were bandied about in a free and easy manner which commended itself very highly to the visitors, some of whom were under the delusion that the discipline of the Guards was too rigid for that sort of thing. Altogether it was a very jolly match, and did much to cement the *entente*.

Portsmouth was the object of our next visit, and there we spent a week going round the various establishments. At first it is a difficult thing for an Army officer to realize that a very large number of naval officers have to spend quite a great proportion of their time on shore, but this is the case owing to the fact that there are

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not ships enough in the Navy at present to give the officer of lieut.-commander's rank and upwards, more than half his service as sea-time. But there are many shore activities, and the majority of them take place at Portsmouth, where officers can specialize in gunnery, torpedo, navigation or submarines, according to their bent.

Some of us were accommodated at the Royal Naval Barracks in Portsmouth, and this was something of a revelation to me, because I have not yet encountered in the Army any quarters to compare with them in comfort and luxury. They are designed to accommodate a large number of officers who attend the various courses at Portsmouth, or have appointments on the staffs, and they were built in a glorious period of history when money for naval requirements was forthcoming in a generous manner. The mess is a very comfortable one, and, by reason of the large numbers living there, extremely cheap. A Marine band plays twice a week at dinner, and once a week at luncheon, this being the routine of big ship life at sea. The rooms are furnished like cabins, though, of course, much larger than actual cabins in a ship.

H.M.S. *Vernon* is the headquarters of the Torpedo Branch, and although there is an old wooden ship of the name still in existence, and also used for torpedo experiments, the greater part of this branch's work is done in a fine new collection of buildings in Portsmouth. Here we had lectures on this armament, and witnessed a practical demonstration of minelaying which was extremely interesting. *Vernon* also trains the electricians who attend to the complicated system of telephonic communication which exists in modern ships; in fact "Torps" (the torpedo-lieutenant in a cruiser or a battleship) has to be a man of many parts, for he is also responsible for the searchlights and for the efficiency of the electric-lighting and ventilation. It is by no means an easy job, and many years are spent in *Vernon* before an officer can qualify as an expert.

Whale Island is known as the "spiritual home" of the gunnery experts, and there one can find a gun of every calibre at present in use in the Navy, mounted and in working order. Miles of sheds there seemed to be, and heaven knows how many different types of gun!

The activities of the island are manifold, and I was surprised to find that it was also the headquarters of drill for the Navy. All naval ceremonial is hatched here, and we saw an excellent film of sailors trooping the colour, which is quite an innovation in naval ceremonial drill.

There was a lot more drill to be seen at the Naval Barracks

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Portsmouth, where the new entries are trained, and where petty officers qualify in various subjects for minor command. The Navy has been suffering since the war from a superfluity of petty officers who obtained promotion owing to pressure of circumstances, in many cases, at the time. Some of these men were entirely specialists, and when things became normal again and they had to be drafted to various duties, it was found that they had no idea of giving orders or obtaining the most elementary results of leadership. Now they do a course at the R.N. Barracks, and are trained very thoroughly. The place reminded me rather of the Guards School during the war, except that that was entirely devoted to drill. New entries who go to Portsmouth learn many things besides, such as hammock-slinging and knot tying, sewing, etc ; and these men are not necessarily seamen, for stokers, engineers and writers attend, and already the beneficial effect of a common beginning is being felt. They are taught primarily that they all belong to the Navy.

The Physical and Recreational School is also at Portsmouth, and we attended there to hear lectures and to see demonstrations. In this department the Army and the Navy are very closely allied, and always have been since Colonel R. Campbell was Inspector of P.T. at Aldershot and made a point of sending his staff to Portsmouth for the interchange of ideas. The Army adopted the naval method of teaching swimming *in toto*, and at the same time was able to help the sister Service about other matters connected with physical training. The *entente* between the two schools is still very much in evidence, and it seemed to me that this was the first place I had seen where a common doctrine existed as regards teaching. Undoubtedly the idea will spread, for there are many ways in which the various schools could help each other more than they do, drill in particular. I am one of those who would like to see absolute uniformity of drill not only with the Navy, but with the R.A.F. as well. Competitions between guards of honour at the Tournament, as to new " stunts " in drill, seem unnecessary and absurd. Why should not a committee be formed to produce a common drill book ?

Space will not allow me to do justice to two other naval institutions which we visited at Portsmouth, the Signal School, and the training depôts for submarines and for coastal motor boats. The former has a world-wide reputation for its experimental wireless research, and practically leads the way in this great science. It was pleasing to hear that many of the vital patents in wireless material belong to the Admiralty, and that unceasing work is being carried out to perfect every detail of the Navy's communications. We

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walked through the workshops, and saw the intricate sets being manufactured for service in new ships.

The submarine headquarters, situated at a place called the Block House, was very fascinating. We went for a voyage in one of the boats and carried out a tactical exercise submerged. This became thrillingly realistic as the captain of the boat was determined to show us all the discomforts and excitements that a submarine must endure in action. Personally I found it a very frightening affair, and breathed a sigh of relief when informed that we were once more on the surface and steaming for harbour. But in one way this adventure was a pleasant surprise—the boat was not nearly so stuffy as one had expected, and the noise from the engines not nearly so loud. Every officer on the staff at the Block House was an enthusiast about submarines, and in spite of the manifold dangers of belonging to such a branch, some of them stick to it until they are very senior.

The coastal motor-boats came under the same organization, and we went for a cruise in them by way of completing the experience. This was a sheer delight, as everything was done at high speed, and in the fresh salt air was very exhilarating. The usefulness of these little craft was very clearly demonstrated, but I understand it has been decided to abolish them in peace time because they are expensive in fuel. After all, if they were wanted they could be built very quickly, and the *personnel* can be trained with lightning speed.

This ended the Portsmouth " week," and the only other visit which I shall mention (there were several), is that to the flying boat headquarters at Felixstowe, where we saw seaplanes and aircraft of many types, and went for flights for experience in reconnaissance. This branch is entirely under the control of the R.A.F., but there is a very close *liaison* kept up with the Navy in view of possible developments. Felixstowe is quite close to the R.N. Training Establishment at Shotley, so we were able to make a careful inspection of that during the same afternoon. This is the place where the seaman begins his career, and where he is trained before his first experience of a ship. Many of the boys arrive from the Greenwich Hospital School, where they also gain a little preliminary knowledge, but the majority enlist in Chatham and Portsmouth and are sent straight to Shotley, where they get a magnificent education, plenty of wholesome food, and the best of exercise and games. It was interesting to watch them on parade, and to wander round the buildings, and hear how they are trained. They all seemed as happy and well-cared-for as public school boys. Nor

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does this careful treatment stop when they go to sea, for it was my privilege later to watch drafts of boys arriving with the Fleet and being posted to the battleships : for a year they live together in one deck, an officer looks after them like a nurse, and they even get extra rations while they are still growing. No wonder the Navy has to turn away annually thousands of boys who clamour to join, and can therefore pick the very best. The shadow of the press gang has disappeared for ever.

III. The Mediterranean Fleet

It is the custom for an Army officer who has been attached to the Royal Naval Staff College at Greenwich to go to sea on the completion of his course, in order that he may gain some practical experience of the working of a fleet, and see the general life and service conditions of the Navy, about which he has heard so much in his theoretical work. This is the essential part of the training, and though it is not compulsory, it ought not to be missed under any circumstances. But an Army officer should remember that all ships of H.M. Navy are mobilized, and at full war strength, which means that every single cabin is utilized, therefore his presence is bound to cause inconvenience to some one. The traditional hospitality of the Navy is such that sometimes this fact might pass unnoticed, and that is the reason why I mention it. Attached officers are no use to a ship ; they are seldom qualified to relieve any officer of any kind of responsible work, and in fact their presence increases the work of the *personnel*. For this reason they ought to be prepared to sling a hammock rather than usurp the cabin of, say, a hard-working watch-keeping lieutenant. As a rule this is seldom necessary as there are usually one or two vacant cabins, but the visitor ought to have the fact fixed firmly in his mind that he is not *entitled* to any private accommodation, and be prepared to refuse it should it involve the turning out of a naval officer. The Admiralty is only too willing to do anything possible for an Army officer who goes to sea with this idea firmly planted in his mind.

The writer asked to be allowed to go to Malta to be attached to the Mediterranean Fleet, and a passage was found for him in a newly-commissioned cruiser, H.M.S. *Ceres*, which was leaving Sheerness a few days after the course at Greenwich concluded. Nothing could have been better as a " breaking-in " experience than that short voyage to Malta. The ship had only just come out of the dockyard at Chatham, and dockyard hands are proverbial

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in the matter of uncleanliness. The decks were ingrained with the mud of hundreds of feet, the brasswork had not been touched for weeks, and the paint was old and well worn. This is a state of affairs which overtakes all ships when they get into any dockyard, and it is unavoidable. But it can be remedied quickly when the repairs are complete.

The remedy in H.M.S. *Ceres* appeared to be almost a miracle. In ten days the ship changed her whole appearance, and became as beautiful and smart as holy-stoned decks, shining brasswork and fresh new paint could make her. Yet this was not the most interesting part of the transformation. Being newly-commissioned her *personnel* were strangers to each other when they joined, and few of them had ever worked together before; also, there were many boys going to sea for the first time. They had to be got working as a team, and working with new material which only a few of them knew anything about in that type of ship. During that first ten days the captain and the first lieutenant were the busiest pair of men that I have ever seen, but long before we reached Malta the ship had found herself, and the work was being done with a smartness and finish which was startling. I dare say I am putting my head into many lions' mouths by suggesting such a thing, but as I watched *Ceres* working her new ship's company into "form," I could not help feeling that the Army might gain by commissioning battalions in exactly the same way as ships are commissioned. There is the advantage of the enthusiasm for something new, which very quickly makes its own tradition, and the fact that men are not long enough in the same atmosphere to become stale. However, the point is so controversial that I do not propose to labour it here. *Ceres* had the initial advantage of having always been a happy ship, and this is a tradition which sticks no matter what the change of *personnel* may be; indeed, I was informed that atmosphere clings to a ship like a sort of astral body and remains consistent until she eventually reaches the scrap-heap.

We arrived at Malta five days before the Mediterranean Fleet went to sea for its summer cruise, which was a very opportune time for the writer, because he had time to transfer to the battleship to which he had been posted, H.M.S. *Marlborough*, and to settle down with a new crowd of shipmates, before leaving harbour. Also, there was time to do a bit of ceremonial calling on the many flagships, and to write one's name in the admirals' books. No sooner had this been done than invitations arrived from the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief-of-Staff, and others to dine with them,

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and one very quickly felt that the Navy was eager to prove its friendship with the Army, even if the representative of the latter happened to be a very junior officer, and that one was expected to feel thoroughly at home. Hospitality, thus begun, remained unceasing when occasion allowed it throughout the cruise, the marvel being that one's liver held out under the strain. Fortunately, it was possible to get plenty of hard exercise and thus to keep fit.

In H.M.S. *Marlborough* two very happy months were spent. Numbers of exercises were carried out at sea, while in harbour we had the rowing regatta at Corfu (a marvellous affair involving much intricate organization, and lasting five days, in which every class of boat carried by a battleship took part, and employed a goodly number of the *personnel* in rowing), and, later, the sailing regatta at Volo in Greece. There was tremendous enthusiasm and interest in the rowing regattas, but the sailing races were much duller, probably by reason of the fact that they got a spell of very calm weather, and no sailing race can be exciting when half the boats are becalmed.

The majority of the time at sea was spent in the Ionian and Ægean Seas, and very pleasant cruising it was in those calm, delightful waters. Some of the harbours visited were very interesting too: Mudros, the old base for the Gallipoli campaign, from which a large number of us were taken in a destroyer to see the Peninsula; Salonika, rapidly assuming solidity after the great fire; Kavala, the centre of the tobacco-growing industry. Gallipoli was a particularly thrilling experience to one who had served only in France and Belgium during the war, though the sight of a Turkish flag flaunting itself from Cape Helles, was disconcerting as an introduction. However, when we landed, a Turkish guard, though scowling and suspicious, offered no obstacle, though the radius over which we were allowed to wander was, for some reason, very strictly limited. We were allowed to walk towards the high ground at Achi Baba, and to visit the graves and monuments at V, X and Y beaches; but though, later in the afternoon, we steamed round the coast to Anzac and Suvla, we were not allowed to land there. Still, it was possible to get an excellent idea of the campaign, and every point of interest has been well marked by monuments. Gallipoli is almost exactly the same to-day, I imagine, as the day it was evacuated. The trenches have not been filled in, and it is possible to follow the lines of defence easily.

At Salonika the great road made by the British which runs to

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the Struma Valley, and upon which the communications of our Army were based, is gradually falling into a state of disrepair, in spite of the fact that it cost millions and would be of the utmost value in peace time. It is still possible to drive along it in a Ford car to the battlefields of the Struma valley, but unless the local government does something to repair the ravages caused by winter floods, this facility will not last very long. The Struma valley is now largely inhabited by refugees who seem to scratch some kind of an existence out of the earth by growing melons, tomatoes and grapes. Maize seems to be the only other crop except tobacco, which, of course, is subsidized by the big business combines, and is therefore the prerogative of the landowners.

Life in a battleship is very different to that in a cruiser, chiefly because there is so much more space, and there is enough deck room for the whole ship's company to parade at once. It seldom happens, of course, that a parade like this takes place, but I was lucky enough to see one while I was in *Marlborough*, as the Commander-in-Chief (Sir Roger Keyes) came on board for an inspection and march past. Over 1,200 men assembled in the waist of the ship, and marched past in single file, each man saluting the C.-in-C. individually where he stood on the quarter-deck. I was amazed at the turn-out and physique of the *personnel*, and particularly with the fact that the average height of the sailors was greater than that of the Royal Marines—the latter fact was apparent, too, in other ships. This parade was not a *pukka* C.-in-C.'s inspection, but only arranged with the idea of giving the ship's company a chance of seeing their Admiral, a privilege which ratings such as stokers and clerks appreciate very much because they seldom get the chance otherwise. I had observed the same principle at work in H.M.S. *Ceres*, during the passage to Malta. Each Sunday after Divisions the captain assembled as many of the *personnel* as possible, and each man walked up to him where he stood on the quarter-deck and called out his name, service, specialist badges (if any). The idea is that, not only can the captain memorize the lot if he likes to take the trouble, but that each man can see and get to know his captain. In this way sailors get to know their officers very intimately, and although there is not the same rigidity about naval discipline (to outward appearances anyway) as there is in the Army, the system seems to be just as good. But in some ways there is a tendency now in the Navy to follow Army methods of organization, and the big ships have introduced a system called the " Divisional System," which divides the *personnel* up into four distinct units, in much the

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same way as the companies of a battalion. Each division has its commander, who is responsible for the discipline and welfare of his unit, but, of course, he is relieved of the responsibility of pay and clothing by the ship's paymaster-commander. This system has many enemies, and I understand has only been a partial success since it was introduced. Feeding arrangements have been the chief difficulty, for sailors have to have their meals according to watches, and food must be kept hot for men who are on duty. Also, unlike soldiers, each man takes a hand in preparing his own meal before it goes to the galley, and he can have it cooked as he wants it; he sleeps in the same mess as he eats; he writes or reads letters and books in the same place too. Many times I wandered forward in the *Marlborough* and *Malaya*, the two battleships in which I lived, and watched the men off parade. They seemed happy enough, and were obviously fit and well, but there can be no doubt that they have to live in very unnatural surroundings, much more so than a soldier ever has to face. A barrack-room, even if it be one of the older type, is a palace in comparison with the mess decks of a battleship. Yet some sailors complete a whole commission of two years in one ship without ever going ashore, preferring rather to save money than to see the world!

At Volo, on the east coast of Greece, I left *Marlborough* and joined *Malaya*, a battleship of the *Queen Elizabeth* class. Again one was made as welcome as a man could be, and given every opportunity to see anything that was going on. We did a high-speed test at sea, a very thrilling experience to feel such a huge ship bounding along like a greyhound and quivering with energy from bow to stern; we did heavy gun practice, equally thrilling to an infantryman; we did exercises and manœuvres. Altogether the time seemed much too short when we returned to Malta in October and I knew my time with the Fleet was drawing to a close. But while waiting for H.M.S. *Chatham*, a cruiser in which the Captain-of-the-Fleet kindly arranged a passage to England, the command of the *Malaya* changed hands, and Captain Astley-Rushton, who had been Director of the Royal Naval Staff College at Greenwich, took over. Almost the first question he asked me was what troops were at Malta, as he wanted to start *liaison* with the Army stationed there at once.

It will be seen that the title of this article is "An Appreciation," and like all appreciations it has an object. That object is to bring the officers of the Navy and the Army together when it is possible to do so. We are mixing up to-day probably more than we have

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ever done before, but it is obvious that we have not really started to put our heads together.

During my attachment to the Mediterranean Fleet I took every opportunity of talking to naval officers of all ranks, and it was amazing to find that a large number still think of the Army as a profession in which rich men spend a few years of cheerful existence before retiring for matrimonial or financial reasons. Another idea was prevalent that Army officers cease work every day at lunch time, get into plain clothes, and amuse themselves for the rest of the day. This latter, of course, is an established " leg-pull " with some who really do know how an Army officer spends his time, but I heard it voiced by people who believed the matter to be a profound truth. How I wished I could give some of my informants a week at Aldershot, preferably in the merry month of May !

But little misunderstandings like these are coming right by degrees, and the prospect of an ideal combined operation may yet be undertaken without fear.

H.M.S. *Chatham* arrived from Colombo, where she had been the flagship of the East India Squadron, and I had the further privilege of completing my attachment in a ship which was coming home to pay off. The first few days in the Mediterranean were a delight, and we played deck games and enjoyed ourselves till " Gib " was passed. But after that the elements militated against me then for the first time during my sea-time, and I was laid *hors de combat*. Not for long enough, however, to let me forget to add *Chatham* to the long list of " thank-you's."

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THE WHITE GUARDS OF FINLAND

By Colonel W. Robertson, D.S.O., R.E. (retired), late Military Attaché in Finland

The adoption of precautionary measures against possible revolutionary action exercises the minds of loyal citizens of many countries during the present times of unrest.

Little attention, however, seems to have been paid in this country to the practical achievements of that successful counter-revolutionary organization, the White Guards of Finland.

Finland is a sparsely populated land, the soil of which yields but grudgingly to efforts at cultivation; the climate is hard and unrelenting in its severity during the dreary winter months, relieved only by the short period of sunny summer days from June to September.

The character of the people bears the impression of these harsh conditions; dogged and tenacious, the Finn has forced himself to fight a troublesome, slow and silent battle against the forces of nature. With but few neighbours he has learnt to trust to himself alone; a hermit with strong and primitive passions, an out-and-out individualist.

After Finland was ceded by Sweden in 1809, Russian autocracy never ceased to oppress the Finnish people by countless measures of severity, intended to crush all Finnish independence of character and sentiment. To all such measures the Finns doggedly and sullenly offered passive resistance, longing for the dawn to arrive, when they should be an independent nation again.

In order to find the origin of the White Guards, it is necessary to go back to the first Bolshevik rising, which took place in Russia in 1905 at the close of the Russo-Japanese War. In Russia the object of the revolutionaries was to strive for a general upheaval in order to gain their political and social aims; in Finland, however, the people aimed at regaining their independence and those rights, of which Russian autocracy had deprived them. The Finnish Labour Party committed the fatal mistake of making the cause of the Russian

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revolutionaries their own. The unbridgable gulf lay between Finland's Western social aspirations and the Eastern chaos of Russia.

The Russian Government, fearing that Finnish resentment might cause open revolt, had disbanded the Finnish Army in 1901 ; only one Guard Battalion had been retained for garrison duties, but this too had been suppressed by 1905.

The continual lawless acts, committed by the Russian troops and police, led to the formation of the " Protective Corps," composed of Finnish volunteers drawn from all classes ; these wore a white band round the arm as a badge—the first germ of the White Guards. The Finnish Labour Party at first cooperated in this movement ; but soon punitive measures, taken by the " Protective Corps," against malefactors, who were leading members of the Labour Party, split the movement. The Labour Party formed its own section of the Corps, who wore a red band round the arm—the origin of the Red Guards. The Red Guards were in close touch with the Russian revolutionaries, from whom they obtained arms.

During the rising in 1905 the Constituent National Assembly of Finland, in which the Labour Party was not then represented, acted with vigour for the maintenance of order ; the Russian police had joined the strikers, so the White Guards were called out for action. Several encounters took place in Helsingfors between the White and the Red Guards, the latter being supported by the Bolsheviks.

This first rising was followed in 1906 by the revolt of the Russian troops in Sveaborg Fortress, near Helsingfors, during which the Red Guards joined the mutineers and endeavoured to organize another general strike.

These independent actions of the Labour Party were detrimental to unity in Finland, so the Constituent National Assembly was reconstituted in 1907 into a Single Chamber of 200 deputies, of whom 80 belonged to the Labour Party. From that time till 1914 no further revolutionary outbreaks occurred in Finland, although no relief from oppression was noticeable even after the establishment of the Russian Duma.

During the Great War Finns of all classes longed for the defeat of Russia, but were powerless to take any active steps to gain their independence during the earlier years of the hostilities.

Although conscription had not been legally abolished in Finland, no troops were recruited by Russia from the Finns during the war. The country was flooded with Russian troops and depôts ; fleets of

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Russian war vessels crowded her harbours; a state of war was declared involving stricter control over the population. In view of a possible German landing additional fortifications were constructed under Russian supervision by Finnish workmen, who were grossly overpaid and corrupted by Russian propaganda; later, these workmen merged with the undisciplined Russian soldiery into pillaging bands, which ravaged the country far and wide.

Some 2,000 young Finns, deprived of any opening for military training in their own country, migrated to East Prussia, where they were trained and formed into a Finnish Jäger Battalion for service on the Eastern Front against Russia.

Finland's opportunity arrived on the outbreak of the Russian revolution in the spring of 1917; the Kerensky Government at once restored the independence of Finland, and handed over control to the Finnish National Assembly.

Nevertheless, scenes of wild disorder took place among the Russian garrison of Finland; the soldiers and sailors broke loose from all control, murdered their officers and, turning out the police, dominated the cities. The Finnish Labour Party, with its Red Guards, joined the mutineers, and organized pillaging bands throughout the country. The White Guards, almost unarmed and unorganized, could make no headway against the forces of disorder, and retired to the Bothnian coast and the north, where the Bolsheviks were unable to gain control.

In the autumn of 1917 the Bolshevik revolution allowed the Finnish Labour Party to dominate Southern Finland. It drove from power the National Assembly, which retired to the coast of Bothnia and became the rallying centre for the loyal White citizens.

The White Guards were declared to be Finnish State troops, and formed the nucleus for the recruits who gathered to form the White Army. Lack of arms and want of qualified military instructors were the two great obstacles to the formation of this Army. A shipload of arms had been smuggled in during 1917, and this supply had provided 6,500 rifles, 25 machine guns and some ammunition; otherwise, there were only some 500 rifles distributed among the Whites all over the country. Sixty young Finns, trained in East Prussia, returned home to act as instructors, and were at once distributed as leaders and instructors to the scattered detachments of White Guards.

A White leader was found in General Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, an ex-Russian Imperial officer, who had been born in Finland. Under his capable guidance energetic efforts were made to form a

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mobile field force out of the raw White levies. A school of instruction for officers was formed, where 200 young men at a time received elementary training during courses lasting for two weeks.

But the armament question presented the greatest difficulty; negotiations were opened with Sweden, and then with the Allied Powers, but with no success. Finally, emissaries were sent to Germany, where they met with a more favourable reception. Arms and equipment for the White Army were promised, but on condition that a German detachment should land in Finland and cooperate against the Red Finns.

The White detachments formed a scattered line from the East Bothnian coast, to the north of Tammarfors, extending eastward as far as the River Vuoksen, running into Lake Ladoga.

The Red Forces at this time comprised the Red Guards, reorganized, armed and trained by the Russians, together with many disbanded Russian soldiers and sailors. As the Red Guards could produce no military leaders, the command and administration of the Red Army were in the hands of Russian officers of revolutionary tendencies.

A vigorous offensive was undertaken by the White detachments on a wide front in order to clear the Red Army from South-Western Finland. Then ensued a winter campaign, conducted with great skill and energy under the immediate command of Major-General Linder, an ex-Swedish officer with Finnish connections. In the initial stages small operations were carried out with the object of obtaining arms and ammunition from the Reds; the capture of a few rifles was counted as a tactical success, the gain of a machine gun almost a victory. Casualties inflicted on the enemy, or ground gained, were minor considerations at this stage of the operations.

As the German arms and equipment began to arrive, more ambitious operations were developed. More trained Finnish instructors from East Prussia joined the White Army, and many Swedish volunteers increased the trained *personnel*.

The organization of the White Army was sufficiently advanced by the middle of March, 1918, to permit an advance to be undertaken.

A general forward movement was begun in April. White detachments, lightly equipped and provided with sleigh transport, moved on skis swiftly over the winter countryside; by means of carefully concealed concentrations they were able to overwhelm in succession the Red posts in front of them.

As the Red forces were driven back, they concentrated in the vicinity of Tammarfors, where they suffered defeat in an engagement

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of some magnitude, incurring heavy losses and abandoning guns and arms on the field.

The victory of Tammarfors cleared the western part of the country of the Red Army, which retreated eastward towards Helsingfors pursued by the White Army.

In the meantime the German detachment, 25,000 strong, under General von der Goltz, had landed at Hangö, in the south-west corner of Finland, having established a base in the Åland Islands. Little opposition was offered to the German advance; Helsingfors and Viborg were occupied after desultory fighting, while the White Army advanced on the northern flank. At the beginning of May, 1918, the Red insurrection had been subdued; its leaders had fled to Russia, and 70,000 Red Finns had been captured.

During the summer and early autumn of 1918 the German detachment remained in occupation of Southern Finland, dominating the country and controlling the administration to the consternation of the Finns. The White Army was disbanded, and a Finnish national Army constituted by conscription.

Three divisions were formed on the Russian model, with equipment taken from Russian stores captured by the Germans; in memory of the Finnish Jäger Battalion a complete Jäger Brigade of all arms was organized and furnished with German equipment. These troops were stationed in the south and south-east of Finland, ready to oppose any possible Russian attack; the frontiers to the east and north-east were watched only by special frontier guards.

The defeat of the German Armies on the Western Front in the autumn of 1918 relieved the situation very much to the advantage of the Finns. Under the terms of the Armistice the German detachment was withdrawn from Finland, whose independence was recognized. General Mannerheim became Regent, and set to work without delay in framing the constitution of the Finnish Republic and in reorganizing the country.

A general amnesty was proclaimed for the Red Finns with the exception of the ringleaders, but the country was still far from being in a settled state. Hostilities with Russia still continued, and revolutionary propaganda was widespread.

The reorganization of the White Guards was accordingly taken in hand in the autumn of 1918, as a voluntary military body, composed of citizens zealous for the maintenance of lawful social order and for the constitution of the State. The aim of the movement was to give military training to its members, and to cultivate athletics, so that they might be capable, when occasion arose, of helping the

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civil authorities to suppress riots or disorder, and also of supporting the Regular Army.

During 1920 and 1921 the White Guards assisted the Regular troops by relieving them of certain guard duties, and were especially useful during the winter of 1922, when the Eastern Karelian rising took place across Finland's eastern frontier, and was suppressed by a Russian expedition. During the operations fugitives frequently crossed the Finnish boundary pursued by Russian troops; these intruders, however, invariably retired as soon as the local White Guards assembled and took energetic action.

The organization of the White Guards is kept quite distinct from that of the Regular Army; according to the latest Statute of 1921 the White Guards are directly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief, the President of the Republic, who appoints their commander and the principal members of their Headquarter Staff: the commander of the Army exercises no control over the White Guards. It may be noted, however, that many members of the White Guards are also Reservists of the Regular Army.

For the administrative needs of the White Guards the country is divided into districts: at present there are about twenty of these. In each district there are established a varying number of local guards according to the size of the population and the number of White Guard members. There are now five hundred and sixty-five guards, comprising over 130,000 members. Guards are organized in regiments, battalions, companies or smaller units according to local conditions; they include not only infantry units, but also units of machine guns, artillery, cavalry, cyclists, police dogs, motor-car and motor-boat patrols, etc. Naturally, there is no uniformity in the formation of units in districts, but each district is capable of forming a mobile column for active operations locally, and at the same time of providing guards at important centres.

Membership of the White Guards may be either "active" or "passive"; the latter class comprises those who from age or disability are unable to undertake active duties, but who lend their moral, financial and social support to further this patriotic movement.

The active members are divided into classes: Class A1—capable of active duty and efficient; Class A2—those over forty years of age, fit for guard duty, and efficient; Class B—those not yet efficient.

Non-commissioned officers are drawn from members who

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undergo extra courses of instruction in each district annually ; 7,000 have already been instructed.

The Officer Corps is recruited from young men, over twenty years of age, of good health, regular habits and good conduct. Normally they undergo five short courses of instruction at the special Officers' School for the White Guards, situated near Helsingfors, which is under the direct supervision of the Headquarter Staff. For those unable to attend this school facilities for instruction are given in the districts, followed by an examination by officers of the Headquarter Staff.

The Headquarters are a completely military organization under the commander, divided into two main branches, corresponding to the British General Staff and Administrative Staff ; to the Headquarters are attached the Inspectorate Staff, the commanders of the motor-car and motor-boat services and the commandant of the Officers' School, with a small personal staff for the commander.

In the district and local guards organization a different system of control is established through a Board, consisting of the military commander as president and four—or more—representatives, elected by the members. These Boards perform functions similar to the British Territorial Associations, keeping in touch with local sentiment, carrying on local administration, thus forming the link between the volunteer members and the official authorities. The elected representatives have, moreover, the duty of selecting new members according to their political sentiments, and of keeping touch with the political situation in their areas. The military commanders have only a small office staff at their disposal, but military and athletic instructors are placed at their disposal by the Headquarters according to the programme of instruction.

The standard of military efficiency varies considerably in different districts ; it is realized that the efficiency of the local guards is chiefly dependent on the standard of the officers and non-commissioned officers. It is on the instruction of these latter categories, and not on the individual or collective instruction of the members, that principal attention is devoted by the higher officers.

Fairly long exercises are carried out by guards at infrequent intervals ; this system has been found preferable, in country districts especially, to frequent short exercises. The Army system of training has been followed, but exercises whose aim is to promote discipline only are omitted as being of less value for the White Guards. Attention is given chiefly to drill in open order under service conditions, and to shooting and fire control.

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Besides the normal periodical parades exercises in marching and tactics take place frequently both in winter and in summer; several guards combine together for these small manœuvres, and whenever any considerable concentration takes place, the opportunity is taken to conclude with a ceremonial parade or a patriotic festival of some kind.

The athletic side of the movement is well organized and creates much enthusiasm, especially in rural districts. Ski-ing is the most important sport in winter; all Finns, except a few city dwellers, are accustomed to skis from childhood, and are very expert in their use. The principal ski events are the 20 kilometre long distance race, cross-country patrol work with map and compass, and shooting from skis. Gymnastics take place in the spring and autumn chiefly, in a closed hall in inclement weather. In summer a ball game, called "nest ball," somewhat similar to baseball with teams of nine players, is very popular. All these sports are carefully taught by trained athletic or gymnastic instructors.

There is much of interest to Britishers in the history and development of the White Guards of Finland. The formation of auxiliary forces to supplement a Regular Army finds its counterpart in the British Territorial Army and in the forces in the British Dominions.

The Finnish situation is of course very different to that in any part of the British Empire; the close proximity of revolutionary Russia gives a political form to the Finnish organization which is very marked. There is always the danger that military organizations with a political foundation may become too strong, and seek to usurp the constitutional authority of the State or to oppress their political opponents.

There is, moreover, the vexed question of the use of such forces in aid of the civil power in case of riots—the prime object of the Finnish White Guards. On the other hand, in times of unrest such an organization as the White Guards is a safeguard to a State in which the Regular Army is recruited by conscription from all classes of the population, the political tendencies of some of whom may be revolutionary in character.

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THE TERRITORIAL ARMY

SOME SUGGESTIONS AS TO ITS RECRUITING, ADMINISTRATION AND TRAINING

By "Second-in-Command," a Serving Officer

Since I first drafted some notes on recruiting and administration in the Territorial Army a letter has appeared in the *Times*, signed "Territorial," advocating the abolition of County Associations as a saving in expenditure without loss of efficiency.

I do not agree with "Territorial" in this, but he puts matters shortly and clearly, and his experience is the same as mine in this, viz.: that Associations are not carrying out their duties as regards recruiting.

The following extracts from his letter are worthy of attention :—

"The three main items of the work that Associations *should carry out* (the italics are mine) are—

"(1) Recruitment for the Territorial Forces and arranging for the cooperation of employers for the men's attendances at drills and camp.

"(2) The provision of buildings, ranges and clothing.

"(3) The care of Reservists and Regular soldiers on discharge. . . . Let us look at the three duties of Associations. The recruitment of the Territorial Forces. In practically every place this is done by the unit, and rightly so. The employers and men of the district concerned naturally look to the unit as the Territorial Army, and no Association could undertake this work without the unit's cooperation, whereas the unit can, and does in the majority of instances, do the work without the cooperation of the Association.

"The provision of buildings, etc. This can be done through the units. At the present time, the initiation of every scheme comes from the unit, the Association acting as a post office. The care of Reservists. This work has not yet been undertaken by the Association."

The writer of the letter also says very truly :

"In the Associations there are many men who are interested and anxious to help the Territorial movement, but, owing to the composition of the Association and the small number of serving Territorial officers who meet these men, there is not enough association between them and the units."

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I agree with "Territorial's" opinions as to the duties of the Associations as regards the provision of buildings, etc., although later on in this article I shall have something to say about the provision of ranges. But I do not agree with his views regarding recruitment, except in so far as "No Association could undertake this work (recruiting) without the unit's cooperation." His suggestion that one staff officer and one clerk per division (covering in some cases several counties) could carry out the work that now is, or should be, done by Associations seems to me to be impracticable. I do not agree that the units could, should or would carry out these duties themselves.

The Territorial Army is a civilian voluntary force and, as its name implies, is raised territorially. For an Army such as this, therefore, to be carried on successfully there must be the closest liaison between it and the civilian life of the country. This can best be brought about through the County Associations. Much of the time of Associations is now spent in administrative services. These services might easily be the province of the military, and would be taken over by the War Office on the outbreak of war. If the Associations were freed of these military duties and confined their energies to recruiting and to the welfare of the men outside their military training, I firmly believe that the Territorial Army would soon be up to establishment, and would keep so.

I do not believe that Territorial units can carry out recruiting alone. Some Territorial officers, with local influence, can fill their companies, especially if they are willing to put their hands in their pockets. But this is not true of the majority of officers, and the average Territorial officer to-day, who is generally very keen on training, much resents the fact that he is expected to do all the recruiting for his command and to look after the social and sporting side of Territorial life, in addition to training, with practically no help. I know of one case where an officer was asked by his Association why his unit was under strength! This when the onus of recruiting is laid on Associations.

As regards the sporting side of Territorial life, many must have seen the recruiting poster showing a young man dressed for the running track, but holding in his arms the implements of every known game, and bearing some such words as, "Join the Territorials for Sport." Now I agree that sport is a great factor in recruiting, but is it realized that if all or any of the games shown in the poster are to be indulged in, it must be almost entirely at the expense of the officers? Territorial clubs, also, are a most important feature of

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Territorial life, and are a great help, both in getting recruits and in inducing men to remain in the Territorials. But with regard to them, too, the initiative in starting them and the financial responsibility attaching to them rests with the officers.

It is upon this side of the life of the Territorial Army that I consider that the County Associations and units should cooperate; neither should be expected to carry out this work separately. The members of Associations are the civilian liaison officers of a civilian force.

Having stated where I consider the most important duties of Associations lie, I will now attempt to give my ideas how this cooperation might be carried out, and how Associations should be composed.

First, as to the composition of Associations—I am in agreement with what is laid down in the Territorial Army Regulations, but I doubt whether sufficient trouble is taken to carry them into practice, or to replace (the few) members who do not give of their best. I would like to see more representatives of labour included. I do not think that secretaries of Associations are always well chosen. The work requires an energetic man, who will not spend all his time in the office, but who will get round his county and be in touch with all local centres. He should be a man who can make a reasonable recruiting speech, and who is prepared to do so. I think, as a general rule, an ex-Territorial officer is more suitable than an ex-Regular officer, because he naturally knows better the needs of the Territorial Army, and is less inclined to work in an official groove. It seems to me that the work of Associations is generally too much centralized, and out of touch with all localities except where the headquarters of Associations are situated. I suggest that sub-committees of Associations might be formed in every place where drill stations exist. These should be under the chairmanship of a member of the parent body. Each sub-committee should work in close touch with the local officer, and it should thus be of great value in helping him to raise funds for prizes for local competition, for starting Territorial clubs (which should soon be able to pay their way), for sport, for arranging smoking concerts and for recruiting efforts. The committees would keep alive local patriotism, and the Territorial soldier would feel that an interest was being taken in him by his town. At present, if a local officer is slightly lacking in "push," the existence of a Territorial unit is hardly realized by its fellow townsmen. Already, I believe, each large district is represented on an Association. In my late company's area, however,

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I never found out who the local representative was, and certainly never saw him.

As regards recruiting, I am strongly of opinion that the holding of a properly organized recruiting week throughout the county in each year is the only method, and is of far more value than spasmodic efforts in different localities. This year the Suffolk Association, in conjunction with the units in the county, held a recruiting week, and I shall be exceedingly surprised if this effort does not result in a large recruitment. This Association has also provided a Territorial sports ground. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of the social and sporting side of Territorial life. Many will say that they do not believe in "touting" for recruits, or pampering the Territorial by providing clubs, etc. I believe such things to be necessary, as long as we have voluntary enlistment. I also believe that the better the Territorial is catered for, the better work he will do.

In discussing Territorial training I am not going to attempt to deal with the subject matter to be taught, but with its incidence and with the special difficulties of Territorials.

I will deal first with the quantity of work that should be aimed at, for there appear to be advocates for both too small, and too large, an amount of military education being given to the Territorials. The former school of thought argues that Territorials should be worked very lightly and given "a good time" to encourage recruiting, with the idea that serious work could be started after mobilization. The other school argues that Territorials are paid for their services and, for the short time they are at camp, should be kept well at it.

The correct formula in my opinion is: that there should be as much work as will not stop the supply of the right type of recruit. (The slacker who only joins the Territorial Army for what he can get out of it need not be considered.) The amount of work that can be given, therefore, must vary according to its incidence, its interest, and the comfort and amusement given to the men outside their work. The more carefully the hours of training are arranged, the more interesting the lessons are made, and the more the comfort and amusement of the men are catered for, the more work will be cheerfully carried out.

The questions of the interest of lessons and the comfort of men are principally the responsibility of Territorial officers. I propose first to make some suggestions as regards drills, the most difficult part of training from which to obtain good value. We are told that training should be progressive, in proper sequence, and also that

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individual and section training should be completed before camp! And this, when recruits have only to put in forty hours and trained men ten hours in drills annually. As men are permitted to attend these drills practically when they please, any sequence of training is almost impossible. Attendances vary, and a man may entirely miss one subject, while receiving instruction twice in another. A complete section is rarely on parade together. Luckily, however, the situation is not so bad as it would appear in so far as about 50 per cent. of the men usually put in many more than their obligatory number of drills.

It seems to me that the following system would give a better value to drills. Each drill station should fix and notify a certain number of dates of drill nights, according to local circumstances, during a certain period. Men would have to attend for their obligatory drills during such period. It is only because men know that they can do their drills when they like that they keep putting them off.

Take recruits first. Fix thirty drill nights of the usual two hours each, between February and June (five months), of which each recruit must attend twenty. For trained men fix ten drill nights, the men to attend five of them. I do not think that such a scheme would prejudice recruiting, nor would it stop the keen man from putting in extra drills.

Another difficulty that has to be met is, that in regulations, no allowance is made for the special instruction of non-commissioned officers. I suggest that it should be made obligatory for all non-commissioned officers to carry out an additional ten drills, to be held between November and February, and before the drill season for the men commences. I think that this regulation would be a fair obligation in return for non-commissioned officers' pay, and I do not think that it would be resented.

I have one other suggestion to make as regards winter training. This is that films (if funds allow) would be a particularly useful method to employ for the instruction of Territorials, who have to squeeze so much instruction into so little time. The Hythe films on formations, and on the Lewis gun, etc., would teach the men in half the time of any other method. If each Association were provided with a projector, this could be sent round to different stations during the winter.

With regard to musketry—and by musketry I mean all small arms—and ranges, I consider that the present method of paying flat rate bounties for qualification in musketry, and the method by which men can fire their course at any times, are wrong.

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These methods result generally as follows: The local officer (after having procured the services of an officer of another company, possibly from a distance, and with the obligation of doing the same for him) has to arrange firing for, say, six Saturday or Sunday afternoons. Markers have to be paid on each occasion, whether the attendance is good or bad, and despite this, there is generally a small number of men who have not fired before coming to camp.

This system seems to me to be wasteful both in time and in money, and I am convinced that it does not result in efficiency. Private Jones, let us say, turns up for musketry. The officer of his company takes full advantage of his presence, by getting him through Parts I and II of his Course on the same afternoon. This may be against regulations, but, in scattered units particularly, musketry would never be finished without it. Private Jones's feelings are that he has merely to reach a very easy standard, to qualify for 10*s*. bounty, and does not worry to do any better.

The following method would, I believe, cost no more and should result in more keenness and efficiency, whilst, in scattered units, fewer ranges should be required :—

There should be four battalion musketry days. Each man would have to attend two of these, when he would fire his annual course, as one of the qualifications for his bounty. In other words, he would no longer receive a separate 10*s*. for musketry; I would abolish this part of the bounty and use the money saved in the following manner: men to receive a day's pay for each of the two days they fire their course. This would amount to about half of the 10*s*. now paid. In addition, I would recommend the payment of a bounty of 5*s*. to a first-class shot (or a Territorial equivalent). The remainder of the old 10*s*. bounty should cover the cost of transport from outlying stations.

The method I advocate would I think be a stimulus for improvement, and would also lead to a saving in the cost of markers. Under it also musketry could be properly supervized, as sufficient competent persons would be available for coaching, marking and keeping range discipline. At present I am afraid that, in small stations, there is not always an officer present at musketry, and in the circumstances I do not know that his attendance can be expected.

Another aid to Territorial musketry would be the improvement of miniature ranges in drill halls. County Associations do not always realize their importance, nor do their surveyors know what is needed.

I agree with "Territorial," in his letter to the *Times*, that

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buildings and ranges should be administered by the War Office through the divisions concerned.

I do not propose to discuss other forms of training (outside training at camp) such as tactical exercises, etc., as the great value of these is recognized, and it is only a matter of how much money is available for them.

As regards annual training at camp, I should like to make a few remarks on the arrangement of working hours, on places where camps should be held and on the amusements of the men. I consider that Territorials, being semi-trained and living under crowded conditions, need more time than Regular troops to clean up for parade, to get their breakfasts, etc.; and that, therefore, they should be given not less than one and three-quarter hours between early parade and the main parade of the day. This is not so small a point as it may appear on its effect on recruiting. Another point is that the Territorial infinitely prefers (and does better work), when there is a long morning parade, if necessary to 2 p.m., to having to turn out on afternoon parades. So long as six hours' work has been done, the afternoons should be allotted to games, except for occasional lectures to officers and non-commissioned officers.

Camps should be held where the men can get amusement after their work is finished. They will work the better for it. If the difficulty of finding training ground necessitates camps being situated a long distance from a town, cheap transport facilities should be arranged. The arrangements made for the amusement of the men in camp are generally good; but this does not diminish their desire to "get out" occasionally.

It is a mistake to hold a camp in the county in which the men are raised. My unit has camped three times since the war in my own company area, with bad results from a recruiting point of view. I resent the argument that insisting on amusement for the men means that the Territorial does not take his job seriously. The more the man is looked after in these ways, the better work he will do. So long as we have to depend on a voluntary system, so long shall we have to consider such points as these.

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THE PEOPLE'S WAR IN FRANCE, 1870–1871

(With Map)

By Major H. Y. Richardson, late 8th Battalion, The Middlesex Regiment

The campaign of 1870 opened disastrously for the French. War was declared on the 14th of July, and on the 2nd of September Sedan fell, and Napoleon III. was taken prisoner.

On the 4th of September he was deposed in Paris, and a Republic was formed, the Third Republic, with an Executive formed of the Minority in the Chamber.

This body had General Trochu at its head, and called itself "The Government of National Defence and War," with the motto "War to the bitter end." It issued proclamations to the people, calling them to arms.

From this date until the 17th of February, 1871, a period of a little more than five months, lasted the "People's War." It was on the 2nd of February that Bourbaki and 80,000 troops of the People's Army were forced in a starving state over the Swiss Frontier, where they laid down their arms, and on the 17th of February the plucky garrison of Belfort marched out with the honours of war, a tribute to its gallantry.

When the Government of National Defence and War was formed, the Regular Army had practically ceased to exist. Metz still held out, but surrendered on the 28th of October with 173,000 French troops. Paris was invested on the 19th of September, Toul surrendered on the 23rd, and Strasbourg on the 28th.

During September, however, public feeling was growing against the invader. The various classes of available men were being called out in masses, but there was as yet no master mind in charge.

The Government remained in Paris, but sent a delegation of its members to Tours. The members were old, and the delegation was practically superseded by Léon Gambetta, when he arrived at Tours as Minister of War on the 9th of October, 1870, having escaped from Paris in a balloon. As in all crises, the man arose,

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and Gambetta stirred the people to their depths, and raised a steady flame of patriotic enthusiasm.

Thirty-two years of age, a contemporary portrait shows a dark-eyed man, with strong, slightly hooked, nose, and head carried high. A small dark moustache, and short, shaggy beard, complete the portrait of a face with energy displayed for all to see. He not only had indomitable energy, but enthusiasm and organizing power, and his Italian fire (for he was from the south of France, but of Genoese origin) carried all before it.

He issued a stirring proclamation, part of which was :

" By order of the Government of the Republic, I have left Paris, to bring you, with the hopes of the people shut up within its walls, the instructions and orders of those who have accepted the mission of delivering France from the Foreigner. The situation imposes great duties on you. The first of all is not to allow yourselves to be diverted by any pre-occupation that is not war, *le combat à outrance ;* the second is, until peace is secured, to accept, as brethren, the command of the Republican power which has come into existence by necessity and right. This power, moreover, could not, without degradation, work to the profit of any ambition. It has only one supreme object, one title to existence ; to rescue France from the depths into which the Monarchy has plunged it. . . .

" We have no lack of men ; what has failed us has been resolution, decision, and rapidity in carrying work into execution. . . . We must utilize all our resources, which are immense, shake off the slowness of our campaigns, counteract foolish panics, multiply guerrilla warfare, and, to an enemy so apt in ambushes and surprises, oppose snares, harass his flanks, surprise him in rear, and, finally, inaugurate the national war. The Republic appeals to all for help ; its Government will avail itself of all zeal, of all forms of capacity. It is its tradition to call to its aid young leaders ; we will do it. Heaven itself will soon cease to be favourable to our adversaries ; the autumn rains will set in, and the Prussians, so far from home, disquieted, anxious, worried by our population now awakened, will gradually be decimated by our arms, by hunger, by natural causes. It is impossible that the glory of France shall be quenched for ever, that the great Nation will allow its place in the world to be determined by an invasion of five hundred thousand men. Let us rise *en masse* and die rather than submit to the shame of dismemberment."

It is true that there was no lack of men. The difficulty was how to raise, equip, arm, feed, staff and lead them. At this time, October, there were organized only 40,000 *Marche* troops, 40,000 *Gardes Mobiles*, 5,000 to 6,000 sabres, and 100 guns. In six weeks Gambetta had 180,000 men on the Loire, with most of the necessaries of war, good and numerous artillery, and sufficient cavalry. In twelve weeks he had organized 800,000 men.

When he started upon his great work, there were available in

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the whole of France only 3 infantry regiments, each with 3 battalions, 3 battalions belonging to 3 other regiments, 1 complete battery of artillery, and 9 cavalry regiments.

The *Marche* troops were those liable for service in the Regular Army, and the *Gardes Mobiles* were men of twenty-one to twenty-six years of age who had escaped military service. The People's Army eventually reached 2,000,000 men, 600,000 being *Marche* troops and 600,000 *Gardes Mobiles*. These last varied in military value according to whence they came. Those of Paris were Parisian, those of the south-east turbulent and undisciplined, and those of the Loire and Cher, led by their own squires, fought splendidly.

For a large part of the above forces there was no lack of rifles, guns and wagons, from the great arsenals of Bourges and Nevers. In addition, there was the *Garde Nationale*, which we saw at work in the late war. In 1870 it consisted of all citizens aged from thirty-one to sixty, totalling some 800,000 in number, on whom was imposed universal service for local defence. And it was in local defence that they did best.

Lastly, came 40,000 of the well-known *Franc-Tireurs*, raised as early as September, 1870. They were really scouts, and were mostly armed with revolvers. They lay in ditches, or behind hedgerows, and shot down hostile scouts, patrols and foraging parties. Irregular as they were, and therefore hated by the Prussians, they were invaluable in creating for their enemies a very real "fog of war," delaying advances and instilling caution into all the Prussian advanced troops. Some of the *Franc-Tireurs* were cut-throats, and a terror to their own people. Others, like Cathelineau's, were first-rate irregular troops, with the motto "For God and the Country," and with excellent moral.

Here, then, was a total of some 2,000,000 men, more or less organized, available for operating on exterior lines against half a million Prussians.

In order to appreciate Gambetta's military task, the map at the end of this article should be studied. It shows the extreme deployment of the Prussian hosts on the 1st of January, 1871, and the deployment at the 6th of September, 1914. It will doubtless come as a surprise to many to note the very much less extent of country occupied by the Germans in 1914, as compared with 1870–1871, in which last year the Le Mans campaign brought the Prussians, for a time, even farther west than the map shows, and within 150 miles of the Bay of Biscay.

Gambetta organized his troops in corps—a task in which he was

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much aided by his remarkable civilian Chief-of-Staff, De Freycinet. The *Marche* regiments he called "The Regular Army," and the rest "The Auxiliary Army," these two Armies forming "The National Army." Rank, pay and command were the same throughout. Working through the 89 Prefects of Departments, each of which Departments was to be declared in a state of war if the enemy came within 62 miles of it, he raised 12 corps, numbered XV. to XXVI., and had in addition Garibaldi's Independent Corps, and Cremer's Division of three brigades. Each corps had three divisions, each of two brigades, and a cavalry division.

The rôle of the People's Army was at first to hang on to the Prussians at every point of their vast deployment, and to prevent their advance. By the end of 1870 most of the French corps had been in action, and all had been beaten, though some had been successful at times, but not so as to achieve any decisive results. The causes of this were many. Although the willingness and warlike feeling of the men of the People's Army were excellent, the organization was new, hasty and incomplete. There was a great lack of generals and staff officers capable by their previous training and practice of commanding the respect and obedience of the troops, who were far too apt, being undisciplined, to question all that was ordered or done. But even good Regular troops might have questioned the leaders of the People's Army, many of whom were quite unskilled in the art of war and were assisted by unwieldy staffs, the members of which were usually as ignorant as themselves, and were conspicuous for the way in which they looked after their own comfort to the detriment of that of the troops.

When immediate supplies of *chassepot* rifles ran out, troops were hastily armed with any kind of rifle, necessitating many kinds of ammunition, and making the replenishment of the latter well-nigh impossible. The mobility of the French was very bad, through lack of properly organized supply trains, and adequate reserves of food and boots. In this condition they had to fight an Army which was periodically brought up to war strength and fitness, as opportunity offered, in men, ammunition, vehicles, boots and clothing. The Prussian advance on Paris was a marvel of mobility, as were the various movements made in the new year, notably the march of General Manteuffel on Besançon, from Chatillon-sur-Seine, some 80 miles, the 14th–18th of January, to the relief of von Werder.

The French forces were tied for supplies to the railway, and were engaged against particularly mobile troops. They were, therefore,

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considerably handicapped, and the result of the fighting would have been still more crushing to the French than it actually was, had it not been for the fact that, while the French staff work was very bad, the Prussian staff work, though good in execution, was very often hampered by poor or wrong information. The Prussian Staff, when faced with an enemy of unknown strength, behind an impenetrable screen of hostile inhabitants, *Franc-Tireurs*, and small posts, was so completely in the dark, that nothing could have saved the invading armies had the French Staff been well enough trained to be able to take advantage of the mass of accurate information which it obtained from the front.

The French officers, like their men, were splendid in keenness, but untrained and undisciplined, and there was an almost total lack of good non-commissioned officers to direct young and inexperienced troops in the field.

A fair idea of the various corps, excepting the XV. and XVI., may be gained by a glance at the composition of the XX. Corps, commanded by General Crouzat. This Corps consisted chiefly of *Gardes Mobiles* from places so far separated as the Upper Loire, Jura, Garonne, Eastern Pyrenees, Upper Rhine, Vosges, Meurthe and Corsica. Many of its *Gardes Mobiles* and *Franc-Tireurs*, officers and men, came from the best families in France, and had left all to follow the Flag. The non-commissioned officers left much to be desired, as the men had had no time to learn their work, but the Corps was obedient and brave, and very patriotic. It had all the good qualities and all the faults of young, intelligent troops, full of ardour, but without experience. Its men invariably obeyed orders and endured hardships uncomplainingly. Some had no shoes and few had gaiters, cartridge boxes, knapsacks or camp equipment. Biscuit to last for four days was served out at a time, and was carried *en bandolier* on a string passed through them. In rain or snow the biscuits crumbled away and the men went hungry. In the bags cartridges became too damp for use. Firearms dated from an 1815 converted rifle to the latest American Remington.

Although the men of the Corps were the finest material in France, they were hopelessly at a disadvantage through lack of proper training, leading, clothing, boots, equipment, rifles, ammunition and supplies generally. The resistance of the People's Army undoubtedly prolonged the war for some five months, but during no part of that time was the result much in doubt. The Prussians always won in the end. The value of the resistance lay in the great losses of men and wealth which the Prussians suffered. They began

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to respect their enemy, and many a noted Prussian general who had, like the ex-Emperor of Germany, thought of " the contemptible army " in front of him, got the fright of his life on more than one occasion.

The Prussians were less than 50 miles west of Paris on the 1st of January, 1871, and anxiety was keen at the Prussian Headquarters at Versailles, for the dense fog of war prevented practically any information reaching it as to the movements of the 300,000 Frenchmen farther to the west. These were in the Forest of Orleans, and the Prussians thought they were at Le Mans, a mistake which might have led to a great Prussian defeat, and the raising of the siege of Paris, had it not been that the French Staff was incapable of properly using the information which poured in from the outposts of the People's Army.

Even when the Prussians found out their mistake, and fought and won the campaign of Le Mans, 5th–12th of January, 1871, they did not know of a great French movement which had meantime taken place. The outstanding achievement of the People's Army was, that it made it well nigh impossible for the invaders, without hard fighting with large forces, to discover the movements and dispositions of the French troops. This important result, without which the war would rapidly have been finished, was due to fighting against a hostile population, to the facility with which irregular troops in close country can obstruct all roads and paths with small parties and ambushes, and to the lack of any *ordre de bataille* of the French Army.

For a month the Prussians lost touch with Bourbaki and his XV., XVIII. and XX. Corps. And no wonder. They had begun to leave the Orleans district on the 23rd of December, and on the 7th of January von Werder, round Belfort, suddenly discovered that he had 100,000 Frenchmen in front of him. The French had sent trainloads of soldiers towards Le Mans as a blind. The whole move, ending in the Lisaine campaign, 5th–29th of January, and to the utter defeat of the French, was originated by De Freycinet, and concurred in by Gambetta, with the object of turning the Prussian left in France, relieving Belfort, and destroying the Prussian communications. General Manteuffel, the Prussian commander in the north, was ordered to join von Werder. The cooperation between these two, the stubborn fight put up by von Werder against overwhelming numbers on the Lisaine, the converging advance of the two generals on the unfortunate Bourbaki, and his retreat into Switzerland, finished the war in the south-east.

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The whole French movement was finely conceived, but it failed, first owing to the inadequacy of the staff work (the rail movement was hopelessly slow), then for lack of supplies (the troops suffered severely en route for want of proper food and other necessaries), then for lack of leaders (the movements in the field were examples of thoroughly bad staff work, columns crossing on the march, and corps artillery delaying whole columns while it went forward to the front), then for lack of training (the troops were worn out, and often bivouacked in icy weather in the open, while the Prussians went into cantonments), and, finally, in the Lisaine battle, for two reasons. First, the French were tied to the railway for supplies; and, second, there was no master mind to strike hard. Bourbaki could have turned von Werder's right on the Lisaine, and rolled him up before Manteuffel's arrival; but his indecision, coupled with his subordinates' reports of the exhausted state of their ill-provided men, lost him the battle.

The difference between good and "half-baked" troops was also shown during the Le Mans campaign, in which seven days' severe fighting left its mark on both sides. Ice and snowdrifts had rendered every movement one long struggle, and bivouacking was out of the question. Troops had to go miles to gain shelter at night, and miles back again at daylight, and this gave a very short day to both sides. So the Prussians, although they pursued, did so half-heartedly, and well it was for the French that this was the case. Officers and men alike had worn out their clothes and boots, and rations were scanty. The weather was bitter. Zeal, endurance, discipline and generalship overcame these troubles in the case of the Prussians, but not so with the French. They had fought magnificently as individuals, but the result of campaigning, equipped and provided as they were, was not uncertain. Rest was imperative but could not be taken. One Prussian formation even was so much exhausted that it made no effort to arrest large bodies of beaten French retiring through the Prussian bivouacks—an almost unheard of thing in war.

The objective of the French strategy, once that strategy emerged, was the relief of Paris. This was brought to nought owing to divided counsels. The Delegation used often to send orders direct to formations, past their superior commanders, while the ill-supplied, ill-disciplined and badly fed troops were unable to carry on the campaign away from the railways. Economy of force was neglected. The Delegation sent Bourbaki to relieve Belfort, when a concentration of the whole French Army with Chanzy at Le Mans would have

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observed this principle. But probably the Prussian power of manœuvre would have defeated this last advance in detail.

The principle of the strategic offensive was used by the French on the Lisaine, but failed through bad leading, bad staff work, bad supplies and half-trained troops. At Le Mans it was neglected, Chanzy being on the defensive from the first, at a time, the 5th of January, when the German Headquarters at Versailles was anxious, and when a bold offensive would have had immense moral effect. The principle of economy of direction is not considered by a leader, like Chanzy, who adopts the defensive. The principle of security was well used on all occasions, and the attempt made by Prince Frederick Charles to surprise Chanzy was frustrated by the system of advanced posts which the latter adopted, and by the assistance of a population hostile to the Prussians.


The characteristics of the People's Army were what one would expect of the flower of a country's manhood, rallying to the Flag in an attempt to hurl back an invader over the frontier. They included obedience, uncomplaining endurance of hardships, great dash in the attack, and use of the counter-attack.

The greatest value of these French Territorial troops was their capacity for producing a fog of war, owing to the natural tendency of irregular troops for what we may call hedgerow fighting, in knots, groups and small bodies. By this means all roads, footpaths and woods, besides farms and hamlets, were closed to the scouts and patrols of the Prussians, who could only obtain information of real value by fighting in formed bodies. But this advantage of the French troops was no very solid advantage, because eventually in all cases the Prussian masses attacked an area, if they had been unable to discover a definite place as the position of the French, and then their superior staff work, leading, power of manœuvre, supplies, training and discipline were bound to tell.

One is forced to the conclusion that, though the resistance of the People's Army undoubtedly caused great losses to the Prussians, and at one time grave anxiety at the German Headquarters, nevertheless the war proper ended at Sedan on the 2nd of September, 1870, and after that the French measures for further resistance were doomed to failure.

Had the People's Army been administered, organized, armed, clothed, disciplined and trained, in the excellent way in which our own Territorial Force was in 1914, the result might well have been different.

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[*To face p.* 114.

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BRIANÇON : THE CENTRE OF THE FRENCH ARMY SKI SCHOOL

By Brevet Lieut.-Colonel C. C. Foss, V.C., D.S.O.,
Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment

Briançon, situated 90 miles due north of Nice, and only thirty-six hours' journey from London, prides itself on being the highest town in France. It stands just above the confluence of the Durance and its tributary la Guisane, blocking one of the historic approaches from Italy ; a fact that is made evident by a series of forts, of the period immediately after Vauban, which crown the summit of every peak around the town.

It is the garrison town of the 159th Alpine Infantry Regiment, one of the two such infantry regiments (in contradistinction to the *Chasseurs Alpins*) in the French Alpine Corps.

This very smart Regiment was particularly successful this year at the International Ski Championship Meeting at Pontarlier early in February. The regimental team was first and thus qualified to represent the French Army in Checko-Slovakia, while one of the sergeants was awarded the title of Ski Champion of France.

The selection of a winter sports resort having been decided for me from the glowing accounts of Briançon given to me by the French military attaché, I found myself one evening towards the end of January, steaming out of Paris—a strange Paris covered in a mantle of snow, as was the whole countryside from the sea to the mountains of the Dauphiné. The time table allowed ample time for breakfast at Grenoble and lunch at Veynes, but, owing to the snow, these meals degenerated into a hasty rush in and out of the station buffets sufficient only to grab sandwiches and to gulp down hot coffee.

After reporting my arrival to the charming and helpful C.O. of the 159th R.I.A., Colonel Lardant by name, all was plain sailing.

Armed with a chit from him I presented myself at the regimental ski factory, where I was received by a sergeant who reminded me somehow of a first-class golf professional. He produced

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a new pair of skis, fitted irons, straps, selected ski sticks and issued me with a Tyrolean pack complete with all necessaries for the mountains; and all was done with a fatherly air and the expedition that denotes an expert in his own job.

One piece of kit was new to me, it is called *une paire de bouts de pieds* and consists of toe caps made of felt. They are fitted over ordinary marching boots (being kept in position by laces tied round the ankle) and enable such boots, which alone would not be sufficiently square toed, to be fitted into the ski irons. They have the added advantage of keeping the toes warm and more or less dry. Thus completely equipped from the quartermaster's stores I was ready to make my *début*.

The French officers staying in the same hotel had received me more as they might have done a brother officer than as an officer of a foreign army, inviting me to their bachelors' table and helping me in every way throughout my stay.

I soon learned that the normal hours of work were from 8 to 11 a.m. and 2 to 5 p.m., but these were more in the nature of a guide when the day was spent near barracks.

The students included two distinct categories:

(*a*) Some 10 majors and captains undergoing the course in mountain warfare for a period of three weeks; and

(*b*) About 16 captains and subalterns together with selected non-commissioned officers and men from units of the Alpine Corps who were doing the ski course of 45 days with the object of returning to their units as ski instructors.

The programme included a graduated series of lessons on ski-ing pure and simple, expeditions partly in sleighs and partly on skis, long and short expeditions on skis, tactical exercises on skis or snow shoes, and demonstrations carried out by the Regiment.

The nursery slope (better known perhaps as "the cabbage patch") at Briançon, is termed the *Champs de Mars* and is actually the glacis in front of a portion of the ramparts of the town. Think how much more dignified "I am going to practise my Christianias on the *Champs de Mars*" sounds, compared to "Let's go and crash about on the cabbage patch." Beyond this nomenclature and the industry with which the officers apply themselves, there is no further comment needed on this feature common to all winter sports resorts.

The sleighs take the place of funicular railways. At an early hour the officers (and sometimes their wives as well) assemble at the rendezvous with that somewhat forced joviality with which it is customary to salute the dawn. At the appointed hour a procession

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of *traineaux* or sleighs arrive. Each is drawn by two mules in tandem and the driver is usually an Arab from Algeria, dressed in the horizon blue uniform, but wearing a red fez. These men belong to the Train and are Frenchmen despite their coffee complexion. A *traineau* holds four persons who sit two facing and two with their backs to the mules. The skis and ski sticks are usually stowed upright in between the two pairs of passengers. Our Algerian driver told me in very fair French that he had been two years in France, but was shortly going back to his country " where they have no snow." These drivers are a cheery lot of men and cause every one considerable amusement as they urge their mules, who all have pet names, to greater efforts in a mixture of Arabic and French argot.

Arrived at the further sleigh terminus the officers are turned out and the climb on skis is begun. " Skins " are not used for climbing, these articles being considered unnecessary and too expensive for the hardy soldier ; so wax and paraffin are only applied just before the descent is made. Lunch is taken either in a refuge near the summit or at the sleigh terminus. In either case it is a meal, not a snack of cold food, for which an hour and a half to two hours is allowed. One cannot help being struck by the skill and expedition with which any officer of the Alpine Corps prepares himself a hot meal of two or three courses, his only fire being a form of " Tommy Cooker." Thus while you are skinning a cold hard-boiled egg, he has broken a couple of fresh eggs into a frying pan and by the time you have made certain the hotel people have forgotten the salt, he is eating two fried eggs, quickly followed by a mutton cutlet, which may be preceded by a dish of green peas. The whole is washed down by a bottle of red or white wine.

Another day we visited one of the forts, perched brooding on the summit of one of the peaks some 3,300 feet above the town. After a rendezvous at the local range, those assembled were divided into three parties, the non-commissioned officers and men, the young officers and the field officers. The first two climbed by the *route d'infanterie* and the third by the *route d'artillerie*, the first route having rather steeper gradients and shorter " tacks," the second taking the hill more gradually. As the ascent is made on the spur of the feature, splendid views are obtained looking alternately across the valleys on either side of the spur.

After a half-hour's halt on the way the slowest party reached the fort at 12.30 p.m., and as it was a glorious day with the blue sky of Nice overhead, we had luncheon in the open.

After lunch the staff officer who was in charge of us led us

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to the roof of the fort and took us for a " tour of the horizon." He described how the frontier between us and Italy lay in relation to the peaks and crests immediately to the east of us and thence northward and southward. He proceeded to name every important peak, crest or glacier which was visible. Looking slightly north of west we had a superb view of the Hautes Alpes, the Meije (11,000 feet), Barre des Ecrins (12,300 feet), Pelvoux (12,000 feet) and nestling against the latter (from our view point) was a small erect tooth named Pic Coolidge, in honour of its English conqueror. Opening out at our feet lay the valley of the Durance and to the south was Rocheburne and Col d'Izouard over which the road runs to Nice.

This lesson in topography was rounded off by an explanation of how the valleys and summits have been used in the past in defence and offence.

We then began the descent retracing our upward journey for the first few hundred feet; absolute control was essential, for to leave the track would have meant serious trouble among scarcely hidden rocks on a steep slope. Then came a gorgeous run on a northern slope along the *route d'intendance* over perfect powder snow, with a finish in front of the company on the range.

The kit issued with the snow shoes consists of large felt boots, with leather soles and heels heavily studded with nails, and *raquettes*, which are oval shaped sieves with large meshes of string. They are about two feet long, but have no tail like those used in Canada.

Once they are firmly attached to one's feet, there is no particular difficulty in walking with them, and therefore they are suitable for issue to troops who are not trained to the use of ski.

A demonstration was given to show the comparative speed of small bodies of men across snow-covered country. Three parties of about 10 men each started off at the same time over the same course consisting of flat, gently sloping and very steep ground, the slopes having to be ascended and descended. The party on skis was loaded up with carbines and 10 kilogrammes of kit. The comparative rate of the men on their feet, on *raquettes* and on ski was as 1 : 2 : 4, and this does not take into account the fatigue and exhaustion of the men after they have struggled up to their waists in the snow. In soft snow, where skis would sink about 6 inches, on *raquettes* one sinks about two feet.

Other demonstrations we saw included tests to compare the thickness of snow penetrated by fire from rifles, light automatics and machine guns. A wall of snow had been built of thickness varying from ·75 of a metre to 4 metres. The text-books advise

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2 metres as being the minimum for safety, but actually only one round, from all the weapons fired, penetrated the ·75 metre thickness. This was accounted for by the fact that the snow had been packed so tightly as to resemble an ice wall, which it was not intended to be. We were shown a patrol post built in snow. It consisted of two blocks of snow with a narrow corridor between them ; in each block a series of cubicles, each being a cube of about 2 metres, had been hollowed out and in these two men lay on fir boughs. The corridor was covered with the bivouac tents which each man carries. Fires are lit near the entrance of the corridor and the hot air circulates throughout the building.

Where these large block-houses are not feasible, two forms of bivouacs are employed. In one system the men dig furrows in the snow, and the bivouacs, one for each man, are pegged down between the two snow banks. In the other system the men (a platoon) tread down the snow in a semi-circle and build up the snow into a bank 3 or 4 feet in height on the circumference. The bivouacs are laid out in the form of spokes of a wheel, each two men sharing one, thus a covering of double thickness is ensured. At the hub of the wheel is the fire which is kept alight throughout the night by a sentry especially detailed for this duty.

All the students took part in the demonstration of "ski-jöhring" or being towed behind a horseman at varying paces.

We were also shown short skis used for work on glaciers ; their length was about two feet and their width a little larger than that of ordinary skis. They really replace the snow shoe and have the added advantage that the wearer can glide down a slope, which of course is impossible on snow shoes.

A word must be said about the ski factory. It is run by the military who complete the skis from the rough wood. But by special arrangement the local civilians are encouraged to hire skis from the factory at a nominal charge for the season. This is done partly to train the potential recruits so that they come up for their eighteen months' military service already proficient in the ski and partly to give the inhabitants a means of visiting one another. They live in little hamlets tucked away in the valleys and have been wont to remain cut off from the outside world for the whole winter. Before the advent of the ski the only exercise undertaken was in connection with wood chopping. Hence the civil authorities encourage the use of skis as well as the military. But I gathered that the older farmer, like his brother everywhere else, is a very conservative soul.

It was very interesting to note that sample skis, made of wood

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from French West Africa and Cochin China, were being tested with the object of finding a wood to take the place of hickory which is expensive and does not grow in French colonies. The pair made of teak seemed not altogether satisfactory, while another pair made from a Senagalese wood was unbelievably heavy for its size. It was thought these woods might be used for competition jumping purposes.

I have already mentioned how helpful all members of the School Staff were to me in every way whether they were officer instructors or *moniteurs*, and what a genuine welcome was extended to me by both senior and junior officers. It only remains for me to add that a cordial invitation is issued by the French military authorities to all officers or cadets from Woolwich and Sandhurst to go to Briançon next winter, and to wish those who accept it as happy and as pleasant a holiday as I had this season.

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INFANTRY FIRE-POWER AND THE BAYONET

By Captain F. A. S. Clarke, D.S.O., The Essex Regiment

"Fire alone will seldom force determined troops out of their position. To drive an enemy from the field assault or the immediate threat of it is necessary." *

Commenting on the manœuvres last year a writer in the Journal of the United Service Institution of India states he was struck by the lack of weight in the assault shown in some of the attacks.† Other writers seem to be of the opinion that the mobility of the infantry on the battlefield is hampered and its fire-power unbalanced by the present organization of the light automatic guns within a battalion. An examination of these questions, therefore, may not be without interest at a time when hints of reorganization are in the air and the experiences of the last manœuvres are still fresh.

Bayonet Strength and Fire-power.—To-day a battalion is organized to produce great fire-power in spite of the fact that a large percentage of its *personnel* are detailed for administrative and other duties, and will only add to fire or bayonet-power in an emergency. A glance at "Small War Establishments" shows that, without casualties, a company can only put 72 bayonets into the assault, even including platoon headquarters, out of a total strength of 153 other ranks. Thus a battalion, at war strength, 854 other ranks, produces only 288 ‡ bayonets; of the remainder some 343 being earmarked for the production of fire and 223 for communications and administrative duties, etc. The writer does not for a moment doubt the necessity for the production of heavy fire-power within a battalion, but is the bayonet strength which can be made available for the assault in proportion to the *personnel* otherwise employed? Further, is the organization now in force the best, bearing in mind the many conditions under which the British Army may be called upon to fight? Possibly some organization may be found which, whilst fulfilling tactical requirements, will increase the bayonet

* *See* F.S.R. II., Sect. 13 (3).

† "Some Impressions of the Army Manœuvres," *Journal of U.S.I. of India*, January, 1926.

‡ *Personnel* of Light Automatic and M.G. sections are not included, as they would be fully engaged (in open warfare) with keeping their weapon in action and with its local protection.

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strength of companies without addition to the total numbers of a battalion.

The Organization of Light Automatics within the Battalion.—The weapon now carried requires at least 1 non-commissioned officer and 4 men—a commander, two men to fire and carry the gun and its kit, an ammunition carrier, and a scout. On these numbers any organization must be based.

There appear to be three possible forms of organization in addition to that now in vogue, namely: (A) Three rifle sections and one L.A. section in each platoon. The L.A. section to consist of two subsections each armed with one light automatic. (B) One platoon of each company to be constituted as a L.A. platoon of four sections, divided in eight subsections each armed with one light automatic. (C) The formation of a L.A. platoon or company as part of H.Q. Wing, or in place of the fourth company.

Apart from tactical considerations, which will be dealt with later, Scheme (A) seems to offer the advantage of increasing the bayonet strength of a company without addition to its number of other ranks, as will be seen from Appendix I. Scheme (B) would require the addition of twelve men per company or it will produce two bayonets per company less than Scheme (A). Scheme (C), unless companies are to be reduced to three platoons or four platoons of three sections, or one company is abolished, would require a large addition to the establishment of the battalion. If this unit were formed at the expense of companies, bayonet strength would be decreased. This last method, therefore, unless it can be shown to possess outstanding tactical value such as to warrant either an increase in *personnel* or a break up of our organization by fours, does not appear so practicable as the others.

The British Army has to be prepared to fight under many different conditions of ground and climate against all kinds of enemies organized or not, a fact which must be borne in mind when considering its organization. In some forms of small wars such weight of fire as can be developed by eight light automatics per company may not be required, or transport difficulties render a reduction of these weapons necessary. We know from experience that the rifleman becomes of increased importance in operations against unorganized forces such as are met under these conditions.* The light automatics themselves need more local protection than is usual in normal warfare. It is suggested, therefore, that this is another argument in favour of Scheme (A), as the removal of one

* The latest example may be found in the Waziristan Operations, 1919–1920.

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light automatic will not unbalance the platoon, and the *personnel* of the subsection without a gun will be absorbed as extra ammunition carriers, scouts or in charge and protecting the pack animals. (*See* Appendix II.)

The Handling of Light Automatics.—Two criticisms are often heard. The first is that L.A. sections impede the mobility of the platoon when deployed, and that opportunities are lost in consequence. The platoon commander, it is supposed, slows down his advance to keep the platoon together. The second criticism is that L.A. sections halt too often to fire or are inclined to follow the rifle sections too closely in a series of short rushes. Both these faults can be overcome by training and leadership, but the writer suggests that the present organization is partly to blame. Moreover, we do not seem yet to have entirely recovered from static warfare, its catchwords, and the diagrammatical normal formations prescribed in innumerable pamphlets during the war. Seldom does one see other formations within the platoon than those shown in diagram form at the end of "Infantry Training," Volume I., although it is expressly stated that these are suggestions only.

The problem which presents itself to the platoon commander in attack, in infinite variation it is true, is to produce fire and movement. The rôle of the light automatics is to provide the bulk of this covering fire, as well as being a reserve of fire-power and a weapon of opportunity. To carry out this rôle, they must be moved by bounds, except perhaps in very exceptional circumstances. These bounds are not necessarily the same as those made by the rifle sections once in touch with the enemy; in fact the fewer the moves the better. The ideal is to have one gun firing or ready to fire whilst the other is moved forward to another fire position; once within close range it is a decided disadvantage to move again until after the assault of the objective. It is precisely this balanced movement which is so difficult to attain in practice, and it is thought that failure to recognize this and to think accordingly produces the cause of criticism.

Tactical Considerations affecting the Organizations suggested above.—The system at present in use of dividing a platoon into two rifle and two L.A. sections is a continuation of the organization attained during the later stages of the last war. It has much to recommend it, especially for static warfare and advances over short distances with limited objectives.

It has been stated above that Scheme (A) has the advantage of increasing the bayonet strength of the platoon whilst at the same time

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retaining its fire-power. This in the writer's opinion is a great advantage. From the tactical point of view the following are put forward as also showing advantages of this method :—

(*a*) *In Attack.*—Control by platoon commander facilitated. Fire direction and control simplified. Greater ease in concentrating the fire of both guns on the target of most tactical importance. There is a definite commander responsible for the moves of the guns and concerned solely with his task—fire to cover the other sections.

(*b*) *In Counter-Attack.*—A platoon detailed for immediate counter-attack would have about twenty bayonets available, quite a respectable force under the circumstances. Such an attack could be mounted very quickly, especially if the action to be taken had been thought out and explained to section leaders beforehand. The L.A. section could be quickly in position and once in view of the objective could keep up a continuous fire on it until the moment of assault by firing its guns alternately.

Outposts.—As a piquet a platoon so organized is more satisfactory than the present platoon in that more men are available for patrols, etc. The main garrison of the piquet position being the L.A. section who would also find the sentry over the piquet. At the moment if more than one sentry group is required, one of the L.A. sections has to be broken up to find patrols, etc., involving much shifting of equipment and leaving the gun behind with the Nos. 1 and 2 who are not equipped for any other duty.

Scheme (B) will provide a very strong reserve of fire power in the hands of the company commander. It is difficult to visualize circumstances under which the L.A. platoon could be used as a unit, except perhaps during operations in mountainous country.* It is true that with this method a company commander could employ the greatest weight of fire at a decisive point, but in mobile operations it is difficult to see how he could foretell where this is going to be until the action develops, when it may be too late to move the platoon into position. If in defence the L.A. platoon holds the front allotted to the company, leaving the rifle platoons for counter-attack, these latter will have to rely on their rifles for covering fire.

In an Eastern theatre of war in which the writer served, light automatics when first issued were organized as a section with company headquarters ; the allotment was two per company. These sections formed a very useful reserve of fire power in the hands of

* Would not the tendency be to split up this platoon directly the company moves into action ?

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the company commander, and in open warfare performed very good work when well handled; they were used very largely on the flanks for protection and for covering movement. But the experience gained does not offer much help in the solution of how to handle a unit of eight guns in the hands of the company commander.

Scheme (C) appears to have all the disadvantages of Scheme (B) with the added difficulties of administration when parts of this unit are attached to companies, as they would have to be when in touch with the enemy. One of the characteristics of the light automatic is that it is a weapon of opportunity; opportunities must be grasped firmly, and at once. It is doubtful if this can be done under such an organization, and if guns are permanently detached to companies when in touch with the enemy the advantages of this arrangement, if any, are lost. Moreover, the light automatic lacks the characteristics of the machine gun proper which fit it for support under battalion control.

Conclusions.—The rifle and bayonet are still the infantryman's chief weapons, the light automatic being a valuable auxiliary.* The platoon is the tactical unit of infantry, and as such must be prepared to cover its movement with its own resources. It appears, therefore, that an organization which retains the two light automatics within the platoon, presents certain tactical advantages, and at the same time allows of greater bayonet strength being put into the assault has decided advantages over that now in use. The writer can seen no valid argument presented for withdrawing the light automatics from platoons. In view of what has been suggested above, it appears that the balance is in favour of retaining these weapons in the platoon, but with a modified organization.

APPENDIX I

A platoon at war strength (Small War Establishments, No. XXIII. A11).

Platoon H.Q. 1 officer.
1 platoon sergeant.
1 runner.

Two rifle sections each of 1 non-commissioned officer and 7 men.

Two L.A. sections each of 1 non-commissioned officer and 7 men.

Total 1 officer and 34 other ranks.

Bayonet strength: 2 rifle sections ..	..	16 bayonets.
Platoon headquarters	..	2 ,,
Total	..	18 ,,

* *See* F.S.R. II., Sect. 13 (6) and (7).

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SCHEME (A)

Platoon H.Q. 1 officer.
1 platoon sergeant.
1 runner.
Three rifle sections each of 1 non-commissioned officer and 6 men.
One L.A. section of 1 non-commissioned officer and 10 men.
Total 1 officer and 34 other ranks.

Bayonet strength : 3 rifle sections ..	..	21 bayonets.
platoon headquarters ..	2	,,
Total ..	23	,,

Each L.A. Section organized as below :

Commander (Corporal).

A. Sub-section.	*B. Sub-section.*
Commander (Lance-Corporal).	Commander (Lance-Corporal).
No. 1, No. 2 } Gun numbers.	No. 1, No. 2 } Gun numbers.
No. 3. Ammuniation carrier.	No. 3. Ammunition carrier.
No. 4. Scout.	No. 4. Scout.

SCHEME (B).

	Other ranks.
Company headquarters..	17
Three platoons each of four sections of 1 and 7 and platoon headquarters of 2	102
One L.A. platoon of four sections of 1 and 10 organized as in scheme (A) above, platoon headquarters 2 ..	46
Total	165

War establishment is 153. *O.R.*

An increase of 12 men per company would be required under this organization. If rifle sections were reduced to 1 and 6, no extra men would be required, but the bayonet strength of the company would then be only 90, that is two less than that produced by Scheme (A).

APPENDIX II

A light automatic section scheme (A) reorganized for warfare against a poorly armed and organized enemy, or in mountain warfare.

Section commander (Corporal)	1
Nos. 1 and 2. Gun numbers	2
Nos. 3 and 4. Ammunition numbers	2
Nos. 5, 6 and 7. Scouts	3
Non-commissioned officer in charge of ammunition and pack animals (Lance-Corporal)	1
No. 8. Spare man (with pack animals)	1

Total, 1 non-commissioned officer and 9 men.

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EXPERIENCES OF A BRITISH COMMISSARIAT OFFICER IN THE PENINSULAR WAR

PART I

By H. A. Dallas

My grandfather Alexander Robert Charles Dallas was born in 1791 ; he was descended from William de Ripley, to whom was granted (towards the close of the twelfth century) the lordship of Dallas, an estate in Cantray, Ross-shire. The grandfather of Alexander, Dr. Robert Dallas, settled in Jamaica and became the owner of a valuable estate there, which was known as Dallas Castle ; his eldest son, Robert Charles, inherited the estate, but having a conscientious objection to owning slaves, he relinquished the property, thereby impoverishing himself and his family to a considerable extent. He was called to the Bar, and practised for a while, but preferred to devote his time to literary pursuits. He was the author of several works, and his taste in poetry was good, so much so that Lord Byron (who was connected with him through the marriage of his sister to the poet's cousin) used, in his young days, to submit his poems to him for his opinion. On one occasion, on his return from Italy, he showed him the first canto of " Childe Harold," which Robert Dallas highly commended ; the Poet refused in that case to accept his judgment and declared that he would not himself undertake to publish it. He forthwith presented it to Robert C. Dallas to do as he liked with it. Thus the first edition was brought out by Robert C. Dallas.*

It will be apparent that Alexander (his only surviving son) had the advantage of a cultivated home in which literary tastes were fostered ; he had excellent abilities, he loved good literature, especially good poetry, and was in the habit of committing long passages to memory ; he was musical and a good linguist, with a ready appreciation of wit and humour ; thus, in spite of the fact that he only spent three years at school, his education in certain directions was beyond the average. Added to this, he was brought up in a home where family affection was strong and the moral

* A full account of the relations between the poet and R. C. Dallas was published after the death of both in a volume entitled, " Recollections of the Life of Lord Byron," by R. C. Dallas, edited by his son (1824).

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standard was high, with the result that he developed a strong character and many versatile qualities which made him, as he grew to manhood, *persona grata* among his associates. " What you do, do gracefully " was one of his father's frequent injunctions, and he said in later life that " it grew up with him like initials cut in the bark of a tree, that become more indelible as the tree grows." Certain it is that he possessed the quality of " charm " and won much affection. Another saying of his father's which greatly influenced his life was the following : " The wise and active conquer difficulties by daring to attempt them. Folly and sloth shiver and shrink at the sight of toil and trouble and make the impossibilities they fear."

" Many times," he said, " have they risen to my mind with great power, under circumstances of no ordinary difficulty."

His parents and sisters were reluctant to let him leave the home, but the time came when it was necessary that he should begin to earn a living. He obtained a clerkship in the Commissariat Office of the Treasury when he was only fourteen years of age. His family lived in Camberwell and he was able to live at home walking every morning across the fields to the office in Great George Street, Westminster.

In his autobiography he relates with what delight when a boy he walked from Somerset House to the Admiralty by the side of the great Lord Nelson just before he joined the fleet for the last time ; and how his " great admiration for Mr. Pitt induced him to venture upon a similar apparent discourtesy " when he walked " as near his side as he could with propriety." He saw the funeral procession of each of these great men. At Nelson's funeral thirty trumpeters blew one united single blast before the procession moved, " It was overwhelming," he said, " I thought I should have leaped from my niche—the tears burst from my eyes—and it left an agitation which I did not easily recover."

When in 1809, a British force was sent to garrison Cadiz and to preserve it from Soult, who invested it with a large force, Colonel Gordon sent for Alexander Dallas and offered him the post of Deputy-Assistant-Commissary-General, which he gratefully accepted. He did not sail, however, until 1810. On his arrival in Cadiz, Dallas found himself " in the very whirlpool of the world." At that time the Government and Kingdom of Spain, and also the corruptions of a crowded city, were condensed in Cadiz.

Although it was an invested city, with the enemy a few miles distant, there was no lack of entertainments. He described the *tertulias* in a letter to his sisters :

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"The higher orders are hospitable . . . from about 8 till past 11 every house is open, and every acquaintance that likes walks up to the drawing room, and makes his or her compliments to the lady of the house, sits down and talks till he or she is tired, and then walks out again to some other *tertulia;* a bottle of wine and some water stands on the table in the corner, which is all the refreshments allowed; the Anglo-Spanish families give tea; in some houses there is a music room and card tables are set in the drawing room, but the card players too often gamble. There are some English houses here where the *tertulias* are both respectable and pleasant when the language is understood. . . . A loss of character in a woman here is not considered an offence of sufficient magnitude to prevent a Spanish lady being admitted into company. . . . Whoever does not choose to gamble is not welcome either to the Marquesa de P——, or to Mrs. A——. Is this the society that you would like your son to be introduced to?"

Dallas had not yet reached the deep religious convictions which were the main influences in his later life, although he never was consciously without religious beliefs; he found an antidote to the more flagrant temptations of Cadiz chiefly in his innate refinement of taste, and in the high moral standard which had prevailed in his home, these influences combined with strong family affection were a protection to him.

But these influences did not prevail against the daily inducement to idleness; and Dallas became increasingly slack in his work, and wasted much time in amusements in houses where he was always welcome at any hour of the day. This neglect of work had very bad results in the department and at last a complaint was sent to the Commissary-in-Chief in London. Before any reply could be received, however, circumstances occurred which gave Dallas a chance to retrieve his position. An expedition was arranged with the object of raising the siege of Cadiz by an attack upon the French from the land side, and he was appointed to accompany the expedition, being next to the senior officer who was to be principally responsible. The order for sailing was so sudden that the senior officer and all his department, except Dallas, lost their passage. On the morning when the expedition arrived at Algeciras the General sent a message that, as the senior officer had not come, Dallas was to make all arrangements for supplying the troops with two days' provisions immediately on their landing. He wrote to his sister:

"Though I was rather downhearted at finding myself alone, I managed so as to be abie to deliver everything by 2 o'clock and the General afterwards expressed himself quite pleased with my exertions."

On this expedition he witnessed his first battle, the battle of Barossa, in which the British and Spanish were victorious.

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When the expedition returned to Cadiz attentions were showered upon Dallas and the other officers both by the General and by others; but his elation was cut short by the arrival of letters from London reproving him for his carelessness in his office work and ordering him to be sent to Jamaica. The General under whom he had served suspended the order in view of his excellent conduct during the expedition; but his distress was great particularly from the knowledge of the pain this would give to his family.

The recall was never confirmed; he had made himself too valuable in the interval which elapsed between the appeal to the Commissary-in-Chief and his reply; and shortly after his return from the expedition he was promoted to a position of responsibility in the Isla de Leon. This did not separate him from the allurements of society; but he was active in his duties, and when the siege of Cadiz was raised, and, the British force was ordered to pursue the retreating enemy, Dallas was put in charge of the commissariat of the 1st Brigade. The following extract from his autobiography is of considerable interest:

"The siege of Cadiz was remarkable on many accounts, but specially from the fact that it was upon this occasion that the long-range cannon was first employed. . . . In 1812 the possibility of propelling a shell four miles was a marvel and a novelty. . . . The almost insular position of the City and the breadth of the bay were thought effectually to secure the inhabitants from the danger of a bombardment. There was a cannon foundry in Seville where a clever engineer officer cast a machine which took away this security. He constructed an engine capable of sending a shell within the range of 6,500 yards. Three of these guns were cast—one of them is now a trophy of victory which is placed opposite the Treasury in St. James' Park. . . . It was found by the French engineers that the hollow shell filled with combustibles was not of sufficient weight to make it possible to send them the full distance and they therefore had to fill them with lead. The result was that the shells never exploded, and did very little damage, and the panic soon subsided. Every precaution, however, was taken by the Authorities. . . . A watchman was placed in the high spire of one of the Churches, who with a telescope observed the Napoleon battery where these mortars were. As soon as he saw the smoke rise he struck the great bell of the church. The winged messenger of death took two minutes in its transit from the battery to its fall in the city, and this allowed the people to seek the refuge of the thicker walled streets, or any other safety they could find. The effect produced by the sound of the bell was most striking. I was one day in the Plaza del Correo, a square much resorted to . . . amidst the crowd I was bargaining with a man for the purchase of a set of pictures when a heavy single toll of the great bell sounded. With a rapidity that was hardly conceivable to me I found myself literally alone. . . . For about four months this bombardment continued and its result was only seventeen persons killed

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and wounded. . . . On the 15th of August it continued after nightfall and still on till over midnight. I happened to be in Cadiz and had a bed at my old lodgings on the wall. After admiring the rolling lights in the heavens (for each shell had a long fuse though it had nothing at its end to ignite) till I was tired I went to bed. I was aroused about four o'clock by my landlady who said the French were blowing up their castles, as she called them. I hastily threw on my clothes and went to the balcony just in time to see the grand explosion which blew up the fort of St. Catalina on the opposite side of the bay. From this surprising sight I turned to one quite as surprising, though of an entirely different kind. It was just the time of early dawn; but even at that early hour the people had left their beds, and were thronging the broad walk of the Muralla immediately under my windows. The frantic expressions of delight, the shouts and hurrahs—the loud singing of national stanzas written against the French—all made a medley of madness for joy. Every man or woman was shaking hands with the next person near them, and I saw many embracing each other, apparently without any knowledge of each other beyond the momentary proximity. . . . It is impossible to describe the sense of exhilaration of spirits which is excited by a sense of liberty after having been confined within a circle of fortified walls for many weary months!"

When we consider the splendid organization by which our troops were provided with abundant supplies of food during the late war, and learn the conditions under which the Commissariat Department had to provide for the force which pursued Napoleon's troops across Spain, the contrast is so great that one wonders at the achievement, and that it was possible for Dallas to be able to say that the 5,000 men of whom he had charge "were never without food during the whole march, except the deficiency of one half-day's rations." In this year 1812, he was only twenty-one years of age.

At the beginning all was comparatively light work and the troops arrived in Seville in good order and good spirits. In Seville the Army was in comfortable quarters for a month, during which time the troops were waiting with suspense for orders from Wellington. At last these orders came: 5,000 men were immediately to join the corps of General Hill in the north-east of Spain. These were placed under the command of Colonel Skerrett, a gallant officer who lost his life later in the war. The march was to begin on the third day after the order was received; Dallas was told by his commanding officer that he had been selected for the honour of taking charge of the supplies of Colonel Skerrett's force; he had only this brief interval in which to make the necessary arrangements for what he was plainly given to understand would be a peculiarly difficult duty.

The produce of the country had been carried away and destroyed

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by the retreating French Army ; desolation marked the track of their march. In his reminiscences he gave the following account of his difficulties :

" The first great trouble I had to overcome was how to obtain by hire or by pressing, the services of three hundred mules or horses and a hundred cars. I was armed with plenary power signed by the Commander-in-Chief and by the Spanish authorities, to take what I wanted, with a pledge that it should be paid for. The good people of Seville with all their personal civility, were very averse to give up their animals and I had to press a great many. . . . All the energy I could bring forth scarcely sufficed to get these arrangements completed even with the assistance of a brother officer under me, and with the necessary staff of store keepers and muleteers . . . the authorities pleaded the impossibility of supplying what they did not possess, and stated many painful things of the conduct of the retreating French Army. There were sufficient tokens to justify their statements in the burnt villages, ruined houses, destroyed vineyards, and in some cases, even the burning olive plantations. This made it apparently impossible to supply the troops from the country. . . . Three hundred bullocks were to accompany the force, and I earnestly urged that they should be sent on in advance. This, however, was neglected ; a number under fifty went with us, and the remainder never overtook the troops. . . . Imagine for a moment the position in which I was placed. When I went forth upon this duty of supplying 5,000 men in their march from the south to the north-east of Spain, through districts the greater part of which were desolated in the manner I have described, I had no conception of the real state of the country. . . . I was not apt to give way to despondency and remembering my father's early lesson [in overcoming difficulties] I started from Seville on the evening before the march of the army, accompanied by Andres [his servant] alone, and we took up our quarters that night at Guillena about twelve miles on the road.

" We had not proceeded many leagues without the reality of the difficulties being forced upon us. These realities were enough to alarm us. Six days' march from Seville would exhaust all that we carried with us—what was to be done after that ? It was well that Andres had a spirit in accordance with my own. He had not learnt the lesson taught me by my father, but he was a sharp-witted clever Andalusian, who had learnt a deep lesson taught him by the French. After much discussion one night, he said that he knew the Andalusians well and that he had witnessed many times the manner in which farmers and others had deceived the French, by sacrificing a part of their property, and hiding the larger portion. He said that he did not think any of them would discover the mystery of their hiding places merely for the English foreigners, but that if I would put a red cockade in my cocked hat, and then lay aside my staff feather, he assured me my Spanish would enable me to win my way to their hidden treasures. ' Besides,' he said, ' the farmers have got wives and daughters, and you can win their good will ; depend on it we shall find stores enough ; let us try—*quien porfia mucho alcanza* ' : a Spanish proverb which means, ' try much and win much.' It was to act upon this plan that we set forth on the following morning.

" It was quite clear that to have proceeded in the ordinary way would

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have left the troops to starve, and the hazardous experiment I was making was in fact the only alternative. Andres and I went forth that morning very much like Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. Having made careful inquiries as to the properties and farms which lay at some distance on the right and left of the road, our plan was to seek these, not saying a word of our purpose, but simply asking hospitality. I do not remember that this was ever refused to us and though sometimes we failed to gain anything beyond being admitted, we never were turned from the door—Andres was very discerning and his Andaluz accent was no small help to us.

"We usually began by talking of the horrors of the French, of which Andres had many terrible chapters to relate. This led to expressions of grief at the ravages the army had made; and by degrees we introduced a word of rejoicing that the people had so well known how to hide their property from such rapacious robbers. It often happened that at the word *esconder* ('to hide,') there were indications on the countenances of some of the party which led us on to further inquiries. I am giving a general sketch of the manner in which we proceeded; to detail the circumstances in the several cases would have the character of a romance indeed. . . . Both of us, as circumstances admitted, ingratiated ourselves with the female part of the families. I sometimes found a guitar in a house which was made very effective. Andalusian wit is proverbial in Spain, and besides there is a happy tone of pleasantry bordering on the very limits of joking, for which their rich language affords abundant opportunity. By my intercourse with the society of Cadiz I had acquired this peculiar tone, and I often found it flash good humour in the faces which bore the weight of suspicion before.

"I look back with surprise on the extraordinary success which attended this plan. On many occasions we drew out hints from various members of the same family which enabled us to jump to conclusions which surprised other members of that family as to the concealment of stores of wheat, barley, Indian corn, etc. The difficulty was to obtain access to the supplies when we became aware of their existence; but I had power to give a good price and was armed with plenary authority with the signature of the Spanish official to guarantee that my draft would be honoured in due course."

On one occasion having discovered and purchased a flock of sheep the shepherd led them through a forest and then rapidly disappeared as they reached an open plain taking his dog with him, leaving Dallas to drive the sheep to their destination as he best could.

Whilst these pressing duties were engaging his whole attention, a mistake arose which might have had very serious effects. Dallas having been ordered to leave his office at Isla de Leon very suddenly, was obliged to entrust a brother officer the task of completing the accounts and forwarding them to the Treasury. This was duly done, but owing to some oversight, or perhaps to the fact that they were forwarded by some one else, the box containing these accounts was left unopened. In consequence a peremptory order was sent

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to the Commissary General to the effect that Dallas was to be sent to England. The Commissary General, Sir Robert Kennedy, had in the meantime been receiving reports respecting the eventful march of the pursuing force and the marked ability with which Dallas was fulfilling his duty of provisioning the Army, and, when this order reached him, he wrote back to the Treasury saying he could not spare such an officer as Mr. Dallas. Sir Robert Kennedy very considerately withheld all knowledge of this circumstance from Dallas until the end of the campaign.*

When the force reached Toledo the work of the commissariat officer became less arduous as it was possible to obtain supplies in the usual way; but when Colonel Skerrett's troops reached Aranjuez it was learnt that General Hill's force (which he had been ordered to join) was in full retreat, that Wellington had raised the siege of Burgos and was falling back on Madrid. Dallas's former difficulties were now renewed. Skerrett's force had to join Wellington's Army at Madrid, crossing the broad river Zarama by a long narrow bridge, called the Puente Larga, and Dallas, who had to go forward in advance of the troops to secure supplies, was obliged to wade and swim the river.

The morning after his arrival in Madrid he learned that Colonel Skerrett and his men after making a gallant stand at the bridge had blown it up and were encamped outside the city.

The commissariat department was in much confusion owing to this sudden retreat.

"A large church had been employed as a place to receive a quantity of wheat . . . but as there was a great want of sacks the wheat had been thrown down on the floor and when I went into the church I had to wade through loose wheat at least two feet thick on the pavement. . . . I immediately mounted my horse and went to Colonel Skerrett . . . he told me that he had just received orders to prepare to march immediately. . . . I told him the state of things in Madrid and that an order was given to destroy all the supplies that were left in store that evening and that if he would halt the division where it was for two hours I would undertake that the men should have two days' rations served out. . . . He told me that his orders were positive . . . that they would be off in a quarter of an hour. I urged the emergency of the case as strongly as I could, and at last I said that I would venture to say that the supplies should be served out in one hour if he would allow that halt."

Colonel Skerrett still refused, saying that his men must follow in rear of General Coles's division. Dallas then asked permission to put the case before General Cole, and to this Colonel Skerrett

* The accounts, duly marked as examined and passed, were eventually all found in a box in the Treasury, bearing the name of Dallas.

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agreed. General Coles asked Dallas if he could promise to deliver the supplies in an hour, and, on being assured on this point, he added, "An hour is a long time in our circumstances, Mr. Dallas, but the case is urgent, and we will order the halt for that time." Dallas started off at full speed:

"It was an agitating moment not to be forgotten. I found the Commissariat store crowded with people, and a clamour of voices. Here my Spanish was of the utmost service. In what they call round Castilian, which means very strong language, I commanded silence in a loud voice. I told the store keeper that I must have what I wanted, and be first served by order of the General. I laid hold of the *capataz*, or chief, of a long string of mules waiting in the street for their loads, and taking him by the collar I bid him hasten the loading of these mules, and if it was not all done in half an hour his animals should be given up to the French. My manner was determined and somewhat violent. My Spanish rebuked him for an oath that he uttered, as I put my hand to the hilt of my sword. The mules were loaded and on their road led by their *capataz* and closely followed by myself. General Cole and his aide-de-camp smiled kindly as we defiled before him, and Colonel Skerrett was somewhat surprised when we arrived. But my Cadiz men who had but one day's provision with them had now three as they started on their retreat; and my heart beat high as I took off my hat to General Cole and told him that I was five minutes within the promised hour."

Shortly after this Colonel Skerrett's force was broken up and Dallas was put in charge of the commissariat of the 4th Division. This was a great step for him and a great responsibility. Six thousand men in retreat and supplies very deficient afforded a severe test of his capacities.

"On the day I delivered up this charge and took leave of General Cole with many thanks for his kindness, he expressed his regret in the kindest manner and assured me of his approval of my conduct during the short period of my connection with the division."

After his relief by a senior officer, Dallas was attached to the 16th Light Dragoons on the staff of General Anson.

During the retreat food was often difficult to obtain and for two days Dallas himself lived upon acorns; but in spite of these privations he never seems to have been ill. Some regiments of the retreating Army were as many as seven days without rations; and the regiment with which Dallas served in spite of his utmost efforts was without rations for two days.

Dallas's reminiscences give a graphic account of the distressing conditions of the retreat and of his own adventures in it. There were two nearly parallel roads diverging from Salamanca and a large proportion of the supplies went upon the wrong road. He says:

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" Unfortunately my servants and mules followed this wrong direction which rendered my duty more laborious and greatly interfered with my personal convenience. . . . There was not a single day without continual and excessive rain. I had no change of clothes and no cloak . . . if it had not been for a replenished flask of rum I should have been obliged to give up. I saw many soldiers and a few officers who were thoroughly exhausted and unable to proceed, and who lay down by the side of the road. We had to pass through some miles of the road in which the soil was thick clay and the rain had washed all the surface away. The passage of men and horses had rendered this part full of holes, into which, if you once put your foot, or specially your horse's foot, the clinging clay made it almost impossible to draw it out again. . . . In the midst of all these troubles there was a liveliness and tone of spirits amongst us which kept us in a greater degree of comfort than would have been considered likely by those unacquainted with the strong feelings which supply the constant pride of military duty."

As an instance of the kind of practical jokes in which a British soldier delights he relates how when one of their sentries had been killed, they buried his body and stuffed his uniform with straw. Two or three shots were immediately fired by the French and the mock sentry was then withdrawn and after a short interval was put up again ; thus they amused themselves with making the French think they had killed five men in succession.

" Towards the end of our retreat, I was in company with two brother officers. We had found no place in which we could pass the night. It was raining hard. We had eaten nothing all day ; the evening had closed in and it had become intensely dark. We went on our way and came at last to a place which we discovered more by feeling than by sight to be an entirely deserted and ruined village. Groping about . . . we came to what we felt to be a high wall, the rain came down so straight that neither side would afford shelter, and we ranged ourselves against this wall to consider what we should do. Our consultation was not long, there was literally nothing to be done, and while my two friends were grumbling most dreadfully, I sat on my horse humming a Spanish song, the words of which were very applicable to our present situation. One of my friends rebuked me for my merriment, and told me I had better use my breath in calling for my servant and baggage. I replied jocosely that I would do that, if they liked it better, and in a loud singing voice I called out, *Venga aca Lorenzo, Lorenzo* (' Come hither, Lorenzo '). To our great astonishment a voice answered from the other side of the same wall, even the voice of the identical Lorenzo who said, ' Here I am, Sir.' Lorenzo had been much distressed at the mistake they had made in taking the wrong road . . . and had ventured with three of the baggage mules to find his way across the country. He had come to this village some time before us and had sought refuge from the straight downpour of the rain on the other side of the very wall where we were waiting. This was a remarkable occurrence, one of the very many by which the Providence of God has cared for me even in the lesser matters of life."

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Unfortunately the baggage mules were not carrying food which was of course a great disappointment. However, a tent was in the baggage and they tried to put it up; but the soil was too wet to hold the pegs and they had to give up the attempt. Lorenzo, however, discovered a shed with a good roof, but it was full of Portuguese soldiers who had made a fire in the middle and completely filled the place.

"We gave our horses to Lorenzo's care and proceeded to the spot, cheered with the thought of shelter and warmth. When we came there, with the authority of officers we turned out the Portuguese soldiers, though with some difficulty; and when the place was clear of men we were in the difficult dilemma of finding it filled with smoke. A good fire was in the middle made of boughs of trees from which most of the wet had been burnt away, but as there was no vent whatever for the smoke, the whole shed was one thick cloud, with the exception of about two feet from the floor where the smoke was thinned and more bearable. All we could do was to lie down in this more tolerable atmosphere around the fire and try to comfort ourselves by getting more warm and dry than we had been for a long time."

Some of the Portuguese soldiers came to the door of the shed and asked to be allowed to "do a frizzle" by the fire, as they could not light one outside. "A frizzle," what was that? Their rations, they said. The officers agreed to let them use the fire but they took the chance to buy a few slices of their rations, and "saltless and breadless, with no other sauce than hunger, we partook of the first meal we had had since sometime the day before." One of them went out of the shed to get some air a little later and stumbled across a dead horse! Did this account for the rations? They had great suspicion that it did.

During the retreat many rear-guard actions were fought. The effect of the mistakes due to the diverging roads was very disastrous; many of the supplies took the eastern road whilst the Army took the western; the bad weather added greatly to the hardships of the march. Every drop of water was so saturated with earth that they could only drink it by straining it through their handkerchiefs. In the midst of this distress the burden of providing food for 480 men and 500 horses weighed very heavily on Dallas; although the number to be supplied by him was much less than on the advance march, the difficulty was as great or even greater. At last on the 1st of December, 1812, the retiring force reached Ciudad Rodrigo and both the Armies retired into winter quarters, the British in Portugal where rest and comfort were obtainable.

To be continued.

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THE ARMY COURSE AT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

By Brevet Lieut.-Colonel G. E. Badcock, C.B.E., D.S.O., R.A.S.C.

As one who has had the good fortune recently to go through the six months' course for officers of the Army at the London School of Economics, I feel that perhaps it may be of use to others briefly to recount something of the course and to endeavour to make an estimate as to its subsequent value to those who have already attended it, as well as those who may do so in the years to come.

First of all, it may not be out of place to state where the London School of Economics is, and what it is. It is situated in Houghton Street, Clare Market—close to the headquarters of the Air Ministry in Adastral House in the Strand at the end of Kingsway. It is a recognized School of the University of London in the Faculties of Economics (including Commerce), of Laws, and of Arts. Its Director is Sir William Beveridge, K.C.B., and it is controlled by a Court of Governors, of which Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, Bart., M.P., is the Chairman.

The course for Army officers, which was initiated by Lord Haldane when he was Secretary of State for War, begins annually early in October and lasts till the end of the following March. There is a break of a month at Christmas. Some thirty officers selected from every arm and branch of the Service attend the course each year.

The School of Economics is an extraordinary cosmopolitan place, gathered together there are students—men and women—from every nation under the face of the sun. It is in fact the one great outstanding institution of its kind in the civilized world. Its pronouncements are authoritative. Its lecturers are all men and women of national, sometimes of international, repute. In the school year, 1924–1925, 2,765 students (2,193 men and 572 women) were on the register, of whom 934 were regular students taking full

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day or evening classes. There were 484 students from countries other than the British Isles representing five of our Dominions and forty-one foreign countries.

These are significant figures, for they tend to show how high the world over British methods of economics and finance and commerce stand.

The course for Army officers is naturally a highly specialized one, for in six months they have to do what an ordinary student for a degree has to do in three years. Like ancient Gaul in Cæsar's days, our course, broadly speaking, consisted of three parts :

(*a*) A regular series of lectures on some fourteen seemingly different, but in reality closely inter-related subjects ;
(*b*) Some fourteen special lectures and addresses by selected people, such as Lord Haldane ; and
(*c*) Some ten " visits of observation," as they were termed, to places like the London Docks, the Great Western Railway works at Swindon, etc.

The main part of our course consisted of lectures on—

(*a*) Public administration.
(*b*) The British Constitution.
(*c*) Economic problems of war.
(*d*) Accounting and business methods.
(*e*) Inland transport.
(*f*) Sea transport.
(*g*) Transportation in war.
(*h*) Commercial law.
(*i*) Economic geography.
(*j*) Economic geography of raw materials.
(*k*) Banking and currency.
(*l*) International institutions (*e.g.* The League of Nations).
(*m*) Social institutions (*e.g.* Trades Unions).
(*n*) Army control.

It is in the application of what one learns that the value of any education consists, and frankly it is difficult to say what value the course is going to be to Army officers in their profession—difficult because there are such an infinite variety of ways in which value may accrue. " Education," as the distinguished author of " The Letters of a Self-made Merchant to his Son " once wrote, " is a good deal like eating—a fellow can't always tell what particular thing did him good, but he can usually tell which one did him harm."

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Consider for a moment the fourteen main subjects which formed the largest portion of our course. At first sight they may seem self-contained and disconnected. In point of fact they are interwoven to an amazing degree. Every one of those subjects loomed large enough in all conscience during the days of the recent General Strike. "Yes," the captious critic may say, "that may all be true, but what use is all that to the Army officer?" It is in the first place of this use—that it makes him a better citizen, for it gives him the knowledge better to understand and to comprehend the complexities of modern economic life. We are all of us citizens whether we are serving our country as soldiers, or are engaged in commerce, and anything which tends to make us better citizens—better in the sense of understanding more clearly the inter-relation of the thousand and one factors of daily life—cannot fail to be an asset, and a very tangible one at that.

This to my mind is the first great advantage of the economic course to Army officers. But, naturally, there are many others—for example, many of us have to deal with contractors, and the course gives you an invaluable insight into the law of contract; it teaches one to walk warily when perhaps at first sight there appears good grounds, say, for purchasing in default against a contractor who has failed to deliver certain supplies. Sooner or later most officers have to deal with P.R.I. work—and one learns on this course how to keep accounts properly—not merely the making of paper records showing money received and money expended, but their wider significance as to whether money expended was well expended. Discounts come into the picture—so, too, does depreciation. Again, on billetting schemes—manœuvres, compensation work, and the like, an officer is apt to come into touch with matters that pertain to commercial law, and to local government when he happens to have dealings with county councils or other local authorities. Some time or other most officers go abroad on foreign service, and an officer learns on the course much that may be of real practical value to him regarding docks, the loading of ships, the running of trains, etc. He learns how properly to assess, whether it is more economical in certain circumstances to send goods by road or by train. We all of us in our rare moments of affluence like to think that we know something of banking and currency; the lectures we heard did at least bring home to the writer his profound lack of knowledge.

Not long ago the Prime Minister, speaking at Leeds, said:

"I have often said I regard it of the greatest importance for workmen in industry, and particularly their leaders, to have what some of them

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already have, a knowledge of the industry that they are in, a knowledge of the costs of that industry, a knowledge of the costs of that industry abroad (that they understand what competition means), a knowledge of the methods of marketing those commodities abroad."

Those who chance to read this article will see its parallel in the economic course for Army officers.

I am one of comparatively few officers who has done both the Senior Officers' Course at Chiseldon, at the now defunct School of Military Administration, as well as the course at the School of Economics, and I have no hesitation in saying that there is no comparison as to which is likely to be of greater value. Excellent as the course at Chiseldon was, in the nature of things it was narrow; for administrative work, unlike tactics and strategy, is not peculiar to the Army, and at the School of Economics an officer gets into a different atmosphere and learns to look at economic phenomena from an entirely different point of view; he is given the means of acquiring knowledge, and who can say when something thus acquired, even perhaps unconsciously, may not be useful? One officer may find himself one day administering a British Colony, or in charge of troops occupying an enemy's territory; another may be called upon to make a "lay out" for wharves and railway sidings at an overseas base. Kantara in the days of the E.E.F. is an instance that comes to mind. Yet another may have to make contracts for coal or petrol or clothing or spare parts for mechanical transport. Even in the more peaceful pursuits of renting a house and dealing with tradesmen it is amazing how frequently something one has learnt on the course comes in useful. And last, but not least, an officer is better able intelligently to read his daily newspaper. He knows something about the League of Nations and Trade Unions; about rubber and oil and the sources of his country's supply of wheat; about finance, railways, trams, buses, canals; about Parliament, revenue and expenditure; about the law of contract and property, and the sale of goods; about merchant shipping, docks, transit sheds; the economic geography of the world, and local government.

He learns habits of accuracy, precision in statement, honesty in handling evidence, and fairness in presenting a cause. He learns, in a sentence, as the Prime Minister has said, "to ask not only how? but why?" He becomes imbued with curiosity, and curiosity is the greatest of all teachers.

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THE CHOICE OF OBJECTIVE IN WAR

By Captain H. A. J. Parsons, M.C., Royal Signals

The first principle of war, as laid down in our Field Service Regulations, is that of " Maintenance of the Objective," and it is generally assumed that the defeat of the enemy's armed forces is the main objective in any war of the first magnitude. This has been the aim of military strategy, at any rate since the time of Napoleon, the underlying idea being that, once an enemy's army is crushed, the political object of the war can be attained automatically. The soundness of this doctrine has been abundantly demonstrated, but it must be realized that the ultimate object of any belligerent is to impose his will on his antagonist, and that the defeat of the opposing army is merely an incidental, though usually an important, step in the fulfilment of this aim. It is clearly recognized that offensive action is necessary to bring about the enemy's defeat, but the time has come for the means of attaining this object to be considered afresh, especially in view of the disastrous experiences of a war of attrition as exemplified by the Great War of 1914–1918. Modern armies and air forces have changed greatly since 1918, and still further changes may be expected in the near future, so that one is justified in asking oneself if strategy is about to undergo a similar transformation. Before discussing this question it may be of interest to consider shortly the development of the principle of maintenance of the objective since the invention of gunpowder, the most epoch-making military invention prior to the Great War.

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The transition from the pre-Napoleonic conceptions of the art of war, as applied by the great majority of commanders, to the methods of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, marks one of the most interesting developments in military science. Perhaps the most striking contrast lies in the small number of battles fought in the old type of war as compared with the new. The basic cause of the scarcity of battles in the period before Napoleon is to be found in the comparative poverty of the national exchequers and

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the expense of maintaining professional armies. As a result, governments were very loath to hazard the loss of their armies in battle, and preferred them to occupy hostile territory or to capture cities providing plenty of booty. A general who succeeded in living on the enemy's country, whilst evading an engagement, was counted a great success. The custom of retiring into winter quarters was largely due to the fear of wastage during operations undertaken in bad weather. Further, a long war suited the soldier adventurers, who abounded in Europe during the seventeenth century, as they became unemployed in time of peace. As a large percentage of the commanders, especially in the Thirty Years' War, were drawn from this class, decisive battles were naturally few and far between. As a result of these ideas, wars became long-drawn-out affairs, and operations were characterized by an apparent aimlessness which often makes it difficult to follow them. Actually campaigns were probably more costly in the long run than if they had been decided by a few pitched battles which, although expensive in men, would have greatly reduced the duration of operations.

It must not be assumed, however, that the consistent avoidance of battle was always wrong under the conditions which obtained during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The strategy of the Duke of Alva during his struggles with William the Silent, the liberator of the Netherlands, clearly indicates that procrastination was often more efficacious than vigorous action. Motley, in his "Dutch Republic," writes of Alva: "Since the days of Demetrius and Poliorcetes, no man had besieged so many cities. Since the days of Fabius Cunctator, no general had avoided so many battles." Yet Alva was probably the first soldier of the age. In 1568, for example, he never gave William the Silent an opportunity for a decisive action, with the result that the latter's army melted away owing to lack of money, with no striking success as a compensation. Alva's system was to shadow, not to engage, his enemy, as he knew that no further assistance would be forthcoming for William unless he scored a decisive success, whilst every day wasted depleted his exchequer still further. In the end, therefore, Alva achieved his objective, which was the dispersal of William's forces, without having recourse to fighting. Such methods would be futile under modern conditions, but when armies depended on victory for funds, the man with the longest purse could often win without striking a blow in anger.

The first step towards more modern methods is to be found in the campaigns of Gustavus Adolphus. This great leader has often

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been called "The Father of Modern War," but it is mainly as a tactician, especially in his application of the principles of fire and movement, that he is famous. In his strategy, however, we see a continuous policy, the ultimate aim of which was the destruction of the enemy's army. He refused to move before he had established a secure base in North Germany; when he did advance, it was with the object of fighting, not of plundering; in fact the war became a controlled operation, instead of a series of raids. Although Gustavus's aim was to destroy the enemy's army, we find him refraining from pursuing the enemy after defeating him, as at the battle of the Lech. The lesson that victory cannot be complete without pursuit was not fully learnt until nearly two hundred years later; but this does not alter the fact that Gustavus was probably the first commander of the period to make the defeat of the enemy in battle his objective, and to maintain this objective without wavering.

Turning to the War of the Spanish Succession, we find a continual struggle between one of the greatest commanders of all time and the advocates of the old method of conducting war. Marlborough saw perfectly clearly that the only true objective was the defeat of the French armies in the field, while the Dutch could think of nothing except the capture of fortresses as a barrier against a French invasion. Thus Marlborough's finest strategic conceptions were continually foiled by the Dutch field deputies, and it was on rare occasions that he was able to obtain his heart's desire, namely a pitched battle. The outcome of the great actions fought by Marlborough and Eugene leaves no shadow of doubt that, had they had their own way, the war would have been brought to a successful conclusion far earlier, and at a far smaller cost, than was actually the case. Marlborough's campaigns mark a tremendous stride forward in the art of war; his successful attack at the Schellenberg against a fortified position confounded his critics, and at Ramillies we find a relentless pursuit following a successful action.

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The Napoleonic wars mark a turning point in military science. Napoleon, like Marlborough, realized that if he destroyed the enemy's army he could attain his ultimate object without difficulty; and he had the inestimable advantage of being unfettered by political difficulties and dilatory allies. In Napoleon's time, too, is to be found the development of the "Nation in Arms" as opposed to the small professional armies of earlier days. The combination of these conditions produced a series of quick decisive campaigns,

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in which the heavy losses of a pitched battle proved cheaper than those of a long-drawn-out war of sieges. Owing to his mobilization of national resources, Napoleon could afford the losses in men entailed by his battles; he was able, therefore, to adopt methods which would have been quite impossible to the commanders of the seventeenth century, whose governments would never have faced the prospect of losing a large proportion of their expensive professional armies at a blow. Napoleon's campaigns afford countless illustrations of the policy of destruction of the enemy's army at the earliest possible moment, and under his leadership pursuit after battle became a normal operation of war. The difference between the French Emperor and the commanders of the old school is nowhere more clearly shown than at Jena. The French Army advanced in such a direction that the Prussians were bound to be brought to battle; when the latter were defeated they were pursued with such energy that very quickly the Prussian Army ceased to exist, so that Napoleon was in a position to enforce whatever terms he liked on his adversary. All that the Prussian generals could offer, on the other hand, was a series of useless manœuvres based on the accepted rules of war, none of which had the slightest effect on the plans of the French commander.

It must not be supposed that the lessons of Napoleon's methods were lost on his opponents. It was the tenacity of one of the despised Prussian generals, Marshal Blücher, that proved one of the main factors in bringing about the Emperor's downfall. No one would suggest that Wellington was unwilling to risk his Army in battle, and at Waterloo we find one of the most relentless pursuits of military history. Throughout these wars sieges took a second place; Wellington's famous sieges in the Peninsula were merely operations conducted with a view to opening up lines of advance for his troops; they were not the principal operations of the campaign.

Before turning to the Great War, it is interesting to see the development of Napoleon's methods in the Franco-German War of 1870–1871. Prussia went into the war as a nation in arms, and every commander had the fixed determination to bring the enemy to battle at all costs. As a result of the previous training of the German Armies, the principle of "marching to the sound of the guns" was overdone, and advanced formations frequently became involved in general actions contrary to the wishes of the Higher Command. The wonderful spirit of cooperation which pervaded the German Armies, combined with the comparative inefficiency of the French, counteracted these mistakes, and the war was brought to a rapid

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and successful conclusion. It is worth noticing, however, that the annihilation of the French Regular Army failed to bring about the immediate subjugation of France; the national forces raised throughout the country had to be defeated before the French Government sued for peace.

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We now come to the Great War, which marks the culminating point of the method of making the enemy's army the main objective, on the principle that everything else is subsidiary to its destruction. The war teems with examples of failure to apply the principle of maintenance of the objective. From the outset, it was plain to thinking soldiers that the German Army was the chief bulwark of the Central Powers; once it was broken, the war was as good as finished. In spite of this, we find "side-shows" all over the world. Admittedly some were directed at "turning the flank" of the line of trenches in the West, but others, such as the campaigns in Mesopotamia and Salonika, were undertaken for a confused variety of reasons, and were certainly not aimed as a blow at the main German Army. The truth of the contention that the German Army was the real objective became clear in the closing stages of the war. The last act of the drama was played on the territory of the victorious, not of the vanquished, nation, contrary to almost all precedent; and it mattered little whether the German Army was defeated in Picardy or in the Palatinate, provided that it was defeated.

Although the ultimate object was attained, no one can suggest that the conclusion was satisfactory; further the stages through which victory was reached were many and painful, and often unnecessary. The idea of the destruction of the German Army was pushed to excess in some of the costly operations of the trench warfare period; and the theory held sway that, so long as Germans were killed in greater numbers than our own men, no sacrifice was too great. It was not until the appearance of the tank as an efficient fighting machine that we were able to make real headway, and, even so, it was not generally realized that the way to make use of the new weapon was only to attack the enemy with it under favourable topographical conditions. If the objective was to kill Germans, the logical deduction was that tanks should only be used on ground which favoured their employment, and on which, incidentally, they eventually won the war. The actual capture of ground or tactical localities was merely incidental; what mattered was that the superior arm should be able to exercise its superiority.

The reason for the peculiar turn taken by the Great War was

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the unprecedented masses of men involved, while machines were really of secondary importance. Nations were able to maintain armies containing a very high proportion of their available man-power, and so it became necessary for vast numbers of men to be killed before the war could be brought to a conclusion. With national armies on such an enormous scale, supported by inadequate mechanical weapons, it is hard to see how a prolonged period of stalemate, resulting in the exhaustion of both the combatants, can be avoided. In the Great War two great surprises were introduced, gas by the Germans and tanks by the British. Insufficient study was given, however, to the capabilities of these weapons; the result was the long-drawn-out war of attrition.

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The question now arises: what of the next great war? It is suggested that various new factors have arisen which may change entirely the objectives of the opposing forces; these factors first showed themselves during the last war, but their probable effects are not yet fully appreciated. The development of the petrol-driven machine (including the cross-country tractor in its various forms) and the increase in the capabilities of aircraft are the factors alluded to. The tank, which is the most warlike form of the cross-country tractor, provides a remedy for the prolonged stalemate of 1914–1918; aircraft provide a direct means of attacking the enemy's population and industrial centres. Both require a great industrial organization to provide and to maintain the necessary machines.

Let us consider what are the most likely effects of the mechanicalization of armies, as heralded by the invention of the tank. First of all, it seems almost certain that armies will be much smaller than those of the Great War, as it will be quite impossible for any nation to provide and to maintain the vast numbers of mechanical vehicles which would be required by similar armies in future. As a result, the organization behind an army will become more and more important, and an increasing number of men and machines will be required at home to maintain one man in the field. A second effect will follow from the reduction in size of armies, namely that open flanks will again become the rule, rather than the exception, and communications will thus be more vulnerable; in fact, war will become a matter of areas, rather than of lines. The weaker side, armed with mechanical weapons, will tend to avoid battle with the enemy's main army while attacking his communications; and such attacks may be assisted by irregular forces operating in the areas in which they live in time of peace. If this type of

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strategy is adopted, we may find battles once again becoming less frequent and manœuvre re-assuming its old importance.

In such circumstances what will be the soundest objective for an army and air force? It may be difficult to bring the enemy to battle; with the reduced size of armies and the delaying power of mechanical weapons a decisive success in the field may not be easy of attainment. However, there is one vital point which can be struck, and that is the enemy's industrial organization, without which he cannot long maintain a mechanical army. Here we naturally turn to aircraft, by means of which it may be possible to paralyse to a great extent the enemy's industries. In fact, this is generally regarded as the correct employment of air forces in the future. The importance of industrial areas was not fully realized during the Great War; yet if Germany had not occupied the Briey basin, she would have probably been unable to fight for so long, while France was mainly dependent on Great Britain. If the enemy's industrial areas can be paralysed and outside assistance is not forthcoming, the war is won.

The easiest way of visualizing the problem is to consider the hypothetical case of a war between France and Germany, with Great Britain neutral or fully occupied in another part of the world. What immediately strikes one is that the most vital industrial areas of the two countries (the Lorraine area and the Ruhr basin) lie close to the common frontier. At the same time the actual armies on the commencement of hostilities will probably be comparatively small, with the French Army the stronger, although Germany has far greater powers of expansion. In these conditions, the French objective must surely be to prevent the expansion of the German forces. This cannot be done just by crushing the German Army in the field; but if the Ruhr were absolutely paralysed, the German expansion could never take place. It may be argued that air forces could carry out the task of paralysing the Ruhr, while the French Army sought to destroy the German Army. No doubt this could be done temporarily, but, in default of further experience, it is dangerous to assume that air action can permanently dislocate a large industrial area. We have very little experience of anti-air defences, and these may prove far more efficacious than is imagined at present. It is suggested, therefore, that the French Army ought to strike direct at the Ruhr. This would have two advantages: first, that the occupation of the Ruhr would greatly strengthen the French industrial resources while crippling the German; and secondly, that the German Army would undoubtedly be brought

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to battle in defence of the Ruhr. The obvious German strategy would be to avoid a decisive action and to play for time pending the development of the national resources.

If it is admitted that the Ruhr is the true objective of the French Army, how can the air force help? It is suggested that, rather than concentrate on industrial centres, it should attack the German mobilization and concentration so as to delay the action of the German Army to the greatest possible extent. With the great distances that can be covered by mechanical formations in a short time, a delay in mobilization might prove fatal, and the air force is the only arm which could cause such a delay. While granting, therefore, that in a long war the normal air targets will be the enemy's industrial centres, it appears likely that the initial targets may be the enemy's army (and air force).

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In conclusion, therefore, it is suggested that the enemy's armed forces will not necessarily be the first objective to be attacked in future wars; the main blow may be delivered directly at an industrial area. In all probability such a blow will have the effect of bringing on a general engagement, but the military object of the war will not be attained until the enemy's industry is paralysed. In the event of a war between two countries, whose chief industrial areas lie within striking distance of their common frontier, we may find an apparent paradox in the strategy of the future, namely, that the objective of the army is the industrial district, while that of the air force is the enemy's army. This is directly contrary to the generally accepted ideas of the present day, but it seems quite likely that the petrol engine and the cross-country vehicle, inventions equal in importance to that of gunpowder, may entirely change the character of war in the future.

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THE CAUSE OF WAR

By Major E. J. Strover, 3/20th Burma Rifles

In a recent number of the *Army Quarterly*, there was an article on the inevitability of war.* The writer gave ten reasons which lead to the outbreak of war, fully realizing that these are the " occasions," and not the " cause," of war.

He gives the cause of all war as the universal existence of the combative spirit. He goes deeper than most historians who usually find causes for war which are in reality only occasions. It seems possible, however, that his cause is in itself only an occasion, and that the true cause of war is the motive which creates this combative spirit.

To find the truth let us take a recent example. The cause of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 is popularly supposed to have been the pressure of a rapidly increasing population which forced the Japanese to acquire an outlet on the mainland of Asia. The actual cause is now known to have been the fear of Japan that Russia would occupy Korea and thus establish a naval base near Japan. Fear, therefore, seems to have been the cause of this war.

Now let us turn to Europe and the incessant cat-and-dog fight between France and Germany. French history books have traced the cause of the War of 1870 to Prussia's wish for revenge which had not been satisfied by the victories of 1814 and 1815. They also admit the ambition of Napoleon III. Time has revealed to all historians that the true cause was fear. The French people seeing Prussia, their ancient rival, growing more and more powerful, became afraid. The rapid and unexpected *dénouement* of the War of 1866 stimulated their fear, and public opinion was openly in favour of war with Prussia. Napoleon III. was afraid of public opinion and weakly yielded to the ill-advised popular clamour.

Now let us look at a third example, the greatest and most recent of all.

* *See* " The Inevitability of War," by Captain A. Peffers, The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles), *Army Quarterly*, April, 1926.

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Germany is popularly supposed to have caused the Great War in order to " take her place in the sun " and to find room for her rapidly expanding population. Urged on by such writers as Treitsche and Nietszche, she developed the principle that " Might is Right," and she proceeded to develop and to train huge efficient armies which would give her the right to dominate Europe and to crush such effete or weak nations as had the temerity to oppose her. This has been publicly recognized, but it has never been publicly recognized that Germany was terrified. Wedged in between Russia on the one side and France on the other, with Armies which, between them, were far bigger than her own, Germany saw herself being crushed between the nut-crackers.

She saw the time coming when she would have to fight Russia and France with only the somewhat effete Austria-Hungary as an ally.

Frightened, she looked round for support. She asked Great Britain for an alliance, but this was refused, as Great Britain still kept her policy of " splendid isolation." Germany had turned to Italy and obtained Italy's alliance, but did not trust her. She saw, therefore, that her security could only be obtained in her own strength, and put her trust in her General Staff. With the destiny of their country placed in their hands, the leaders of the German General Staff naturally prepared the Army and the country to be ready to launch an offensive immediately on the outbreak of war.

The preparedness of Germany and her immediate aggression has been considered, even by respected writers, as a proof that she caused the war because of her desire to dominate Europe. Such confusion of thought is largely due to partiality of view. The truth is that every nation armed itself from fear of every other nation. Russia mobilized her masses from fear of Germany and Germany declared war from fear of Russia. France and Great Britain declared war from fear of Germany and the whole world was dragged in.

Fear is the root and cause of war. Fear due to misunderstanding, the inability to see the other nation's point of view. The fear of the democratic statesman who is afraid to tell his nation the truth. The fear of each nation which fears to tell another nation about its own fears.

Great Britain's prestige has never been higher than since 1918. The nations all over the world marvel, and rightly so, at the successes which we, a peaceful and industrial nation, achieved during the Great War. They show their admiration even now by following our lead. Surely then it is our duty to give them a good lead.

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The German is notoriously unable to see a foreigner's point of view. The Frenchman never travels outside his own country.

The Englishman alone has that natural gift of sympathy which enables him to see the other man's point of view. Is it not then obviously the Britisher's duty—the British newspaper editor's duty, and the British statesman's duty—and privilege—to lead Europe by showing that he understands the point of view of other nations and thus try to eliminate that fear which is the cause of most of the evil in the world and chiefly of that most stupid of all evils—war ?

The first step is to broadcast our own point of view and thus to avoid misunderstanding by showing our object candidly. The second step is to encourage other nations to show their point of view and to understand their responsibilities and fears.

It is not suggested that these steps will eliminate war, but that they will at least help to mitigate fear, which is the chief cause of war.

The League of Nations has not abolished war, but, by candid discussion, it has already made a beginning by removing a small part of the chief cause of war. It is at last being recognized that patriotism is not inconsistent with internationalism, and that the best patriots are those who have a wide and just international outlook.

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" DOUGHBOY " HUMOUR

By J. M. Scammell, Major, O.R.C., U.S. Army.

Reading the article on " The Humour of the Soldier " in *The Army Quarterly* of April, 1923, chanced to recall to my mind that our American " Doughboy " * was what Bret Harte would call " an amusin' cuss." There is not the slightest intention of setting up the doughboy as a rival of Tommy Atkins as a humourist. As a matter of fact, it is precisely because the brands of humour are so different that a comparison is at once useless and most interesting.

And yet it was a startling similarity that led to the writing of this article. The story of Tommy Atkins's scriptural quotation, " And the Lord said unto Moses, ' 'Arf right turn,' and the retort of his pal, ' And Moses, not knowin' 'is drill, turned 'arf left," has its counterpart in the American Army. I heard this in the A.E.F., quoted by one man :

" And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, ' Squads east or west, as the case may be.' † But Moses, being ill-instructed of the drill-sergeant, executed ' Squads roundabout.' ‡ Whereupon the Lord waxed exceeding wroth and gave Moses ten days in the ' hoose-gow.' " §

The old soldier has his views, and he expounds them passing well. The following critique of the medical department is attributed to an old veteran ; to his batch of recruits he explained :

" Things is gettin' great. Nowadays when you take on, the doctors round you up and scratch your arm—no more small-pox ; then they shoot some bugs into you—no more typhoid fever ; then

* " Doughboy " is the standard unofficial term used to describe the American foot-soldier. Entomologists disagree regarding the origin of the word. Probably there is some connection between the term and the habit which the infantryman has acquired of plodding *doughtily* through the dough-like mud. They themselves insist that they are so-called because, like dough, they are always needed (kneaded).

† Colloquial for " squads right or left, as the case may be "—an expression culled from the I.D.R.

‡ Colloquial for " squads right about."

§ The " hoosegow " is colloquial for the guard house. Syn. " brig," " cooler," " can," etc.

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they shoot some more bugs into you—no more pneumonia. By-an'-by they'll tatoo a pork chop and a fried egg on your arm, and there you are—rationed for your hitch."

Sergeants can be so thoughtful! The cavalry "rookie" who said to the stable sergeant, "Sergeant, please pick me out a nice, gentle, peace-loving horse," met with the sympathetic question: "Did ye ever ride a horse before?" "No," said the recruit. "Well," said the amiable sergeant, "here you are. Just the very animal for you. Never been ridden before. You can both start out together."

One of the stories that was told at every post during the war concerns a recruit doing his first tour of guard duty. Late at night an officer returned to camp. "Halt!" came the challenge. The officer halted. A long, painful silence ensued. The officer impatiently began to advance. "Halt!" came the order once more. Another pause. Again the officer began to advance. A rifle bolt rattled—"Halt!" The officer, now thoroughly exasperated, demanded: "Sentry, what are your orders?" In a trembling voice came the answer: "To say 'halt' three times and then shoot."

There is another sentry story told about a tremendously tall officer, standing six feet four inches in his stockinged feet. One dark night he was challenged: "Halt! Who's there?" "Officer of the camp," he replied. "Dismount, officer of the camp, and advance to be recognized," came the order.

The following story is told of a sentry in the Toul sector. It was one of the raw, foggy days not uncommon in some parts of "Sunny France." Through the fog the sentry saw a figure approaching. "Halt!" he challenged, "Who's there?" "Colonel Blank," was the response. "Welcome to our mist, Colonel," came the unconventional reply.

Perhaps the following is not, strictly speaking, an example of soldier humour, but it is a good war story. It concerns a Jewish soldier who was mustered out. His friend said to him, "So you was in the Army, Ikey?" "Sure, I was in the Army." "Did you get a commission?" "No; straight salary."

The Mess sergeant is a personage in the U.S. Army. It is wise to cultivate him. "Got anything to eat, Sergeant?" asked a "Buck private." "I wouldn't go so far as to say that," replied the dignitary, "but I can give you a plateful of 'slum.'"

Another doughboy, the day that new boots had been issued and the old ones turned in to the salvage depôt, was struggling with

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a piece of beef that was putting up a magnificent defence. Turning to the Mess sergeant he said significantly: " We don't draw any rations from the salvage depôt, do we, Sergeant ? "

To " slum," beans and " Canned Willie," there was added during the war by way of " variety " tinned salmon. This was straightway dubbed " Goldfish."

In the area in France where I served for six months, there was what I used to call a " crop-waving general "—the kind that would get red in the face and neck, nearly burst, and wave his crop about like a baton to beat time to his blistering profanity. This type, I hasten to add, is now about obsolete. Well, this general was a rigid disciplinarian, and even his official car must be saluted on all occasions. Once his car, in a swirl of dust, passed the recumbent figure of a doughboy stretched flat on his back on the grass by the roadside, puffing unconcernedly at a fag. The general's car shrieked to a sudden stop ; then slowly backed up to the amazed soldier. " Young man," roared the general, " come here ! " Impressed by the unexpected attention, the doughboy drew near. " Why didn't you salute me ? " bellowed the irate general. The soldier struggled unsuccessfully to mobilize his vocal paraphernalia, but an awkward silence was the best he could do. " Why didn't you salute me ? " again demanded the general. " Well, sir," faltered the casual, " you didn't look like no general to me." The explanation, apparently, was sufficient. The general knew that " the drinks were on him," because he told the story himself.

The French locomotives and coaches were a source of amusement to the American soldier. Accustomed to the big " bull " American locomotives with their hoarse virile voices, the shrill whistles of the French engines appeared effeminate. The day I landed at Brest one of the soldiers saw a string of French railway coaches, and ran over to " play with them." Jocularly he put his shoulder to one, and to his delight found that he could move them. " Aren't they ' cute ' ? " he asked. " I'm goin' to take them home for the kids."

The story is told of an American unit which had been ordered to dig in. The earth was flying industriously except at one point where blue cigarette smoke curled lazily into the air. The lieutenant ran over in that direction. " Dig in ! Dig in ! " he cried. " Hush," came a reproachful voice, " you will disturb my contractor." Closer inspection disclosed a Boche turning up the sacred soil of France as only a Boche could do. He was only a few inches from the muzzle of the recumbent doughboy's rifle.

Another story of digging in is told, in which the soldier stopped

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his labour to draw a fag from the package in a pouch of his ammunition belt—a favourite and convenient place for cigarettes. Seeing a khaki-clad figure passing, he called out: "Hey, buddie, gimme a light." The other obligingly held out a burning match. The doughboy, looking up to thank his "buddie" discovered to his amazement the star of a brigadier. "I beg your pardon, sir," he said, "I didn't mean any disrespect. I didn't notice you was a general." "That's all right, buddie," said the general—who apparently was a "regular guy"—"but you should thank God I wasn't a second lieutenant."

My own "outfit" provided considerable amusement. It was the "Wild West" division. In my company was a long, rangy corporal—an ex-cowboy. At halts I used to like to repose behind a hedge or some other screen, and listen to his picturesque comments. I recall one apt description. He was telling about a tall, thin friend. "Bill was so thin," said the corporal, "that when he went to put his pants on in the mornin', it looked like a rat-tail goin' into a bar'l."

We were making a night march to the front. The road was long and the packs were heavy. It was pitch dark. From the ranks came a disgusted voice saying, "'Join the Army and see the world.'" * From another squad a second voice chimed in, adding "On foot!" From elsewhere a third supplemented, "And at night!"

Of course our coloured soldiers provided the A.E.F. with a neverfailing and peculiar brand of humour. The story is told of a negro parson who was caught in "de suction," as some of them called the draft, and who became a chaplain. Being a good Baptist he conducted revival services and, in the month of January, decided to hold a baptism. It was a bitter cold day and the river was frozen. It became necessary to chop a hole in the ice through which to immerse the candidates for eternal glory. The first ardour of some of the converts was sensibly cooled by the prospects of so ill-timed a baptism, and they preferred the future prospects of a too-warm climate to the immediate certainly of an icy plunge. But the chaplain would have none of such pusillanimity. Laying hands upon the nearest soldier, he plunged him into the hole in the ice. The swift current seized upon the luckless candidate and bore him straightway off to the pearly gates. But the parson was scarcely disconcerted. It was just the dramatic touch required to

* A quotation from that versatile author "Anon," who wrote the descriptive literature on recruiting posters.

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make the occasion a grand success. In a fine frenzy he intoned: " De Lawd giveth an' de Lawd taketh away. Bring me anothah privit."

These coloured soldiers were amazingly frank in their discussion concerning their fears. They generally managed to express themselves in vivid and picturesque terms. A story is told of two soldiers in a coloured division sent into the line in the Argonne. They were told that they would attack the next day, and that 60,000 white troops were back of them in support. " Sam," said one to the other, " what yo' all reckon them there papahs back home gwine ter say 'bout us termorrow ? " " Ah don' 'zackly know, niggah," replied Sam, " but ef yo'all feels lak Ah does, dey's gwine ter have big black headlines right across de page: " SIXTY THOUSAND WHITE TROOPS TROMPED TO DEATH."

One of the reasons why few American coloured troops were good combat troops was that they had coloured officers. There is more real colour discrimination between different classes and colours of negroes than there is between negroes and whites. Except for " po' white trash," the Southern negro admits as a matter of course that a white man is to be depended upon. Were this not a circumscribed subject, I could give examples coming under my own notice. But the coloured soldier's attitude towards his coloured officers is well illustrated by the following story. " Where is headquarters ? " a newly arrived colonel asked a coloured soldier. " Ah don' know, boss," he replied. " There is an officer; go ask him," said the colonel. " He don' know neithah, colonel, sah," said the chocolate soldier, " he's only a niggah too."

The result was that when the coloured division referred to above had come to the time for attack and whizz-bangs began to come over, they broke and streamed to the rear. One of the divisions in support was the " All American," composed of men from every section of the Union. Among them were some Southerners. As the dusky warriors swarmed past, one called out, " Hey, there, nigger! Weren't there any trees up there ? " " Trees, white man ? " the ebony soldier instantly called back, " there wa'nt enough trees fo' de officahs."

Another coloured soldier was halted by a colonel. " What are you retreating for ? " asked the officer. " Retreatin', boss ? Ah ain't retreatin'. But Ah sure has passed a lot what is."

Another was leggin it past division headquarters. The major-general stepped out to stop him. " I'm your general," he announced. " Golly, boss, is I back that far ? "

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Of course, there were those who stood by and did their bit. Sometimes they were a bit informal and substituted an imaginative formula instead of routine commands. There is a story told about a coloured sergeant of artillery who gave his orders for firing something like this: "Mistah Kaisah, count yo' men. Open de do'. Walk right in. Close de do'. Pull de latch. Mistah Kaisah, count yo' men again."

The same quality was displayed by the darkey who approached his captain with a complaint about his boots. "Cap'n, suh," said he, "mah shoes am too big."

"You'll have to do the best you can," replied the captain, who was a-wearied with complaints. "Plenty of men in this Army have shoes that don't quite fit."

"Don' *quite* fit, Cap'n, suh," said Private Cole, "dey don' fit *nohow*. Does yo' say 'tenshun, Cap'n, Ah comes to 'tenshun. Does yo' say right 'bout face, Ah right 'bout faces, but mah shoes stays at 'tenshun."

No account of the American soldier would be complete without some reference to his partiality for the game of "African Golf," or "Liberian Checquers" as it was sometimes called. This game is played with trained or untrained celluloid or bone cubes marked with dots. If one hears a snapping of fingers accompanying grunts, profanity and such exhortations or comments as "Baby needs a pair of shoes," "Shoot it all," "Little Joe," "Snake's eyes," "A natural," "Read 'em and weep," etc., the chances are that the doughboys are engaged in adjusting the distribution of wealth by means of "shooting craps." After a run of seven straight "naturals" one player once remarked optimistically, "Now I am just even." "Even with who?" demanded a player who was, if not "broke," at least badly bent. "You mean even with Carnegie?"

In the Army of Occupation in Germany there was a corporal who was interested in history. He learned that the town in which he was billetted had once been the home of Martin Luther, and he decided to make a pilgrimage to the house if he could find it. In his squad there was a private who spoke German, so to him the corporal applied for help. That evening the private came in convulsed with merriment. "By gosh, corporal," he said, "that's a good one on you. You know that bird Luther you been askin' about? Say, that baby's been dead for three hundred years."

On the transport coming home I used to hear a fanciful expression. In mid-ocean the horizon appears to be up-hill. When some impatient doughboy would complain of the slowness of the

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ship, another would say, " That's all right, buddie ; it's naturally slow work climbing this hill, but just wait until we get to the top and begin to slide down the other side."

But to my mind the most brilliant piece of wit in the American Army during the war came to pass in the spring of 1919. Two years before, Pershing had landed and had supposedly made the historic remark : " Lafayette, we are here ! " Two years later the " Stars and Stripes," the newspaper of the A.E.F., came out with this bold headline : " Lafayette, we are here yet ! "

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NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

THE most interesting books of the quarter are Volume III of the German official account of the war, reviewed in a special article; the fifth volume of the late Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf's papers; Colonel Schraudenbach's account of his adventures with the Turkish Army; and the American General Harbord's "Leaves from a Diary." These three books are placed first in this collection of reviews.

AUSTRIA

The fifth volume of the military papers of the late Field-Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf: *Aus meiner Dienstzeit* (*Vienna, Rikola*, £1 12*s*.), was completed shortly before the author's death. It deals with the period October, November and December, 1914, and therefore with the Austro-German offensive against Warsaw, the retreat, the Russian advance against Silesia, the counter-offensive of Lodz, the winter-fighting in the Carpathians, and also with the second unsuccessful offensive against Serbia. We are shown how the war appeared to the Austrian Chief of the Staff day by day, Army by Army, and are given the Army reports and important correspondence received, the usual notes of important interviews, and the confidential reports for the Emperor Franz-Joseph, written to his A.D.C., General von Bolfras. By looking at the excellent series of daily situation maps, we get a very good idea of what took place without wading through the mass of difficult place-names in the text. Conrad is at some pains to show that, so far from the Austrians leaving the Germans in the lurch before Warsaw in October, 1914, it was the latter who went first, swinging back and exposing the Austrian left.

A number of points of general interest crop up in the course of this important volume of 985 pages. The Austrian campaign, Conrad writes to Bolfras, was based on the assumptions that the Germans would arrange their offensive into Poland to take place at the same time as the Austrian advance, and that they would

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rapidly (about the fortieth day) obtain a great success in France and then send large forces to assist Austria. "Both assumptions proved false." The removal of Moltke from the post of Chief of the General Staff on the 15th of September, 1914, was concealed from Germany's faithful second. As late as the 7th of October, the Austrian plenipotentiary at German Great General Headquarters, Count Stürgkh, reported that Falkenhayn had taken the place not of Moltke, but of Stein, the Deputy C.G.S. One despatch of Stürgkh, reporting the swing back of the German right wing after the battle of the Marne, the German failure, as Conrad calls it, was held up in transit by the Germans.

The Germans also endeavoured to conceal their failure at Ypres, Conrad being informed that "the inundation of the battlefield by cutting the Yser banks brought the German attack to an end."

In certain politico-military matters the Emperor interfered; *e.g.* to prevent local defensive levies being taken away and used as field troops, and to ensure that there was unity of command when Austrian and German troops cooperated.

We learn from a conversation between Count Czernin and Conrad that Austria's original policy was to annex Serbia; but when Russia came into the war, to do no more than to maintain the monarchy.

There is an appreciation of the unfortunate Potiorek, who commanded in the two unsuccessful offensives against Serbia in 1914. Of him Conrad says:

> "The highest leader must not give way to imagination, but he needs it in the sense of a spur to his activities and as a means whereby things exhibit themselves to him in their concrete reality. Limits to the imagination must be drawn by a sober calculated appreciation, or it will be hard to evade dangerous deceptions."

Further, the leader's imagination must help him to see a geographical picture of the field of operations, and the position and movements of the troops. Potiorek failed because he was in too great a hurry to capture Belgrade, deploying his two Armies too far apart in the hope of catching the enemy in his net, and grossly overworking his troops in difficult country.

There are some details of the ammunition output in the winter of 1914, which seems to have greatly exceeded that of the British at that period: for the field gun, 13,000 rounds a day in October, 20,000 in January; for the field howitzer, 4,000 and 6,000; for the 5·9-inch howitzer, 600 and 900.

By far the most interesting item in the book is a verbatim report of an interview between Falkenhayn and Conrad on the 19th of

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December, 1914. The latter pleaded for a campaign to defeat the Russians for good and all, when the Allies would give in. To this Falkenhayn replied :

" I fear that we cannot achieve that. Without England it would be possible, but with England, not, and that strengthens France. Besides there is the danger that we may not achieve our object in Russia, and meantime something unpleasant may happen in France. We must not underestimate the English Army."

And then he began to talk about a defensive line along the Vistula in order to prevent the Russians coming beyond it ; and when Conrad again pressed him, said : " I have to reckon with the fact that we are not safe in the West, and, if we are broken through there, successes in Russia are without value ; " he spoke of making " a Chinese wall in Poland," and of taking away as many men as possible for the West. Again Conrad pressed for a greater effort against the Russians to drive them beyond striking distance. To this Falkenhayn replied : " But we cannot wait so long. We want to begin our offensive in France in February [1915]." Conrad had no expectation of success in the West. Why, says he, should the Germans who failed to break through at the beginning of the war when they had fully efficient means and fully capable troops, succeed with the already greatly reduced means and forces ? It was, as he said to Falkenhayn, " one opinion against another." What other pressure was brought to bear on Falkenhayn to force him to undertake the offensive against Russia in 1915 does not transpire in Conrad's book. We know from other sources that it was mainly that of the great pair Hindenburg-Ludendorff, whose succession of great decisions ultimately lost the war for Germany. We must be everlastingly thankful that Falkenhayn did not get his way and did not attack in the West in 1915.

Turkey

Colonel Ludwig Schraudenbach was one of the German officers sent to Turkey to command an Ottoman division ; his book *Muharebe* (*Munich, Drei Masken*, 10 *marks*), an expansion of an official summary published by the Bavarian War Office,* is very outspoken. It is an extraordinary revelation of the Turkish Army from within and of the ignorance of the Great General Staff as regards things Turkish, and confirmation of the many stories of the steady resistance offered by the Turks to their German taskmasters. The author is by no

* Reviewed in the *Army Quarterly*, July, 1924.

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means prejudiced, and in his preface tells his fellow-countrymen that :

" No German at the front or in the Homeland during the war ever suffered even temporarily such misery and destitution as the Turkish soldiers endured throughout the war, and the Turkish civilian nearly the whole time."

The great mistake the Germans made was that they never recognized that the Turks

" were children of a foreign *Kultur* with quite different standards of government, military administration and organization, and that no training could convert them into even colourable copies of Brandenburgers and Pomeranians. The Great General Staff imagined them quite different to what they were, and never troubled to get reliable reports about them from the German missionaries, men employed on the Baghdad railway and scientists who were digging up antiquities in Mesopotamia and elsewhere."

The highly trained German officer found it impossible to work with " the primitive thinking, acting-on-instinct Turkish leaders," and " serious conflict was the normal conclusion of the service of Germans in the Ottoman Army."

Colonel Schraudenbach was from the beginning of the war until May, 1916, what we should call G.S.O.1 of the II. Bavarian Corps, and finding life dull and work hard in the long period of trench warfare, and little chance of promotion, he volunteered for service in Turkey. His qualifications were that twenty years before he had made a trip to the Levant, and that he spoke French fluently.

When he arrived in Constantinople, the German Mission sent no one to meet him, then mistook him when he called for some one else, and finally left him to fend for himself in getting a German orderly officer, interpreter and kit. Told in Berlin that he must not take his German batman with him, he found all his brother officers had got theirs, so telegraphed on arrival for his man, who in the course of time came along. He received no increase in pay, and found great difficulty in keeping up the dignity of a divisional commander on 9 marks a day. To reach his first command, the 24th Division, just outside the entrance to the Dardanelles on the Asiatic side, he had to pay for a motor boat. He soon discovered that his interpreter knew nothing about military language : "rearguard" and " reserve " were all the same to him, as both carried out their duties " behind." The 24th Division contained but seven battalions and three batteries, and some specimens of divisional troops ; the infantry was armed with Russian rifles, sighted in *archines* (2·4 feet),

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which were treated as metres! As for the artillerymen, they possessed good will, but not even elementary knowledge. There was a hospital, but no equipment or drugs, and when he suggested that the sick should have some kind of diversion, the medical officer in charge provided a big drum. He found a man dressing his wounded foot at the spring whence divisional headquarters drew their water supply. The most useful men of the division were the *gendarmes*, who made expeditions, often to a great distance, to get recruits. Surrounding a village at night, like a press gang, they carried off all the men, old and young, who could not pay a ransom.

After two months of peace, watching the sea, the author begged for something more active, and got himself transferred to the 12th Division of the II. Corps in the Armenian Caucasus to the north of Diabekr.

Having with great difficulty found the II. Corps—for both the German Mission and the Turkish War Ministry were misinformed as to its location—he learned that the 12th Division was not at the front, but in the wildest part of the Kurd territory.

> "There our troops," he was told by his corps commander, "are waging war not against the Russians, but against subjects of the Sultan. . . . I myself dare not venture near it except with a strong escort."

He was assigned to the 14th Division, which held the crest of a ridge 8,000 feet above sea-level, with the Russians hardly in sight. The fight was one against hunger, cold and spotted fever. Food, and that only in small quantities, came at intervals, there was no firewood, no lighting material. Though it was October, the troops had only worn-out linen jackets and trousers, hardly one had an overcoat or blanket, fewer still had boots. They lived in shelters built of stones, some three feet high, covered with branches of stunted oak. The animals were in an even worse condition, slowly dying from want of forage; the corps recommended that boiled thorn bushes should be given them; but as there was no fuel and little water, even this was a counsel of perfection. Such trenches as there were had been hewn out of the rock with wooden wedges and hand labour. There were no tools, no engineer stores, and less than 50 rounds per gun.

The main cause of the shortage was that there was no road by which to bring up supplies. Under German orders, the Turks had begun a road from Diabekr; but they had only removed the surface turf "to offer something to the eye," and had made no attempt to put in a foundation or to metal it. It had ruts knee deep.

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Further, there were no tradesmen, as the Turks had killed or murdered the Armenians who exercised the normal regimental trades.

The divisional commander was warned not to ride without escort, as his men would shoot him for the value of his gloves or boots. On the 24th of November, 1916, the Russians wisely fell back to lower ground for the winter, and in due time the world was informed from Berlin: "The enemy has been defeated and driven back on a front of 30 kilometres."

The air was poisoned by the smell of rotting bodies of men and animals behind the Turkish lines. Schraudenbach's German predecessor had died of typhus, and now he himself fell ill. Fortunately, the 14th Division was ordered to Mesopotamia proceeding by march route and boat down the Tigris, and the author decided to get two weeks' leave to Aleppo to recover his health, and to catch his division up. He reckoned without the Turkish lines of communication, for it took him three months to get back. "How," writes he in his diary, "can a military Power whose line of communication—*nota bene* behind its most important front—is so incapable of carrying traffic, compete with England?"—telegraph lines broken down, no fuel for engines where there was a line of railway, mediæval roads, and hardly any animals. But all this was unknown at Constantinople and to the higher authorities, for when a pasha came along sufficient vehicles and animals, carriages and fuel were got together to deceive him.

Whilst obtaining leave at the II. Corps he met Mustapha Kemal, acting commander of the Army. Of him he records:

"I remember him as a serious man, who with all courtesy stuck to business. It appealed to me favourably that he did not offer the usually inevitable coffee. He clearly knew how to distinguish between a private visit and official duty: the first Turk who really has something of the Grand-Seigneur."

Schraudenbach did not arrive at his divisional headquarters again until the 6th of April, 1917, after many adventures en route; Baghdad had fallen and the division was in the hills, Jebel Hamrin, to the north. It had sunk to 5 battalions, 4 mountain guns, a squadron of 40 men, and a couple of engineers. The men were starving, living by plundering villages, and there was no ammunition—he learned from the German railway troops that the Baghdad railway only carried 300 tons a day at best for the Second, Fourth and Sixth Army, and the Sixth near Baghdad alone required 500 tons.

The British not appearing, the 2nd and 14th Divisions were

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ordered to advance, the objective not being confided to any one. Being fired on they were ordered back and received as next objective, "to keep 2,000 metres from the British." Then again the 14th Division was ordered to advance, "for what object, for what reason remained unexplained." All the time his Turkish General Staff officer put every obstacle in his way, slept when he was most wanted, deceived him as to the position of troops, neglected to send out orders, and when asked for explanation had the usual Turkish excuses: "The orderly officer's horse is sick." "Ah, you may do that with German troops—but *nos troupes, vous savez!*" Finally, the author was blamed for the poor behaviour of his division and asked to be relieved. And he had the pleasure of seeing his G.S.O. working like a slave for his Turkish successor.

Western Front

"Leaves from a War Diary" (New York, Dodd, Mead, 5$), by Major-General James G. Harbord, is based on the author's letters to his wife, and is remarkable for its simple outspokenness. General Harbord was first Chief of the Staff to General Pershing, then he slipped away to command the Marine Brigade in its celebrated action at Belleau Wood in May, 1918, and, promoted, to command the 2nd Division in the flattening out of the Soissons salient in July, 1918. This ended his fighting career, for President Wilson was meditating planting on the American Army a super-Geddes in the person of the Panama Canal builder, Goethals, to manage the L. of C. and Supply. General Pershing, profiting by the experience of the B.E.F., immediately put General Harbord into the post. He declared that he must have a first-class fighting soldier, in order to raise the moral of the L. of C., which was largely administered by officers unfit for the front.

The book is full of sidelights on the war in 1918. Unheedful of 1861–1865, if nothing else, President Wilson sent elderly generals to France, ignored Pershing's recommendations, and promoted to brigadier a list of men which made the C.-in-C. "furious" and which the author designates as an "outrage." He adds:

> "There is always a possible tragedy in the career of every general who starts to serve our hysterical, inefficient people, whose thousand activities at this moment seem to be moving along parallel lines instead of being converged on one object, and whose idea of conducting war seem to be to send crowds of individuals and commissions of every description to visit France, and to talk, talk, talk."

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Of General Pershing and himself he says,

" We have a firm respect for the British Army," but he blames Great Britain for engaging " in too many sideshows. Such operations are only justified in war when they have a direct bearing on the object of the war. The place to beat the Germans is where the Germans are, and that is on the Western Front."

He sums up the initiation of the Supreme War Council as " a wild grab for civilian control of the Armies to the exclusion of Haig and Robertson." Elsewhere he speaks of the Council as the " Versailles Sewing Society." It was all talk at the conferences. " As the cynical Colonel House said, nothing was done." We learn incidentally that Colonel House " had practically no chin " and did not travel alone ; he had an immense " House Party," which " consists, exclusive of stenographers, secretaries, supers, soldiers, Roman soldiers, etc., etc.," of a number of civilian experts, whose names take up nearly a page. " A very numerous and Democratic aggregation."

House's advice to his party was :

" Listen to what they say. Do not promise them anything. Be pleasant. It is our day to smile. Do not tell them anything about tonnage. Just circulate round among the little fellows and listen to their stories. Be kind and agreeable."

Of the French and British cooperation, he writes that it was like " two badly trained horses pulling separately instead of together," and that the Allies only really combined against America to make her go their way, " they are a unit when it comes to casting lots for our raiment."

The French come in for many hard knocks :

" They are the most delightful, exasperating, unreliable, trustworthy, sensitive, unsanitary, cleanly, dirty, artistic, clever and stupid people that the writer has ever known. Intensely academic and theoretical, yet splendidly practical at times, it will be a wonder if we do not feel as much like fighting them as we do the Germans before the war is over, for our alliance tries human patience—American patience—almost to the limit. . . . No transaction can be had with them in which a pocket cash register is not a necessary part of the equipment."

French staff work was poor, mainly " because the French Staff could not make up its mind and stick to it." American units and divisions under French orders were arbitrarily debussed at unknown points. " They had no maps, no guides, they were not told where to go."

General Harbord has many little jokes. Speaking of the number

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of French generals *dégommés*, he says: "The British have also put a number into the peerage or otherwise disposed of them." His book is one that even a *blasé* reviewer can read from cover to cover.

M. Ferdinand Engerand, the talented author of *Le Secret de la Frontière* and *La Bataille de la Frontière, Briéy, 1914*, has written a short life of the late *General Lanrezac* (*Paris, Bossard*, 4.50).

On the opening page he gives the words of Maréchal Pétain when handing to Lanrezac on the 6th of September, 1924, the insignia of the Grand Cross of the Légion d'Honneur:

"The eminent services that you have rendered to your country have not been forgotten. The manœuvre in retreat that you directed will remain a model of this class of operation. We were all impressed that by executing it you preserved your troops from being completely surrounded, and saved your Army for France."

General Lanrezac was not one of those who believed in headlong offensive at all costs. "The preconceived offensive, systematic, and obligatory," the favourite doctrine in the French General Staff, as he saw it, was the negation of manœuvre, and if acted on by subordinate commanders would deprive the higher commanders of the slightest power of control.

General Lanrezac was the first to appreciate that the Germans were not limiting their operations to Belgium east of the Meuse, and his insistence to General Joffre that he must allow the Fifth Army to be shifted further north and west in order to meet the menace and avoid envelopment of the left flank is well known. Owing to the failure of the French Third and Fourth Armies, Lanrezac's Army was actually exposed to envelopment on both flanks, until the B.E.F. arrived. M. Engerand considers that the retreat from Charleroi entirely upset the German plans, and that without it the battle of the Marne would not have been possible.

At Guise General Lanrezac inflicted on the pursuing Germans a serious defeat, so serious that it stopped Bülow's Army for four days, and led the *Reichsarchiv* to issue an official account in two volumes to prove that the battle was a German victory.

M. Engerand does not do much to clear up the reasons for the removal from command of so eminent a soldier. General Joffre in announcing his supersession said to Lanrezac, "You criticize all the orders that are given you." To which the general replied, "But events have proved how justified were my criticisms. I bow to your decision, knowing that after a great defeat there must be scapegoats." In the official pamphlet issued on the 10th of

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December, 1914, entitled *Quatre Mois de Guerre*, the French General Staff stated: "*Le général Lanrezac, au lieu de contre-attaquer le 23, se repliait le 24 sur Beaumont—Givet inquiet qu'il était des menaces que l'ennemie dirigeait croyait-il, sur sa droite.*" *Croyait-il* was somewhat unfair, as the whole German Third Army was there. As the statement was palpably written in entire ignorance of the true situation, *raisons de santé* were invoked. These also were disproved. His failure to get on with Sir John French was next alleged, and it was even said that the British General had asked for his removal. This Lord French, shortly before his death, categorically denied, in a letter which is quoted. M. Engerand also quotes with approval the appreciation of General Lanrezac in the British Official History of the War, and gives it as his own opinion that Lanrezac's real sin was that he

"had dared to point out the fundamental error of Plan 17, which is the origin of all our past misfortunes and all our present difficulties. For certain personalities, Lanrezac was, from the point of view of strategy, a heretic, who took into account realities rather than doctrines, and had some notion of ground. . . . There was a conflict of two mentalities, of reason against dogma."

Études tactiques sur des Épisodes de la Grande Guerre. Opérations du 1er Corps Colonial. (*Paris, Charles-Lavauzelle, 20 francs*), by *Commandant breveté Jean Charbonneau de l'infanterie coloniale*, is a particularly valuable study. Much in the manner of Hamley, the author has selected three operations of the I. Colonial Corps, describes them at length—the book contains 345 pages and sketch-maps—and then comments on them, and draws deductions. The book contains definite hard facts, from which, with a large scale map to follow the operations, much valuable instruction can be drawn. The three operations chosen are—first, the rupture of the German front at the battles of the Somme, 1916, when the French XXXV., I. Colonial and XX. Corps, in that order from right to left, on the British right astride the Somme, broke the enemy's resistance, beginning by the capture of Frise. Commandant Charbonneau tries to bring out that there must be "manœuvre"—convergent or outflanking movement—on the field of battle, even in the so-called frontal attack. But the chief lessons to be learnt at the Somme were in the organization and distribution of the infantry, and in liaison with the other arms.

The second incident deals with the operations of the I. Colonial Corps during the Nivelle offensive April, 1917, when it was employed

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to make an attack on the western side of the German salient (the Laffaux salient), the apex of which was at Fort Condé above the Aisne. The main attack was northward, east of the apex. Unfortunately, the flank attack was not made the decisive one, it was really only a diversion. With insufficient men and guns, it could accomplish little against a strongly entrenched foe. It is typical of the "Nivelle spirit," that when the G.O.C. I. Colonial Corps expressed his doubts as to the value of the attack against positions so well furnished with defenders, he was told by the Sub-Chief of the Staff of the Sixth Army, "All the better, you will make more prisoners."

The third study describes the defence of the Rheims area by the corps in the great German offensive, 15th of July—6th of August, 1918, when the enemy pressed through on either side of Rheims, leaving a French pentagonal salient round the city, about twelve miles across the base. The Colonials fought magnificently, but were also well handled, disposed in depth, not too many in the front line—although it was to be defended to the last—and full use was made of reserves and the advantage of interior lines.

Der deutschen Zusammenbruch 1918, *Glossen zu dem Werk des parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses* " (The German collapse, 1918. Gloss to the book of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry), by *Wolfgang Foerster, Oberarchivrat am Reichsarchiv, Oberstleutnant â.D.* (*Berlin, Eisenschmidt, 2 marks*), is hardly worthy of a prominent member of the German Historical Section or of the author of *Graf Schlieffen und der Weltkrieg*. It is not an attempt to provide a simple explanation of the matter in the three-volume report of the Parliamentary Committee which inquired into the causes of the loss of the war in 1918, but an ill-balanced attack on Professor Delbrück, one of the experts attached to the Committee, who took views very unfavourable to General Ludendorff. It is a partisan effort to explain away such evidence and such opinions expressed by members of the Committee and its expert advisers as were adverse to the High Command and the General Staff. The author asserts that the Committee admitted its own incompetence—though it only said that some of the problems put to it were "partly insoluble"—and claims that it would have been better to have left the verdict to suitably chosen historical experts—possibly himself and other ex-General Staff officers, now employed in the *Reichsarchiv*.

He will not even admit the failure of the ex-Kaiser :

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" His decisions were not always lucky, and finally had fateful results, but this was due to human imperfection, not to apathy or neglect of the duties of his office. . . . I believe, too, that Wilhelm I. had scarcely a greater share in the forming of the great decisions which were the foundations of the success of his reign than Wilhelm II. had in his time."

Further, we are informed that Ludendorff

" had no inclination whatever to mix in politics . . . only an honourable feeling of responsibility compelled him to interfere with the policy of Bethmann-Hollweg, which he regarded as fatal."

Ludendorff's collapse and sudden demand for an armistice at all costs were due merely to

" change of strategy . . . it was not now to be hoped that the enemy's will to war could now be broken by offensive action, it must be gradually weakened by a strategic defensive."

Kühlmann, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was removed from his post because he openly spoke of peace :

" on no account should the impression of an officially organized action be evoked . . . for peace, a political victory behind the enemy's front [as in Russia no doubt] was required."

The book is another desperate effort to explain away Germany's defeat in the field ; it is curious, but totally unconvincing.

Yet another reason has been discovered by a German for the loss of the war. In *Warum haben wir den Krieg verloren? Das Scheitern des deutschen Angriffes im Frühjahr und Sommer*, 1918. (Why did we lose the war ? The collapse of the German attacks in the spring and summer, 1918.) Hamburg, Neuland, 2*s*. Professor Hans Schmidt of Giessen University, whose book has run through many editions in Germany, advances the theory that it was finding drink in the French villages and getting drunk that broke the impetus of the German offensives of 1918. He twice suggests that the champagne, rum, schnaps and other forms of alcohol were deliberately placed by the French as traps for the susceptible Teutons. He does not seem to have heard of the British Expeditionary Force canteens.

He gives the names of several villages at which the alleged drunkenness took place, viz. in March, 1918, Ham, Albert, Rozières, Warvillers, Vauvillers, Villers Bretonneux and Montdidier ; in April, 1918, Estaires and Merville ; in May, 1918, Soissons and Fère en Tardenois. (The reviewer can state that in September, 1914, when the B.E.F. arrived in this last village on the heels of the

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Germans, he could find absolutely nothing left in the way of drink, but some 3-star aperient water.)

Herr Schmidt produces little but hearsay evidence, although he has some statements from army chaplains and teachers—apparently teetotalers. As English authorities he mentions a Captain Peter Wright and a Professor Roy. Twice he quotes orders: A Sixth Army order of 15th of April, 1918, with reference to drunkenness in La Gorgue, Estaires and Merville interfering with the sending up of supplies; and a regimental order (unit not given) of the 11th of June, 1918, with a warning against plundering and immoderate use of alcohol, which refers to troops having become blind drunk after the capture of Albert, Moreuil and Soissons. He has the kind thought that perhaps the collapse of General Gough's front was due to his troops being drunk.

The author perhaps has overstated his case. The German troops could not have found very much to drink in the small towns and villages mentioned after four years of British occupation. But they were given an alcohol ration, according to his own admission, before an assault—he quotes the official memorandum on the "Breakthrough battle," "*Merkblatt für den Bataillons-Regiments- und Brigade-Kommandeur der Infanterie in der Durchbruchsschlacht*," Section 7, which directs the issue of alcohol on heavy fighting days,* and this ration, with what the Germans found added to it, may have overcome the weaker vessels, and produced some drunkenness, but not on a scale to influence operations. There seemed to be more drunkenness before and after the Marne, 1914, than in 1918. Ludendorff, to whom Herr Schmidt sent a copy of his lecture on the subject, seems in reply to have summed the matter up pretty well—

"I thoroughly understand a strong attitude against alcoholism; but when it is said on page 49 that drink robbed us of victory, other things are passed over which we should as little forget as the serious damage done by drink—not drink issued as a ration, but drink found by the troops. That the soldier yielded to temptation was due to want of discipline, and this had nothing to do with drink, but was the result of pernicious influences in the Homeland. Thus, there was a chain of causes and effects, with the pernicious result that we did not achieve what we might have done. I see the connection somewhat differently from Herr Dr. Schmidt."

At any rate, we know for certain that the failure of the Lys offensive was not due to drunkenness or to the men in any way. From the

* The German Official Monograph, *Die Tragödie von Verdun*, p. 37, states quite simply that the assault troops were given alcohol.

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captured papers of the German Fourth Army * the stopping of the offensive after the capture of Mont Kemmel was due to direct orders from Ludendorff, who lost heart and took counsel with his fears, imagining the imminence of an Allied counter-attack.

L'Occupation Allemande en France (1914–1918) (*Paris : Payot*, 20 *francs*), by *Georges Grommaire, agregé de l'université, professeur au lycée Buffon*, is a compendium, arranged under suitable headings, of the offences and crimes against the laws and usages of war committed by the German Armies in France. The reader will early come to the conclusion that the manifestations of Teuton *Kultur* were carried out on a definite and approved system, and were not the arbitrary action of individual criminals, although a licence unusual in a disciplined army seems to have been allowed.

M. Grommaire has chapters on the German organization of conquered territory, with an exposition of the German theory that war should be made on everybody, not the enemy's armed forces alone. The interruption of the normal life of the civil population, paralysis of business and arrest of the ordinary means of communication and requisitioning are particularly elaborated. To get over the prohibition that only articles of use for war purposes may be requisitioned, the Germans took furniture, ornaments, pictures, jewelry, etc., " on loan," but, of course, never returned them. There are chapters on taxes and contributions (the ordinary rates and taxes were compounded, and a lump sum was demanded), the systematic removal of raw material, and the exploitation of agriculture ; cattle raising, forests, mines and factories ; forced labour, including that of women ; the police control of everything, letters, schools, health and the persons of the women. There is a vivid picture of the life of the Germans in the occupied towns and villages, which brings out the curious combination of bully and sentimentalist in the Teuton. One commandant used to give evening parties, which he ordered prominent inhabitants to attend.

The author sees in the German methods a definite plan, not only to destroy the future of the occupied territory by the removal of all machinery of value, the destruction of water, gas and electrical supply, and of vegetable and animal life, and the demolition of houses, but the more subtle and far-reaching attempt to destroy the race itself by deportation, ill usage, violence to women, degradation of youth, and failure to arrange sanitary and medical care. No unprejudiced person who reads this book will remain unconvinced of the ruthless character of the methods of the German as a conqueror.

* *See* the review in the *Army Quarterly*, October, 1925, p. 157.

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La Somme sous l'occupation Allemande 27 août—19 mars, 1917 (*Paris : Tequi*, 3.50 *francs*), by *the Abbé Charles Calippe*, with a preface by the Bishop of Amiens, is a collection of stories and notes of the German occupation by the Curé of Sailly Saillisel, a village well known to the B.E.F. It is an authentic record of the brutality, tempered by occasional elephantine efforts at kindliness, of the Teuton invaders. On the one hand, their police break open the chest containing the church monies and abstract them; on the other, the commandant orders the bells to be rung for the Curé's birthday. There are interesting figures of the wages paid for forced labour—in special paper money which the communes of the invaded area had to produce—and the forced loans. The book forms one of a series prepared by the French clergy; others dealing with Champagne, Picardy and Artois have already been published. They will be invaluable to students of *Kultur*.

Le ravitaillement de la Belgique pendant l'occupation allemande, by *Albert Henry* (*Paris : Les presses universitaires*, 5 *francs*), is an account written for the Carnegie Foundation by the Director-General of the French Ministry of Agriculture. It begins with an account of the Belgian official organization of food supply, its complete upset by the Germans, their refusal to contribute in any way to the feeding of the occupied territory, and their census and requisition of supplies. With every prospect of starvation before the Belgians, an organization was initiated by private enterprise; but the Germans were suspicious, and neutral help was invoked; the United States, Spain and Holland took part, and a system was evolved. Every detail of rationing is given at length, but the importation of foodstuffs was invariably below the minimum required. The author concludes with an examination of the report of Professor E. H. Starling, F.R.S., on "Food Conditions in Germany," 1919, presented to Parliament, in which it is made out that the ration of the German population was smaller by 33 per cent. than that provided for the Belgians. But, not having visited Belgium, the Professor relied on the paper figures of the theoretical ration, which, if he had taken the trouble to inquire, he would have found was never actually available. Even the casual observer who marched through Belgium in November, 1918, and entered Cologne shortly afterwards would have seen that the Belgian population was underfed, and the German living almost in luxury.

England an der Westfront (*Berlin, Verlag für Kulturpolitik*, 15*s*.) is an abbreviated translation of Field-Marshal Earl Haig's

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Despatches, prepared by General Hoffmann, who was Ludendorff's successor as Chief of the Staff on the Eastern front.

In his preface General Hoffmann expresses his regret that Lord Haig did not add a critical appreciation of the Allied and German strategy; he adds that, nevertheless, the Despatches contain a mass of interesting items,

"from which I particularly would cite two: namely, the right appreciation of the attack on Verdun, unfortunate both from the military and psychological point of view; and the admission how near we came to victory in March, 1918. Only a few hastily collected troops, without cohesion or fighting value, separated us from Amiens. Had the German attack been made north of the Somme only with the whole of the available forces, the history of the war would probably have taken another course."

He continues that the Despatches do justice to German heroism:

"only the description of the victorious British attacks in the summer of 1918 is misleading. The comparison of the British and German forces is by number of divisions. This gives a false idea; for a German division had considerably fewer battalions than the British [not after the reduction to 9 in January, 1918] and their actual fighting strength was so small that a comparison of the number of divisions must give a wrong impression."

Cinq Epées Glorieuses (*Dijon, Lumière*, 1.50 *francs*) contains studies of the five Marshals, Joffre, Pétain, Franchet d'Esperey, Fayolle and Foch, by General Canonge.

Russia

La Guerre sur le front oriental—en Russie—en Roumanie (*Paris, Charles-Lavauzelle*, 12 *francs*), *by Général Windgradsky*, is a volume of personal reminiscences. The author commanded first a horse artillery *groupe* in the 2nd Guard Cavalry Division of Rennenkampff's Army; from January, 1916, the 14th Divisional Artillery in Brusilov's (later Kaledine's) Eighth Army; and at the end of that year was sent as the head of an artillery mission to the Rumanian Army.

The points of especial interest that he brings out are: the apathy of the middle class as regards the war:

"the intellectual classes were even in the last years anti-militarist. The great majority always sought to evade military service, were little interested in, and, contrary to most Westerns, were ignorant of the most elementary notions of military affairs. . . . Thus the cultivated classes, save for a few exceptions, did not put their energies at the disposition of their country, as they did in other countries."

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He particularly notes the activity of German spies during Rennenkampff's campaign in East Prussia; young Germans rode bicycles alongside the Russian columns. He describes East Prussia as unfavourable for artillery action:

"all the roads had deep ditches, with few crossings; tall trees and numerous farms with their orchards, limited the view; numerous barbed wire fences impeded rapid movement."

The training of the Russian Army was far from scientific. Until March, 1916, it had no up-to-date artillery instruction, it simply let off guns; it was heedless of concealment. In 1915, in the Gorlice-Tarnow offensive of the Austro-Germans, the Russians got so accustomed to retiring from lack of ammunition, that the slightest menace to their flanks set them retreating again, and the enemy obtained successes with inferior forces. The young officers had no influence over the men. Nothing stopped the Germans, but the necessity of a halt for rest, supplies and reorganization.

The difficulty in bringing Russian help to the Rumanians arose from lack of railways:

"In the years preceding the war a military convention existed between the Central Powers and Rumania, which made us fear that we should find the latter on the side of our enemies. In view of this possibility we refrained from building new roads and railways in Bessarabia. As a result, our enormous south-west railway system, well developed and equipped, was connected to the Rumanian lines only by the Rasdielnaïa—Ungheny branch, a single track of a limited capacity. The Bender—Bolgrade—Rem line ended at the last named, and no effort to continue it on to Galatz was made before the autumn of 1916."

General Windgradsky was on leave at Petrograd on the 9th of March, 1917, and saw the first act of the revolution, which, like so many other witnesses, he describes as beginning in a bread riot. Then the criminal classes took a hand with housebreaking and robbery. The Socialist newspapers spoke of a "revolution without bloodshed." As a matter of fact, the insurgents killed a number of officers, and at Kronstadt scenes took place which made one's hair stand on end. General Berthelot, who was in Russia, drew the attention of M. Goutschkow, the Minister of War:

"to the good discipline which reigned in the French revolutionary armies. In these, if generals were shot for disobeying orders, the rank and file were hanged for stealing fowls."

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Air

Mit der deutschen Luftfahrt durch dick und dünn (With the German aircraft through thick and thin), *by Leo Leonhardy* (*Berlin : Hackebeil*, 6*s*.), combines an account of the writer's own doings in the air during the war with bitter diatribes against the Allies for restricting Germany's air forces. One wonders, if Germany had won, what aircraft she would have allowed France and England. Since the war Major Leonhardy has occupied important official posts in connection with flying, as air expert of the German Customs Service, Chief of the Air Peace Commission in the Ministry of War, Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Flying, and head of the German Commercial Flying School. He gives it as his opinion that Great Britain is Germany's principal enemy and the motive power in all the restrictive measures, and ends his book by claiming command of the air for Germany.

Badly injured in an air collision in February, 1914, he was not able to fly, and even then only as an observer, until May, 1915. His service was first mainly in Rumania, then he had a squadron at Verdun in 1916, under the Crown Prince. The latter in conversation blamed the diplomats for not obtaining peace after the Marne " on the basis of *status quo ante*." Having lived nearly next door to the Prince for ten months, he vouches for his strict morality. Later in the war the author was in charge of bombing squadrons. At the time that a final sortie of the German Fleet was suggested, the Flying Corps formally proposed that all the flying forces should cooperate against the British Fleet.

Incidentally, he states that there was a monthly ration of iron crosses, whether there was fighting or no, so that in quiet times they were easy to obtain, whilst in a battle there were not enough for all worthy of the decoration.

General

General-Feldmarschall von der Goltz Pascha (*Berlin : Koehler*, 9 *marks*) is a life of the author of " The People in Arms," by Lieut.-Colonel B. von Schmiterlow, who was at school with him, and with whom he corresponded on most intimate terms the whole of his career. The pair kept up the somewhat cumbrous boy-time nicknames, derived from Heine's *Zwei Ritter*, of *Crapülinski* and *Waschlapski* (except, of course, they spelt the former with a K), frequently

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quoting the line *Polen is noch nicht verloren* (Poland is not yet lost) in various circumstances. Such is German humour.

Born in 1843, in East Prussia, the second son of a Freiherr (Baron) and Rittersgutbesitzer (owner of a knight's land), Colmar, Freiherr von der Goltz—all sons in that knightly province take the father's title—entered the 41st Infantry Regiment in 1861, served in the war of 1866, married, and entered the Staff College in 1867. In 1870 he was appointed to the Staff of the Second Army (Prince Frederick Charles). On being presented on joining, all the Prince said to him was " Ten buttons, very nice boots " (he had, by mistake, ten buttons on his tunic instead of eight). In spite of his odd ways, the personal influence of the Prince in his Army was, we learn, tremendous. The muddle just before and during the battle of Gravelotte Goltz ascribes to G.H.Q. and the headquarters of the Second Army being alongside each other :

" they were mixed up . . . responsibility disappeared. In the Second Army we waited for the King's orders ; G.H.Q. probably thought that the Second Army had done everything immediately necessary."

Thus the French disappeared from the battlefield of Mars la Tour, and no one knew whither they had gone. " *Das Gas erlischt ist weiter nicht*," then a popular song, was hummed by a General Staff officer, Lindequist, when the Guard Division asked him where the enemy was : " The gas turned off, it is no longer there."

The war of 1870–1871 over, Goltz found himself still a subaltern, with three children, and two more soon to come ; so he turned to literature to eke out his £90 a year, and never more did regimental duty. He was instructor at the Potsdam cadet school, and at the Staff College ; G.S.O. of a division, and in the Geographical and Historical Sections of the Great General Staff. In 1878 he attended the French Army manœuvres and wrote on the 24th of October to his *Waschlapski :*

" The French have *summa summarum* made great progress, and, if they continue in this way, we may in ten years very well get the good licking (*gut die Prugel bekommen*) that we so richly deserve."

The licking was to come just forty years later.

In June, 1883, debts and want of money drove Goltz to accept service with the Turks as Director of Military Education, and at Constantinople he remained twelve years. He returned to Germany to command the 5th Division, and in 1898 to be Inspector General

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of Engineers and Pioneers. The appointment of an infantry officer to such a post for five years may seem strange, but it was arranged by Graf von Schlieffen, Chief of the General Staff, in order that the engineers, " who lived a little-helpful separate existence," might be brought into the Army. Mudra, an engineer officer, in 1918 an Army commander, was his Chief of Staff. In 1902 Goltz was given command of the I. Corps, and six years later became one of the Army Inspectors, ear-marked to command an Army in war. He was placed on the retired list in 1912, having, according to his biographer, been over-zealous in his pan-Germanism and patriotic fervour on public occasions.

On the declaration of war in August, 1914, Goltz wrote to the author :

" As regards the situation that England's declaration of war has created, I need not write anything to you. We are of the same opinion. The beginning of this most fearful situation (*diese ganze furchtbare Lage*) was the publication of the so-called Re-insurance treaty with Russia by Caprivi."

Appointed Governor-General of Belgium, his efforts to make the German garrison behave with decency brought him into collision with powerful influences, and he resigned and was sent to Turkey. His end at the age of seventy-three in Baghdad just before the surrender of Kut is well known. His friend and biographer expresses his conviction that he was not poisoned by the Turks, but died of spotted typhus.

Unsere Pioniere im Weltkriege (Our field engineer companies in the world war), edited by *Lieut. of the Reserve Otto Riebicke*, " issued at the instigation of the former Inspector-General of the Engineer and Pioneer Corps and Fortresses " (*Berlin, Kyffhäuser, 7 marks*), is a collection of stories of the heroic deeds of the German Engineers. Written in a highly dramatic style, that sometimes drops into *vers libre*, for the purpose of encouraging the German nation now " in serfdom (*Knechtschaft*)," there is little solid instructive or historical matter in the stories, except an account of the engineer work at the landing on the Baltic Islands. The hate with which they bristle is directed almost entirely against the British.

The following extract is taken from a sketch entitled " the Death of Bapaume " in 1917 (we follow the author's paragraphing) :

" Three hundred days had the enemy hammered on Picardy, three hundred days with all artillery and all calibres and all munition factories.

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" He had lashed the water out of the earth and hurled slush over the land, trampled out villages and destroyed towns, fertilized with blood and sown with steel.

" He had raged tempests of drumfire over our position, kneaded the trenches with fists of iron—but always still found life, his master—Germans.

" His infantry had rolled forward in waves of corpses, division on division, Armies, black, yellow and white—and had broken in floods of blood.

" From tanks he had cried Death, and the German artillery threw Death back.

" So it had been, 300 days and 300 nights.

" Picardy was a landscape of the moon : craters, ruins and splintered trees.

" Over it hung the heaven, a dome of fire, pierced by the smoke pillars of those awful days.

" The glow of burning edged all horizons.

" The earth tottered.

" In the presence of fire was the last hour born.

" Now came the Engineers for the last act.

" Demolition troops.

" To leave the British nothing, to give them much.

" No, a fearful annihilated nothing should they find : a gift of the Danai, a weapon that fought for us, if they seized it greedily.

" Yes. The Engineers blew the cellars into the air, tore open the ruins, sealed the wells, destroyed all shelters, laid bare all hiding places, blew up the streets and barred the roads.

" So the British found naught but the fearful annihilated nothing, when the hour came that they advanced against empty trenches, called piles of rubbish a town, thought phantoms were flesh and blood foes, switched lies for truth and wirelessed to the world, ' After heavy fighting the British army entered Bapaume.' "

Poor man, it must have been gall and wormwood to him, as he himself took part in the demolition work, to learn that—as many visitors will recall—the demolitions in Bapaume, except for the explosion in the Hotel de Ville, which killed two French deputies, were badly organized and far less effective than elsewhere, and word painting will not make it otherwise.

There is no account of the mine warfare at Messines Ridge or elsewhere.

Two facts emerge from all the deluge of invective : one is, the reason the trench-mortar batteries (*Minenwerfer*) were manned throughout by the Engineers was that they had devised the weapon before the war for wire cutting. The other is that from " early in century " the Schleswig-Holstein field engineer battalion was specially trained in landing operations ; the disembarcation of troops

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and stores on an enemy coast was mainly practised. "Suitable boats, machines and apparatus were also acquired in peace time." Would that we had done the same, then the Gallipoli expedition need not have been advertized by the purchase of barges at the Piræus!

The book seems popular in Germany, as it is in its second edition.

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REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON MILITARY SUBJECTS

Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research. Vol. V., No. 21. July to September, 1926. Sheffield: Sir W. C. Leng & Co. 6*s.*

The most interesting features of this number are the "Articles of War, 1627," a "Memorial," by Sir Thomas Fairfax of his experiences in the Civil War, 1642–1644, and the usual notes, questions and replies. There is an attractive coloured print of a contemporary engraving of the battle of Dettingen.

The annual subscription to the Society is only one guinea, and back numbers of the Journal can be obtained very cheaply by new subscribers. Any Mess which does not subscribe to, and bind, this most interesting and often amusing military record is losing much pleasure and profit, as would be easy to prove by quotation did space allow it. The Journal is valuable for the vivid sense of continuity and tradition its pages give, with their evidence of the minds and manners of our predecessors. After the sharp break of the Great War this sense of the past is surely especially needed in regimental life.

Information concerning the Society may be had from the Honorary Secretary, The Society of Army Historical Research, c/o The Library, The War Office, S.W.1.

Training Horses for Races: A Handbook for Amateur Beginners. By Capt. G. W. L. MEREDITH. With an Introduction by Lieut.-Colonel GEOFFREY BROOKE, D.S.O. London: Constable & Co. 4*s.* 6*d.*

This is a very good book. It is stimulating, even exciting, for it is written with zest, much knowledge and real horse-love, and it is clear and short. Though ostensibly dealing with training for steeple-chasing and point-to-point races, it is essentially a book for every young horse owner and horse lover, for it is as

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infallible in the statement of principles as it is admirable in the broad indication of methods. It should be impossible to read it without enthusiasm. This, and Colonel Brooke's own "Horse-sense and Horsemastership of To-day," are easily the best books of their kind known to the reviewer. It is much to be hoped that it will have a large sale, in the infantry no less than in the mounted branches of the Army.

Operation Orders Made Easy. By Lieut.-Colonel F. A. PILE, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*, Royal Tank Corps. Hugh Rees. 3*s.*

The author gives short and clear advice on the writing of orders, typical brigade and battalion orders for the principal operations of war, and relevant notes and sketches, designed to provide a framework for candidates "sitting before a sheet of spotless paper, completely at a loss as to how to commence an order."

Examiners are nowadays, however, only concerned to see that an officer can frame orders likely "to bring about a course of action in accordance with the intentions of the commander, and with full cooperation between all arms and units." In the reviewer's opinion such books as this work against, and not for, the educational aims and efforts of the General Staff. The way to learn to write orders is to concentrate effort and criticism on bringing about the intended course of action; rules of thumb, directed to the passing of examinations, are but an aid to the evasion of the necessary practice in this. Such advice as Colonel Pile's, that "a great deal of this paragraph can often be copied straight from the higher Formation's order," shows the cloven hoof of the crammer.

Guide to First Class and Special Certificates: Practical Mathematics. By F. PERCY ROE, Army Educational Corps. Gale & Polden. 6*s.* 6*d.* net. *By post*, 7*s.*

This is one of a series of ten books dealing with preparation for the third, second, first and special certificates, intended both for the use of the instructor and for individual work. The arrangement of the present volume is logical, and the argument clear and concise. If the rest of the series are as good, it should meet requirements admirably. The price of the four books necessary for the first class certificate is together a guinea, and this is a good deal for individual purchase by the soldier. There is no doubt, however, of the efficiency and interest of the volume under review.

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History of the 26th Punjabis, 1857–1923. By Lieut.-Colonel P. S. STONEY. Gale & Polden.

When, as a subaltern, Colonel Stoney completed the history of the 26th Punjabis during the first fifty years of its existence the Regiment, as a whole, had never taken the field, although detachments had served with distinction in several expeditions, and the unit had acquired an enviable reputation for general efficiency and the faithful discharge of its duty.

Republished after the Great War, the story is now told of arduous service on the North-West Frontier in 1914–1915, and then of the campaigns in Mesopotamia where the 26th Punjabis bore its full share of fighting and hardship. The Regiment was concerned in the repeated attempts to relieve Kut, and added to its reputation during the advance to Baghdad and beyond. The tale of honours and successes won in peace and war is as full as it is impressive, and there are numerous illustrations of great regimental interest.

As it is the practice to prepare translations which are issued and read to the men the value of this volume in fostering *esprit-de-corps* is hard to overestimate. Indian Army reorganization does not always take into account the importance of regimental tradition. The 26th Punjabis is now known as the 2nd Battalion of the 15th Punjab Regiment, but Colonel Stoney says with legitimate pride, "The change . . . has not caused any deterioration in the Battalion spirit."

Aircraft and Commerce in War. By J. M. SPAIGHT. Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd. 6*s*.

The necessity of reinforcing our naval strength with adequate air-power appears a very obvious requirement of Imperial defence, but it cannot be urged too frequently. Mr. Spaight also discusses the effect which the development of air forces will have upon the economic weapon as wielded by our Navy in the Great War—a matter which clearly presses for more attention and understanding than it receives.

He envisages the use of aircraft to stop ships suspected of carrying contraband, and points out the numerous complications in which such action is liable to involve us with neutrals. The solution offered is that of definite agreements regarding what may or may not be shipped on certain routes, so that the right of search need not be exercised except in a comparatively few cases.

It is pointed out that agreements of this nature were arrived at

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in the Great War and, although hastily drafted and containing many defects, were, in the main, highly successful.

Such a policy presupposes that our prestige and strength on the sea and in the air is strong enough to initiate it—another argument for adequate preparation. It also appears to count upon every neutral being a benevolent neutral.

Talks on Leadership. By "BASILISK." Royal Artillery Institution. 1*s*. 4*d*., post free.

There should be a welcome for the second edition of this successful little book published in 1921 and primarily intended for the benefit of newly-commissioned gunner officers. Some additions and improvements have been made, and a distinguished artillery officer, General Sir Herbert Uniacke, has written an appreciative foreword. The author's "general principles" are sound and exhaustive; his advice on dealing with men both collectively and individually has the weight of his own experience; his "don'ts" are almost a complete guide in themselves. Every young officer, no matter in what arm of the Service, can read these pages with profit.

India. By the EARL OF RONALDSHAY. Cambridge University Press. 1*s*.

This is the published form of the inaugural lecture delivered at the nineteenth local lectures summer meeting at Cambridge University this year. It first epitomizes the story of British achievement in India and explains the difficulties which have confronted, and still confront, our administration of the great peninsula. As Governor of Bengal during a very critical period the author also speaks with authority on the problems of the future, and voices a real sympathy with genuine Indian aspirations.

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ARTICLES IN REVIEWS

The Contemporary Review, July, 1926. "The Study of War," by Major-General Sir George Aston, K.C.B.

This article examines the arguments in favour of the organized study of the nature and conduct of war, and indicates the movements, having this end in view, which are now on foot both in Great Britain and America.

The Fortnightly Review, July, 1926. "The Administration of the Fighting Services," by Capt. E. Altham, C.B., R.N.

The author of this article recommends that "the logical, efficient, and economical administration of the fighting services demands two, and not three, Ministries, and two, not three, professional staffs."

The National Review, July, 1926. "The Occupation of Peking by the Allies after the Siege of the Legations in 1900," by Capt. Wilmot P. M. Russell, M.C.

The Nineteenth Century and After, July, 1926.

(1) "The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Campaign of 1809: Unpublished Letters from the Bowood Papers," by the Earl of Kerry, D.S.O.

These letters are the result of a request made by Thiers in 1846 to obtain through the Comte de Flahault, who had been A.D.C. to Berthier and was then French Ambassador at Vienna, certain information from the veteran Archduke with regard to the latter's plan of campaign and tactics during the Wagram campaign. It is strange, as Lord Kerry points out, that Thiers failed to make any reference in his History to these communications, and did not "hesitate to attribute to the enemy commander some pages of other views and plans for which he can have had no authority other than his own imagination."

(2) "The Myths of War," by Lieut.-Colonel A. G. Baird Smith, D.S.O.

Several points arising out of Mr. Veale's article, under the above title, which appeared in the April number, are dealt with by the author; and Mr. Edward Anderson has a letter dealing with the

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particular case of the Bryce report on the subject of German atrocities.

The Quarterly Review, July, 1926.

(1) An anonymous article on "British Air Power," in which the author, in the course of a number of detailed propositions, states "that the existence of a separate Air Ministry, a separate Air Staff and a separate school of, so-called, air strategy, is illogical and a danger to national defence."

(2) "Short Histories of British Wars," by Major-General Sir George Aston, K.C.B.

This article is in the form of a review of "A Short History of the British Army to 1914," by Capt. E. W. Sheppard, "The Naval Side of British History," by Professor Callender, and other works. The author emphasizes, amongst other points, the distinction between the conduct of war and the conduct of operations, and the need of considering the relationship of sea and land forces to each other.

The National Review, August, 1926. "Fontenoy," by H. A. Bryden.

LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

"Training Horses for Races." By Capt. G. W. L. Meredith. Published by Constable & Co., Ltd. 4*s*. 6*d*. net.

"Guide to First Class and Special Certificates." Practical Mathematics. Published by Gale & Polden, Ltd. 6*s*. 6*d*. net.

"A History of the 26th Punjabis, 1857–1923." Published by Gale & Polden, Ltd.

"Aircraft and Commerce in War." By J. M. Spaight. Published by Longmans, Green & Co. 6*s*. net.

"The Empire at War." Edited for the Royal Colonial Institute by Sir Charles Lucas, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Vol. V. Published by The Oxford University Press. 25*s*. net.

"India." By the Earl of Ronaldshay. Published by The Cambridge University Press. 1*s*. net.

"Talks on Leadership." By "Basilisk." Published by Royal Artillery Institute, Woolwich. 1*s*. 4*d*. post free.

"History of the Sixteenth, The Queens, Light Dragoons (Lancers), 1912–1925." By Colonel Henry Graham. Printed by George Simpson & Co., Devizes, Ltd. £2 2*s*.

"New Methods in Exterior Ballistics." By Forest Ray Moulton. Published by The University of Chicago Press.

"Governments and War." A study of the conduct of war. By Major-Gen. Sir F. Maurice, K.C.M.G., C.B., Hon. LL.D. Cambridge. Published by Wm. Heinemann, Ltd. 8*s*. 6*d*. net.

"The Armies of the French Republic and the Rise of the Marshals of Napoleon I." By Colonel Ramsay Weston Phipps. Published by Oxford University Press. 18*s*. net.

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PARLIAMENTARY NOTES

House of Commons

Royal Air Force (Parachutes).—On the 9th of June, in reply to a question by *Viscount Sandon*, the *Secretary of State for Air* informed the House that he was advised that the Irving parachute, which had been adopted, was a more suitable type for the use of the Royal Air Force than the French parachute recently demonstrated in conjunction with Major Evans's life-saving suit.

Poison Gas.—On the 14th of June, in reply to a question by *Captain W. Benn*, the *Secretary of State for War* stated that experiments with animals were unfortunately necessary in order to obtain adequate data for ensuring defence against poison gas and the treatment of casualties. He further stated that the Washington and Geneva agreements would not justify the Government in omitting to take precautions for the protection of troops and civilians against gas in war.

Emigration.—On the 15th of June, in reply to a question by *Mr. Ramsden*, the *Secretary of State for War* announced that the number of men trained at the vocational training centre at Catterick who have since emigrated to the Dominions was approximately 130.

Medical Officers.—On the 15th of June, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Colonel Fremantle*, the *Prime Minister* stated that the Government had decided to give effect to the report of the Committee appointed last autumn on questions relating to the recruitment of medical officers and nurses for the fighting Services as from the 1st of July.

Airship Flight to India.—On the 17th of June, in reply to a question by *Sir H. Brittain*, the *Secretary of State for Air* informed the House that the first airship flight to India might be expected to take place in 1928. Mooring masts were being erected at Cardington and Ismailia, and a shed would be available at Karachi, where for the present, from motives of economy, the erection of a mast was postponed.

Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes.—On the 21st of June

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in reply to a question by *Mr. Hore-Belisha*, the *Secretary of State for War* stated that no persons held shares in the Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes, which was registered as a "company not for profit."

ROYAL TANK CORPS.—On the 22nd of June, in reply to a question by *Brigadier-General Brooke*, the *Secretary of State for War* informed the House that the number of infantry officers who had transferred to the Royal Tank Corps during the last three years was 234.

ROYAL AIR FORCE RESERVE.—On the 24th of June, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy*, the *Under-Secretary of State for Air* stated that the strength of the Royal Air Force Reserve was 991 officers and 6,238 airmen. The number of Reserve pilots available for actual flying was 708, of whom 588 were in regular flying practice.

PURCHASE OF HORSES.—On the 24th of June, in reply to a question by *Mr. A. Williams*, the *Secretary of State for War* stated that the numbers of horses purchased during the financial year 1925–1926 was as follows :—

In England	1,136
„ Scotland	21
„ Wales	25
„ Ireland	1,928

MENTION IN DESPATCHES.—On the 5th of July, in reply to a question by *Colonel Day*, the *Secretary of State for War* stated that the recognition of more than one mention in despatches by the award of distinctive emblems or by the insertion of a number in the centre of the oak-leaf had been considered before the existing emblem was approved, but found impracticable.

EXPORT OF WAR MATERIAL.—On the 6th of July, in reply to a question by *Colonel Day*, the *President of the Board of Trade* supplied a full statement giving particulars of the licences issued during 1925 for the export of war material valued above £500.

AFGHANISTAN AIR FORCE.—On the 14th of July, in reply to a question by *Sir F. Hall*, *Lord Stanley* stated that the strength of the Afghan Air Force was understood to be approximately 12 machines and 36 men, nearly all of whom were Russians. The force was commanded by an Afghan, but Russians were advising in regard to training and development.

RHINE ARMY.—On the 20th of July in reply to a question by *Mr. R. Smith*, the *Financial Secretary to the War Office* stated that

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the strength of the British Army of the Rhine on 1st July, 1925, was 9,000 and on the 1st of July, 1926, was 8,000, approximately.

RHINE ARMY.—On the 21st of July, in reply to a question by *Sir F. Hall*, the *Secretary of State for War* stated that the cost of the Army of Occupation for the year 1925–1926 was estimated at £2,089,000 and for the current year at £1,854,700.

ROYAL AIR FORCE CASUALTIES.—On the 28th of July, in reply to a question by *Mr. Viant*, the *Secretary of State for Air* informed the House that, the numbers of Royal Air Force *personnel* killed and injured in flying accidents since June 30, 1925, were 65 and 89 respectively. Seventy aeroplanes of post-war design and 192 of war design had been written off Air Force charge after crashing during the year ended the 30th of June, 1926.

RHINE ARMY (MARRIAGES).—On the 29th of July, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy*, the *Secretary of State for War* announced that, from the beginning of the occupation to the end of 1925, 648 marriages between British soldiers and German women had been recorded.

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APPENDIX

[*Supplied from official sources with the permission of the Controller of His Majesty's Stationery Office.*]

I. THE ARMY

1. ARMY COUNCIL

The Rt. Hon. Sir W. Laming Worthington-Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P., *Secretary of State for War* (*President of the Army Council*).

The Rt. Hon. Colonel the Earl of Onslow, O.B.E., Res. of Off., *Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War* (*Vice-President of the Army Council*).

General Sir George F. Milne, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., D.S.O., Col. Comdt. R.A., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C., *Chief of the Imperial General Staff* (*First Military Member*).

Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, *Adjutant-General to the Forces* (*Second Military Member*).

Lieutenant-General Sir W. Campbell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, *Quarter-Master General to the Forces* (*Third Military Member*).

Lieutenant-General Sir J. F. Noel Birch, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Col. Comdt. R.A., *Master-General of the Ordnance* (*Fourth Military Member*).

Captain H. D. King, C.B.E., D.S.O., V.D., M.P., R.N.V.R., *Financial Secretary of the War Office* (*Finance Member*).

Sir H. J. Creedy, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., *Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War* (*Secretary of the Army Council*).

2. DEPARTMENTS OF THE WAR OFFICE

Secretary of State for War

The Rt. Hon. Sir W. Laming Worthington-Evans, Bart., G.B.E., M.P.

Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War.	Lieutenant-General Sir David G. M. Campbell, K.C.B.
Judge Advocate-General.	Sir F. Cassel, Bt., K.C.

Chief of the Imperial General Staff

General Sir George F. Milne, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., D.S.O., Col. Comdt. R.A., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C.

Director of Military Operations and Intelligence.	Major-General J. R. E. Charles, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director of Staff Duties.	Major-General A. R. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
Director of Military Training	Major-General H. H. S. Knox, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

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Adjutant General to the Forces

Lieutenant-General Sir R. D. Whigham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director of Recruiting and Organisation.	Colonel Sir R. S. May, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director of Personal Services.	Major-General G. J. Farmar, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
Director-General, Army Medical Service.	Lieut.-General Sir M. H. G. Fell, K.C.B., C.M.G.

Quarter-Master General to the Forces

Lieutenant-General Sir Walter Campbell, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

Director of Movements and Quartering.	Major-General A. A. McHardy, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director of Remounts.	Major-General G. H. A. White, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Director of Supplies and Transport.	Major-General G. F. Davies, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E.
Director of Equipment and Ordnance Stores.	Major-General R. K. Scott, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Director-General, Army Veterinary Services.	Major-General H. T. Sawyer, C.B , D.S.O.

Master General of the Ordnance

Lieutenant-General Sir J. F. Noel Birch, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Col. Comdt. R.A.

Directors of Artillery.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) S. C. Peck, D.S.O., *p.a.c.*
	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) S. W. H. Rawlins, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Director of Fortifications and Works.	Major-General H. F. Thuillier, C.B., C.M.G.
Director General of Factories.	

Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War

Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for War.	Colonel the Earl of Onslow, O.B.E., Res. of Off.
Director-General of the Territorial Army.	Lieutenant-General Sir H. S. Jeudwine, K.C.B., K.B.E., Col. Comdt. R.A.
Comptroller of Lands.	H. G. Goligher, Esq., C.B.E.

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Financial Secretary of the War Office

Financial Secretary.	Captain H. D. King, C.B.E., D.S.O., V.D., M.P., R.N.V.R.
Director of Army Contracts.	N. F. B. Osborn, Esq., C.B.

Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War

Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War and Accounting Officer.	Sir H. J. Creedy, K.G.B., K.C.V.O.
Deputy Under-Secretary of State.	J. B. Crosland, Esq., C.B.
Assistant Under-Secretary of State.	A. E. Widdows, Esq., C.B.
Chaplain-General.	Rev. A. C. E. Jarvis, C.M.G., M.C., D.D.

3. COMMANDS OF THE ARMY AT HOME

A.—Aldershot Command

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	Lieut.-General Sir P. W. Chetwode, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) C. P. Heywood, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Major-General in charge of Administration.	Major-General Sir P. O. Hambro, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
1st Cavalry Brigade.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) F. W. L. S. H. Cavendish, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
1st Air Defence Brigade.	Colonel C. W. Collingwood, C.M.G., D.S.O.
1st Division.	Major-General Sir C. F. Romer, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
1st Infantry Brigade.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) Hon. A. G. Hore-Ruthven, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
2nd Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Commandant J. G. Dill, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
3rd Infantry Brigade.	Colonel C. P. Deedes, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 1st Division.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) A. G. Arbuthnot, C.M.G., D.S.O.
2nd Division.	Major-General Sir E. P. Strickland, K.C.B., K.B.E., C.M.G., D.S.O.
5th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) W. W. Pitt-Taylor, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
6th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) W. H. Bartholomew, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 2nd Division.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) H. R. Peck, C.M.G., D.S.O.

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B.—Eastern Command

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	Lieut.-General Sir W. P. Braithwaite, K.C.B., *p.s.c.*
Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) Sir H. J. Elles, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C.
Major-General in charge of Administration.	Major-General J. W. O'Dowda, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
4th Division.	Major-General Sir P. de B. Radcliffe, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
10th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) T. W. Stansfield, C.M.G., D.S.O.
11th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) F. J. Marshall, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
12th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) E. B. Hankey, D.S.O.
C.R.A. 4th Division.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) A. B. Forman, C.M.G., D.S.O.
54th (East Anglian) Division.	Major-General J. Duncan, C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
161st Essex Infantry Brigade.	Colonel T. N. S. M. Howard, D.S.O.
162nd East Midland Infantry Brigade.	Colonel J. Brown, C.B.E., D.S.O., T.D.
163rd Norfolk and Suffolk Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. M. Luckock, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 54th Division.	Colonel O. M. Harris, D.S.O.
44th (Home Counties) Division.	Major-General Sir H. W. Hodgson, K.C.M.G., C.B., C.V.O.
131st (Surrey) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel B. C. Dent, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
132nd (Middlesex and Sussex) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. E. Solly-Flood, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
133rd (Kent and Sussex) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel R. N. Dick, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 44th Division.	Colonel R. E. Myddleton, T.D.

C.—London District

General Officer Commanding.	Major-General the Lord Ruthven, C.B. C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
General Staff Officer, 2nd Grade.	Major E. W. S. Balfour, D.S.O., O.B.E., M.C., *p.s.c.*
26th (London) Air Defence Brigade.	Colonel A. F. Thompson, D.S.O.
56th (1st London) Division.	Major-General Sir G. P. T. Feilding, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., C.M.G., D.S.O.
167th (1st London) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel G. C. B. Paynter, C.M.G., D.S.O.
168th (2nd London) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel A. E. Glasgow, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

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C.—LONDON DISTRICT—*continued*

169*th* (3*rd London*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel J. V. Campbell, V.C., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.
C.R.A. 56*th* (*The London*) *Division.*	Colonel L. S. Bayley, D.S.O.
27*th* (*London*) *Air Defence Brigade*	Colonel H. C. Simpson, C.M.G., D.S.O.
47*th* (2*nd London*) *Division.*	Major-General Sir W. Thwaites, K.C.M.G., C.B., *p.s.c.*
140*th* (4*th London*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel W. H. V. Darell, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
141*st* (5*th London*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel C. H. Pank, C.M.G., D.S.O., T.D.
142*nd* (6*th London*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel T. R. C. Price, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 47*th* (2*nd London*) *Division.*	Colonel E. H. Eley, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., T.D.

D.—NORTHERN COMMAND

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	Lieut.-General Sir C. H. Harington, G.B.E. K.C.B., D.S.O., Col. The King's R., *p.s.c.*
General Staff Officer 1st Grade.	Colonel W. W. Seymour, *p.s.c.*
Colonel on the Staff in charge of Administration.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) O. H. Delano-Osborne, C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
5th Cavalry Brigade.	Colonel P. J. V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O.
6th Cavalry Brigade.	Colonel H. S. Sewell, C.M.G., D.S.O.
50*th* (*The Northumbrian*) *Division.*	Major-General F. A. Dudgeon, C.B., *p.s.c.*
149*th* (*Northumberland*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel H. H. S. Morant, D.S.O.
150*th* (*York and Durham*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel H. L. Alexander, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
151*st* (*Durham*) *Light Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel G. H. Stobart, C.B.E., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 50*th* (*Northumbrian*) *Division.*	Colonel C. E. Palmer, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
49*th* (*The West Riding*) *Division.*	Major-General N. J. G. Cameron, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
146*th* (1*st West Riding*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel Lord A. J. Hunter, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*
147*th* (2*nd West Riding*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel H. B. H. Orpen-Palmer, C.M.G., D.S.O.
148*th* (3*rd West Riding*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel D. S. Branson, D.S.O., M.C.
C.R.A. 49*th* (*The West Riding*) *Division.*	Colonel J. G. B. Allardyce, C.M.G., D.S.O.
46*th* (*The North Midland*) *Division.*	Major-General C. C. Van Straubenzee, C.B., C.M.G.

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D.—NORTHERN COMMAND—*continued*

137*th* (*Staffordshire*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel C. J. C. Grant, D.S O., *p.s.c.*
138*th* (*Lincolnshire and Leicestershire*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel L. H. P. Hart, D.S.O., T.D.
139*th* (*Sherwood Foresters*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel B. A. Smith, D.S.O., M.C., T.D.
C.R.A. 46*th* (*The North Midland*) *Division.*	Colonel W. W. Jelf, C.M.G. D.S.O.

E.—NORTHERN IRELAND DISTRICT

General Officer Commanding.	Major-General F. F. Ready, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
General Staff Officer 2nd Grade.	Major O. Y. Hibbert, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*

F.—SCOTTISH COMMAND

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	Lieutenant-General Sir W. E. Peyton, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., D.S.O., Col. The 15/19 H., *p.s.c.*
General Staff Officer 1st Grade.	Colonel E. G. L. Thurlow, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Colonel on the Staff in charge of Administration.	Colonel (temp. Col. on Staff) C. R. Newman, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
51*st* (*The Highland*) *Division.*	Major-General A. B. Ritchie, C.B., C.M.G.
152*nd* (*Seaforth and Cameron*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel L. Holland, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
153*rd* (*Black Watch and Gordon*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel A. J. Reddie, C.M.G., D.S.O.
154*th* (*Argyll and Sutherland*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel Sir N. A. Orr-Ewing, Bart., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 51*st* (*The Highland*) *Division.*	Colonel E. F. Shewell, C.M.G., D.S.O.
52*nd* (*The Lowland*) *Division.*	Major-General H. L. Reed, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
155*th* (*East Scottish*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel S. H. Eden, C.M.G. D.S.O.
156*th* (*West Scottish*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel R. S. Murray-White, D.S.O.
157*th* (*Highland Light Infantry*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel A. J. McCulloch, D.S.O., D.C.M., *p.s.c.*
C.R.A. 52*nd* (*The Lowland Division*).	Colonel F. Rainsford-Hannay, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

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G.—Southern Command

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	General Sir A. J. Godley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, Col. R. U. Rif., A.D.C.
Colonel on the Staff, General Staff.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) H. Karslake, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Major-General in charge of Administration.	Major-General G. H. B. Freeth, C.B. C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
2nd Cavalry Brigade.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) B. D. Fisher, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
3rd Division.	Major-General Sir J. T. Burnett-Stuart, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
7th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) G. H. N. Jackson, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
8th Infantry Brigade.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) W. D. Wright, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
9th Infantry Brigade.	
C.R.A. 3rd Division.	Colonel (temp. Col. Comdt.) H. C. Stanley-Clarke, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
48th (The South Midland) Division.	Major-General T. T. Pitman, C.B., C.M.G.
143rd (Warwickshire) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Hon. M. A. Wingfield, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
144th (Gloucestershire and Worcs.) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel Lord H. C. Seymoor, D.S.O.
145th (South Midland) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel L. A. E. Price-Davies, V.C., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, A.D.C.
C.R.A. 48th (The South Midland) Division.	Colonel W. E. Clark, C.M.G., D.S.O.
43rd (The Wessex) Division.	Major-General Sir E. Northey, G.C.M.G., C.B.
128th (Hampshire) Infantry Bgde.	Colonel H. C. R. Green, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
129th (South Wessex) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel M. H. E. Welch, C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
130th (Devon and Cornwall) Infantry Brigade.	Colonel E. Treffry, C.M.G., O.B.E., T.D.
C.R.A., 43rd (The Wessex) Division.	Colonel A. C. R. Nutt, D.S.O.

H.—Western Command

General Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	Lieutenant-General Sir R. H. K. Butler, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
General Staff Officer, 1st Grade.	Colonel Sir H. Wake, Bart., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Colonel on the Staff i/c Administration.	Colonel (temp. Col. on the Staff) E. Evans, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C.
53rd (The Welsh) Division.	Major-General Sir T. O. Marden, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*, Col. Welch R.

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H.—WESTERN COMMAND—*continued*

158*th* (*Royal Welch*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel A. C. Girdwood, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
159*th* (*Welsh Border*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel Hon. A. F. Stanley, D.S.O.
160*th* (*South Wales*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel D. H. Leslie, T.A.
C.R.A 53*rd* (*The Welsh*) *Division.*	Colonel A. H. D. West, D.S.O.
55*th*(*The West Lancashire*) *Division.*	Major-General B. F. Burnett Hitchcock, C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
164*th* (*North Lancashire*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel L. J. Wyatt, D.S.O.
165*th* (*Liverpool*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel H. A. Walker, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
166*th* (*South Lancashire and Cheshire*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel C. N. Perreau, C.M.G.
C.R.A. 55*th* (*The West Lancashire*) *Division.*	Colonel H. E. Carey, C.M.G., D.S.O.
42*nd* (*The East Lancashire*) *Division.*	Major-General A. Solly-Flood, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Col. P.W. Vols., *p.s.c.*
125*th* (*Lancashire Fusiliers*) *Brigade.*	
126*th* (*East Lancashire and Border*) *Infantry Bgde.*	Colonel R. E. S. Prentice, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
127*th* (*Manchester*) *Infantry Brigade.*	Colonel E. L. Challenor, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O.
C.R.A. 42*nd* (*The East Lancashire*) *Division.*	Colonel H. de C. Martelli, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

J.—CHANNEL ISLANDS

Guernsey and Alderney District:	
Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops.	Major-General Hon. Sir C. J. Sackville-West, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., *p.s.c.*
Jersey District:	
Lt.-Governor and Commanding the Troops.	Major-General Hon. Sir F. R. Bingham, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

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4. DISTRIBUTION OF REGULAR UNITS OF THE ARMY

A.—Cavalry Regiments

Regiment.	Station.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
The Life Guards (1st and 2nd)	Regent's Park	Lt.-Col. Hon. G. V. A. Monckton-Arundel, D.S.O., O.B.E.	
Royal Horse Guards (The Blues)	Windsor	Lt.-Col. Lord A. R. Innes-Ker, D.S.O.	
1st King's Dragoon Guards	Rhine	Lt.-Col. W. F. Chappell, D.S.O.	
The Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Gds.)	Sialkot	Lt.-Col. R. H. Osborne, D.S.O., M.C.	
3rd–6th Dragoon Guards	Colchester	Lt.-Col. G. A. Sanford, D.S.O.	
4th–7th Dragoon Guards	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. A. S. Pilcher	
1st The Royal Dragoons	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. W. T. Hodgson, D.S.O., M.C.	
The Royal Scots Greys (2nd Dragoons)	Meerut	Lt.-Col. J. J. Readman, D.S.O.	
3rd The King's Own Hussars	Egypt	Lt.-Col. F. R. Burnside, D.S.O.	
4th Queen's Own Hussars	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. H. E. Macfarlane, D.S.O., M.C.	
5th–6th Dragoons	Risalpur	Lt.-Col. J. A. Brooke	
7th Queen's Own Hussars	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. Hon. D. P. Tollemache, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
8th King's Royal Irish Hussars	York	Lt.-Col. A. Curell.	
9th Queen's Royal Lancers	Egypt (tempy.)	Lt.-Col. J. Greene, D.S.O.	
10th Royal Hussars (Prince of Wales's Own)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. M. Graham, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own)	Shorncliffe	Lt.-Col. F. H. Sutton, M.C.	
12th Royal Lancers (Prince of Wales's)	Hounslow (for Egypt)	Lt.-Col. J. Blakiston-Houston, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
13th–18th Hussars	Edinburgh	Lt.-Col. W. Holdsworth.	
14th–20th Hussars	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. F. B. Hurndall, M.C., *p.s.c.*	
15th–19th Hussars	Egypt	Lt.-Col. J. Godman,	
16th–5th Lancers	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. G. F. H. Brooke, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*	
17th–21st Lancers	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. T. P. Melvill, D.S.O.	

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B.—Royal Regiment of Artillery

Stations of Units.

Brigades, Royal Horse Artillery.

Brig.	H.Q. and Batteries.	—	Brig.	H.Q. and Batteries.	—
1	H.-Q.	Aldershot	3 (ctd).	D.	Abbassia, Egypt (for Trowbridge).
	A, B				
	M	Aldershot (for St. John's Wood)	5	H.-Q. G,	Newport (Mon.) (for Meerut).
2	H.-Q. K	Meerut (for Egypt)		N	Newport (Mon.) (for Sialkot)
	C	Sialkot (for Egypt)			
	L	Risalpur (for Egypt)		E	Trowbridge (for Risalpur)
3	H.-Q.	Abbasia, Egypt (for Newport (Mon.))	Unbrig.	I	Secunderabad
	J, F			O	St. John's Wood (for Aldershot).

Field Brigades, Royal Artillery.

1 (Army)	H.-Q. 11, 52, 80 (H), 98	Deepcut	16	H.-Q	Kirkee
2	H.-Q. 35 (H)	Shorncliffe		27 (H), 34, 72	
	42, 53, 87			86 (H)	Secunderabad
3	H.-Q. 18, 62, 65 (H), 75	Deepcut (for Exeter)	17	H.-Q. 10 13, 26, 92 (H)	Bordon
4	H.-Q.	Longmoor	18 (Army)	H.-Q. 93, 94, 95 (H)	Edinburgh (for Woolwich)
	4 (H), 7 14, 66			59	Dunbar (for Woolwich)
5	H.-Q. 63, 64, 73, 81 (H)	Bulford (for Larkhill)	19	H.-Q. 29 (H)	Brighton (for Wiesbaden)
6 (Army)	H.-Q. 69, 74, 77, 79 (H)	Larkhill (for Bulford)	20	H.-Q. 41, 45 (H) 67, 99	Aldershot
7	H.-Q.	Lucknow	21	H.-Q. Z (H).	Lahore (for Newcastle)
	9, 17	Cawnpore		P	Lahore (for Sheffield)
	16	Fyzabad			
	43 (H)	Wiesbaden (for Brighton)		Q (H)	Ferozepore (for Sheffield)
8	H.-Q. H (H) V, W, X	Bulford		Y	Jullundur (for Newcastle)
9	H.-Q. 19, 20, 28, 76 (H)	Newcastle-on-Tyne (for Deepcut)	22	H.-Q. 32, 33, 36 (H)	Rawalpindi
10 (Army)	H.-Q. 51, 54	Sheffield (for Deepcut)		55 (H)	Campbellpore
	30 (H), 46	Colchester	23	H.Q. 60, 89, 90 (H)	Nowshera
11	H.-Q. 78 (H), 83, 84, 85	Bangalore (for Lahore)		100 (H)	Peshawar
12	H.Q. 6,	Bangalore (for Jullundur)	24	H.Q. 22, 50, 56 (H)	Jhansi
	23	Bangalore (for Ferozepore)		70	Nasirabad
	49	Bangalore (for Lahore)	25	H.-Q. 12, 25, 31 (H) 58	Bordon
	91 (How.)	Woolwich (for Edinburgh)	26	H.-Q. 40 (H) 48, 71	Jubbulpore
13	H.Q. 8, 44 82 (How)	Woolwich (for Dunbar)		15	Allahabad
	2	Quetta	27	H.-Q. 21, 24, 37 (H)	Mhow
14	H.-Q. 68, 88 (H)	Hyderabad (Sind)		47	
	38, 61 (H)	Exeter (for Bristol Bangalore)	28	H.-Q. 1, 3, 57 (H)	Meerut
15	H.-Q. R, T, U, S (H)			5	Bareilly

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Allotment of Batteries to Field Brigades.

Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.	Batt.	Brig.
H	8th	1	28th	18	3rd	35	2nd	52	1st	69	6th	86	16th
P	21st	2	13th	19	9th	36	22nd	53	2nd	70	24th	87	2nd
Q		3	28th	20	,,	37	27th	54	10th	71	26th	88	14th
R	15th	4	4th	21	27th	38	14th	55	22nd	72	16th	89	23rd
S		5	28th	22	24th	39	19th	56	24th	73	5th	90	,,
T		6	12th	23	12th	40	26th	57	28th	74	6th	91	12th
U		7	4th	24	27th	41	20th	58	25th	75	3rd	92	17th
V	8th	8	13th	25	25th	42	2nd	59	18th	76	9th	93	18th
W		9	7th	26	17th	43	7th	60	23rd	77	6th	94	,,
X		10	17th	27	16th	44	13th	61	14th	78	11th	95	,,
Y	21st	11	1st	28	9th	45	20th	62	3rd	79	6th	96	19th
Z		12	25th	29	19th	46	10th	63	5th	80	1st	97	,,
		13	17th	30	10th	47	27th	64	,,	81	5th	98	1st
		14	4th	31	25th	48	26th	65	3rd	82	13th	99	20th
		15	26th	32	22nd	49	12th	66	4th	83	11th	100	23rd
		16	7th	33	,,	50	24th	67	20th	84	,,		
		17	,,	34	16th	51	10th	68	14th	85	,,		

C.—Pack Brigades, Royal Artillery

Brig.	H.-Q. and Batteries.	—	Brig.	H. Q. and Batteries.	—
I.	H.-Q.	Ewshott (for Egypt)	20th etd. (Indian)	10 (H)	Quetta (for Egypt)
	2, 3	Ewshott (for Murree)	21st (Indian)	H.-Q., 12 (H)	Jutogh
	4	Ewshott (for Quetta)	22nd (Indian)	H.-Q. ..	Kohat
II.	H.-Q., 5, 7 9	Bulford		8 (H) ..	Khyra Gali (for Egypt)
III.	H.-Q., 16, 18, 19	Aldershot	23rd (Indian)	H.-Q. 17 (H)	Raznak
IV.	H.-Q., 15, 20, 21	Norwich	24th (Indian)	H.-Q. ..	Peshawar
V.	H.-Q. ..			11 (H) ..	Bara Gali
	1	Helmieh (for Ewshott)	25th (Indian)	H.-Q. ..	Abbottabad
	13, 14 ..			6 (H) ..	Kalabagh (for Egypt)
20th (Indian)	H.-Q.,	Quetta			

Medium Brigades, Royal Artillery.

1	H.Q. 1, 3 (How.) (T.D.)	Shoeburyness (for Larkhill)	3 (etd.)	6 (H) (T.D.)	Gibraltar (for Ipswich)
	5 (How.)	Ipswich (for Larkhill)		11 (H) (T.D.)	Gibraltar (for Shoeburyness)
	22 (How.) (T.D.)	Shoeburyness (for Feroze-pore)	4	H.-Q. 9 (T.D.)	Muttra
				13 (H)	Agra
2	H.Q. 7 (How) (T.D.)	Ambala (for Malta)		14 (H) (T.D).	Roorkee (for Delhi)
	4 (How.) (T.D.)	Peshawar (for Malta)		16 (H) (T.D).	Delhi (for Muttra)
	8 (How.) (T.D.)	Ferozepore (for Gibraltar)	5 (unbri-gaded)	15 (T.D)	Fort William Calcutta
	12 (H.D.)	Ambala (for Gibraltar)		17	Christchurch (for Ambala)
3	H.-Q. 2 (T.D.)	Malta (for Shoeburyness)		23 (H) (T.D.)	Fort Fareham

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Heavy Batteries, Royal Artillery.

Battery.	—	Battery.	—	Battery.	—
1	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth	14	Bombay	27	Singapore (for Bom
		15	Plymouth (for Sierra Leone)	28	Bere Island [bay)
2	Jamaica			29	Mauritius
3	Sierra Leone (for Plymouth)	16	Fort Brockhurst	30	Spike Island
		17	Plymouth	31	Gibraltar
4	Gilraltar	18	Lough Swilly	32	Fort Brockhurst
5	Plymouth	19	Ceylon	33	Plymouth
6	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth (for Malta)	20	Bere Island	34	Leith Fort
		21	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth	35	Aden (for Gibraltar)
				36	Templebreedy
7	Aden	22	Fort Brockhurst	37	Leith Fort
8	Gibraltar (for Portsmouth)	23	Malta (for Hong Kong)	38	Hong Kong
				39	Spike Island
9	Bombay (for Aden)	24	Shoeburyness	40	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth
10	Malta	25	Hong Kong (for Singapore)		
11	Singapore			41	Fort Carlisle
12	Hong Kong	26	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth	42	Clarence Barracks, Portsmouth
13	Karachi				

Anti-Aircraft Brigade, Royal Artillery.

1st	1, 2, 3,	Blackdown.
Survey Co., Royal Artillery		Larkhill.

D.—Royal Engineers

Stations of the Head Quarters of Units.

School of Military Engineering, R.E. Depôt, Chatham.
Electric Light School, Gosport
Training Battalion, R.E., Chatham
Depôt Battalion, R.E., Chatham
R.E. Mounted Depôt, Aldershot
Railway Training Centre, Longmoor
1st Field Squadron, Aldershot
1st (Fortress) Co., Gibraltar
2nd (Field) Co., Egypt
3rd (Fortress) Co., Dover
4th (Fortress) Co., Gosport
5th (Field) Co., Aldershot
6th (Field) Park Co., Aldershot
7th (Field) Co., Rhine
8th (Railway) Co., Longmoor
9th (Field) Co., Shorncliffe
10th (Railway) Co., Longmoor
11th (Field) Co., Aldershot
12th (Field) Co., Aldershot
13th (Survey) Co., York
14th (Survey) Co., Edinburgh
15th (Field Park) Co., Aldershot
16th (Fortress) Co., Paull-on-Humber
17th (Field) Co., Bulford
18th (Field Park) Co., Shorncliffe
19th (Survey) Co., Southampton
22nd (Fortress) Co., Gosport
23rd (Field) Co., Aldershot
24th (Fortress) Co., Malta
26th (Field) Co., Bordon
27th (Fortress) Co., Bermuda
30th (Fortress) Co., Plymouth
31st (Fortress) Co., Ceylon
33rd (Fortress) Co., Queenstown Harbour
34th (Fortress) Co., Guernsey
35th (Fortress) Co., Pembroke
36th (Fortress) Co., Sierra Leone
38th (Field) Co., Aldershot
39th (Fortress) Co., Sheerness
40th (Fortress) Co., Hong Kong
41st (Fortress) Co., Singapore
42nd (Field) Co., Egypt
43rd (Fortress) Co., Mauritius
44th (Fortress) Co., Jamaica
45th (Fortress) Co., Portsmouth
49th (Fortress) Co., North Queensferry
54th (Field) Co., Bulford
55th (Field) Co., Catterick
56th (Field) Co., Bulford
58th (Porton) Co., Porton
59th (Field) Co., Catterick
Experimental Bridging Estabt., Christchurch
1st A.A. Searchlight Bn. R.E., Blackdown and Belfast

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E.—Royal Corps of Signals

Stations of the Head Quarters of Units.

School of Signals, Catterick
Depôt Bn. R. Signals, Catterick
Training Bn. R. Signals, Catterick
Signals Experimental Estabt., Woolwich
" A " Corps Signals, Ewshott
1st Cavalry Divisional Signals
" D " Troop, Cavalry Divisional Signals, Aldershot
" E " Troop, Cavalry Divisional Signals, Tidworth
1st Divisional Signals, Aldershot
2nd Divisional Signals, Aldershot
3rd Divisional Signals, Bulford
4th Divisional Signals, Colchester
No. 1 Anti-Aircraft Signal Co., Blackdown
No. 1 (Med. Art.) Signal Section, Colchester
No. 2 (Med. Art.) Signal Section, Larkhill
No. 1 (Field Art.) Signal Section, Newcastle-on-Tyne
No. 2 (Field Art.) Signal Section, Edinburgh
Aldershot Command Signal Co., Aldershot
Eastern Command Signal Co., London
Northern Command Signal Co., York
Scottish Command Signal Co., Edinburgh
Southern Command Signal Co., Salisbury
Western Command Signal Co., Chester
North Ireland Signal Co., Belfast
South Ireland Signal Section, Spike Island
Rhine Command Signal Co., Cologne
Rhine Field Signal Co., Cologne
No. 1 Co., Egypt Signals, Egypt
No. 3 Co. Egypt Signals, Egypt
No. 2 Wireless Co., Sarafand
Signal Section, Iraq
Signal Section, Gibraltar
Signal Section, Malta
Signal Section, Malaya
Signal Section, Hong Kong
Signal Section, North China
Signal Section, Mauritius
Signal Section, Bermuda
Signal Section, Jamaica
Signal Section, Sierra Leone
Signal Section, Ceylon
" L " Co., Simla

F.—Infantry Regiments

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st Grenadier Guards	Windsor (for Chelsea)	Lt.-Col. E. G. H. Powell.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. L. M. Gregson, O.B.E.	
3rd ditto	Tower of London	Lt.-Col. M. E. Makgill-Crichton-Maitland, D.S.O.	
1st Coldstream Guards	Chelsea Barracks	Lt.-Col. E. D. H. Tollemache, D.S.O., M.C., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. G. J. Edwards, D.S.O., M.C.	
3rd ditto	Pirbright	Lt.-Col. J. C. Brand, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st Scots Guards	Wellington Barracks (for Warley)	Lt.-Col. G. H. Loder, M.C.	
2nd ditto	Chelsea Barracks (for Aldershot).	Lt.-Col. Sir V. A. F. Mackenzie, Bart., D.S.O., M.V.O.	
1st Irish Guards	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. R. V. Pollok, C.B.E., D.S.O.	
1st Welsh Guards	Pirbright	Lt.-Col. R. E. K. Leatham, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Scots (The Royal Regt.)	Glasgow	Lt.-Col. J. H. Mackenzie, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto (The Royal Regt.)	Egypt	Lt.-Col. F. C. Tanner, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st The Queen's Royal Regiment (West Surrey)	Dover	Lt.-Col. R. G. Clarke, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Allahabad (for Khartum)	Lt.-Col. J. Rainsford-Hannay, D.S.O.	
1st The Buffs (East Kent Regt.)	Gibraltar (for Bareilly)	Lt.-Col. R. E. Power, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Portland (for Aldershot)	Bt.-Col. J. Kennedy, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The King's Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster)	Shorncliffe (for Aldershot)	Bt.-Col. O. H. L. Nicholson, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Rawal Pindi	Lt.-Col. J. A. Nixon, D.S.O.	
1st Northumberland Fusiliers	Ballykinlar	Lt.-Col. W. N. Herbert, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Fyzabad (for Nowshera)	Lt.-Col. S. H. Kershaw, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Royal Warwickshire Regiment	Shorncliffe	Lt.-Col. C. R. Macdonald, C.M.G., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Delhi	Bt.-Col. C. F. Watson, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Royal Fusiliers (City of London Regiment)	Ambala	Lt.-Col. M. O. Clarke, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Aldershot (for Rhine)	Lt.-Col. G. A. Stevens, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The King's Regiment (Liverpool)	Aldershot (for Malta)	Lt.-Col. G. L. Oliver	
2nd ditto	Iraq (for Lichfield	Bt.-Col. W. A. Blake, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Norfolk Regiment	Egypt and Cyprus	Lt.-Col. J. P. L. Mostyn	
2nd ditto	Colchester (for Aldershot)	Lt.-Col. S. J. P. Scobell, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Lincolnshire Regiment	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. F. G. Spring, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. A. B. Johnson, D.S.O.	
1st Devonshire Regiment	Blackdown (for Gibraltar)	Lt.-Col. G. N. T. Smyth-Osbourne, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Aden (for Devonport	Lt.-Col. E. Hewlett, C.M.G., O.B.E.	
1st Suffolk Regiment	Colchester	Lt.-Col. R. G. Coles	
2nd ditto	Gibraltar	Lt.-Col. F. S. Cooper, D.S.O.	
1st The Somerset Light Infantry (Prince Albert's)	Devonport (for Egypt)	Lt.-Col J. S. N. Harrison, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Khartum (for Devonport)	Lt.-Col. H. I. R. Allfrey, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st The West Yorkshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's Own)	Ballykinlar (for Holywood)	Lt.-Col. A. M. Boyall, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Mhow	Lt.-Col. A. A. W. Spencer	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st East Yorkshire Regiment	Tientsin	Lt.-Col. J. McD. Haskard, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Lichfield (for Aldershot)	Lt.-Col. W. G. Geddes, D.S.O.	
1st Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regt.	Malta	Lt.-Col. J. P. Tredennick, D.S.O., O.B.E., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Dover	Lt.-Col. W. R. H. Dann, D.S.O.	
1st Leicestershire Regiment	Egypt	Lt.-Col. F. H. Edwards, D.S.O., M.C.	
2nd ditto	Colchester	Lt.-Col. W. T. Bromfield	
1st The Green Howards (Alexandra Princess of Wales's Own Yorkshire Regiment)	Strensall	Lt.-Col. M. D. Carey	
2nd ditto	Jamaica and Bermuda	Lt.-Col. C. H. de St. P. Bunbury	
1st Lancashire Fusiliers	Dover	Lt.-Col. A. H. Spooner, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Madras and St. Thomas Mount	Lt.-Col. W. J. Woodcock, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Scots Fusiliers	Portsmouth	Lt.-Col. C. H. I. Jackson, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Landi Kotal (for Ferozepore)	Bt.-Col. H. E. R. R. Braine, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Cheshire Regiment	Dinapore (for Poona)	Lt.-Col. H. S. Adair, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. E. G. Hamilton, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.	
1st Royal Welch Fusiliers	Nasirabad	Lt.-Col. H. V. V. Kyrke, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Pembroke Dock (for Rhine)	Bt.-Col. C. I. Stockwell, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st South Wales Borderers	Devonport (for Lichfield)	Lt.-Col. L. H. Tudor, O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Agra	Lt.-Col. T. C. Greenway, D.S.O.	
1st King's Own Scottish Borderers	Edinburgh (for Bordon)	Lt.-Col. W. T. Wilkinson, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Egypt (for Hong Kong)	Lt.-Col. J. C. W. Connell, D.S.O.	
1st The Cameronians (Scottish Rifles)	Catterick	Lt.-Col. E. B. Ferrers, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Quetta	Lt.-Col. H. H. Lee, D.S.O.	
1st Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers	Shorncliffe	Lt.-Col. R. C. Smythe, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Gloucestershire Regiment	Aldershot (for Portland)	Lt.-Col. J. Fane, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Jhansi	Lt.-Col. R. Wilkinson, D.S.O.	
1st Worcestershire Regiment	Meerut (for Allahabad)	Lt.-Col. L. M. Stevens, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. F. P. Dunlop, C.B.E., D.S.O.	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st East Lancashire Regiment	Quetta	Lt.-Col. P. Hudson, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Bordon (for Pembroke Dock)	Lt.-Col. J. H. L. Poé, D.S.O.	
1st East Surrey Regiment	Hong-Kong (for Rawalpindi)	Lt.-Col. F. S. Montague-Bates, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Jersey	Lt.-Col. J. S. Fitzgerald, *p.s.c.*	
1st The Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry	Lucknow	Lt.-Col. H. D. Goldsmith, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Guernsey	Lt.-Col. H. T. Dobbin, C.B.E., D.S.O.	
1st The Duke of Wellington's Regiment (West Riding)	Gosport	Lt.-Col. F. H. B. Wellesley.	
2nd ditto	Singapore	Lt.-Col. C. J. Pickering, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Border Regiment	York	Lt.-Col. G. H. Harrison, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Khartum (for Malta)	Lt.-Col. A. J. Ellis, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Royal Sussex Regiment	Bordon	Lt.-Col. C. E. Bond, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rawal Pindi	Lt.-Col. S. de V. A. Julius, *p.s.c.*	
1st Hampshire Regiment	Jubbulpore	Lt.-Col. R. S. Allen, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Plymouth	Lt.-Col. L. C. Morley, C.B.E.	
1st South Staffordshire Regiment	Bombay and Deolali	Bt.-Col. J. R. M. Minshull-Ford, D.S.O., M.C.	
2nd ditto	Plymouth (for Shorncliffe)	Lt.-Col. P. R. C. Commings, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Dorsetshire Regt.	Malta (for Meerut)	Lt.-Col. G. M. Herbert, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. J. F. Badham, D.S.O.	
1st The Prince of Wales's Volunteers (South Lancashire)	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. G. C. Kelly, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Lebong and Barrackpore	Lt.-Col. B. Evans	
1st Welch Regiment	Bareilly (for Aden)	Lt.-Col. C. R. Berkeley, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Tidworth	Lt.-Col. T. G. Mathias, D.S.O.	
1st The Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)	Multan	Lt.-Col. R. A. Bulloch, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Fort George	Lt.-Col. S. A. Innes, D.S.O.	
1st Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry	Rhine	Bt.-Col. A. G. Bayley, C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
2nd Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry	Chakrata	Lt.-Col. W. H. M. Freestun, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Essex Regiment	Colchester	Lt.-Col. A. B. Incledon-Webber, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Cawnpore	Lt.-Col. C. R. Roberts-West	
1st The Sherwood Foresters (Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment)	Londonderry	Lt.-Col. K. C. Weldon, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Razmak (for Karachi)	Lt.-Col. R. S. Hart, D.S.O.	
1st The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire)	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. F. W. Greenhill, O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Gravesend	Lt.-Col. W. P. H. Hill, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Northamptonshire Regiment	Blackdown	Lt.-Col. R. M. Raynsford, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Karachi (for Sudan)	Lt.-Col. G. L. Crossman, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The Royal Berkshire Regiment (Princess Charlotte of Wales's)	Lahore (for Fyzabad)	Lt.-Col. A. E. F. Harris, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. F. H. Moore, C.B.E., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Queen's Own Royal West Kent	Poona (for Madras)	Lt.-Col. A. K. Grant, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto [Regiment	Woking	Lt.-Col. J. T. Twisleton-Wykeham-Fiennes	
1st King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry	Dover	Lt.-Col. H. W. B. Thorp, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Ferozepore (for Peshawar)	Lt.-Col. H. Mallinson, D.S.O.	
1st King's Shropshire Light Infantry	Poona and Kirkee (for Dinapore)	Lt.-Col. B. E. Murray, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rhine	Lt.-Col. J. C. Hooper, D.S.O.	
1st Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge's Own)	Aldershot (for Catterick)	Lt.-Col. W. A. Stewart, O.B.E.	
2nd ditto	Ahmednagar	H. P. F. Bicknell, D.S.O.	
1st King's Royal Rifles Corps	Rawal Pindi (for Waziristan)	Lt.-Col. F. G. Willan, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Aldershot	Lt.-Col. C. A. Howard, D.S.O.	
1st Wiltshire Regiment (Duke of Edinburgh's)	Tidworth (for Plymouth)	Lt.-Col. F. H. Dansey, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Kamptee and Nagpur	Lt.-Col. A. W. Timmis, M.C.	
1st Manchester Regiment	Rhine	Lt.-Col. C. C. Stapledon	
2nd ditto	Rangoon and Port Blair	Lt.-Col. J. R. Heelis, M.C.	

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Infantry Regiments—*continued*

Regiment.	Location.	Commanding Officer.	Remarks.
1st North Staffordshire Regiment (The Prince of Wales's)	Calcutta	Lt.-Col. H. V. R. Hodson, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Lichfield (for Blackdown)	Bt.-Col. F. C. T. Ewald, D.S.O.	
1st York & Lancaster Regiment	Bordon	Lt.-Col. T. W. Parkinson, D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Jullundur	Lt.-Col. B. J. Curling, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Durham Light Infantry	Belfast	Lt.-Col. A. E. Irvine, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Sialkot and Amritsar	Lt.-Col. J. W. Jeffreys, D.S.O.	
1st Highland Light Infantry (City of Glasgow Regt.)	Holywood (for Aldershot)	Lt.-Col. T. A. Pollok-Morris, O.B.E., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Bangalore and Belgaum	Lt.-Col. W. H. E. Segrave, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
1st Seaforth Highlanders(Ross-shire), Buffs (The Duke of Albany's)	Aldershot	Lt.-Col.K G.Buchanan, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Cherat and Khanspur (for Lahore)	Lt.-Col. J. O. Hopkinson, D.S.O., M.C.	
1st Gordon Highldrs.	Secunderabad	Lt.-Col. I. Pictyn-Warlow	
2nd ditto	Bordon	Bt.-Col. Sir J. L. G. Burnett of Leys, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders	Maymyo and Mandalay	Lt.-Col. A. D. Macpherson, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
2nd ditto	Rhine (for Edinburgh)	Lt.-Col. G. I. Fraser, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
1st Bn. The Royal Ulster Rifles	Rhine (for Aldershot)	Lt.-Col. E. G. Dunn, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Wellington, Calicut and Malappuram	Lt.-Col. H. R. Goodman, D.S.O.	
Royal Irish Fusiliers (Princess Victoria's)	Egypt	Lt.-Col. F. W. E. Johnson, D.S.O.	
1st Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's)	Egypt	Lt.-Col. G. W. Muir	
2nd ditto	Parkhurst	Lt.-Col. C. P. James, D.S.O.	
1st Rifle Brigade (Prince Consort's Own)	Peshawar (for Landi Kotal)	Lt.-Col. E. B. Powell, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*	
2nd ditto	Aldershot (for Colchester)	Lt.-Col. J. L. Buxton, C.M.G., D.S.O.	

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5. ROYAL TANK CORPS

Headquarters Royal Tank Corps Centre ..	Wool.
Col. Comdt. T. C. Mudie, D.S.O. *p.s.c.*	
Depôt	Wool, Dorset.
Lieut.-Col. H. D. Carlton, D.S.O.	
2nd Battalion	Farnborough.
Lt.-Col. C. D. V. Cary-Barnard, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
3rd Battalion	Lydd.
Lieut.-Col. W. J. Shannon, C.M.G., D.S.O.	
4th Battalion	Catterick.
Lieut.-Col. H. G. R. Burges-Short, D.S.O.	
5th Battalion	Perham Down, Salisbury Plain.
Lieut.-Col. N. H. Stone.	
1 Section, 12th Armoured Car Company ..	Rhine.
Central Schools	Wool.
Col. C. N. F. Broad, D.S.O.	
1st Armoured Car Company	Quetta.
2nd „ „	Bangalore.
3rd „ „	Cairo.
5th „ „	Scarborough.
6th „ „	Peshawar.
7th „ „	Lahore.
8th „ „	Kirkee.
9th „ „	Cawnpore.
10th „ „	Delhi.
11th „ „	Razani.
12th „ „ (Less 1 Section)	Belfast (for Bovington).

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II. THE ARMY IN INDIA

[*Corrected up to the 1st of August*, 1926.]

Army Headquarters

Commander-in-Chief

Commander-in-Chief. Field-Marshal Sir William R. Birdwood, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

Military Secretary's Branch

Military Secretary. Major-General J. F. S. D. Coleridge, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

General Staff Branch

C.G.S. Lieut.-General Sir A. Skeen, K.C.B., K.C.I.E., C.M.G., I.A., *p.s.c.*

D.C.G.S. Major-General W. M. St. G. Kirke, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

D.M.O. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) W. L. O. Twiss, C.B.E., M.C., I.A., *p.s.c.*

D.D. (*Intell.*) Colonel M. Saunders, D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

D.M.T. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) R. J. Collins, C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

D.D.S.D. Lieut.-Colonel K. D. B. Murray, D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

ATTACHED TO GENERAL STAFF

Major-General, Cavalry. Major-General C. A. C. Godwin, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Major-General, Artillery. Major-General W. H. Kay, C.B., D.S.O., B.S.

Colonel on the Staff, Royal Engineers. Colonel C. W. Singer, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

Adjutant-General's Branch

A.G. Lieut.-General Sir J. S. M. Shea, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., I.A., *p.s.c.*

D.A.G. and D.P.S. Major-General Sir W. S. Leslie, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

D. of O. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) M. R. Walsh, C.M.G., M.C., B.S., *p.s.c.*

Dir. Medl. Services. Major-General O. L. Robinson, C.B., C.M.G., K.H.P.

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Q.M.G. Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir Richard Stuart-Wortley, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

D.Q.M.G. and D.M.Q. Major-General C. N. Macmullen, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

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Quartermaster-General's Branch—continued.

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Dir. of E. and O. S. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) W. L. J. Carey, C.I.E., B.S.

Dir. Vety. Services in India. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) F. W. Hunt, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., B.S.

Dir. of Remounts. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) W. A. Anderson, C.B.E., I.A.

Master General of Supply Branch

Master General. Major-General Sir E. H. de V. Atkinson, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., B.S.

Dir. of Artillery. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) C. C. Palmer, C.B.E., B.S., *p.s.c.*

Dir. of Contracts. Colonel W. B. Dunlop, D.S.O., O.B.E., I.A.S.C.

Dir. of Farms. Lieut.-Colonel A. S. Marriott, Mily. Farms Dept.

Dir. of Ordnance Factories and Manufacture. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) G. C. Sturrock, C.B.E., F.I.C., A.I.E. (Ind.), B.S.

Engineer-in-Chief's Branch

Engineer-in-Chief. Major-General R. N. Harvey, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

Northern Command

(RAWALPINDI)

G.O.C.-in-Chief. General Sir Alexander S. Cobbe, V.C., K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O., I.A. *p.s.c.*

Colonel on the Staff, General Staff. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) R. J. T. Hildyard, C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

D.A. and Q.M.G. Major-General K. Wigram, C.B., C.S.I., C.B.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Peshawar District

(PESHAWAR)

Commander. Major-General R. A. Cassels, C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

1ST INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(*Risalpur*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) W. G. K. Green, C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.

1ST INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Landikotal*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) G. G. Loch, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., B.S.

3RD INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Peshawar*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. C. Potter, C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

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Peshawar District—continued.

HEADQUARTERS, 4TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Nowshera*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) S. F. Muspratt, C.S.I., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Kohat District

(FORT LOCKHART)

Commander. Major-General H. Isacke, C.B., C.S.I., C.M.G., B.S., *p.s.c.*

6TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Kohat*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) P. L. Beddy, C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.,

Rawalpindi District

(MURREE)

Commander. Major-General Sir L. R. Vaughan, K.B E., C.B., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

11TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Abbottabad*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) J. Whitehead, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., I.A., *p.s.c.*

12TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Rawalpindi*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. L. Knight, C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

13TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Jhelum*)

Brigade Commander. Major-General R. S. St. John, C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Lahore District

(DALHOUSIE)

Commander. Major-General A. E. Wardrop, C.B., C.M.G., B.S.

2ND INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(*Sialkot*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. R. Harbord, C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.

Ferozepoore Brigade Area

(*Ferozepoore*)

Brigade Commander. Col. (Temp. Col. Commandant) R. J. F. Hayter, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

JULLUNDUR BRIGADE AREA

(*Jullundur*)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) D. I. Shuttleworth, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

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Lahore Brigade Area

(*Lahore*)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) W. A. Fetherstonhaugh, C.B.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

AMBALA BRIGADE AREA

(*Ambala*)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) D. Deane, D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Waziristan District

(DERA ISMAIL KHAN)

Commander. Major-General A. Le G. Jacob, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., C.B.E., D.S.O., I.A.

7TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Razmak*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) O. C. Borrett, C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., B.S.

8TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Bannu*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) S. B. Pope, D.S.O., *p.s.c.*

9TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Razani*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. C. Kensington, C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C., I.A., *p.s.c.*

10TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Manzai*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) R. C. Wilson, D.S.O., M.C., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Western Command

(QUETTA)

G.O.C.-in Chief. Lieut.-General Sir George M. Kirkpatrick, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., B.S., *p.s.c.*

Colonel on the Staff, General Staff. Colonel (Temp. Colonel on the Staff) B. R. Moberly, D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

D.A. and Q.M.G. Colonel (Temp. Colonel on the Staff) A. J. G. Moir, D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

ZHOB INDEPENDENT BRIGADE AREA

(*Loralai*)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. L. Porter, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

Baluchistan District

(QUETTA)

Commander. Major-General Sir W. H. Anderson, K.C.B., B.S., *p.s.c.*

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Baluchistan District—continued

14TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Quetta*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. C. Alexander, C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

15TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Quetta*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) P. F. Pocock, C.B., D.S.O., I.A.

Sind-Rajputana District

(KARACHI)

Commander. Major-General H. F. Cooke, C.B., C.S.I., C.B.E., D.S.O., I A.

NASIRABAD BRIGADE AREA

(*Nasirabad*)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) G. S. G. Craufurd, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., A.D.C., B.S.

Eastern Command

(*Naini Tal*)

G.O.C.-in-Chief. General Sir G. de S. Barrow, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., A.D.C., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Colonel on the Staff, General Staff. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) L. F. Renny, C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

D.A. and Q.M.G. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) W. M. Fordham, C.B.E., I.A., *p.s.c.*

United Provinces District

(*Meerut*)

Commander. Major-General G. McK. Franks, C.B., B.S., *p.s.c.*

3RD INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(*Meerut*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. A. Tomkinson, C.B., D.S.O., B.S.

17TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Dehra Dun*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) C. R. Bradshaw, C.B., C.B.E., I.A., *p.s.c.*

18TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Bareilly*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) P. H. Dundas, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

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United Provinces District—continued

19TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Lucknow*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) A. E. McNamara, C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S., *p.s.c.*

DELHI INDEPENDENT BRIGADE AREA

(*Delhi*)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) H. Barstow, C.B.E., I.A.

Presidency and Assam District

(*Calcutta*)

Commander. Major-General H. D. O. Ward, C.B., C.M.G., B.S.

ALLAHABAD BRIGADE AREA (INDEPENDENT)

(*Allahabad*)

Commander. Major-General M. R. W. Nightingale, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

Southern Command

(*Poona*)

G.O.C.-in-Chief. Lieut.-General Sir H. B. Walker, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

Colonel on the Staff, General Staff. Colonel (Temp. Col. on the Staff) C. J. B. Hay, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

D.A. and Q.M.G. Major-General P. Holland-Pryor, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O., I.A.

Central Provinces District

(*Mhow*)

Commander. Major-General Sir H. C. Holman, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

20TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Jhansi*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) F. W. Ramsay, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

21ST INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Jubbulpore*)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) W. H. Beach, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., B.S.

Poona District

(*Poona*)

Commander. Lieut.-General Sir C. W. G. Richardson, K.C.B., C.S.I., I.A., *p.s.c.*

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Poona District—continued

4TH INDIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE

(*Secunderabad*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) E. D. Giles, C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

16TH INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Ahmednagar*)

Brigade Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) A. W. H. M. Moens, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

22ND INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE

(*Secunderabad*)

Brigade Commander. Major-General A. L. Tarver, C.B., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

Bombay District

(*Bombay*)

Commander. Major-General E. S. Girdwood, C.B., C.M.G., B.S.

Madras District

(*Wellington*)

Commander. Major-General J. Ponsonby, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., B.S.

BANGALORE BRIGADE AREA

(*Bangalore*)

Area Commander. Colonel R. B. Worgan, C.S.I., C.V.O., D.S.O., I.A.

Burma Independent District

(*Maymyo*)

Commander. Major-General H. C. Tytler, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., D.S.O., I.A.

RANGOON BRIGADE AREA

(*Rangoon*)

Area Commander. Colonel (Temp. Col. Commandant) P. B. Sangster, C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.

Aden Independent Brigade

Commander. Major-General J. H. K. Stewart, C.B., D.S.O., I.A., *p.s.c.*

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III. THE ROYAL AIR FORCE

1.—Air Council

President of the Air Council.	Lieut.-Colonel the Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel John Gurney Hoare, Bart., C.M.G., M.P., Secretary of State for Air.
Vice-President of the Air Council.	Major Sir Philip A. G. D. Sassoon, Bt., G.B.E., C.M.G., M.P., Under Secretary of State for Air.
Members.	Air Chief-Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C., Chief of the Air Staff; Air Vice-Marshal Sir P. W. Game, K.C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, Air Member for Personnel; Air Vice-Marshal Sir W. G. H. Salmond, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*, Air Member for Supply and Research; Sir W. F. Nicholson, K.C.B., Secretary of the Air Ministry.

2.—Air Ministry

Secretary of State for Air.	Lieut.-Colonel the Rt. Hon. Sir Samuel J. G. Hoare, Bart., C.M.G., M.P.
Under Secretary of State for Air.	Major Sir Philip A. G. D. Sassoon, Bt., G.B.E., C.M.G., M.P.
Secretary of the Air Ministry.	Sir W. F. Nicholson, K.C.B.

Department of the Under Secretary of State for Air

Director of Civil Aviation.	Air Vice-Marshal Sir W. S. Brancker, K.C.B., A.F.C.

Department of the Secretary of the Air Ministry

Secretary.	Sir W. F. Nicholson, K.C.B.
Deputy Secretary.	Sir S. Dannreuther, Kt., C.B.
Principal Assistant Secretaries.	H. W. W. McAnally, Esq., C.B.; B. E. Holloway, Esq., C.B.; J. A. Webster, Esq., C.B., D.S.O.
Director of Accounts.	J. S. Ross, Esq., C.B.E.
Director of Contracts.	C. R. Brigstocke, Esq., C.B.
Director of Meteorological Office.	G. C. Simpson, Esq., C.B., C.B.E., LL.D., D.Sc., F.R.S.

Directorate of Lands (Joint Service for War Office and Air Ministry)

Controller of Lands.	H. G. Goligher, Esq., C.B.E.

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Air Ministry—*continued*

Department of the Chief of the Air Staff

Chief of the Air Staff.	Air Chief-Marshal Sir H. M. Trenchard, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C.
Director of Operations and Intelligence.	Air Commodore C. L. N. Newall, C.M.G., C.B.E., A.M. (Deputy Chief of the Air Staff).
Director of Organization and Staff Duties.	Air Vice-Marshal Sir I. L. B. Vesey, K.B.E., C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Signals.	Air Commodore L. F. Blandy, C.B., D.S.O.
Director of Works and Buildings.	Major-General Sir W. A. Liddell, K.C.M.G., C.B.

Department of the Air Member for Personnel

Air Member for Personnel.	Air Vice-Marshal Sir P W. Game, K.C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director of Personal Services.	Air Vice-Marshal C. A. H. Longcroft, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C.
Director of Training.	Air Commodore H. C. T. Dowding, C.M.G., *p.s.c.*

Department of the Air Member for Supply and Research

Air Member for Supply and Research.	Air Vice-Marshal Sir W. G. H. Salmond, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., *p.s.c.*
Director of Technical Development.	Air Commodore F. C. Halahan, C.M.G., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.V.O.
Director of Scientific Research.	H. E. Wimperis, Esq., O.B.E., M.A., F.R.Ae.S., M.I.E.E.
Director of Airship Development.	Group Captain P. F. M. Fellowes, D.S.O.
Director of Equipment.	Air Commodore A. M. Longmore, C.B., D.S.O., *q.s.*

3.—Air Commands (United Kingdom)

AIR DEFENCES OF GREAT BRITAIN

Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief.	Air Marshal Sir John M. Salmond, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.V.O., D.S.O., A.D.C.
Air Staff Duties.	Air Commodore F. V. Holt, C.M.G., D.S.O., *q.s.*

Wessex Bombing Area

Headquarters : Andover.

Station H.Q... ..	Andover.	Station H.Q. ..	Bircham Newton.
No. 12 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Andover.	No. 7 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Bircham Newton.
Staff College ..	Andover.	No. 99 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Bircham Newton.
No. 58 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Worthy Down.	No. 9 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Manston.
No. 11 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Netheravon.	No. 207 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Eastchurch.
Station H.Q... ..	Spittlegate.		
No. 100 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Spittlegate.		
No. 39 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Spittlegate.		

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AIR DEFENCES OF GREAT BRITAIN—*continued*

Fighting Area

Headquarters : Uxbridge.

Station H.Q.	Kenley.
No. 32 (Fighter) Sqdn. ..	Kenley.
•No. 24 (Commn.) Sqdn.	Kenley.
No. 56 (Fighter) Sqdn. ..	Biggin Hill
Night Flying Flight ..	Biggin Hill.
Station H.Q.	Northolt.
No. 41 (Fighter) Sqdn. ..	Northolt.
Communication Flight ..	Northolt.
No. 25 (Fighter) Sqdn. ..	Hawkinge.
No. 17 (Fighter) Sqdn. ..	Hawkinge.
Station H.Q.	Duxford.
No. 19 (Fighter) Sqdn. ..	Duxford.
No. 29 (Fighter) Sqdn. ..	Duxford.
No. 111 (Fighter) Sqdn.	Duxford.
Station Flight	Duxford.
No. 3 (Fighter)	Upavon.
No. 23 (Fighter) Sqdn. ..	Henlow.
No. 43 (Fighter) Sqdn. ..	Henlow.

Inland Area

Headquarters.

Air Officer Commanding.	Air Vice-Marshal Tom I. Webb-Bowen, C.B., C.M.G.
Chief Staff Officer.	Air Commodore Bertie C. H. Drew, C.M.G., C.B.E., *p.s.c.*

Units Administered direct by Inland Area Headquarters.

Air Ministry Wireless Section	Air Ministry.
••R.A.F. Central Band	Uxbridge.

No. 21 Group

Headquarters : West Drayton.

†Reception Depot ..	West Drayton.
‡No 1 Stores Depot	Kidbrooke.
Port Detachment ..	South Dock, West India Dock, E.14.
School of Store Accounting and Store Keeping	Kidbrooke.
‡Medical Stores Depot	Kidbrooke.
‡No. 2 Stores Depot	Altrincham.
‡Record Office ..	Ruislip.
¶R.A.F. M.T. Depot	Shrewsbury.
¶Home Aircraft Depot	Henlow.
§Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment ..	Martlesham
No. 15 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Martlesham.
No. 22 (Bomb.) Sqdn.	Martlesham.
‡No. 3 Stores Depot	Milton.
‡No. 4 Stores Depot	Ickenham.
‡The Packing Depot	Ascot.
Detachment	Orfordness.
R.A.F. Depot .. (Including School of Physical Training.)	Uxbridge.
Superintendent, R.A.F. Reserve ..	Northolt.
‖R.A.F. Officers' Hospital	Uxbridge.

• Directly under Air Ministry for operations.

•• Directly under Director of Personal Services, Air Ministry, for technical administration.

† Directly under Director of Training, Air Ministry, for technical administration.

‡ Controlled directly by the Air Ministry as laid down in A.M.W.O. 822/1921.

§ Administered as laid down in A.M.W.O. 33/1926.

‖ Under No. 21 Group for administration only.

¶ Directly under Director of Equipment, Air Ministry, for technical administration.

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AIR DEFENCES OF GREAT BRITAIN—*continued*

Inland Area—*continued*

No. 22 Group

Headquarters : Farnborough.

•School of Photography	Farnborough.	No. 16 (Army Cooperation) Sqdn.	Old Sarum.
†Experimental Section, R.A.E.	Farnborough.	School of Balloon Training	Larkhill.
No. 4 (Army Cooperation) sqdn.	Farnborough.	No. 13 (Army Cooperation) Sqdn.	Andover.
School of Army Cooperation	Old Sarum.	No. 2 (Army Cooperation) Sqdn.	Manston.

No. 23 Group

Headquarters : " St. Vincents," Grantham.

No. 2 F.T.S.	Digby.	No. 1. F.T.S.	Netheravon.
No. 5 F.T.S.	Sealand.	C.F.S.	Upavon.
Armament and Gunnery School	Eastchurch.	Electrical and Wireless School	Flower Down.
School of Technical Training (Men)	Manston.	Detachment of E. and W. School accommodated at	Worthy Down.

Coastal Area

Headquarters: 33–34, Tavistock Place, W.C.1.

Air Officer Commanding	Vice Air-Marshal F. R. Scarlett, C.B., D.S.O.
Chief Staff Officer	Group Captain P. H. L. Playfair, M.C.

Units Administered Direct by Coastal Area Headquarters

‡Inspector of Recruiting	4, Henrietta St., W.C.2.	R.A.F. Training Base	Leuchars.
(*a*) R.A.F. Recruitiug Depot	4, Henrietta St., W.C.2.	(*a*) Headquarters.	
§Research Laboratory		(*b*) No. 404 (Fleet Fighter) Flight.	
§Central Medical Board	3–4, Clement's Inn, W.C.2.	(*c*) No. 442 (Fleet Reconnaissance Flight.	
Specialists Medical Establishment		(*d*) No. 443 (Fleet Reconnaissance) Flight.	
†Marine Aircraft Experimental Establishment	Felixstowe.	R.A.F. Station	Donibristle.
(*a*) Flying Boat Development Flight	Felixstowe.	(*a*) No. 405 (Fleet Fighter) Flight.	
		(*b*) No. 406 (Fleet Fighter) Flight.	
		R.A.F. units for H.M.S. *Furious*.	

• Directly under Director of Training, Air Ministry, for technical administration.

† Controlled directly by the Air Ministry, as laid down in A.M.W.O.822/1921.

‡ Directly under Air Ministry for technical administration.

§ Under the D.M.S., Air Ministry, for technical administration (medical).

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AIR DEFENCES OF GREAT BRITAIN—*continued*

(b) Coastal Area—*continued*

No. 10 Group

Headquarters : Lee-on-Solent

R.A.F. Base .. .. Calshot.
(*a*) Headquarters.
(*b*) No. 480 (Coastal Reconnaissa ce) Flight.
(*c*) H.Q. Training Squadron.
(*d*) Air Pilotage Flight.
(*e*) Seaplane Training Flight.
(*f*) Marine Training Section.
School of Naval Co-operation .. .. Lee-on-Solent.
Storage Unit.. .. Tangmere.

R.A.F. Base .. .. Gosport.
(*a*) Headquarters.
(*b*) No. 420 (Fleet Spotter) Flight.
(*c*) No. 421 (Fleet Spotter) Flight.
(*d*) No. 422 (Fleet Spotter) Flight.
(*e*) No. 461 (Fleet Torpedo) Flight.
(*f*) No. 462 (Fleet Torpedo) Flight.
(*g*) Development Flight.
Care and Maintenance Party .. .. .. Cattewater.

(c) Cranwell

Headquarters : Cranwell, Sleaford, Lincs.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Commander A. E. Borton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C.

Administrative Duties. Wing Commander S. W. Smith, O.B.E., *q.s.*

Units as follow :—
R.A.F. (Cadet) College.
Band.
R.A.F. Hospital.

(d) Halton

Headquarters : Halton House, Halton, Wendover, Bucks.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Vice-Marshal C. L. Lambe, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.

Units as follow :—
No. 1 School of Technical Training Apprentices .. .. Halton.
School of Cookery .. .. .. ,,
R.A.F. Hospital .. .. .. ,,
(*a*) Pathological Laboratory .. ,,

(e) R.A.F. Staff College

Headquarters : Andover, Hants.

Commandant. Air Commodore Edgar R. Ludlow-Hewitt, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C.

(f) Special Reserve and Auxiliary Air Force

Headquarters : 145 Sloane Street, London, S.W.1.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Commodore John G. Hearson, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O.

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AIR DEFENCES OF GREAT BRITAIN—*continued*

Special Reserve Units.

No. 502 (Ulster) Bombing Squadron ..	Aldergrove.

Auxiliary Air Force Units.

No. 600 City of London (Bombing) Squadron	Northolt.
„ 601 County of London (Bombing) Squadron	„
„ 602 City of Glasgow (Bombing) Squadron	Renfrew.
„ 603 City of Edinburgh (Bombing) Squadron	Turnhouse.

B.—OVERSEAS

(a) R.A.F., Middle East

Headquarters : Villa Victoria, Cairo.

Air Officer Commanding.	Air Vice-Marshal Sir Oliver Swann, K.C.B., C.B.E.
Chief Staff Officer.	Air Commodore C. R. Samson, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.F.C.

Units as follow :—

Administered direct by Command Headquarters.

R.A.F. Depot, Middle East	Aboukir.
Aden Flight	Aden and Somaliland.
No. 216 (Bombing Squadron	Heliopolis.
„ 47 (Bombing) Squadron ..	Helwan.
„ 208 Army Cooperation) Squadron	Moascar, Ismailia.
„ 4 Flying Training School ..	Abu Sueir.

(b) Iraq Command

Headquarters : Baghdad City.

Air Officer Commanding.	Air Vice-Marshal Sir J. F. A. Higgins, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., A.F.C.
Chief Staff Officer.	Air Commodore T. C. R. Higgins, C.B., C.M.G.

R.A.F. Units as follow :—

Administered Direct by Command Headquarters.

Station Headquarters	Hinaidi.
H.Q. Accountant Office	Baghdad.
Brigade Accountant Office	„
Aircraft Depôt	Hinaidi.
Indian Hospital	Karradah.
British Hospital	Hinaidi.
Central Supply Depôt	„
Petrol Dump	„
Supply Depôt	Mosul.

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AIR DEFENCES OF GREAT BRITAIN—*continued*

(b) Iraq Command—*continued*

Administered Direct by Command Headquarters—continued

No. 1 (Fighter) Squadron	Hinaidi.
„ 6 (Army Co-operation) Squadron	Mosul.
„ 8 (Bombing) Squadron	Hinaidi.
No. 30 (Bombing) Squadron	„
„ 45 (Bombing) Squadron	„
„ 55 (Bombing) Squadron	„
„ 70 (Bombing) Squadron	„
No. 3 Armoured Car Company ..	Basrah.
„ 4 „ „ „ ..	Hinaidi.
„ 5 „ „ „ ..	Mosul.
„ 6 „ „ „ ..	Hinaidi.
Station Headquarters	Basrah.
Stores Depôt	„
Base Supply Depôt	„
Combined Hospital	„
Inland Water Transport	„
No. 84 (Bombing) Squadron	Shaibah.

Military Forces in Iraq.

2nd Battalion The King's Regt.	Iraq Signal Section.
2/16th Punjab Regt.	No. 2 Wireless Coy., R.C.S. (No. 2 Section).
4/2nd Bombay Pioneers.	40th Combined Field Ambulance,
2/16th Punjab Regt.	Veterinary Hospital.
116th Transport Coy.	

(c) R.A.F. India

Headquarters : Delhi.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Vice-Marshal Sir E. L. Ellington, K.C.B., C.M.G., C.B.E., *p.s.c.*

Chief Staff Officer. Group Captain A. Chamier, C.M.G., D.S.O., O.B.E.

Units as follow :—

Headquarters, No. 1 Indian Wing ..	Peshawar.
No. 60 (Bombing) Squadron ..	Kohat.
No. 20 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	Peshawar.
Headquarters, No. 2 Indian Wing ..	Risalpur, Nowshera.
No. 27 (Bombing) Squadron ..	„ „
„ 5 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	„ „
Headquarters, No. 3 Indian Wing ..	Quetta.
No. 28 (Army Cooperation) Squadron	„

Units administered direct by Command Headquarters :—

Aircraft Depôt	Karachi.
„ Park	Lahore.
No. 31 (Army Cooperation) Squadron ..	Ambala.
Central Accounts Office	Poona.

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AIR DEFENCES OF GREAT BRITAIN—*continued*

(d) R.A.F. Mediterranean

Headquarters: Valletta, Malta.

This Command comprises all units cooperating with the Navy in the Mediterranean Sea area.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Commodore R. H. Clark-Hall, C.M.G., D.S.O., *p.s.a.*

Units as follow:—

R.A.F. Base	Calafrana, Malta.
(*a*) No. 481 (Float Plane) Flight ..	„ „

R.A.F. Units—

(*a*) Headquarters.
(*b*) No. 402 (Fleet Fighter) Flight.
(*c*) No. 403 (Fleet Fighter) Flight.
(*d*) „ 423 (Fleet Spotter) Flight
(*e*) „ 440 (Fleet Reconnaissance) Flight.
(*f*) „ 441 (Fleet Reconnaissance) Flight.
(*g*) „ 460 (Fleet Torpedo) Flight.

H.M.S. *Hermes.*
Headquarters.

(e) Palestine Command

Headquarters: Bir Salem, Palestine.

Air Officer Commanding. Air Commodore E. L. Gerrard, C.M.G., D.S.O.

R.A.F. Units as follow:—

Command Accounts Office	Bir Salem.
No. 14 (Army Cooperation) Squadron (less 1 Flight)	Ramleh, Palestine.

R.A.F. Units as follow:—

No. 2 Armoured Car Company ..	Sarafand and Jerusalem
Supply Depôt	Sarafand.
Palestine General Hospital	Ludd.
Repair Section	Sarafand.
Headquarters, R.A.F., Trans-Jordania ..	Amman.
1 Flight No. 14 (A-C) Squadron ..	„
1 Section of No. 2 Armoured Car Coy.	„
Military Units in the Palestine Command:—	
No. 2 Wireless Coy., R.C.S. (H.Q. and No. 1 Section)	„

(f) Independent Units, &c.

Aeronautical Committee of Guarantee (British Section)	*via* A.P.O., S 40, British Army of the Rhine.

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Printed in Great Britain by William Clowes and Sons, Limited, London and Beccles.

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Vol. XIII. No. 2. *January, 1927.*

The Army Quarterly

FEB 2 1927

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THE
ARMY QUARTERLY

VOL. XIII. No. 2. JANUARY, 1927

EDITORIAL

THE speeches on the subject of Imperial defence, delivered by Mr. Baldwin and by other statesmen of the Empire at a meeting of the Imperial Conference on the 26th of October, are worthy of close attention if for no other reason than that they illustrate very clearly how little the conception of our Imperial defence organization has changed during the last twenty years. It might have been supposed that the lessons learnt at such great cost between 1914 and 1918 would have induced the statesmen of the Empire seriously to set to work in order to devise some kind of workable machinery by which the whole military and civilian strength of the King's Dominions all over the world might be utilized at once to the best advantage for the common good in the unhappy event of the outbreak of another war. But presumably the detailed discussions on the question of Imperial defence which have taken place between the statesmen of the Empire at the Imperial Conference have forced them to the conclusion that in time of peace at any rate it is not feasible to set up any permanent body representing the Empire as a whole with definite authority to coordinate a united defence policy. With an Empire such as ours, consisting as it does of a community of free and independent nations scattered all over the world, each of which is jealous of any interference with, or control of, its resources even in the common interest, such a conclusion was perhaps inevitable. Each nation, in addition to being determined to maintain its independence, has to consider its own immediate problems of defence, and, as these are intimately bound up with its geographical, financial and political conditions, it cannot be expected to submit itself to any unified system of Imperial defence which

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would free its elected leaders of a full responsibility for the efficiency of its military forces and the safeguarding of its territory from hostile attack. It seems, then, that the establishment of any real unity of control in the matter of Imperial defence is not practical politics, and it is equally clear from a study of the discussion at the Imperial Conference that any material readjustment of the expenditure on armaments as between Great Britain and the Dominions cannot be expected now or in the immediate future. So long as Great Britain is the most populous and richest portion of the Empire, her people must be prepared to continue to bear the largest share of the cost of Imperial defence. In this latter connection, however, it is satisfactory to note that both Mr. Bruce, on behalf of Australia, and Mr. Coates, on behalf of New Zealand, stated that in their opinion their respective countries should contribute more largely towards the naval defence of the Empire. Mr. Bruce informed the Conference that so far as the Navy was concerned, " the view of Australia was that the question of naval defence, particularly the protection of the trade routes of the Empire, was one in which all were equally concerned, and that something should be done to try and ensure that the burden was a little more equally divided." * Mr. Coates announced that New Zealand was ready to increase her own division of the Royal Navy and to pay for the maintenance of cruisers.

So far as the general matter of Imperial defence is concerned, it is satisfactory to learn on the assurance of their respective Prime Ministers that the primary object of each Dominion is to provide for its own defence, and that all the Dominions are developing their military and air forces on the same general lines as these forces are being developed in this country. So long as the organization, training, armament and equipment of military and air force officers and men are similar throughout the Empire, the task of employing them together in one army, should the occasion arise, will be a far less difficult one than might otherwise be the case. The more, too, that officers from this country are attached to the staffs and units in the Dominions and vice versa, the better it will be for bringing about an interchange of ideas, and a better understanding of each other's point of view.

" The coordination of all activities in the sphere of defence," to use Mr. Baldwin's words at the Imperial Conference, is still to be

* Mr. Bruce stated that the defence expenditure of the Empire for 1925–1926 was per head : Great Britain 51*s.* 1*d.*, Australia 27*s.* 2*d.*, New Zealand 12*s.* 11*d.*, Canada 5*s.* 10*d.*, and South Africa 2*s.* 6*d.*

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left to the Committee of Imperial Defence. This Committee, as the Prime Minister was careful to remind his hearers, is a purely advisory and consultative body, and it has, as Lord Balfour pointed out twenty-two years ago, " not the smallest authority to impose obligations, financial, political, military or naval." It is no doubt useful for a Prime Minister to have such a body always at hand to which he can refer any awkward military problem that may arise ; but it is difficult to see how the Committee of Imperial Defence, as at present constituted and utilized, can really bring about any effective coordination in the military defence of the Empire. This matter has been so constantly discussed in these Notes that there is no object in venturing any criticism of the Prime Minister's most recent utterance in defence of the Committee and its work. Before the war it no doubt performed—and may once again be performing —valuable functions, but they are known only to the initiated. Obviously, however, a purely consultative body cannot be a satisfactory coordinating authority and it is useless to imagine, therefore, that the Committee of Imperial Defence can coordinate " all activities in the sphere of defence." Its motto may be " Cavendo Tutus," as the Prime Minister claims, but it can only secure safety if some other body of persons will take the precautions which it may deem necessary. The Prime Minister as chairman or convener of the Committee of Imperial Defence, must convince the Prime Minister as the chief of a political party and leader of the House of Commons that the safety of the nation and the Empire demands a certain line of policy. In the past this has presumably been no easy task ; in the future it is scarcely likely to be less difficult. It appears to us more and more evident that it is not so much to the Committee of Imperial Defence that we must look for this coordination of the military resources of the Empire, as to a combined General Staff representing the three Fighting Services of this country acting in close cooperation with the General Staffs in the Dominions. Such a body would be qualified by knowledge and experience to advise the Governments of the Empire on all matters of defence, and would be in a position to carry out the decisions of the Governments when they were arrived at.

* * * * *

It is a pity that Sir William Robertson's book " Soldiers and Statesmen," which is reviewed in this number of the *Army Quarterly*, has not been produced at a lower price, because it is a work which should be studied carefully by all Britons. As an historical document it is of great interest, and as a warning and guide to those who

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now and in the future have charge of their country's destinies it should be of immense value. The author sets down in plain and terse English the story of a great Empire drifting into a war for which it had never seriously prepared, and "muddling through" only after a succession of perfectly avoidable disasters had driven home those elementary principles of the conduct of war which should form part of the education of every citizen.

How little the true nature of a great war involving the whole of the British Empire was realized in 1914 is shown by the fact that the Imperial General Staff which, as its name indicates, should have been responsible for the supreme direction of a war in three continents, embarked *en bloc* for France at the outbreak of hostilities as the General Staff of one of the Armies in the field.

This was the *fons et origo mali* from which our misfortunes came. For the first seventeen months of the war it is no exaggeration to say that we had no military policy, no General Staff capable of forming such a policy, and no machinery for carrying it out even if we had had one.

Sir William Robertson shows that it was mainly due to the absence of any such controlling military authority that we drifted into the various attractive looking side-shows which so gravely affected the whole course of the war and prolonged it.

The lessons of these unfortunate campaigns, however, have to a great extent been already taught in the pages of Blue Books, and readers will probably feel that valuable as this part of the book is, the real interest of Sir William Robertson's work lies in the author's account of the period from December, 1915, to February, 1918, during which, as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, he was responsible for the supreme direction of operations in all theatres of war.

Sir William was at the outset confronted with immense difficulties. Success in the main theatre of war was already seriously imperilled owing to the fact that we had been committed to enterprises elsewhere which entailed diffusion of strength and an appalling strain upon our resources in men and shipping—enterprises, too, which in most cases, even if success were to attend them, could exercise little effect upon the ultimate result of the struggle. His first step, therefore, was to induce Ministers to consent to the principle that victory could only be gained by the defeat of the German Armies in France and Flanders. Having reconstituted the Imperial General Staff, he proceeded to carry out the policy thus decided upon by concentrating every available man and gun in the main

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theatre, and reducing our commitments in the minor theatres of operations to the minimum consistent with safety. Unfortunately errors in strategy can seldom be altogether retrieved in the course of a war; political considerations formed an insurmountable obstacle to some of his plans; but at least there was now a definite policy to pursue, and had Ministers only supported him by placing entire confidence in him, in their commanders in the field, and in the policy to which they had given their consent, there is little doubt that the war might have been ended in 1917, and certainly the disasters of 1918 could have been avoided. But in fairness to Ministers it must be remembered that a war of attrition imposes a fearful strain upon statesmen. It is not given to every man to have the vision of an Abraham Lincoln. It is not unnatural that Ministers should have grown uneasy at the fearful cost of what seemed to them merely a gain of a few hundred yards on the Somme, at Arras and in the Yypres salient. Sir William admits that, in spite of his rigid avoidance of any unduly optimistic forecasts, General Headquarters in France sometimes raised expectations which were not fulfilled. But when every excuse has been made for the difficult position in which Mr. Lloyd George found himself, there is little excuse for the course of action adopted by him when he was Prime Minister. It seems clear that from the autumn of 1916 onwards he had ceased to believe in the policy to which he had set his hand and had lost confidence in his military advisers. His course was an obvious one. If he no longer trusted his military advisers, he should have replaced them. Instead of doing this, he contented himself with making their task as difficult as possible. The various methods which he employed to carry out his ideas as to the conduct of the war without consulting his appointed military advisers from the time of the Nivelle episode to the time of the formation of the Versailles Council—afford an invaluable object lesson as to the kind of difficulties which are encountered in the relations between statesmen and soldiers where those relations have not formed the subject of previous study.

* * * * *

It is to be hoped that no British military leaders in the future will be faced with the precise situation that Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Haig were called upon to face during the Great War. Their treatment by their political chief contravened the standard of what is due from a Minister to his technical advisers. But the really important question for us to-day is "Have the lessons been learnt?" If another war were to break out to-morrow,

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would its supreme direction be subject to the same ignorance and mishandling as occurred between 1914 and 1918? The answer to each of these questions must be in the negative if one is to judge from the general tone adopted by Ministers and ex-Ministers when discussions upon problems of defence take place in Parliament and from the speeches of the statesmen of the Empire at the Imperial Conference. The Committee of Imperial Defence has been revived after its period of slumber during the war in exactly the same form as in 1914, and no scheme apparently has been devised whereby our statesmen and soldiers respectively are allotted their definite duties in forming in time of peace and carrying out in time of war the military policy of the Empire and the nation with due regard to coordination of effort.

* * * * *

The debate initiated by Lord Templemore in the House of Lords on the 1st of December was raised "to call attention to the continued shortage of officers and other ranks in the Territorial Army, and to the rumours of further reductions in the Regular and Territorial Armies." The result of the debate was not very satisfactory because Lord Onslow, the Under-Secretary of State for War, made it tolerably clear that he was not in a position to state whether or not a decision as to any reduction in the strength of our military forces had been reached by the Government. It is disquieting, in view of the rumours which have recently been in circulation in the Press, that the Under-Secretary was not able to give a definite assurance to the House of Lords that there was no intention still further to cut down the Army. Despite the existence of the League of Nations and the praiseworthy efforts that are now being undertaken at Geneva to bring about a general reduction in armaments, the situation in Europe and throughout the world is not such as to justify us in curtailing our military forces. Admittedly the cost of defence is a heavy burden to the taxpayer, but this form of expenditure is a kind of insurance that is inevitable for a nation which has interests and responsibilities all over the world. It is the duty of the Government to make sure that our defence force is adequate for any demands that may be made on it, and it is the duty of Parliament to convince itself that the public money is being expended to the best advantage. This country, as Lord Onslow pointed out in the House of Lords, since the war has gone farther in the way of disarmament than any other country. Since 1921, for example, the Army Estimates have been reduced by just over £40,000,000, and although the cost of the Army to-day is

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large it must be remembered that this is due mainly to the heavy burden of pensions and to the fact that the pay of all ranks is rightly on a higher scale than in 1914. The actual strength of the Army at the present time is considerably lower than it was before the war. The Regular Army is less by 27,000 men than it was in 1914; the Army Reserve, by 51,000; the Special Reserve, by 51,500—and, as if this reduction were not serious enough, the Territorial Army, which is now officially our second line of defence, is 35,903 below its establishment. It may be that there are grounds for criticism as to the manner in which the money voted by Parliament for the Army is expended, but no one, who is at all familiar with the political situation throughout the world and will face facts, can seriously assert that our military forces are too large. Another great war, for the time being at any rate, is unlikely, but nothing would be so likely to bring one about as the recurrence of the theory held by some European Powers in 1914, that Great Britain could not engage in one. The late Sir Eyre Crowe, permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, in an able memorandum which was written on the eve of the late war and has just been published,* pointed out that "The theory that England cannot engage in a big war means her abdication as an independent State. She can be brought to her knees and made to obey the behests of any Power or group of Powers who can go to war. . . . I venture to think that the contention that England cannot in any circumstances go to war is not true, and that any endorsement of it would be an act of suicide." What Sir Eyre Crowe wrote in 1914 is as true to-day as it was on the day that it was written. The policy of this country is to keep the peace, but it cannot hope to have a real influence in the counsels of the nations, or to make the League of Nations an effective instrument for the preservation of peace, if it refuses to contemplate the possibility of war and does not maintain a force sufficient to guard its interests all over the world.

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Military flying must obviously entail a certain amount of risk, but the large number of air crashes that have taken place recently is causing a considerable uneasiness to the public, and the numerous questions on the subject which have been addressed to the Secretary of State for Air in the House of Commons have

* *See* "British Documents on the Origin of the War," Vol. XI. "The Outbreak of the War." Foreign Office Documents, 1914. Collected and arranged by J. W. Headlam-Morley. Stationery Office.

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elicited but little information to account for these disasters. "Air accidents," as Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes pointed out in a recent article in the *Sunday Express*, "arise from weakness in design, inefficient maintenance of material, or from inadequate physical condition or error in pilotage." Of these four causes of accident "error of judgment" on the part of the pilot is the one which, according to an answer in the House of Commons, is considered to be the cause of two-thirds of Air Force accidents. Without a detailed knowledge of the methods of Air Force administration, it is not easy to say why these errors of judgment are apparently so common. This knowledge is only possessed by those responsible for the administration, and this responsibility in practice is a continuous one because Air Council appointments and higher commands in the Air Force appear to circulate amongst a limited number of officers. Outside this circle no information is made public from which any accurate deductions as to the administration of the Air Force can be made. With the exception of chaplains and doctors the Air Force Estimates give no guide as to the duties on which *personnel* are employed or are qualified to be employed; no indication of the numbers employed in any particular sphere of work who have an expert as distinct from a semi-amateur knowledge of that work; no knowledge as to the division of expenditure on material between new type machines, and new machines of an old type, and the reconditioning of old machines.

Parliamentary questions have not been particularly productive in supplementing knowledge. They have elicited the number of pilots, but they have not procured information as to the average amount of flying a pilot carries out, or the actual number of officers regularly employed as pilots as compared with the number employed on other duties but possessing and retaining a pilot's qualification by virtue of occasional flights—nor is it known outside the Air Ministry the extent of the practice flying which entitles an airman to retain a pilot's qualification.

If there is to be any intelligent outside criticism of Air Force administration, it is clear that, in addition to a knowledge of these points, a detailed analysis of the circumstances of each accident should be available. It is impossible to form a sound opinion as to the cause of any particular accident unless one is aware of the various contributory causes, *e.g.* the type of machine which crashed, its age and design, the age of its pilot, his flying experience and recent flying practice, the amount of recent flying

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in the unit to which the machine belongs and the way in which the maintenance of the machine has been carried out. Unfortunately, information of this kind is not given to the public, and there is some doubt in view of an answer to a question in the House of Commons given by Mr. Leach, Under-Secretary of State for Air in the late Government, as to the extent to which important points such as these are examined at the Air Ministry.* In view, therefore, of the inadequate nature of the available information it is only possible to form any opinion as to the reasons for so many regrettable accidents on deductions based on such facts as come to light.

It is noticeable, for example, that there is frequently a rush of accidents in July, August and September, which are the best months for flying. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that much of the annual flying practice is concentrated in these months. If this is the case, two possible reasons for the numerous accidents suggest themselves. First, do the *personnel* get sufficient regular practice during the remainder of the year to enable them to enter upon this active period of flying in a high state of efficiency? and, secondly, are they called upon during this period of three months to do an amount of work which induces either overstrain or casualness? It is suggested, too, that it is possible—judging from the reports of some recent accidents—that the maintenance organization is not all that could be desired. A squadron leader has an amount of work which makes it very difficult for him to attend personally to detail in the maintenance of the machines under his command. He has, therefore, to depend largely upon his flight commanders for the efficiency of their machines, and it is conceivable that some of these officers have not the necessary technical knowledge to carry out their task satisfactorily. During the war there was attached to every Air Force station an engineer officer with the requisite technical knowledge who was held responsible for the condition of the machines. It is suggested that such an officer's services might well be utilized in time of peace.

Finally, as regards machines, it seems doubtful whether safety is receiving its share of the already very small Research vote. We cannot face an extended casualty roll arising from machines of improved performance but of greater risk. Increased safety must march with increased speed and load.

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* Mr. Leach stated that such information would involve very lengthy research into past records.

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Civil war has been waged in China practically continuously for the past fifteen years, and over a million men are under arms there to-day.* For the past six months the war has assumed a " Red *v.* anti-Red " aspect, in which the " Red " forces are represented in the south by the Armies of Canton and in the north by an Army based on Inner Mongolia; both these Armies are the organs of the Kuomintang or " national " party, which has its present headquarters at Canton and the mouthpiece of which is the Cantonese Government. The strength of the Kuomintang lies in the fact that it is the only organized party in China and that its branches exist not only throughout China but also amongst Chinese communities overseas. Moreover, it is a party organized on Soviet lines, financed from Moscow and supplied with Russian advisers, military instructors, money and munitions.

The " anti-Red " combination is an alliance of three independent " War Lords " who controlled important areas in the north and in the Yangtze valley—Chang-Tso-Lin of Manchuria, Wu Pei Fu of the middle Yangtze, and Sun Chuan-Fang of Shanghai. The chief weakness of this alliance lies in the fact that the War Lords have no common aim other than the preservation of their spheres of control from aggression from the south, and no individual aim other than personal aggrandizement.

In August, 1926, a Cantonese Army about 100,000 strong advanced north against Hankow, on the Yangtze, which was at that time the headquarters of Wu Pei Fu. More by bribery than by military skill, Hankow fell to the Cantonese with surprising ease and Wu Pei Fu's forces then retired north in the direction of Peking. Wu is now discredited as a military leader and his troops have taken no further part in the fighting.

Having established their position at Hankow, the Cantonese faced east and attacked Sun Chuan Fang's Army, which had moved out from Shanghai to protect the important cities of Kiukiang and Nanchang. For some weeks the Cantonese were held in check and affairs had approached a state of deadlock in the middle of November, when, once again by use of bribery, the Cantonese captured both cities, and, by the end of the month, Sun's troops were reported falling back through Nanking in the direction of Shanghai.

About the middle of November Chang Tso Lin—the Generalissimo of the " anti-Red " alliance—called a conference at Tientsin to discuss what measures could be taken to prevent further progress

* *See* Map at the end of the Editorial.

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by the Cantonese. Chang has had several bitter failures when his northern troops have ventured towards the Yangtze region, and it was not surprising that the proposed measures consisted mainly in the establishment of a powerful force on each of the two lines of advance from the Yangtze to the north, the Hankow-Peking railway and the Pukow-Tientsin railway. However, an effort is being made to save Shanghai, and at the end of November it was reported that reinforcements from the north had reached Nanking and were pushing up the Yangtze to stem the Cantonese advance from Kiukiang.

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It is always impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy even the immediate future in China. But the present rapid spread of the Kuomintang movement is similar in many respects to the manner in which the wave of republicanism spread through China in 1911 and brought about the downfall of the Imperial dynasty. So disunited are the various anti-Kuomintang forces that it may not be many months before the Kuomintang power spreads to Peking, leaving Chang Tso Lin—whose Army of 175,000 men is the best equipped in China—to withdraw to Manchuria. Two questions may well be asked: (1) why is Great Britain interested in China? and (2) how are British interests in China being affected?

The reply to the first question is that Great Britain has great commercial and financial interests in China. Normally British traders handle nearly forty per cent. of China's foreign trade, their share in it amounting to an annual sum of about £140,000,000 a year. This country's share in China's foreign debt is about £85,000,000, and for many years past British *personnel* have supervized the two great securities for this indebtedness, the Maritime Customs and the Salt Administration. Our main trade interests are located in the forty-nine sea and river Treaty Ports, and the value of British property in China excluding Hong Kong, has been assessed at £300,000,000.

In answer to the second question, the first point is that civil war in China has a particularly disastrous effect upon trade, due to the fact that there are no roads and that fighting takes place up and down the main arteries of trade, the railways and rivers, completely paralysing commerce.

But the particular danger to British interests lies in the spread of Kuomintang control. It is the avowed policy of the Kuomintang —instigated and directed from Moscow—to denounce all treaties,

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to take over control of the Customs service, to renounce all foreign debts, and to instigate a universal boycott on foreign trade; in short, to ruin the interests of all foreign Powers in China, and those of Great Britain in particular.

It is difficult to see what effective counter-action can be taken by any foreign Government. Armed intervention on a large scale by one Power or by any combination of the Powers, is scarcely practicable at the present time, nor is it likely that such intervention would bring about the desired results. It is only the protection of British lives and property which is within the scope of our available forces in China, and even this can only be carried out with increasing difficulty.

The ultimate hope lies in the undoubted fact that the Chinaman is not a natural Bolshevik, and dislikes foreign control of any kind. Whether it lies within the power of the Kuomintang eventually to throw off the yoke of Moscow, even if its leaders so desire, is a matter which only the future can decide.

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Major Martel's article entitled " Mechanization " which appears in this number of the *Army Quarterly* will be read with much interest by all soldiers whether they agree or disagree with his outlook upon war in the future. Major Martel as the inventor of the " one-man " tank not unnaturally is persuaded that the sooner the Army is mechanized the better it will be both in the interest of efficiency and also of economy. In view, however, of the kind of war which we are most likely to be called upon to face in the near future, it would be unwise if those in authority shared this view. If we knew that we were going to fight in a country as flat as a billiard table, there might be something in the suggestion of the complete mechanization of our armed forces. But we may be called upon to fight in mountainous or thickly wooded countries, and in such regions the use of tanks is much restricted and infantry is still the principal arm upon which reliance can be placed. There also seems to be a little confusion of thought in Major Martel's mind as regards the length of a frontier and the means of its defence —and when he speaks of " defence " he usually appears to allude to fortifications. The length of a frontier is not so important from a military point of view as the nature of its topography. If it is open country, tanks can be used either in attack or defence, but, if it happens to be a mountainous district, their value, to say the least of it, is much reduced. Tanks cannot fortify a position, but they can defend it in suitable country by attacking an enemy who

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tries to capture it. Finally, we cannot afford to forget that although in Europe we have no such frontier to defend as that between France and Germany, the defence of the North-Western Frontier of India still is one of our main military problems.

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Lieut.-Colonel Lucey's article on the " Promotion of Officers " explains the new principles governing the promotion of officers in the Army which have recently received the sanction of the Army Council. " It will come as a surprise to many," he says, " that the result of so much thought, discussion and deliberation, which is known to have been lavished on this particular problem, can be condensed into the space of a four-page pamphlet." But it is really not so very surprising because in the main the regulations contained in the pamphlet only put into words the existing practice regarding promotion. They merely define the conditions and qualifications which render an officer eligible for selection—conditions and qualifications which have in the past always been supposed at any rate to guide those who were responsible for this somewhat invidious task. Colonel Lucey's statement that " brevet promotion is now to be opened to the whole Army and no longer confined to those officers who distinguish themselves on the staff alone " will astonish a good many people. However, it is undoubtedly true that staff officers have hitherto been more fortunate than regimental officers in being awarded this form of promotion, and, if the new regulations will do away with this unfairness, something will have been gained by them. The main thing in any system of selection is that the selectors should be guided by nothing but the good of the Service, and that all personal prejudices and predilections should be subordinated to the public good.

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On the 7th of October, 1926, the President of the German *Reich* accepted the resignation of General von Seeckt, the commander of the *Reichswehr*. The next day the latter published the following farewell to the national forces: " To-day I must say a heartfelt farewell to the Army that came into being and grew under me.

" Come of the old Army, grown old with it in years of splendid peace and honour-full war, I could do nothing better than strive to hand down its virtues to the young Army. Whether I have succeeded, it is for you, my comrades, to prove.

" Keep German soldier-honour bright; this means fulfilment

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of the duty: every one in his place, hour by hour, day by day, in life and in death.

"Over the top—advance.

"VON SEECKT,
"Generaloberst."


"Berlin, 8th of October, 1926."

General Heye who succeeds Seeckt in command of the *Reichswehr* is fifty-six years of age. He is an infantry officer and was staff officer of the *Landwehr* Corps at Tannenberg, August, 1914. He continued to serve on the Eastern Front until 1917, when he was transferred to France. In August, 1918, he was placed in charge of the Operations Section of the Supreme Command in succession to Colonel Wetzell. In this capacity in November, 1918, he interviewed the representatives of divisions at the front, called to headquarters to report whether their troops would continue to fight, and reported to the Kaiser, that they would not fight either against the enemy or against the insurgent population at home. After serving in the *Reichswehr* Ministry, he received command of the 1st *Reichswehr* Division.

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Field-Marshal Sir Arthur Barrett, G.C.B., G.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., whose death has occurred since the issue of the last number of the *Army Quarterly*, was born in 1857 and joined the 44th Foot at Secunderabad as a sub-lieutenant in September, 1875. He entered the Indian Staff Corps four years later and was posted to the 3rd Sikhs, with which Regiment he served in the second Afghan War, taking part in Lord Roberts's famous march to Kandahar and in the subsequent punitive expedition in the Mari country. In 1882 Barrett transferred to the 5th Gurkhas and served for a period as adjutant of the Calcutta Volunteers. He took part in the Hazara expedition of 1888, and in 1891 was again on active service serving with the Gurkhas in the Miranzai operations and in the Hunza-Nagar campaign. In 1895 he was promoted major and served as A.A.G. on the staff of the Punjab Frontier Force. During the frontier wars of 1897–1898, Barrett was first D.A.Q.M.G. and then A.Q.M.G. of the large force mobilized against the tribesmen, and received the brevet of lieutenant-colonel for his services. In 1905 he was appointed D.A.G., Northern Command, and two years later was promoted Major-General and given command of the Nowshera Brigade. In 1908 he commanded the 2nd Brigade in the Bazar Valley Expedition and in the campaign against the

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Mohmands, and then became Adjutant-General in India—a post which he held for nearly three years during the time that Sir O'Moore Creagh was Commander-in-Chief. In 1902 he was appointed to command the Poona Division. Soon after the declaration of war with Turkey in 1914 he was given command of two brigades with which he occupied Basra and established British control between Kurna and the sea. When it was decided to push forward towards Baghdad with an army corps under the command of Sir John Nixon it was intended that Barrett should retain the command of the 6th Division, but his health was not good and he decided to resign his post, which was given to Sir Charles Townshend. On his return to India, Barrett was given command of the Northern Army and was in charge of the operations against the Mahsuds in 1915 and again in 1917. Finally, in the spring of 1919, when the Ameer Amanullah Khan proclaimed a *jehad* and stirred up the Afghans once again to embark on a war against the British in India, Barrett was appointed to command the North-West Frontier Force, and, despite the difficulties against which he had to contend—insufficient transport and inadequately trained troops—succeeded in defeating the Regular Afghan Army at Dakka, and in pacifying the frontier tribes. It was a difficult task which earned the commendation of Sir Charles Monro, the Commander-in-Chief in India. Barrett had been given the G.C.B. and made A.D.C. General to the King in 1917. He was given the G.C.S.I. and retired from the Army in 1920, and received the baton of Field-Marshal in the following year. He was a cool and resourceful soldier whose name will be long remembered as one of the faithful guardians of the Indian marches.

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General von Heeringen, who commanded the German Seventh Army at the beginning of the war, died on the 9th of October, at the age of seventy-six. He entered the infantry in 1868, and served in the War of 1870–1871. He then held a series of staff appointments until 1892, when he obtained command of a regiment. He remained six years with troops, and then returned to the Ministry of War for three years. Subsequently, he commanded a division and then a corps, and in 1909 became Minister of War, in which capacity he piloted the measures for the great increases of the Army. From the 28th of April, 1916, to the 18th of November, 1918, he commanded the German coast defences.

10th December, 1926.

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CHEMICAL WARFARE *

By Brigadier-General H. Hartley, C.B.E., M.C., F.R.S.

It can be said without fear of contradiction that there is no military subject on which opinions have been influenced so much by ignorance, misunderstanding and prejudice as chemical warfare, and its position to-day is so anomalous that its discussion is a rather delicate task. Any future war must be national in character: gas is known to be an effective weapon, easily and cheaply manufactured in industrial plants, and offering great opportunities of surprise. Sooner or later will not some nation fighting for its existence demand the use of everything in its power to gain its end, despite any previous agreements? And, if some excuse were needed, it would not be difficult to find one under the conditions of war psychology, so long as high-explosive shells are used, each of which emits on burst a considerable volume of a toxic gas—carbon monoxide. Smoke screens, too, may be a fruitful source of misunderstanding. The same forces which may produce war, will lead to the employment of gas.

The present position seems to me to emphasize the dangers which may arise from attempts to limit the application of scientific developments to war by international conventions. It is impossible to foresee what may be the relation of some general formula to future discoveries, or what differences of interpretation may arise respecting it: its mere existence may arouse suspicion and be a contributory cause of war: there can be no guarantee that it will be observed, while reliance on it may imperil national safety again as it did at Ypres on the 22nd of April, 1915.

The supposition that gas would be more cruel than other weapons has proved notoriously false. Except in the first few weeks when it was used against unprotected troops, the proportion of men who died or were permanently injured was far less with gas than with other weapons. During the last sixteen months of the war the

* This article was delivered as a lecture in the University of London on the 25th of November, 1926.

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death rate among our own gas casualties was 2·6 per cent., while for other casualties it was at least 25 per cent. Many casualties were caused by the effect of mustard gas on the eyes, yet only ten cases were recorded of persistent impairment of vision and four which resulted in the loss of an eye.

It is now generally admitted that many military objects can be attained with less suffering by using gas than by other means. But is it really of any value to discuss whether some new weapon such as gas is more or less humane than, let us say, the tank, which, to quote the terse but expressive words of "Field Service Regulations," "can be utilized to destroy hostile weapons and personnel by passing over them."

If we recall how near civilization came to a catastrophe as a result direct and indirect of the exhaustion due to the last war, there is little encouragement to do anything that may tend to lengthen some future struggle. On Christmas Day of 1621, Donne, preaching in St. Paul's Cathedral, used these words—"So by the benefit of this light of reason, they have found out Artillery, by which warres come to quicker ends than heretofore, and the great expence of bloud is avoyded: for the numbers of men slain now, since the invention of Artillery, are much lesse then before, when the sword was the executioner." *By which warres come to quicker ends than heretofore*—this will not result from restricting the application of science to war, even if it were possible. When war can be made archaic, there will be nothing to fear from it.

Assuming then, as we must for my purpose, that "if we have war, we shall have gas," we find that some recent writers have predicted the most alarming effects which will be obtained by it. All such claims need the most careful analysis, for nothing is harder than to estimate the real value of a new weapon in time of peace and to assess its tactical possibilities and the possible development of protection against it.

In attempting to forecast the future of chemical warfare, the most valuable evidence we have is our experience of gas during the last war, and, whilst admitting the danger of basing a general forecast on the particular conditions existing in 1914–1918, that experience will at any rate allow us to discover the characteristics which distinguish gas from other weapons and the factors which determine its success.

No nation entered the war prepared to use gas, or equipped with any defence against it. The German chemical works were not even included in their mobilization scheme, and it was not until

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million rounds of gas shells were fired in the preliminary bombardments: for counter-battery work as much as 80 per cent. of the shells contained gas, and for other tasks 50 per cent. There is ample evidence that the Germans relied considerably on the use of gas in their attacks, and in general it appears to have accomplished its immediate object so long as the weather was favourable. It is significant that on the 15th of July, the day of the German failure at Rheims, the wind was blowing towards the German lines. But, despite the uncertainty arising from weather conditions, gas had proved so useful a weapon that by the end of the war 25 per cent. was the normal proportion of gas ammunition in all the armies. Thus in a short time gas had developed into an effective weapon which had to be reckoned with in almost every situation. During the last sixteen months of the war it was responsible for 14 per cent. of the British and for 28 per cent. of the American casualties, but the tactical advantages gained by its use were of even greater significance. Chief among these were the neutralization of artillery, interference with movement, hampering of communication and the possibility of compelling the evacuation of a position by means of a persistent gas.

It must be recognized that these successes were gained under exceptional conditions which may never recur again. In the last war everything was of the nature of a set-piece; positions were accurately located and were usually held for long periods, so that it was possible to bring up large quantities of gas ammunition and use them effectively. And it soon became obvious that the bigger the area covered by a gas bombardment the greater was its effect, as in big contaminated areas defence by tactical means was impossible, and men had to remain in the gas. On the other hand, in 1917 and 1918 these successes were gained against troops who were thoroughly trained and experienced in gas defence; how good their discipline was is proved by the enormous increase in the number and gravity of casualties when precautions were neglected. Safety depended mainly on a trained nose and individual initiative, and in 1918 it might almost have been said of our men as of the hounds in "Reynard the Fox":

> "Their noses exquisitely wise,
> Their minds being memories of smells."

This is a standard of defence which it will not be easy to maintain in time of peace.

What now are the special characteristics of gas which differentiate

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it from other weapons? First, there is its peculiar relation to gas defence. The modern respirator gives complete protection to the eyes and lungs, and it can be worn for long periods with a comparatively small reduction of fighting efficiency, although it must be removed to eat or drink. Protection of the skin against mustard gas is a more difficult problem as protective clothing is less efficient than a respirator and is a considerable handicap. Experience shows that the effects obtainable with gas will always depend enormously on the protective appliances and gas discipline of an opponent, if these are defective its effect may always be overwhelming.

Gas is the only weapon which can produce continuous effects both in time and space. There need be no gaps in a gas cloud as in a barrage, and a persistent substance such as mustard gas will lie on the ground giving off toxic vapour for some time. The effects on *personnel* of a high explosive bombardment practically cease with the shelling, whereas after a heavy mustard gas bombardment respirators must be worn continuously for days, and there is always the risk of contact with the liquid which invariably produces a casualty owing to blistering. Many effects can be obtained with persistent substances which are unthinkable by other methods.

Then gas is less rigid in its trajectory than other projectiles; it will sink into trenches and dug-outs, it will drift with the wind over a target and give results which would otherwise be obtained only with a direct hit: hence its value when a target is not definitely located. It may be remembered that in "The War of the Worlds," written nearly thirty years ago, when the Martians could not see a battery to destroy it with the heat ray, they discharged the black smoke which killed everything under cover, and when it had done its work it was cleared by jets of steam—a remarkable anticipation even for Mr. H. G. Wells.

Again, gas is more subtle in its nature than other missile weapons, a wide range of substances may be used with properties especially suited to particular tactical purposes and there is always the possibility of surprise offered by the discovery of a new compound.

It is difficult to compare the effect of gas on moral with that of other weapons, but it is unquestionable that the ill-understood danger, the constant strain of watchfulness, the fear of new gases with more painful properties, and even the feeling of confinement when wearing a respirator, must tend to weaken the spirit of a force, especially if it has had little experience of gas.

Like all weapons gas has its limitations and these are often

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not sufficiently realized. For every gas there is a minimum effective concentration, and, unless this is attained, its employment is of little or no value. Lachrymators will put the eye out of action in a few seconds at a concentration of one part in two to five millions of air, mustard gas will cause eye or lung casualties after an exposure for one hour to one part in a million of air, phosgene will produce a casualty after an exposure of one or two minutes to a concentration of one part in fifty-thousand. These concentrations may seem very small, but an immense quantity of gas is needed to produce them even momentarily over an area of one square mile. A recent French article * contains a calculation of the weight of a non-persistent gas like phosgene necessary to produce a lethal atmosphere over the whole of Paris. The result is 800 tons, which it is said could be dropped in gas bombs by a fleet of a thousand aeroplanes making two journeys in a night, supposing that the bombs contained 33 per cent. of their weight of gas. But this calculation neglects entirely the fact that the liberation of gas would be spread over many hours and that the contents of each bomb would quickly be dispersed by the wind, except on a perfectly still night. Obviously, for such a purpose, a persistent gas would be more economical and effective, and on the basis of a recent German calculation† it would require 25 tons of mustard gas to contaminate one square mile effectively, while exactly the same weight of phosgene would be required to produce a lethal concentration over this area, which would rapidly be dispersed by the wind. The speed of the wind and the state of the atmosphere have an enormous effect on the concentration obtained by the use of a given amount of gas. No weapon is influenced to anything like the same extent by weather conditions. With wind velocities of over 12 miles per hour the dispersal of gas is so rapid that the effect of gas shells would be almost negligible except with lachrymators or other persistent gases, and even with these there would be a great decrease in efficiency. Hence, there must always be considerable uncertainty attaching to the employment of gas in any operation, and meteorological forecasts will play an important part in gas tactics.

Bearing in mind these characteristics, what part is gas likely to play in future wars ? The answer depends on the extent to which gas is likely to supplement other weapons, and the economy and certainty with which tactical objects may be obtained by its employment. Obviously this involves assumptions as to the evolution

* *See Les Ailes*, Paris, 8th of October, 1925.
† *See* Hanslian, *Wissen und Wehr*, 1926, *Drittes Heft*, p. 129.

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of war and the possible developments of gas and other weapons. There is no lack of prophets, and, on the whole, the experts who realize more clearly the difficulties and limitations involved and from their familiarity perhaps pay too little heed to the influence of gas on moral, make more modest claims than other writers who contend that gas will be the most powerful weapon of the future. Used at the right place and moment and in adequate amount it offers brilliant possibilities, but theoretical victories might well be won with other weapons on the same assumptions. Comparisons of the numbers of machine-gun bullets and of gas molecules are picturesque but misleading.

From the scientific side it is necessary to consider the possibility of fresh substances being discovered with new or vastly increased toxic properties, and of their employment in so much more effective a manner as to alter the complexion of gas warfare and to upset completely the balance between defensive and offensive power. Here prophecy is perhaps somewhat rash. But if we consider the enormous numbers of compounds synthesized by chemists, comparatively few have properties which make them of use in war, and the most effective of these of each type do not differ greatly as regards the concentrations at which they become dangerous, so that we have some reason for agreeing with Senator Paternò * that it is unlikely that new substances of much greater military value than those we know to-day will be discovered.

As regards improved methods of employment, although chemical warfare is a recent development, intensive work has been done on existing methods of producing concentrations of gas in the field, so that whilst such weapons as the gas shell and bomb will undoubtedly be improved, their factor of efficiency will not be multiplied many fold, and on the weapon side the effectiveness of gas may be increased more by its use in aircraft and tanks than by the improvement of older methods. Naturally, gas may and will produce many surprises, but it must not be assumed that because of its novelty it will be capable of spectacular development.

It is probably a safe assumption that the two factors most likely to influence land tactics in the future are the development of aircraft and of mechanical transport, the latter will make for quicker movement not limited to roads or railways, and safety from both will lie in mobility, dispersion and concealment, all of which will

* *See* Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission for the Reduction of Armaments, September, 1924.

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make the use of gas more difficult. In fact, the encounter battle of the future may offer few opportunities for its employment.

Looking forward to the ultimate mechanization of land forces, and the concentration of fighting-power in fast moving units with almost complete freedom of manœuvre, we arrive at conditions analogous to those existing in sea warfare, without the submarine or the torpedo, when a decision is reached by the destruction or immobilization of the fighting units. Turning for a moment to the sea battle, it appears certain that the destruction of a battleship would be accomplished with greater certainty by high explosive than by gas, and that it would not be worth while surrendering any hitting power for gas. But, bearing in mind the brief vital moments of a long-range naval action and the possibility of dislocating the fighting organization of a battleship, perhaps gas may not be altogether a negligible factor, and may offer chances of some brilliant stroke of opportunism. There is no need to emphasize the danger of conventional dogmatism about a new weapon. It is well illustrated by a German report on a successful gas operation in 1918, which ends thus :—" Even though the British have so often violated the technical laws of gas warfare as regards wind conditions on other occasions, it is still surprising that they should have carried out a gas projector attack on the night in question. . . ." Needless to say, it was the surprise that produced the success.

Whatever may be the part of gas in the encounter battle of the future by land or by sea, as the fighting forces become more and more complex, their maintenance will entail the existence of ever-increasing organizations in their rear—dockyards, bases, railroads, supply parks and aerodromes—which from their size, their permanence and their nature are admirable targets for attack by persistent gases. In many cases they would be accessible only to attack by aircraft, and the problem would arise as to the relative value of the destruction caused by an H.E. bomb and the lasting effects of contamination by a gas bomb or possibly of spray from an aeroplane. Much would depend on the state of gas defence in bases and rear échelons.

Let us now consider the different phases of a war in rather more detail. The beginning will be very different in the future to the past; instead of a period when the efforts of each combatant are concentrated on their own mobilization, an aggressive Power will do its utmost to strike a decisive blow at the outset by means of a mobile force and aircraft, and to paralyse the enemy's prepara-

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tions, for it is clear that any delay makes victory more uncertain and of more doubtful value. In these initial blows, whether they are struck at political centres or at mobilization centres, gas is likely to be used both on account of its moral effect and of the disorganization it might produce before defence measures were properly organized. At this stage comparatively small quantities of a persistent gas might have considerable effects at vital points, which might be attacked successfully from the air before anti-aircraft forces had been completely mobilized.

Passing next to the battlefield, in open warfare much will depend on the degree of mobility attained: against infantry and artillery committed to their positions gas will always be effective if it is available at the right moment. But in view of the dependence of gas on weather conditions it may not be considered advisable to carry gas shells in divisional transport, and with the fleeting opportunities offered by an encounter battle, by the time gas arrived the chance for its use might have passed. However, the availability of gas might be much enhanced by means of tanks and aircraft.* Tanks might contaminate roads and important positions, or form obstacles with mustard gas, which it would be dangerous to cross and impossible to occupy without the risk of heavy casualties. Low-flying aeroplanes might drop gas bombs on cover or might spray woods likely to contain troops, or even spray troops themselves moving in close order behind the front. There are many other possibilities, *e.g.* the use of mustard gas against bivouacs and billets, or the use of projectors brought up by carrier tanks in local attacks. The problem in mobile warfare is mainly whether gas can be made available at the right moment in sufficient quantity, and this is a question of military transport which I am not qualified to answer.

If a war was protracted and the opposing forces grew in size, the time taken for an encounter battle to develop might increase and offer a better opportunity for gas, and there would necessarily come static periods when a state of position warfare would recur and gas could be used with greater ease and effect in forward areas. As a force grew, its rear organization would become more vulnerable and yet so vital to its existence, that it might be quite impossible in the future to maintain in the field such forces as fought on the Western Front in view of the developments of gas, aircraft and tanks. Much would turn on the mobility of transport; if this were inde-

* The average gas shell contains less than ten per cent. of its weight of gas, while aeroplane bombs might contain a much larger percentage.

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pendent of roads and railways, the use of gas would be much more difficult against supply lines, except when natural obstacles enforced a particular route. The problems of chemical warfare in the future are thus bound up most intimately with the mobility of the forces engaged, with this complication, that the tank and the aeroplane may themselves become the chief means by which gas is distributed.

But in spite of its uncertainties, and I admit there are many, there can be no doubt that chemical warfare presents a serious military and naval problem which demands effective measures of defence, reinforced by the possibility of retaliation, without which an enemy might well gamble on the use of gas. The power to retaliate depends on the existence of a chemical industry, for with this, as with so many other weapons, a nation's fighting strength is largely conditioned by its industrial strength. Defence measures, therefore, must include industrial development, even to the extent of maintaining uneconomic plants which may be in excess of the world's needs at the moment. From the standpoint of waste such plants are in the same position as armaments. Economic pressure, however, is likely to bring its own solution of this difficulty in the shape of international agreements delimiting markets and supplies of raw materials. The possibility of such agreements is dependent on the organization of an industry in each country in some form of trust, and the placing of such great industrial power in a few hands is still regarded with some suspicion. But the modern trust, based largely on the advantages of pooling resources and research and of preventing wasteful overlapping, is a guarantee of efficiency and of stability, which gives security to labour, while it admits of international agreements as to markets and raw materials, thus eliminating one of the most likely causes of war in the future between democracies. War and industry, the two great destructive and constructive agents, are very closely related. War has wrought many changes in industry, and, as a reaction, industry may supply the surest guarantees of peace.

Since these words were written a combination has been formed by the leading chemical firms of this country which has great significance both for our industrial strength and for the problem of national defence, since the war value of an industry, like its peace value, depends largely on its organization.

But to return to my main topic, the outstanding fact in the history of gas warfare is the dependence of its effects on the state of protection of the troops exposed to gas. Against untrained and unprotected troops even a harmless lachrymator will be decisive,

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and, so long as it is necessary to maintain the armed forces of the Crown, it will be necessary to equip them with the most efficient means of gas protection which science can provide, and to maintain their gas discipline at a high level. To omit to do so is to invite disaster. Gas defence cannot be improvised hastily, gas training demands a long apprenticeship.

But of no less importance is the existence of a properly informed public opinion, capable of forming a sane judgment, unbiassed by panic or prejudice, on a problem which at any time may once more become of vital moment to the safety of the Empire.

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"THE OTHER SIDE OF THE HILL"

No. VI*

THE GERMAN DEFENCE OF BERNAFAY AND TRÔNES WOODS: 2ND–14TH OF JULY, 1916†

(With Map)

PART II‡

THE THIRD GERMAN COUNTER-ATTACK ON TRÔNES WOOD, 11TH OF JULY

IT will be remembered that of the 123rd Division, brought up on the 9th to the Nurlu District, the 178th and 182nd Regiments had gone into the line to relieve the exhausted 12th Reserve Division; the 178th to Hardecourt opposite Maltz Horn Trench and 182nd on either side of it, two battalions to Hem and Clery on its left and one battalion to Trônes Wood on its right. Its remaining regiment, the 106th Reserve, had been kept back at Nurlu. On the 10th, one of the battalions (the 1st) of the latter had been moved up to east of Ginchy, and, in the early hours of the 11th, two companies were sent forward to the second line at Guillemont. The first half company to arrive, about 100 men, met Capt. v. Mosch and his survivors as they arrived in the second line from Trônes Wood. With this reinforcement Capt. v. Mosch at 5.30 a.m. went forward again and pressing through the wood drove back the Bedfords who had broken through in places to the eastern edge, capturing

* Previous articles in this series appeared in the *Army Quarterly*, January, 1924; April, 1924; July, 1924; January, 1925; October, 1925; and October, 1926.

† The following list of the principal German authorities used for this article may be of interest to any reader wishing to trace further details of the fighting in this sector of the Somme battle front: *Der grosse Krieg*, Vol. 2: Schwarte; *Geschicte des Krieges*, Vol. 3: Stegemann; Bavarian Official History (*Die Bayern im Grossen Kriege*); *Bataille de la Somme*; *Feld. Art. Regt. Nr.* 21: Jancke; *Feld. Art. Regt. Nr.* 57: Uebe; *Feld. Art. Regt. Nr.* 245: Heydenreich; *Res. Inf. Regt. Nr.* 104: Braum; *Res. Inf. Regt. Nr.* 106: Bamberg; *Inf. Regt. Nr.* 153: Schmidt; *Erinnerungsblatter der 178er*: Giesecke; *Inf. Regt. Nr.* 182: Pache.

‡ Part I of this article appeared in the *Army Quarterly*, October, 1926.

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20 prisoners. "The right flank of companies Pache and Lanzendorf, threatened with immediate envelopment, was thus saved."

Immediately south of the wood in front of Maltz Horn Trench the 20th Liverpool had gained a footing in the German position now held by a battalion the 178th Regiment. Groups of ten and twenty withdrew to the second line south of Guillemont, but the further advance of the Liverpools was held up by enfilade fire from the south-eastern side of the wood, and, to quote the History of the 178th Regiment,

"by the arrival of the battalion adjutant who immediately brought forward again some of these men and organized a counter-attack which not only prevented the gap being extended but also regained a greater part of the lost trench."

Throughout the morning the fighting continued both in the wood and to the south of it, craters and sectors of trenches being taken and retaken, but no further definite progress was made by either side, the Bedfords continuing to hold a small wedge-shaped position into the wood south of the railway line and a footing in the southern side.

About midday the remainder of the two companies of the 106th Reserve Regiment came forward from Guillemont into the wood and cleared isolated parties of the Bedfords still north of the railway. These retired by way of Longueval Alley to Bernafay Wood. During the evening a counter-attack made on the Bedfords in the southern side of the wood drove them out of it, so the whole wood was again in German hands with the exception of the wedge on the western side, south of the railway, still held by the survivors of two companies ("C" and "D") of the Bedfords. The German hold on the wood at this time was as follows: The western edge north of the railway was held by the composite company of the 51st Reserve Infantry Regiment supported by one company of the 106th Reserve Regiment; south of the railway was the other company of the 106th Reserve Regiment and company v. Mosch (182nd Regiment), the south-western corner with the exception of the Bedford wedge was held by company Pache and the southern side by company Lanzendorf. As before, the edge of the wood was held by small posts with stronger parties in support points in Central Trench.

The battalion (2nd) of the 182nd Regiment which had borne the brunt of the fighting in the wood since the morning of the 9th had by now little fight left in it; the men were so much exhausted that they slept through the heaviest bombardment. The remaining two companies of the 1st Battalion (106 Reserve), therefore, were

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ordered forward to Guillemont during the day, and its 2nd Battalion sent up from Morval to the battle-front. Orders were given for the relief of the companies of the 182nd Regiment in the wood, and at the same time to clear the whole of the southern part of it of the enemy. To do this the two remaining companies of the 1st Battalion were to move from Guillemont to the wood and line up in it along the railway, facing south; the advance through the wood to the southern and western edge to begin at 9 p.m. Of the 2nd Battalion one company was to support the left flank of the advance through the wood, two companies were to occupy the second line at Guillemont and the remaining company to remain at Ginchy in reserve. The 178th Regiment opposite Maltz Horn Trench was to assist by attacking with its right that part of the trench south-east of Trônes Wood.

The orders for this attack were found on an officer of the 178th Regiment captured by the French near Hardecourt during the afternoon and information was at once (6 p.m.) sent through to British headquarters.

An artillery barrage was immediately placed between Guillemont and Trônes Wood, and the ground east of Guillemont kept under fire. The effect of this is told in the History of the 106th Reserve Regiment:

"The movement of the companies was quickly discovered by the enemy, and from 7 p.m. onwards a heavy artillery fire covered the zone of advance so that the two companies of the 1st Battalion were only able to reach their position of assembly in the wood after much delay and with heavy loss by advancing in small groups or individual rushes from Guillemont. The 2nd Battalion also came under heavy fire in its advance to Guillemont and suffered heavily before it reached the second line position (*Braune Stellung*) there. The 5th Company of this battalion, which was to assist the left flank of the attack, worked forward from Guillemont in small groups, but was unable to reach the eastern edge of Trônes Wood until 11 p.m."

In the meantime, however, at 5 p.m., the order for the relief had reached the companies of the 182nd Regiment in the wood: "Four companies of the 106th Reserve were to push through the wood and pass through us, whereupon we were to retire by sections." The delay in the advance, however, caused some confusion, and, at about 11 p.m., as the companies of the 106th Reserve were forming up for the attack, the survivors of the 182nd were already moving back out of the wood to Guillemont, leaving only a few posts along the southern and western edge. Before the advance of the 106th Reserve from

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the railway southward through the wood could begin, reports came back of a fresh British attack that had gained a footing in the southern part, and at the same time posts on the western side facing the Bedford wedge sent back for reinforcements. The planned counter-attack was therefore abandoned and the companies sent up instead to strengthen the defence where most needed. Thus the 2nd, 3rd and part of the 5th Companies were sent back to check the advance in the southern part of the wood, the 1st and 4th sent to reinforce the posts on the western side, and the remainder of the 5th held back in reserve near Strong Point on the Guillemont road.

The new British attack referred to was carried out by the 17th Liverpool (89th Brigade). It was intended to occupy the southern edge of the wood before the German counter-attack, referred to in the captured order, could reach it in any strength. At 10.30 p.m. the Battalion in artillery formation, lines of companies in column of groups, advanced from the sunken road, east of La Briqueterie. The trees at the southern edge of the wood stood out against the sky in the failing light and gave the direction. Had the edge of the wood been occupied the Battalion must have suffered heavily but, for reasons already given, the greater part of the defenders had already left and the relieving companies of the 106th Reserve had not yet arrived. The Battalion was able, therefore, to slip into the wood with few casualties except from one of the small posts left behind which was quickly surrounded, and then meeting no organized opposition companies moved through the wood to a line along the south-eastern edge facing Guillemont, the left thrown back into the wood to protect the left flank towards Strong Point. The Liverpools at once wired this line and dug in behind it. About 1 a.m. when the relieving German companies eventually advanced from the railway through the wood towards the southern edge, they were surprised to find wire and organized opposition in the wood itself. One party got hung up in the wire and was disposed of with a Lewis gun; the others fell back and made no further attacks during the night. About midnight the commanding officer of the Liverpools had met the senior officer of the Bedford companies holding the Bedford wedge, and it was decided to dig a trench across the wood joining up the new Liverpool trench with the Bedford wedge. Covering parties were sent out in front of this line taking up concealed positions in the dense undergrowth, and behind them the new line was dug and wired during the 12th.

Meanwhile, the British 90th Brigade and its opponents, the

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battalion (2nd) of the 182nd Regiment, which had faced and fought each other continuously for three days and nights, were withdrawing out of the battle zone, the 90th Brigade to Bois Celestins and the battalion of the 182nd Regiment to the sheltered valley between Ginchy and Morval. The former had lost during the fighting 33 officers (5 killed, 21 wounded and 7 missing) and 756 other ranks (84 killed, 430 wounded and 242 missing); the German 182nd Regiment gives the approximate losses of its 2nd Battalion during the Trônes Wood fighting as 6 officers (2 killed and 4 wounded) and 560 other ranks (60 killed, 300 wounded, 200 missing).

The Fourth German Counter-attack, 12th of July

During the 12th orders were given for another effort to clear the British out of the wood. The two remaining companies of the 2nd Battalion 106th Reserve Regiment were to advance at 8.30 p.m. from the second line at Guillemont and to secure the western side of the wood, whereupon the troops in the wood were to assemble along the railway, as on the previous day, and attack southward using flame-throwers (*Flammenwerfer*) to clear the British out of their new position in the southern part. The right of the 178th Regiment was to cooperate by an attack from about Arrow Head Copse against Maltz Horn Trench. The movement of the two companies out of Guillemont was, however, observed by the British artillery, and so heavy was the barrage at once put down between that village and Trônes Wood that the companies were scattered with considerable loss and had to return to the second line trench. The supports (two companies) of the 178th Regiment which had been ordered to move forward to carry out the attack on Maltz Horn Trench, south of the wood, were also so heavily shelled that they were unable to reach their front trench. As a result, the whole attack was again abandoned and the survivors of the two companies (7th and 8th) of the 106th Reserve Regiment were sent up later to Trônes Wood under cover of darkness to reinforce the line there.

The 3rd Battalion of the 106th Reserve Regiment arrived from Nurlu by way of Morval during the night, and, in the early hours of the 13th, moved up into the second line at Guillemont, one company (the 11th) going forward into the wood and reinforcing the posts along the north-western edge, including the northern point of the wood.

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THE FOURTH BRITISH ATTACK ON TRÔNES WOOD, 13TH OF JULY

On the morning of the 12th, after the failure of the British 89th Brigade to capture the wood, it was decided to put in a fresh division for the undertaking, and, during the night of the 12th–13th, the 30th Division was relieved by the 18th. During the period 8th–13th of July the former Division in the Trônes Wood fighting had lost in casualties 90 officers (21 killed, 61 wounded and 8 missing) and 1,844 other ranks (229 killed, 1,211 wounded and 404 missing).

The offensive on the German second line Longueval—Pozières had already been ordered for 3.20 a.m. on the 14th, and it was considered of the utmost importance that Trônes Wood should be captured by that time in order to secure the right flank of the attack moving up against Longueval, and also to enable guns to be pushed forward on to the northern slope of Caterpillar Valley to support, if possible, a further advance beyond the second line. General Rawlinson, therefore, ordered the XIII Corps to capture Trônes Wood by midnight of the 13th–14th at all costs.

The 18th Division came up on the evening of the 12th, and, during the night 12th–13th, its 55th Brigade took over the trenches, the 7th Buffs to Maltz Horn Trench and the 7th R. West Kent to the southern part of Trônes Wood, with the 7th Queen's and 8th E. Surrey in support. The attack was to be delivered at 7 p.m., the Buffs to hold Maltz Horn Trench and at the same time capture Strong Point on the Guillemont road, the R. West Kent to press through and capture all that part of the wood south of the railway, and the Queen's to attack the northern part of the wood from Longueval Alley. The two latter Battalions were thence to consolidate the entire eastern side of the wood facing Guillemont, placing entrenched posts and machine guns every 100 yards along it.

The R. West Kent suffered losses in crossing the open from the sunken road to the wood, chiefly from artillery fire, but entered the southern part and moved northward passing the new Liverpool—Bedford trench. Soon afterwards, however, its advance was broken by the strong points in the southern part of Central Trench held by the 3rd and 5th Companies (106th Reserve Regiment) and efforts to take them failed with heavy loss. Nevertheless, two of the R. West Kent companies pressed through the wood past these points to the railway line where they remained during the night, but were unable to get word back where they were. To reinforce the 3rd and 5th Companies (106th Reserve Regiment) the 9th Company and a platoon of the 11th Company were sent down Central Trench from the

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northern part of the wood. The 8th Company continued to hold Strong Point on the Guillemont road, the Buffs being unable to capture it.

The attack of the Queen's from Longueval Alley was met at once by heavy machine-gun and rifle fire from the north-western side of the wood in spite of the fact, as is stated in the History of the 106th Reserve Regiment, that " the German posts along the western edge were smothered with gas shells during the last ten minutes of the bombardment prior to the assault." Most of the attack was checked with heavy loss before reaching the wood, and the parties which succeeded in entering it " were rushed at once by the supports of the 11th Company and either driven out again or killed." *

Before midnight the 10th Company (106th Reserve Regiment) was sent forward from Guillemont and reinforced with small detachments the posts along the western side of the wood. The Machine-Gun Company of the Regiment was also brought up from Morval, two of its sections being sent up to the western edge of the wood, north and south of the railway respectively, and the other two kept back in the second line at Guillemont.

The Fifth British Attack on Trônes Wood and its Capture, 14th of July

By midnight reports which came back to British XIII Corps headquarters as to the situation in the wood were very scanty and unfavourable. The attack by the Queen's on the northern part of the wood had definitely failed and the greater part of the R. West Kent men had disappeared into the middle of the wood, all efforts to reach them or to get word back from them being checked by the Germans still holding the southern part of Central Trench. The XIII Corps commander, Lieut.-General W. N. Congreve, V.C., therefore telephoned to 18th Divisional headquarters and asked how it was intended to secure the right flank of the main attack on the Longueval line due to start at 3.20 a.m. Major-General F. I. Maxse replied that he would relieve the 55th Brigade by the 54th immediately, and that he still hoped to gain possession of the wood before the main attack could be adversely affected. At 12.45 a.m. the operation of capturing the wood was therefore handed over to Brig.-General T. H. Shoubridge, commanding the 54th Brigade.

In view of the need for immediate action, the simplest possible

* One platoon of the Queen's, under Lieut. B. C. Haggard, which entered the wood from Longueval Alley did, however, remain in it throughout the night.

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plan of attack was ordered, namely, to advance from the sunken road and to sweep straight through the wood from south to north, establishing a defensive flank along the eastern side, facing Guillemont, as the sweep progressed. It was 4 a.m. and light before the attack, led by the 6th Northants, got under way and casualties were suffered from shell and rifle fire before reaching the southern edge of the wood. Nevertheless, it was entered, and, at 6 a.m., the strong point at the southern end of Central Trench was rushed with the bayonet, the Germans leaving over 50 dead. Other units of the Brigade now came forward into the wood and Colonel F. A. Maxwell, V.C., commanding the 12th Middlesex, took over command in the wood and formed a line of men of different units, including some of the W. Kents who had been there all night, right across it, approximately along the Liverpool—Bedford trench dug two nights previously. This line now advanced northward picking up the R. West Kent companies by the railway and driving ahead of it a number of isolated parties of Germans, most of which left the wood by the east side north of the railway and retired on Guillemont. By 9 a.m. the northern point of the wood had been reached and the wood was clear of the enemy.

The History of the German 106th Reserve Regiment states that:

"The enemy got into the southern corner of the wood and rolled up the defence of South Central Trench, which he attacked from front and rear firing into it with Lewis guns. He then advanced northwards and thereby threatened to envelop the defenders along the western edge of the wood, the left wing, along the southern part of it, being withdrawn to the railway, but suffered heavy loss in doing so. The troops in the northern part of the wood held on till about 9 a.m. when the withdrawal from it was ordered. The survivors of the regiment crossed from the wood to the second line in good order though under a heavy fire and took up a position along it between Guillemont station and the sugar factory (Waterlot Farm). This movement was covered by three machine guns of the two sections of the regimental machine-gun company, all four guns of which had been successfully brought back from the wood. They took up a position immediately east of the wood and kept the eastern edge continually under fire during the withdrawal. Eventually, the crew of two of them were killed by fire from the wood, the other being brought back to Guillemont later in the morning. The enemy did not pursue beyond the eastern edge of the wood."

The Germans Abandon their Efforts to Retake the Wood

During the morning, relying on the capture of Trônes Wood, the main British attack on the German second line, Longueval—Pozières,


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had been delivered and had successfully entered it in several places. The British 9th Division had entered Longueval village, and during the afternoon the southern corner of Delville Wood was occupied,* and Waterlot Farm in the second line between that wood and Guillemont was captured. The German 24th Reserve Division, brought from the Champagne to about St. Quentin on the 12th, was marched thence by Hargicourt to the Somme battle-front where it arrived during the 14th, its head, the 107th Reserve Regiment, to Morval. This Regiment had received orders to retake Trônes Wood in order to relieve the British pressure against Longueval, and during the late afternoon its companies had deployed and moved up to Guillemont. Here, however, it was stopped and given counter-orders in view of the British success in Delville Wood and at Waterlot Farm, which threatened Guillemont itself from the north. The Regiment, therefore, was put into the line on the defensive north of Guillemont, making a fresh defensive position from the village northward past the eastern side of Delville Wood. The second line position on either side of Guillemont village now became the German front line of defence.

(*Concluded.*)

* *See* No. V of this series : " Delville Wood, 14th–19th of July, 1916," *Army Quarterly*, October, 1925.

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TRONES WOOD, 1916.

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LORD CURZON'S FRONTIER POLICY AND THE FORMATION OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE, 1901

(With Map)

By Captain C. Collin Davies, Ph.D., Member of the Royal Asiatic Society

On the 6th of January, 1899, Lord Curzon of Kedleston succeeded Lord Elgin as Viceroy of India. Many people thought that this appointment was going to be a complete triumph for the Forward School. They predicted that we should soon find ourselves fighting with Cossack hordes on the banks of the Oxus, and that the new Viceroy's frontier policy would approximate to the worst features of that which had marred the administration of Lord Auckland. For many years Lord Curzon had made a close study of the geography of Asia, its political and commercial problems. Unlike the majority of his predecessors, he had taken the keenest interest in Indian affairs and was by no means ignorant of the Frontier and its turbulent inhabitants. To quote his own words: "I love India, its people, its history, its government, the absorbing mysteries of its civilization and its life." To rule India had been his great ambition in life. What, then, had been his studies by way of preparation for his heavy responsibilities?

Not only had he served as Under-Secretary for India in 1891–1892, but he had also travelled extensively in the East. He had seen the principal cities of Japan and had visited Korea, China, Indo-China, Annam, Cochin-China and Cambodia. In 1888 he made his famous journey along the Transcaspian Railway to Bokhara the Noble and to Samarkand, the final resting-place of the mighty Timur. Thence he proceeded in a tarantass to the city of Tashkent. The following year found him in Persia. In 1894 he discovered the source of the Oxus to be a huge glacier at the eastern end of the Wakhan Pamir. From the Pamirs he proceeded to Chitral, making the acquaintance of the Thums of Hunza and Nagar on the way. After leaving Chitral he visited Kabul as a guest of Abdur Rahman,

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and, at one time, was reported as murdered. From Kabul he rode along the historic road to Kandahar and eventually reached the British outposts in Baluchistan. The new Viceroy had, therefore, completed a tour of the north-western frontiers of India which few have been privileged to undertake.

When Lord Curzon arrived in India, the Government of India had successfully brought to a conclusion a series of punitive expeditions against widespread and violent tribal risings, which had taken place at a most critical juncture, when India was suffering from the effects of widely diffused famine and plague. The frontier seemed calm, but the conflagration of 1897 had left bitter memories in its wake, and the echoes of the Tirah expedition had scarcely died away. The Afridi of the Khyber were clamouring for allowances which they had forfeited by their own acts; and British forces were locked up in lonely outposts and forts in tribal territory. More than 10,000 British troops were cantoned across the administrative border, in the Khyber, on the Samana range, in Waziristan, and in the Malakand area. Not only were these advanced positions many miles from a base, but they were also entirely unconnected by lateral communications. They were, therefore, in constant danger of being overpowered before supports could be rushed to their assistance. This state of affairs was extremely dangerous, in that the presence of troops, cooped up in miserable caricatures of forts from which, in many cases, they were too weak to sally forth, constituted a source of irritation to the tribesmen and an invitation to strike one more blow in defence of their independence. The lesson of 1897–1898 seemed to have had no effect upon the authorities in India for, not only were they still persisting in a policy of dispersion instead of concentration of forces, but proposals were also being brought forward for the construction of fresh and costly fortifications in tribal territory. Fortunately, wiser counsels prevailed under Lord Curzon, and his policy can best be described as one of withdrawal and concentration.

Towards the end of Lord Elgin's Viceroyalty, Lord George Hamilton, the Secretary of State for India, had, in his despatch of the 28th of January, 1898, sent a timely note of warning to the Government of India. Recognizing that the events of the 'nineties had considerably increased our responsibilities and enlarged the chances of collision with the tribes, he recommended certain measures which would be of essential importance in any reconstruction of our frontier policy. The most important of these were the avoidance of interference in the tribal zone; the best possible

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concentration of military forces; and the maintenance of the Khyber pass as a safe artery of communication and trade. Even before the termination of hostilities, he had telegraphed to the Viceroy that, "no new responsibilities should be taken unless absolutely required by actual strategical necessities and the protection of British Indian border." * In other words the forward policy of the 'nineties was to be replaced by one of non-interference resembling in many respects the old "close-border" system.

Lord Curzon belonged to no particular school of frontier policy and it soon became apparent that, with the exception of Chitral, the retention of which he favoured on Imperial grounds, he objected to any forward moves. At the same time, he was of opinion that the policy of inactivity associated with the name of Lawrence had become obsolete, owing to the lapse of time and the change of circumstances, such as improved communications. It was no longer possible for us to remain inactive behind a sort of Chinese Wall, when the Durand Convention of 1893 had extended our sphere of influence over the so-called independent tracts. He had definite views on frontier policy even before he landed. In a speech delivered to old Etonians before leaving for India he maintained that it was the duty of a Viceroy "to preserve intact and secure, either from internal convulsion, or external inroad, the boundaries of that great and Imperial Dominion." In his second Budget speech of the 27th of March, 1901, he gave a list of twelve reforms, which it had been his intention to carry out ever since he had arrived in India. First in importance he placed the creation and pursuit of a sound frontier policy. What he accomplished can be best summed up in his own words:

"Withdrawal of British forces from advanced positions, employment of tribal forces in defence of tribal country, concentration of British forces in British territory behind them as a safeguard and a support, improvement of communications in the rear." †

The system of tribal militia and local levies was necessary in order to protect the tribal country, and would, by offering increased facilities for military employment, solve, to a certain extent, the poverty and unemployment question, one of the abiding problems of the unadministered hills. This system naturally differed in various parts of the frontier, from the crude and rudimentary native levies under a system of feudal service, which existed in Chitral,

* *See* Blue Book, 1898. Cd. 8714, p. 26. Despatch dated 13th of October, 1897.

† *See* Lord Curzon's Budget speech, 30th of March, 1904.

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to the Khyber Rifles, who were well-equipped and trained by British officers. He recognized that the militia would break down, if called upon to perform the duties of Regulars, as had been the case in the Khyber in 1897; he arranged, therefore, for their protection and support by movable columns and a system of light railways within the British administrative borders. In addition, he paid a personal visit to the frontier, where, at an imposing Durbar held at Peshawar and attended by the local Khans and Sirdars, he pointed out that we had no intention of interfering with their religion or independence, and that we would pay them allowances, if the roads and passes were kept open and offenders handed over to justice.

By 1904, the new system was in operation along the whole frontier from Chitral to Baluchistan. All Regular troops had been withdrawn from Gilgit, and the protection of that isolated position left in the hands of the Kashmir Imperial Service troops. In Chitral alone, for reasons already given, were Regular forces to be found. These were concentrated at Kila Drosh in the southern extremity of Chitral, at a discreet distance from the Mehtar's capital. Mastuj was the headquarters of the Chitrali irregulars. In 1902, the Khar Movable Column was withdrawn and Regulars stationed at Chakdarra, Malakand and Dargai. Chakdarra was of great importance owing to the fact that the Swat river had been bridged at that spot, and it was also the starting-point of the famous road to Chitral. All the outlying posts were held by the Dir and Swat levies, who were responsible for the safety of the road. To support our troops on the Malakand, a light railway was constructed from Nowsherra to Dargai. Similarly, Regular troops were recalled from the Khyber, which was garrisoned by the re-organized Khyber Rifles, consisting of two battalions under British officers. A flying column was kept in constant readiness at Peshawar to move to the support of our troops in the Khyber. Peshawar was connected with Jamrud by an extension of the broad gauge railway; with Landi Kotal by a road running through the Mullagori country; and with Kohat by a cart-road running through the Kohat pass. The Mullagori road was an alternative route to the Khyber and its construction had been previously advocated by Sir Robert Warburton. The bridge over the Indus at Kushalgarh and the extension of the railway from Kohat to Thal were not completed during Lord Curzon's term of office. In the Orakzai country, the Samana Rifles were raised, and were supported by British troops at Kohat. British garrisons were withdrawn from Kurram and replaced by two battalions of the Kurram Militia, equipped and officered on the

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same lines as the Khyber Rifles. In the Waziri country, the Northern and Southern Waziristan Militia were raised for the protection of the Tochi and Gomal passes respectively, and were supported by movable columns stationed at Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan. In Baluchistan the Quetta-Nushki railway was commenced, but it was not completed until 1905. The importance of this line lies in the fact that it has been instrumental in popularizing the Nushki-Seistan caravan route.

The creation of the North-West Frontier Province was the consummation of all his frontier policy: to quote his own words, it was "The keystone of the Frontier Arch." It must not be imagined, however, that the idea of forming a new province across the Indus emanated from the fertile brain of Lord Curzon. For at least a quarter of a century, viceroys, administrators and generals had, tentatively or otherwise, put forward proposals for the creation of a new administrative unit, which they hoped would usher in an era of peace on the blood-stained border and prove a panacea for most of the evils to which it was subject.

In the first place the question of the rectification of the frontier districts had nothing to do with the proposal to separate the Punjab from its trans-Indus tracts, for it originated in the proposal to annex Sind to the Punjab. In 1843, six years before the Punjab was wrested from its Sikh owners, Sir Charles Napier completed the conquest of Sind, which was placed under the Government of Bombay. Had the Punjab been annexed first, in all probability Sind would have been incorporated with the Punjab, of which it formed an integral part; for, as Lord Dalhousie pointed out, it was connected with the Punjab by the strongest of all natural links, a large river.* The Court of Directors, however, was not prepared, for financial reasons, to sanction this poposal. After the Mutiny the question was reconsidered, but, owing to the backward state of communications along the Indus, Lord Canning refused to give his consent. Moreover, Sind was prospering under the excellent administration of Sir Bartle Frere. The *status quo* was, therefore, maintained, and even to-day, in spite of distance, Sind remains under the Government of Bombay. Frere, however, was always in favour of the proposal, in order that there might be one Government from the seaboard to Kashmir, but, at the same time, he objected to any scheme under which the distinctive features of the Sind system would be abandoned. In 1876 Lord Northbrooke

* *See* Blue Book, 1878. LVIII. Cd. 1898, p. 5. Minute dated 20th of February, 1856.

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was of opinion that Sind should be joined to the Punjab, but, in the following year, Lord Lytton, who succeeded him as Viceroy, placed the question on a different and enlarged basis by proposing the creation of an enormous trans-Indus province, consisting of the six frontier districts of the Punjab and of the trans-Indus portion of Sind. At the head was to be a Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General. Under him were to be two separate Commissioners for the Pathan and Baluch tribes respectively. Lytton argued that:

"The Viceroy would, by means of this arrangement, command the services of his own specially selected agent, in whose hands the threads of all our border politics and tribal relations would be concentrated. The time of such an agent could be devoted almost entirely to purely frontier duties; and he would be better able than any Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab can possibly be to visit . . . all parts of the frontier." *

There were three objections raised to this scheme: that certain of these districts were integral parts of the Punjab; that their internal administration would suffer by separation; and that frontier affairs could be best supervised and carried out by the Punjab Government. Lytton replied that these districts were separated from the Punjab geographically, historically and racially. He also pointed out that, "all unnecessary links in an administrative chain admittedly weaken the strength of it." In his covering despatch of the 17th of May, 1877, he proposed that Bombay should receive the whole or part of the Central Provinces, in order to compensate it for the loss of trans-Indus Sind. This, of course. raised a storm of indignation and contributed largely to the non-acceptance of the scheme. The Secretary of State could not see his way clear to accepting the scheme as proposed by Lytton, and suggested a compromise in the form of a separate Commissioner for both the Pathan and Baluch tribes, but there was to be no Chief Commissioner. Both Sir Charles Aitchison, the Foreign Secretary, and Sir Robert Egerton, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, vigorously protested against a compromise so full of "the seeds of future misunderstanding, confusion and divided responsibility." But Lytton himself accepted the half-hearted compromise, hoping no doubt that in course of time his original proposal would become a *fait accompli*. He had appointed Lord Roberts as the first Northern Commissioner when the Second Afghan War, 1878–1880, broke out,

* *See* Blue Book, 1878. LVIII. Cd. 1898, p. 134. Minute dated 22nd of April, 1877.

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whereupon his plans automatically fell to the ground. With the close of the first phase of the war, in 1879, he again set to work, only to be interrupted by the murder of Cavagnari. When the war came to an end, in 1880, Lord Lytton had been succeeded by Lord Ripon, who does not appear even to have considered the matter. During the Viceroyalty of Lord Lansdowne, 1888–1894, the proposal was revived in its original form, namely, the transfer of Sind to the Punjab; but, owing to the formation of the Baluchistan Agency, Sind had ceased to be a frontier district. Before leaving India, Lansdowne left on record his opinion that the Durand Agreement, which had increased our responsibilities north of the Gomal, necessitated the creation of a separate frontier province in direct communication with the Government of India. Lord Elgin, who succeeded Lord Lansdowne, found his time fully occupied in dealing with the 1897 risings. When the wave of fanaticism had rolled away and the preaching of the Mad Mullah was heard no more, the Secretary of State, in his despatch of the 5th of August, 1898, wrote as follows :—

"Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the present arrangements are not satisfactory; and that it is desirable that the conduct of external relations with the tribes on the Punjab Frontier should be more directly than heretofore under the control and supervision of the Government of India." *

Lord Elgin consulted the officials of the Punjab Government, the majority of whom objected to any dismemberment of the Punjab; but, at the same time, many of them confessed that an entirely new province was the only alternative to the existing system.

This was the state of affairs when Lord Curzon became Viceroy. Since the days of Dalhousie some change had been thought desirable, while, from 1877 onwards, the idea of a separate frontier province had been advocated under different forms by viceroys, capable administrators and experienced generals. After carefully considering the merits and demerits of the proposal, Lord Curzon determined to carve out a new frontier province across the Indus. The reasons which led him to take this step are clearly and ably laid down in his Minute of the 27th of August, 1900. He points out that the most fanatical and turbulent of the border tribes are those inhabiting that part of the frontier which lies to the north of the Gomal river. Between the frontier system and the authority of the Viceroy, who is the real head of foreign affairs of which tribal politics form the chief part, there is placed a subordinate Government through whose

* *See* Blue Book, 1901. XLIX. Cd. 496, p. 71.

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hands all frontier questions have to pass before they reach the Government of India. The Viceroy, therefore, is in the extremely difficult position of being responsible for the conduct of border affairs, though he is unable to appoint the various frontier officials and political officers, all of whom are chosen by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.

"I venture to affirm that there is not another country or Government in the world which adopts a system so irrational in theory, so bizarre in practice, as to interpose between its Foreign Minister and his most important sphere of activity, the barrier, not of a subordinate official, but of a subordinate Government, on the mere geographical plea that the latter resides in closer proximity to the scene of action—a plea which itself breaks down when it is remembered that for five months in the year the supreme and the Local Governments are both located in the same spot, Simla." *

As Lord Salisbury had pointed out in 1877, the Punjab Government was placed in charge of the frontier at a time when communications were tedious, when Russia was a great but distant Power, and when the Government of Lahore was not overburdened with internal affairs.† But since that date the Russian menace had steadily increased, vast tracts of tribal territory had been absorbed, and the extension of railways and the introduction of the telegraph had brought Calcutta into close touch with the remotest parts of the Indian Empire. Under the existing system, with its long official chain of reference, rapidity of action and swiftness of decision, both of which were essential on a frontier, were well-nigh impossible. Weeks, even months, passed before the Viceroy's decision arrived. Some system which would accelerate the receipt of reports and the transmission of orders was absolutely essential. Not only was delay inevitable, but the very fact that the Government of Lahore neither originated, nor was responsible for India's foreign policy, produced inefficiency. In refutation of the argument that the Punjab officers, who had spent long periods on the frontier, knew more about border politics than a Viceroy whose knowledge was only acquired during his term of office, Lord Curzon gave detailed facts to show that in reality Punjab officials had not spent very long periods on the frontier itself. He sincerely believed that the best administrators were those who had spent most of their lives in the settlement of tribal affairs, and instanced Lord Lawrence, General John Jacob, Nicholson, Sir Herbert Edwardes, Mackeson, Warburton and

* *See* Blue Book, 1901. XLIX. Minute dated 27th of August, 1900, para. 28.

† *See* Blue Book, 1878. LVIII. Cd. 1898, p. 153.

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Sandeman. The result of inexperience must necessarily be " departmental irresolution, dissipation instead of concentration of responsibility, and long and injurious delays."

Having decided to create a new province, Lord Curzon had to consider several possible forms of new administration. He might have accepted the grandiose scheme of Lord Lytton, but he rejected it on the grounds that it was too cumbersome and too immense a burden for any single man to shoulder. In addition, owing to the fact that Sind was no longer a frontier district and Baluchistan was being successfully administered under the Sandeman system, he considered that no rectification of the southern borderlands was needed. Another suggested form of administration had been to form a frontier province stretching from Chitral to Dera Ghazi Khan, and including within its limits the districts of Rawalpindi and Jhelum. This he rejected because it meant a needless dismemberment of the Punjab. It had also been proposed to retain the existing system, that is, to keep the management of frontier affairs in the hands of the Punjab Government, but to appoint a Lieutenant-Governor well versed in tribal politics and customs. This, however, would have been very unfair to the settled districts, the interests of which would have been sacrificed to those of the border tracts. Perhaps the greatest objection to this was that it would be contrary to the instructions contained in the Secretary of State's despatch of the 5th of August, 1898, and would not tend to place the conduct of external affairs more directly under the control of the Government of India.

Numerous compromises, which could not possibly have survived the test of time, were also put forward. The most important of these was to make the Commissioner of Peshawar directly responsible to the Government of India as far as his external policy was concerned, but for internal affairs he was to remain answerable to the Punjab authorities. For at least a quarter of a century this suggestion had been reprobated by all the greatest frontier authorities, who were of opinion that it was impossible to separate political from administrative duties on a frontier, where they were so closely interwoven. It is difficult to understand why Lord George Hamilton, the Secretary of State, had, once more in 1898, suggested this as a solution. He had, in all probability, failed to realize that the administrative border of India was an arbitrary line drawn through the limits of a more or less homogeneous population ; and that the people on either side were closely connected socially, ethnically and commercially.

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"Thousands of our subjects are constantly visiting independent territory, many thousands of the hillmen regularly migrate to our districts, whole clans live for half the year on this and for the other half of the year on that side of the border; where the residents within and without the frontier are not men of the same clan or of the same tribe, they are connected by the intimate ties of common race, of marriage, neighbourhood and of an association, territorial and social, which has endured for many generations." *

Lord Curzon came to the conclusion that none of these schemes was suitable. Some were too ambitious; some had become obsolete owing to changed circumstances; while many of them were based upon a false assumption, the separation of the politics of the hills from those of the plains; or upon the existence of two distinct groups of officials, which the tribesmen would not understand. After a careful examination of all previous proposals, he put forward his scheme which he believed to be the only workable remedy at that time. The frontier districts were to be separated from the Punjab by the creation of an entirely new administrative unit, the North-West Frontier Province.

Politically, the province is divided into two parts, the settled districts of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan, and the five agencies of Wana, Tochi, Kurram, Khyber and Malakand, lying between the administrative and Durand boundaries.† It is interesting to note that between the Gomal and Chitral there was only one trans-Indus district which was not taken away from the Punjab: the trans-riveraine tahsil of Isa Khel, the inhabitants of which were non-Pashtu-speaking Pathans, was still to be included within Punjab limits. The head of the new unit was to be a Chief Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-General, to be appointed by and responsible to the Government of India. In addition, there was to be both a Revenue and a Judicial Commissioner.

Four objections were raised to the creation of this new province: the existing revenue system would be disturbed; it would entail a succession of territorial rectifications and compensations; it would deprive the Punjab Government of the opportunity of training officers in frontier affairs; and it would lead to a more forward policy. Lord Curzon replied that it was not proposed to revolutionize the revenue system, but to train officers gradually for the new province. Secondly, only the Punjab was to be in any way dismembered. He pointed out that under his scheme he

* *See* Blue Book, 1901, p. 75.

† The cis-Indus tract of Hazara was not included in the scheme as originally drafted by Lord Curzon.

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took away from the Punjab only about one-fourteenth of its area, one-fifteenth of its total revenue, and about one-eighteenth of its population. As far back as 1864, Sir Henry Maine had written :

" The association with the Punjab of districts so essentially different from it in character and conditions as those which lie beyond the Indus, is quite as likely to delay the progress of the Punjab as to hasten that of their less civilized populations." *

As has already been shown, the trans-Indus tracts were quite distinct from the Punjab : their historical connection was quite recent, dating back only to the time of Ranjit Singh ; geographically they were shut off from the Punjab by the Indus ; and the Pathan tribes, speaking a different language and living under different social conditions, were ethnically unlike their cis-Indus neighbours. In Lord Curzon's opinion there was no need to compensate the Punjab for the loss of its frontier districts ; this proposal had been instrumental in shipwrecking Lord Lytton's scheme. If in the 'seventies the Punjab had been a rapidly expanding province with an overworked executive, it was still more so at the commencement of the twentieth century when its population, revenue and trade had increased by leaps and bounds. The canalization and irrigation schemes of the Chenab river, Lower Bari-Doab and Sind-Sagar would serve as ample compensation. To quote the opinion of a contemporary Punjab official :

" Towns have grown, Municipalities have been created under new and complex laws, the whole machinery of Local Self-Government has been started, hundreds of miles of railway and canals have been opened, the cultivated, and what is more important, the irrigated area has been enlarged by scores of thousands of acres,—in a word development in all directions has been so great that it is questionable whether there is not enough cis-Indus to occupy the full energies of a great administration." †

The third objection, that it would deprive the Punjab Government of the opportunity of training officers for frontier service, was answered by placing the officers employed upon the list of the Political Department of the Government of India. Under this arrangement the cream of the Indian Civil Service would be available, and any officers showing special aptitude for dealing with frontier tribes could be permanently posted, if this were thought desirable. Therefore, in Lord Curzon's opinion, the opportunity of training officers would be enhanced rather than diminished.

That the new system would be " a measure of defence and

* *See* Blue Book, 1878. LVIII, p. 134. † *See* Blue Book, 1901, p. 101.

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
security " was his reply to the fourth objection, that it would lead to a more aggressive frontier policy. He pointed out that it could not be said that the Punjab had served as a barrier against aggression, for, during the fifty years of Punjab control, at least forty expeditions had been needed against the tribes. Referring to the case of British Baluchistan, he was able to state that its creation had not been followed by any marked martial activity. Both these arguments appear particularly weak to the present writer. The pressure during the 'nineties was exerted by the Government of India ; in any case, its consent had to be obtained for any advance into tribal territory. Arguing in the same strain as that adopted by Lord Curzon, it cannot be said that the creation of the new province prevented the two expeditions of 1908, or settled the Waziristan problem. His reference to Baluchistan, too, was rather out-of-place for it does not follow that a system of administration, which was successful in that area, would have a corresponding result in the northern Pathan country. One other objection remains to be noticed : there might be a difficulty in finding a suitable person to fill the post of Chief Commissioner. Lord Curzon was not mistaken in his choice of Sir Harold Deane, as the first Chief Commissioner.

The greatness of Lord Curzon's frontier policy does not lie in the fact that he originated the idea of a new frontier province—to hold that opinion, as has been shown in this article, would be utterly false. It lies rather in the fact that he carried out a reform which had been discussed and generally approved for nearly twenty-five years. He knew full well that finality can never be reached on the Indian frontier ; and did not claim that his solution of the problem would last for ever.

Were his expectations fulfilled ? He gave India a longer period of rest from border warfare than she had experienced for many weary years ; and he was truthfully able to refer thus to the creation of the new province.

" You will all remember the outcries of the prophets of evil. It was going to inflict an irreparable wound upon the prestige of the Punjab Government. It was to overwhelm the Foreign Department with tiresome work. It was to encourage ambitious officers to gasconade upon the frontier. It was the symbol of a forward and Jingo policy, and would speedily plunge us in another Tirah campaign. . . . I am content with the simple facts that for seven years we have not had a single frontier expedition, the only seven years of which this can be said since the frontier passed into British hands ; and that, whereas in the five years 1894–1899 the Indian taxpayer had to find 4½ million pounds sterling

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for frontier warfare, the total cost of military operations on the entire North-West Frontier in the last seven years has only been £248,000, and that was for the semi-pacific operation of the Madsud blockade." *

It was not until after the Great War that it was decided to re-examine the problem presented by the North-West Frontier Province. In the year 1922, the Bray Commission toured the frontier districts for the purpose of examining all available evidence, both native and official. It very soon became apparent that the cry for reunion with the Punjab had become a matter of acute controversy between Hindus and Mussulmans. The inhabitants of the Province are overwhelmingly Mussulman, hence the Hindu minority, fearing that a future autonomous North-West Frontier Province would be against their interests, strenuously advocated reunion with the Punjab. Behind all reasons brought forward in support of this proposal, and at the root of the whole matter, was this bitter religious controversy. The Hindu *vakil* class desired reunion, because they believed that under the Punjab Government and with the Frontier Crimes Regulations repealed, there would be greater scope for the legal practitioner across the Indus. The general opinion of British local authorities was that, for strategical reasons, the Province must remain entirely in the hands of the Government of India. At the same time, many Government witnesses were prepared to accept certain internal reforms, the introduction of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and the establishment of a Legislative Council. Some witnesses proposed the separation of the unadministered tracts from the British settled districts, to the impossibility of which this article affords ample evidence. Nawab Sahibzada Sir Abdul Qaiyum, a wealthy border landowner, voiced the opinion of the dwellers across the Indus, when he said: "We are a separate nation having no real national connection with the people on the other side of the Indus." From this it becomes apparent that the Mussulmans of the Province, who constitute nine-tenths of the total population, object to reunion with an uncongenial Punjab element.

The report of the Bray Commission has been published in India, but is not yet available in this country. It appears, however, from the pages of the *Pioneer Mail*, that the majority decided against any alteration of the *status quo*.

* *See* Lord Curzon's speech at the United Service Club, Simla, 30th of September, 1905.

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THE ENIGMA OF TOULOUSE: A STUDY IN PSYCHOLOGY

(With Diagrams)

By Major A. H. Burne, D.S.O., R.A.

Since the value of studying military history is sometimes questioned, it may be worth while emphasizing the fact that in one important branch of military science the lessons of history can never grow stale. Though the advent of fresh weapons and their antidotes are constantly changing the tactics of the battlefield, human nature and the working of men's minds remain unchanged. The object of the following article is, therefore, to show how the study of a past campaign in its psychological aspect can still teach us a useful lesson in leadership.

The Duke of Wellington once sent 10,000 Englishmen on a three miles' march across the front of the enemy on a commanding height, within musket shot and in full view of this enemy, and over swampy ground with an unfordable river in their rear! Was he mad? or merely caught napping for once?

But this is not the end of the indictment. Having completed this march, he expected them to form front to their flank, still in view, and to charge up a steepish hill at the enemy in position on the top—an enemy known to possess guns and cavalry and under the command of an experienced and able general.

Could folly go further?

The battle was, of course, that of Toulouse, and the general, Marshal Soult. I myself have stood on the French position and gazed in astonishment (in common no doubt with many other students of war) on the scene of Wellington's hardihood; and I asked myself the question, did the Duke stumble upon an undeserved success in this battle or was there more in it than meets the eye? This question I set myself to answer. It is an important one because we are taught to study and to admire the battles of victorious generals, and, if we

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blindly worship the goddess of success, she may play us false. In this way the study of military history might, so far from teaching us sound lessons, be positively harmful and misleading.

In starting out to tackle this problem I formed a theory which I thought might furnish the clue to the enigma.

The hypothesis which I set out to examine may be expressed as follows: That Wellington's action, so far from being a blind gamble, or an act of lunacy, or one founded on insufficient information, was, on the contrary, a closely thought out and nicely calculated move, based on all the known factors of the case; that due weight was given to the psychological factor as it affected both the French troops and their commander, and that it proved to be the dominating influence in the battle; that at this period of the war the French soldiers were markedly inferior to the English in moral, and that their leader had become so much accustomed to defeat and retreat, and was naturally of such an irresolute mind, that he would not seize the opportunity offered to him of crushing the British column in its passage across his front—in short, that Wellington knew his man and made full use of this knowledge in fashioning his plan.

If the above hypothesis can be substantiated, the battle of Toulouse becomes a valuable witness to the importance of studying the psychology of one's opponents, and in particular of the opposing general—a lesson which is brilliantly brought out in that classic study, "The Green Curve."

In order to establish the truth of this theory it will be necessary to show that during this 1814 campaign: (*a*) the French troops were of a low moral; (*b*) Marshal Soult suffered from irresolution and lack of initiative; and (*c*) Wellington profited by (*a*) and (*b*) to take ever-increasing risks in his plans, culminating in this battle of Toulouse.

It may not be out of place here to note that English accounts of this campaign are singularly meagre. It is mainly to French sources that we must go for our facts, especially as regards the battle of Toulouse. Of course most French accounts are highly coloured and biassed.* Nevertheless, I was fortunate in obtaining two invaluable books. The first of these, "*Evènements militaires devant Toulouse en* 1814," was written by an eye-witness, Lapène, a battery

* I examined several in the Public Library at Toulouse and found them almost valueless for my purpose. According to them "*le Maréchal*" was a heaven-born leader and every Frenchman was dying to shed his blood for "*la patrie.*" It came, therefore, as a surprise to find that there were many French deserters, and that Wellington on his arrival in Toulouse was greeted by the Toulousians with almost delirious joy.

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commander,* and is a modest, straightforward account of the battle as viewed by the author. The second is, I should imagine, easily the best work in any language on the 1814 campaign, "*L'Evacuation de l'Espagne et l'invasion dans de midi*," by Capitaine Vidal de la Blache, published in 1914. Well informed and impartial, it abounds in delightfully sly hits at Soult, pointed in that neat French epigrammatic way to which it is so hard to do justice in English. For the battle of Orthez the best book I have come across is General Beatson's "Wellington, the crossing of the Gaves and the Battle of Orthez." Wellington, in his despatches, remains the chief authority of course for his own actions, and in the "Supplementary Despatches" (Vol. VIII) he gives an interesting *exposé* of his action at Toulouse. But it should be noted that this *exposé* was written many years after the battle, and that his memory and impressions cannot always be relied upon—as, for instance, his notorious reference to the conduct of the artillery at Waterloo.

It is chiefly from these sources that I have tried to test the three above-enumerated propositions. Let us examine them each briefly in turn.

(*a*) *That the French Troops were of low moral.*

The French themselves admitted this. General Dumas quotes a contemporary report: "Our troops appear too much penetrated with the superiority of the enemy; they have no doubt that his plan of invasion will succeed." Many of the soldiers, it must be remembered, were conscripts, and the pay of the whole Army was in arrears and their food was bad. No longer could they "live on the country" with impunity, as they did in Spain. In fact their efforts to do so made them distinctly unpopular amongst the Basques, some of whom actually welcomed the advent of the English. The behaviour of the latter was admirable. In fact Wellington was able to make the remarkable report that they were "the protectors of the property of the inhabitants against the plunder of their own armies; and their cattle, poultry, etc., are driven into our lines for protection."†

On the eve of the battle of Orthez Vidal de la Blache describes the French as "*pénétrés de la supériorité de l'ennemi depuis qu'ils reculaient sans cesse, ne mettaient pas en doute qu'ils seraient battus.*" After this they were to suffer a severe defeat and recoil a further 150 miles,

* The copy of this work that I read was published in 1834, but its first edition came out only eight years after the battle.

† The news of Napoleon's defeat at Leipsic had also shattered the confidence of the troops in the invincibility of their hero, and the fortunes of their country.

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before standing up to the English at Toulouse : is it likely that their moral would improve during this period ? The British Army on the other hand was in excellent fettle. The majority of the men were veterans who had never known defeat, serving under a general who had never lost a gun. A few months previously the Duke reported that his troops were " never in such heart, health, and condition as at present." The Spanish troops no doubt did not come up to this standard, but the majority of them had been sent back to Spain. It is then clearly established that the French troops were of a distinctly low moral compared with their rivals.

(*b*) *That Marshal Soult suffered from irresolution and lack of initiative.*

(*c*) *That the Duke of Wellington profited by* (*a*) *and* (*b*) *to take ever-increasing risks in his plans, culminating in the battle of Toulouse.*

These two propositions can best be examined simultaneously.

Starting from the crossing of the Pyrenees ; Wellington from his position on Mont Atchuria must have witnessed the astounding assault by the 95th Rifles on the Petite Rhune. So steep is the ascent, without a vestige of cover, that one has to go almost upon hands and knees in places. The French were dismayed at the spectacle and did not wait for the bayonet. The Duke must also have been impressed in another sense by the total lack of any " reaction " on the part either of the French local troops, or of Soult himself.*

And so we come to the battle of Orthez. During the retreat Soult had been announcing with weary reiteration to the War Minister, Clarke, his intention of striking at Wellington at the first opportunity. And now the opportunity was to arise.

On the 26th of February, 1814, the French Army was concentrated around Orthez, with the river Gave de Pau (swift, and fordable only in places) protecting its front. Wellington stood facing Soult on the south side of the river, but Beresford's 4th and 7th Divisions had managed to cross ten miles to the west and were rapidly approaching along the northern bank. Meanwhile, the 3rd Division forded the river five miles west of the town. The British Army was thus in two groups, with six miles and a river separating them. And in face of them and concentrated was the whole French Army, roughly equal in numbers to the Allies. Here

* True, the latter struck back in December, but it was little more than " a flash in the pan," and, if we are to believe Gleig, impressed the English soldiery scarcely at all. In any case the forty-mile retreat to Orthez must have removed any good impression that this stroke had made upon the French.

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seemed just the situation that Soult had been waiting for, when he wrote to Clarke two days previously "*je suis déterminé de profiter des fautes qu'il fera et l'attaquer à l'instant même ou l'occasion me paraitra favorable.*" The occasion and the instant had arrived; and what did Soult do? He consulted his generals. One was for attacking, the others for retiring. But Soult did neither. He just sat still. He dared not retreat, after his brave words to Clarke. He dared not attack—as I believe—for psychological reasons; the man Soult was dominated by the man Wellington, the one imposed his mastery upon the other. Nothing else can explain his letting slip this golden opportunity. He was admirably placed to carry out Napoleon's prescription for defending a river-line, namely, to fall *en masse* on the enemy before his crossing is completed. If he did not feel equal to doing this, he should have followed the advice of his more prudent generals, and retreated while there was time.

Come we to the battle itself. A glance at Diagram No. 1 will show the hardihood of Wellington's plan. It seems to breathe contempt of his adversary. And, to anticipate, it bears a striking resemblance to the situation confronting him at Toulouse, and to the methods he adopted for meeting it.

In each case the French held a bridgehead over a considerable river, with a town on the far side, and with heights beyond the town on which the bulk of their Army rested; in each case Wellington boldly divided his Army, having Hill's Corps on his right facing the bridgehead and conveying the remainder across the river to his left, leaving Hill isolated; finally, on each occasion he launched two divisions to the assault of the heights by a flank march in view of the enemy, and with an unfordable stretch of river immediately in their rear.

At Orthez these two divisions were, the 6th on the right and the 3rd on its left. For over a mile the former must have been visible to the French from their higher position 200 feet above them; and although during the succeeding wait of two hours the undulations of the ground afforded them a certain amount of cover, their position must have been spotted, and indeed Picton reports that they were there exposed to the most continuous and severe cannonade that he had ever seen.

Napier affirms that the 3rd Division was for two hours isolated on this part of the battlefield, awaiting the arrival of the 6th on its right, and the Light Division on its left. If this was really the case, Soult must have been aware of the situation, and the fact that he refrained from attacking the 3rd Division is quite in keeping with

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his frame of mind, and subservience to the will of his great opponent.*

Wellington cannot fail to have been impressed by the imperturbable onset made by the troops of the 3rd and 6th Divisions, as also by the utter absence of any sort of counter-move against them on the part of Soult. The battle well illustrates what Wellington could dare and his troops could carry out, side by side with Soult's attitude, " letting I dare not wait upon I could," and it is not unreasonable to believe that in the next battle this lesson was not forgotten.

Soult's retreat need not detain us long. Wellington, having won a brilliant victory against a numerically equal antagonist holding a strong position, now displayed his great failing as a commander: he never fully exploited his victories. On this occasion the fact that he had been slightly but painfully wounded in the battle may partly account for the fact that the French retreat was so little unmolested. In fact, on the 14th of March, Soult attempted to fall upon Wellington's scattered columns. But again that fatal hesitation overcame him, and the twenty-four hours' delay which ensued enabled Wellington to concentrate, and the opportunity was lost.

Yet the French commander had been bombarding Clarke with his bold intentions. For instance, on the 4th of March he wrote: " Directly I ascertain the march of the enemy I shall attack whatever corps is in front of me," and, on the 11th, " If I get the chance of overthrowing any hostile corps I shall not fail to seize it," and only two days after such a chance was missed he had the face to write: " If the chance offers of falling upon one of their columns, I shall seize it eagerly." As de la Blache duly observes, " *De la ménace Soult ne passe guère aux actes.*"

However, so far as manœuvring was concerned, Soult held his own fairly well with his adversary, who, on the 25th of March, found the French Army firmly established at Toulouse, protected by the swift-flowing Garonne, and occupying the suburb of St. Cyprien as a bridgehead.

Wellington's first problem was naturally to cross the river Garonne —here over 100 yards wide—and it might be supposed that Soult

* Perhaps I may be excused for remarking *en passant* that the battlefield is a remarkably interesting one to study on the ground.

The features of the terrain are well-defined and the whole position is visible from Wellington's headquarters in the Roman Camp.

General Beatson states in his book that nothing can now be seen from the camp, owing to trees; but since he visited the spot the trees on the northern portion of the camp have been felled and one can in imagination stand where Wellington stood (and where he received his wound), and look across the valley at Soult, nervously stroking his chin, and trying to make up his mind.

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would oppose that crossing. Yet Wellington in his deliberate and almost leisurely arrangements for the crossing seems to have assumed that the latter would submit to a passive defence.

Certainly Wellington tempted fortune very highly. On the 31st of March he threw Hill's Corps across the river by pontoon above Toulouse and sent it wandering twenty miles to the south of the city. Yet Soult, although he became aware of this move, did not take advantage of his bridgehead to sally forth and crush the remainder of the English Army. Again, a few days later, hearing that Wellington was reconnoitring a crossing below the city, he contented himself with strengthening the outer defences on the eastern bank. The news of the fall of Paris no doubt encouraged him to some extent in his passivity.

Finding the ground impracticable to the south, Hill, on the 2nd of April, withdrew his force across the river. Wellington, never fearing, then tried the other flank. This time he left Hill in front of the bridgehead and marched the remainder of his Army some twenty miles to the north. Yet again Soult made no move against the isolated force opposite to him.

A still worse omission was to follow—Wellington successfully bridged the river during the night of the 4th of April, and got three divisions across. The river then suddenly rose and washed away the bridge. From 7 a.m. on the 5th till the evening of the 8th, when the bridge was restored, there was thus an isolated force of 18,000 men on the enemy's side of the river and Wellington had no means either of reinforcing or of withdrawing it. What a chance for Soult! Needless to say, he did not take it. His excuse was that he believed that the bulk of the British Army was across the river. Whose fault was that? Surely his own, for not taking sufficient steps to find out. V. de la Blache's comment on these three days is delicious: "*Du côté anglais comme du côté français il règne sur ces journées critiques du 5 au 8 avril, qui ne font honneur à aucun des adversaires, un silence prudent. Wellington attendait le bon plaisir de la Garonne; mais Soult?*"

On the 8th, Wellington, having succeeded in restoring the bridge, was ready to make his plan for the assault on Toulouse. Judging from his experience of Soult during the last three weeks, we may expect it to be a daring one. And so it was. If he appeared to transgress almost every known rule of war at Orthez, scattering his two wings so much that they were not able to give mutual support or be in real strength at any point, manœuvring in the presence of the enemy, marching across his front, and giving up to him all the

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advantages of interior lines—still more does he appear to transgress those same rules at Toulouse. Glance at Diagram No. 2, which gives the movements of the Allied Army, each arrowhead representing a division.

The similarity with Orthez will be at once apparent, only the boldness of the conception is even more marked. Note that the two Armies were approximately equal in numbers; that Soult had fortified his position, and had not only interior lines but the two conditions necessary to exploit them, namely, room and time to manœuvre. His vantage point on the Calvinet Ridge combined with the heavy ground in the valley which imposed slow movements on the British, ensured the latter. Wellington must have been aware of this, from his reconnaissance on the 9th, yet in face of it he formed a plan which if it were propounded at a war game would be designated as the act either of a child or of a lunatic—utterly impracticable!

The plan was simply that the Spanish and Beresford's 4th and 6th Divisions were to deliver the real blow on the extreme left, as nearly simultaneously as possible, while the remainder of the Army made holding attacks. We can dispose of the Spanish attack by saying that it was delivered prematurely, and repulsed without much difficulty. This left Soult free to devote his whole attention to Beresford.

Standing on the northern end of the Calvinet Ridge, where the French commander first took up his position, one can just see the Pont de St. Caprais. The hillock of Pujade then hides the route followed by Beresford as far as the farm of Mont Blanc; thence it is intermittently visible up to Peyriole and after that practically every yard of the way is visible. Though there were a few copses, which have since been cut down, they are counterbalanced by the increasing number of buildings, and probably hedges, and the foliage on the 10th of April would not be so dense as when I visited it in May.

Soult spotted Beresford's force debouching from the Pont de St. Caprais. He promptly called up Taupin's Division which was in reserve, and sent it along the ridge to the south-east where we will leave it for the moment. Meanwhile, Beresford's advance was being preceded by cavalry moving along both banks of the river. This cavalry force was too late to prevent the bridges of Balma and Lasbornes from being blown up, but it managed to secure that of Montaudran, farther to the south.

The ground over which Cole's and Clinton's Divisions had now to plod their way contained numerous marshes, and the whole of it

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was swampy with the recent rain. The river L'Hers was also swollen.*

The unhappy plight of Beresford's men is vividly described by Lapène, who from his battery position on the top of the ridge was an interested eye-witness of this amazing march. He writes:

"We soon saw this corps moving along the left side of the river L'Hers . . . exposed to a most violent cannonade from the emplacements established on the ridge. The ground to be crossed, inundated by the recent rain, contained also many boggy patches. To skirt round them would delay the attack and lose valuable time; to approach nearer the Calvinet ridge would put them at the mercy of our cannon. The Scottish troops surmounted with the most courageous obstinacy the difficulties of the ground in their path; we watched these intrepid foreigners hurling themselves into the marshes, climbing out covered with mud, in water up to the waist, and in the middle of a hail of bullets and shells."

A private afterwards described it as not a march, but a running scramble. The leading column, Cole's 4th Division, passed so close under the foot of Calvinet that for about two miles it was within a range of 1,000 yards! Clinton's 6th Division appears to have kept nearer the river bank, and did not consequently suffer so severely, owing to the greater range and the slight shelter of the above-mentioned copses.

Beresford pushed on as fast as he could, and the natural result of thus forcing the pace in front was that the column got strung out; and when Cole had reached the comparative shelter of the Château l'Hers Clinton was about an hour behind. Also the guns had been left miles in rear hopelessly floundering in the morass. The march had now lasted for several hours and the troops had suffered heavy losses. At any point during the last two miles of this march the French cavalry could have charged down the hill into the defenceless flank that Beresford was exposing, had Soult dared to launch an attack. Several of his generals pressed him to do so, but he flinched from it, and a grand opportunity was missed.

In order to follow closely the upshot of this episode, one must have the lie of the ground in one's mind's eye. The ground slopes up at about 1 in 12 or 5° from the Château to the crest of the hill,

* I had the good fortune to visit the spot immediately after heavy rain, when the state of the river was probably much as it was during the battle. It is there about 20 yards wide, and deeper than a man according to local information. The bottom is muddy, the banks steep, and in its then condition one could not have got men or horses across without boats or rafts. In short, it was an impassable obstacle. I walked through the meadows along the ground the British troops must have traversed and found it a distinctly heavy soil, although it has of course been drained since the battle.

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distant about 700 yards. On the crest, situated in a distinct re-entrant, stood a house called La Sypière (it still stands). A redoubt had been partly constructed round this house and garrisoned with a battalion, under the command of a general. It marked the extreme right of the line, though the ridge continued for another 700 yards. About 500 yards to the left was another redoubt, and a battery was in support. The Caraman road sloped diagonally up the hill half-way between Château and redoubt. A sunken road branches off from it straight up the hill towards the redoubt : it cuts deep into the hillside and constitutes a formidable obstacle, especially to cavalry. It ceases to be sunken about 75 yards short of La Sypière. The slope was slippery with the rain.

Beresford marched through the Château grounds and when the head reached the Caraman road he formed up Cole's Division, facing to the right, evidently with his left on the road. His intention was to go " bald-headed " for the crest, without waiting for Clinton. So like Beresford !

I feel fairly confident that the forming-up place was as I have given it in Diagram 3. This seems to be the natural place for forming up if one follows Lapène's account carefully on the ground, and Commandant Bial, in his " *Histoire populaire de la Bataille de Toulouse*," states explicitly that it was between the Balma and Caraman roads. Hence it is not clear why both de la Blache and Fortescue make the English left extend almost to La Filaire, which was on the ridge, and would have involved an oblique march along the hillside in order to attack the Château. Also the line would have been cut in two by the very pronounced ravine-like sunken road which is scarcely marked on the map, but must have existed at the time of the battle. I prefer then to think that the forming-up place was as shown on Diagram 3.

And meanwhile, what of the French ? It will be remembered that Taupin's Division had proceeded along the ridge to the south-east. On reaching the La Sypière redoubt it halted and lay down for half an hour. Soult followed it thither as soon as he had fathomed Beresford's design, and personally made the dispositions for an overwhelming attack to fall on Cole's devoted head. He placed Rey's Brigade on the right of the redoubt with 6 squadrons, extending the line still farther to their right ; and Gasquet's Brigade on the left of the redoubt with a cavalry regiment on its left.

Including the garrison of the redoubt and the battery, the French very heavily outnumbered the 4th Division, apart from having all the advantage of ground, freshness, and surprise.

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Soult made Rey's Brigade lie down out of sight just behind the crest, awaiting, like the British Guards at Waterloo, the moment to attack. On the given signal Rey's Brigade was to spring up and attack, supported by fire from Gasquet, the redoubt, and battery, while the cavalry was to threaten the enemy's flanks. The battle-field was set—the French awaited in confidence the clash of arms.

The British line came stumbling slowly up the hill, closely watched by the experienced eye of Soult; not a shot was fired, scarcely a man was visible on the crest. The moment was a tense one. Cole must have reached about the spot marked BB on the diagram when Soult suddenly pointed with his finger and exclaimed to Taupin, standing at his side, "*Les voilà, général Taupin, les voilà! Je vous les livre!*" and turning to those around him he said, "*Ils sont à nous.*" "*Ils sont à nous!*" repeated the soldiers within earshot, and the cry seems to have gone down the line, kindling a spirit of *élan* in the French ranks as it passed through them.

The powder was dry, the pistol well primed, and the Commander-in-Chief had himself supplied the necessary spark. What he did after that we do not know, but we do know exactly what Taupin did. His course was plain, his orders clear. Following the tactics which had proved so successful in his attacks at Orthez, he flung Rey's Brigade down the slope straight at the foe, leading it in person with drawn sword. This sudden apparition from an apparently unoccupied position naturally took the British troops aback, but only for a moment. What followed is simplicity itself, though it may come as a surprise to those readers who are unacquainted with the issue. Closing their ranks and forming squares on each flank against the cavalry which was also seen on the crest, menacing their flanks, the men of our 4th Division quietly loaded, took a steady aim, and poured a devastating volley into the French column. It was the old old story of English line versus French column, and once again the line prevailed. Its shattering fire had almost as great an effect as that famous volley on the Heights of Abraham. The oncoming French came to a halt in mid-charge. Taupin, frantically struggling to deploy his columns, fell pierced with three bullets. This increased the consternation in the French ranks, and it was added to by the explosion in their midst of a few Congreve rockets. The fire from the redoubt was masked, as Rey's Brigade (in order to avoid the sunken road) was forced slightly to its left in front of the redoubt (*see* Diagram 3). The same sunken road may also have prevented the squadrons on the right from charging; at any rate

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they merely looked on, and Gasquet's Brigade took practically no part in the action. The cavalry on the left trotted down the road, but did not engage closely. The British then resumed their stolid march up the hill; whereat the shaken Frenchmen, seeing the approach of their terrible opponents, broke ranks and streamed back over the crest. Still worse was to follow; their panic spread to the battalion in the redoubt whose men, deaf to the entreaties of their General, abandoned their post and streamed away to the rear. Gasquet's Brigade and the cavalry followed suit, and soon there was not a Frenchman left on the hill-top. Cole's conquering troops, continuing their leisurely climb, entered the redoubt and captured it without a blow!

Was ever a more astonishing feat of arms? Everything that man could devise, or nature furnish, appeared to be in the French favour, and yet their defeat was abject and complete!

While Cole's column was climbing the hill a French officer was heard to exclaim, "*C'est la colonne de Fontenoy!*" And it may indeed be likened to that feat of arms, but not in the way that the Frenchman meant or expected; he forgot that at Toulouse there was no Irish Brigade to come to their aid.

Various excuses have been made for the French failure, but nothing can mar the majesty of the British achievement. Soult, who was moved to tears at the loss of the redoubt, has been shielded, and Taupin made the scapegoat; but the former was on the spot to control his subordinate if necessary, whereas he evidently made no effort to do so.

Taupin certainly appears to have carried out his commander's intentions; the expression Soult used seems as clear in intention as the apocryphal "Up Guards and at 'em." By charging down the hill he was, as we have noted, merely repeating a course which had proved successful at Orthez; and against any but British troops it would probably have proved successful.

Then again, though the course taken by the charge screened the fire from the redoubt this was almost certainly due to the hollow road. Adequate reconnaissance would have disclosed its position; the attack would then probably have taken place from the left flank. The existence of this hollow road and its bearing on the fight has not been referred to in any account of the battle that I have seen. Also the effect of the fire of such troops as the redoubt held could not have been considerable.

But if the French made no obviously bad mistake, to what was due the staggering success of the British attack? It is childish to

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attribute it, as some Frenchmen do, to the explosion of a few Congreve rockets in that short space of time. Much more telling must have been the effect of the musketry. The fact that Taupin received three bullet wounds points to the intensity and accuracy of this fire. But I think there was something more than this.

One should picture to oneself the thoughts and feelings of some of the rough untutored men in the ranks, as they floundered across the French front in the manner so graphically described to us by Lapène. Even the private soldier must have thought what a peculiarly desperate move it was. Yet hour followed hour and still the enemy failed to fall upon him. This in his eyes was yet further justification for his implicit confidence in Wellington. "Old Nosey knows what he is about," he would say to himself. If I may be pardoned a personal illustration; it once fell to my lot to be in a column which was moving across the face of a commanding position which we rightly believed to be held by the Germans. As we quietly trotted across and not a shot was fired at us, I said to myself, "Old —— knows what he is about," and my confidence in the General was naturally increased.

So then we have this body of men, drawn from all parts of the United Kingdom, men who had fought shoulder to shoulder in many a successful battle, under a commander who had never known defeat, executing a movement which even to the most unthinking must have appeared hazardous. Yet all was going "according to plan," and with each step taken confidence would be increased. Then came the quiet methodical forming-up for the assault, followed by the steady advance up the hill. All hearts were by this time steeled for the inevitable encounter, and with supreme confidence in their commander, in their comrades and in their good "Brown Bess," and with as supreme a contempt for their foe, they turned their steady gaze upon the frowning heights and their "measured tramp" shook the hill.

Contempt is the keynote to the undertaking on the part of designer and executors. As Commandant Bial sadly, almost querulously, points out, it was "contrary to the rules of prudent tactics" and, he significantly adds, "exhibits in our adversaries a supreme contempt for our capacity." As significant as anything is the paralytic state of the neighbouring troops who witnessed the downfall of Rey's Brigade. One can picture them almost dazed with astonishment at the unexpected outcome of the affair, saying to themselves, "Well, if they can break up that attack, anything is

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possible to these terrible islanders." *Le Garde recule! Sauve qui peut!*

The victory was in fact one of superior moral. The French, it is true, charged down the hill with considerable *élan*, but it was an enthusiasm born of the moment—a mere "flash in the pan"—far removed from, and far inferior to, the long-formed and well-established conviction of superiority which conditioned their adversaries' moral. Of this moral superiority Wellington must have been aware, and that it entered into his calculations there can be no reasonable doubt.

Thus we come back to a final consideration of the motives that led the Iron Duke to adopt such an astonishing proceeding, and we find in the light of his past encounters with Soult that it was founded on the latter's irresolution, combined with that feeling of moral superiority which his own troops possessed over their opponents.

It is true that Wellington nowhere explicitly gives this as a reason for his action. But I think this can be explained. In the first place, he was always rather reticent about his own thoughts and feelings. Secondly, it would be singularly short-sighted for a General to belittle the talents of a General he has vanquished, as such belittlement would tend to diminish the merit of his own achievement. Yet though he was careful not to commit himself on paper to a disparaging view, he did once in an unguarded moment in an after-dinner conversation with Sir H. C. Bunbury, at about this time, express his true mind. "Soult," he observed, "is a very able man, excellent as an administrator, but in the field he is apt to doubt and hesitate and lose the proper moment for acting."

His memorandum explanatory of the battle (Supplementary Despatches, Vol. VIII, p. 752) does not deny this view of the case. It merely states that he sent Beresford along the near side of the river L'Hers because it would take too long to go round. Naturally it would be preferable to skirt the river, but the fact that he deliberately chose the near side shows that he calculated that the risk was justifiable (as the upshot proved). He does not give the grounds for his calculation; but the memorandum was written years after the event when they may not have been very clear in his mind. And these grounds were, I contend, due to his profound insight into the mind of his opponent, and his correct apprehension of the respective moral of the two sides. In other words it was a consideration of spiritual values which finally shaped his action—the interplay of mind upon mind, or what nowadays we denote in a word as psychology.

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War is largely a matter of guess-work. Wellington's well-known saying that he had spent his life in guessing what was going on " the other side of the hill " may fairly be taken to include " in the other fellow's mind." And in this case, at any rate, he guessed aright.

It has been said that the Duke frequently stumbled upon success when he did not deserve it. Toulouse is given as an example. He was the " fortunate general." I do not believe there is such a thing as a " fortunate general " in the sense that fortune will consistently stick to one man. In the long run Dame Fortune deals out her largess with a fairly level hand, and if one individual is consistently successful—as Wellington was—the cause must be within himself. Hence I attribute his success at Toulouse, not to a slice of undeserved luck, but to a nice calculation ; founded on a psychological study of the factors of the case.

If this is the true explanation of the enigma of Toulouse, what practical lessons can we learn from it for future war ?

The first and obvious one is the importance of collecting and collating in time of peace all possible information about those leaders who might be engaged either against or with us in war. The years of trench warfare may have obscured the importance of this ; but cannot the actions of the German leaders who opposed us in 1914 be deduced from their past-known characters ?

Von Kluck was a dour, determined man, a thruster in his methods, as a war game held at Berlin in 1913 showed. Von Bulow was aged and worn out ; consequently, when he bumped up against an enemy, he screamed for help from the armies on either side of him. Von Moltke did not possess the confidence of his army commanders ; hence they did not keep him properly informed and each went his own way—resulting in the lack of cohesion which made possible the Marne, and that gap in the line on the Aisne which might have led to another great defeat.

Next, since the factor of the character of one's opponent must always receive consideration, steps should be taken to emphasize it during training. This is difficult, but by no means impossible. For example, no " appreciation of the situation " should be deemed satisfactory which does not refer to it ; no tactical examination for promotion should ignore it ; and manœuvres should be so designed that they offer a number of likely courses for each opponent to take and thus give the advantage to that commander who can best size up his opponent and divine the course that he will in consequence

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adopt. It follows that the more manœuvres resolve themselves into "a set piece," the less can this lesson be taught.

The third lesson is the importance of obtaining superiority of moral. This requires no stressing, but there is one aspect of this subject which may be touched on. Do we pay enough attention in peace time to maintaining the moral of our troops in a retirement? Do we keep before them the idea of the offensive intention even during a rearward move? The idea of *reculer pour mieux sauter?* The conception of leading the enemy into a trap? The deliberately undertaken retreat with an ulterior object? Soult was faced with this problem, above all others, and I believe he struggled hard to answer these questions in the affirmative. But are not we English a little inclined to take superiority of moral for granted? Fortunately for us the moral of the "Contemptibles" was so high that it stood the strain of a prolonged and unexpected retreat, but little had been done in peace time to prepare our minds for the shock, and in a future war we might not have that supreme confidence in our leaders and ourselves that our Army took to France in 1914.

Many will recollect the Irish manœuvres round Abbeyleix, when Sir Lawrence Parsons made a prolonged withdrawal "*pour mieux sauter*" and what it cost him. May it not be said of a commander in the future that he placed his career in jeopardy by exercising an initiative of this nature!

Though outside the immediate scope of this article it is perhaps worth pointing out, before concluding, what a valuable object lesson this whole campaign of 1814 is in the military virtue of resolution in action; a virtue so easy to enumerate yet so difficult to practise in time of peace. Soult's appreciation of the situation was at times brilliant, and his manœuvring ability was almost the equal of Wellington's; on paper he was admirable, but the touchstone of action betrayed the base metal of indecision. This power to decide at the critical moment and to act inflexibly in the terms of your decision, facing the terrors of the unknown resolutely, is the hall mark of a great commander. General Wolfe, in one of his attempts on Quebec in open boats, was surprised by fire from the shore; casualties mounted up and something had to be done at once. Wolfe came to an instant decision and acted on it. "All boats make for the shore." They did so, and the landing was effected. This same Wolfe years before had prepared himself for such an emergency. In the following words he touched the heart of the matter: "Nothing is to be reckoned an obstacle to an undertaking


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of this nature which is not forced to be so on trial; in war something must be allowed to chance and fortune, seeing that it is in its nature hazardous and an option of difficulties; the greatness of an object should come under consideration as opposed to the impediments that lie in its way."

I sometimes think that Wellington must have read that passage.

I will end by quoting without comment one more passage, of more recent date. Training and Manœuvre Regulations declare, "Military History must unquestionably have the most important place in study as being the best means . . . of studying the preponderating part which human nature plays in all operations."

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n shown thus —.—.—.—.—.—

head represents one British Division.




DIAGRAM (5). Dotted line represents the track of the 4th Division.

AA is Beresford's forming up place.

BB " " " " position when attacked.

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vision.

city.

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MECHANIZATION

By Major G. Le Q. Martel, D.S.O., M.C., R.E.

The object of mechanization is to render an army more efficient in the performance of its duties without increasing the cost to the country. Whether it pays to mechanize a part or the whole of an army depends entirely on the object for which that army is maintained. With continental armies such as the French and German armies the primary object is the defence of a frontier 300 miles in length. A mechanical force of tanks and subsidiary arms may have great striking power, but it is certainly less able to defend a long frontier than a conscript army based on infantry and machine guns. Whether the striking power of the former would be such a threat to the enemy that the linear defence of the frontier would be unnecessary is a moot point, which is not likely to be settled or accepted for a very long time. Moreover, from a financial point of view, a conscript army would have to be very greatly reduced in numbers to pay for the cost of the provision of tanks and mechanical arms necessary for a mechanized force. With the British Army the position is quite different. As we have a volunteer army we have to pay the men and every man saved reduces the army bill by some £120 a year. Hence a comparatively small reduction in strength will provide a considerable sum for the provision of mechanical weapons. Furthermore, we have no frontier to defend such as the Franco-German frontier, entailing large numbers of men and machine guns on the outbreak of war. We have frontiers of considerable length in our possessions abroad, but it would be quite impossible to keep sufficient troops in any one place to defend the whole frontier, and, if our possessions should be attacked, we need—more than any other Power—a force that can deliver a rapid counter-stroke against the aggressors. Now the infantryman is a poor means of attack, but a good means of defence provided he has anti-tank weapons. On the other hand, the tank is a good means of attack, but poor in defence. Whether we shall ever reach the position where the infantry is used for defence only and tanks for

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offence only is hard to say, but many signs point in that direction. The Frenchman is mainly concerned with defence, hence he needs large numbers of infantry, and, although he would like it, he cannot afford an expensive mechanical striking force as well. In our case, and in so far as finance is concerned, we could have a mechanical force instead of a small regular army of infantry divisions, but in the past grave doubts have been expressed as to the capabilities of a mechanical force. It has been argued that the tank is a very expensive article, and is very vulnerable to anti-tank weapons, and it needs the assistance of other arms to attain decisive success; also that the ground in the colonies is often unsuitable for the employment of tanks. We have, however, recently developed small tanks which are very cheap and very handy, and with the addition of these small tanks the capabilities of a mechanical force can be very much increased.

Until recently no country made any special effort to produce a really cheap tank. The French possessed the "Renault," weighing some six tons and costing some £1,500, but something much cheaper, lighter and more suitable for mass production was required. The first attempt in this country was the "Morris" tank, and four of these have undergone preliminary tests which warrant trials with the troops. More recently the "Lloyd Carden" tank has been developed, which has some advantages and some disadvantages compared with the "Morris" tanks. These tanks can be made for one man, who both shoots and drives, or for two men, in which case one man drives and the other shoots. The armament is one automatic rifle.

The capabilities of these tanks vary with the type, but, generally speaking, they can travel at 20 miles an hour on good going and 10 miles an hour across country. They can turn in a very small space and are very handy, and, as they are very narrow, they can negotiate wooded country by passing between the trees. They can climb very steep slopes, cross ditches and narrow trenches, and travel about 100 miles on one fill of petrol. The armour on the "Morris" tank is as thick as on the "Vickers" tank and provides all-round protection. The "Lloyd Carden" is at present less completely protected. The cost of the first experimental models of the "Morris" type was £750, but this figure should be very considerably reduced if large numbers were ordered. The "Lloyd Carden" tank costs considerably less. The cost of upkeep of these small tanks will be very small. When they have overcome certain small troubles which always appear in the present experimental

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stage, they should cost no more in upkeep than a small car. As regards the cost of a unit composed of men in " one-man " or " two-men " tanks my own view is that we shall eventually find that we can equip and maintain one man in a " one-man " tank at the same cost to the country as two infantrymen. This statement is a forecast which is not founded on existing facts and should therefore only be taken as an expression of opinion. As regards the " two-men " tank the saving is much less marked, because two men are employed, and in these days it is men and not machines that cost the most money, but worked out on the same basis two men in one " two-men " tank will cost the same as three infantrymen.

It is not suggested for a moment that either the " Morris " or the " Carden Lloyd " tank represents exactly what is required, or that the small tank in its final form will be particularly like either of these early models, but one point is quite certain, and that is that a small cheap tank can be produced which shall be made of commercial components, capable of going almost anywhere a horse can go, and as reliable and foolproof as the ordinary motor-car. It is interesting to note that there is no particularly new mechanical invention in the construction of these tanks; they were built to fulfil the requirements of a new tactical idea, and the suggestion was tactical rather than mechanical. In December, 1924, the tactical part of this article was written almost in its present form, and it was this that led to the construction of the first small tank.

It will be seen at once that with small cheap tanks of this nature the previous objections to mechanization are much reduced. They can traverse wooded country and pass along narrow tracks in difficult country. They use dispersion to avoid casualties from anti-tank weapons. The infantry was forced to use dispersion in attack by the development of rapid small-arm fire, and tanks are fairly certain to be forced to do the same by the development of anti-tank weapons. Fifteen " Morris " tanks, or a still greater number of " Carden " tanks, can be constructed at the cost of one " Vickers " tank, and what anti-tank weapon will stop the charge of large numbers of these small tanks? In suitable country they will be backed up by the ordinary large tanks. In fact the tanks become the mechanized infantryman, but without the lack of mobility and offensive power of the infantry soldier. There will always be ground in places on which these small tanks cannot be employed, but even then there is no reason why the mechanized infantry should not dismount and fight on foot. Let us, therefore, set an ideal at which we can aim, and then the intermediate steps are more easily

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selected. Let us for the moment assume that the ideal to be aimed at is the mechanization of the whole of the Regular Army, and that the tactical basis should be the mechanical infantryman, *i.e.* one or two men in a very small and very cheap tank that is made of commercial motor components.

The numerical strength of the Army roughly would have to be halved to provide for the payment of the necessary mechanical machines. On the other hand, something in the nature of a mechanized brigade group would constitute as large a force as one divisional commander could control.

Hence our Expeditionary Force would change from four infantry divisions to twelve mechanical divisions, and the whole force would be capable of moving 100 miles in twenty-four hours and be self-supporting without communications for at least four days. The strength of this mechanical army will lie in great mobility and striking power. The weakness will lie in defence. For financial reasons we are reduced to keeping very small forces for the protection of our possessions overseas. These forces are too small in most cases to establish a linear defence of the frontier. Increase the mobility and striking power by mechanical means and the weakness in linear defence becomes much less dangerous. In a continental war the two alternatives hardly have any comparison. No one will take us very seriously if we suggest using four infantry divisions in the opening phases of a war of the first magnitude. Replace this (at the same expense) with twelve mechanical divisions of a highly trained Regular Army and the position is very different. A striking force of this nature would probably have decisive results on whichever side it was used. If we can overcome the mechanical and tactical difficulties and produce a mechanical army equally capable of waging small wars abroad or fighting in a continental war, then we shall again become a first-class Power in any war in which we may become involved.

The change from ordinary infantry to mechanized infantry is, however, in the nature of a revolution, and no one is going to plunge into a change of this nature without much preliminary trial; but it is in these trials that the danger lies. As soldiers we have always been conservative, and we cling to existing conditions. If we propose to use mechanized infantry in twos and threes to help ordinary infantry in the attack, we shall certainly not get full value from them. There is a suggestion that these small tanks should be used as reconnaissance machines; if by this it is intended that they should move a few miles ahead in pairs and report the presence

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or otherwise of the enemy, then the " Morris " tank is not the best machine for the purpose. A motor-car constructed on the lines of the " Morris " six-wheeler will travel over any tracks and most ground in a European country, and, although ditch-crossing capability is desirable, it is not essential for this work. The original object with which the first of these small tanks was designed was to provide a means of attacking the enemy without the appalling delays which are caused at present by the necessary preparations which have to be made before an infantry attack can hope to succeed against machine-gun defence. On manœuvres the infantry attacks very boldly, but we know full well that in war the majority of these attacks would fail. With mechanized infantry in small tanks the position is very different. The tanks would work in groups of about eight tanks under an officer, and a company of about 100 tanks would attack on a front of about 500 yards. In this way a mechanized battalion, reduced in numbers to cost the same as an infantry battalion, could attack on twice as wide a frontage and with far greater chance of success. In defence the mechanical infantryman will be weak, but our Regular Army should be used mainly for offensive operations; hastily raised volunteer forces can be used in defence when necessary after very little training. On gaining contact with the enemy the mechanized infantry will be able to drive in his advanced troops without delay and so obtain information as to his dispositions. It may even be able to continue the attack with success, but against strong defences it will need the assistance of ordinary tanks, artillery and the other arms in the usual way. Whether there should be one man or two in each tank is debatable, and the tactical trials will show the comparative advantages. For purely reconnaissance purposes two men are probably essential, but in the attack it is questionable whether a larger number of " one-man " tanks is not preferable to a smaller number of " two-men " tanks. The question of moral hardly arises. The men would be talking to each other over the top of the car before the attack, and when the time came they would charge the enemy with only five or ten yards between the tanks. There would, therefore, be no more isolated feeling than in the charge of a troop of cavalry. This, then, was the original object with which the first of these tanks was designed, and it is suggested that when we come to tactical trials we should use them in this way, and not dispersed in pairs or as reconnaissance machines only. It may be argued that we have only taken the case of mechanical infantry against ordinary infantry. This is reasonable, however, because

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we are not likely to meet enemy mechanized infantry in small wars overseas and in a continental war it has already been shown that continental armies are faced with great difficulties compared with ourselves in producing a mechanical force of this nature.

If it is accepted that a small mechanical striking force suits our needs better than a larger (but still very small army), then the first stage is to decide on the tactical basis. The possibilities of these small tanks must be thoroughly tried out. At present we are endeavouring to organize a mechanical force, but our pace in the battle is the pace of the infantryman.

It is no use thinking that we can replace the infantryman in this type of work by a tank such as the " Vickers " tank. These expensive machines will be comparatively few in number and will fall an easy prey to anti-tank weapons if they are used in small numbers on the forefront of the battle. If we can use mechanized infantry in small tanks for the main attack, then we can organize the remainder of the force with one aim in view—namely, to assist the mechanized infantry, and the work of the various arms will be quite clear. Armoured cars and the R.A.F. will carry out the long-distance reconnaissance. The mechanized infantry will carry out its own close reconnaissance and will lead the attack. The tanks will act in close support to the mechanized infantry and deal with the enemy's tanks. The main rôle of the artillery will be to protect the mechanized infantry from gunfire by counter-battery work and by the use of smoke ; the pack artillery will be quite unnecessary. The work of the engineers will be the provision and destruction of communications. When the force is stationary, the mechanized infantry will provide the outposts. In fairly enclosed country the men will retain their small tanks for this work, using their machines like steel rifle pits concealed behind hedges, etc., but in very open country they will dismount and act as infantry.

A force organized in this way would appear to be very suitable for use in a European war, and could equally well be used in many parts of the Empire. In countries like Egypt a larger proportion of armoured cars would be required, and in those countries in which the communications consist mainly of tracks a larger proportion of small tanks might be necessary, but the main organization could remain the same. In some places where fighting can only be carried out on foot the mechanized infantrymen would have to dismount, and this weakness would have to be accepted.

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SOME ASPECTS OF MAUDE'S CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA

By Major R. H. Dewing, D.S.O., M.C., R.E.

No. I

RIVER CROSSINGS

Of some half-dozen river crossings which were attempted or carried out during General Maude's campaign in 1916–1917, there are four which particularly repay study: (*a*) the attempted crossing of the Tigris at the Husaini bend by the 7th Cavalry Brigade and 40th Infantry Brigade on the 20th of December, 1916;* (*b*) the crossing at Shumran on the 23rd of February, 1917;† (*c*) the crossing of the Diyala on the 7th–9th of March;‡ and (*d*) the passage of the Adheim on the 18th of April.§

The essentials for success in river-crossing operations can be epitomized in two words—preparation and surprise. Assuming a general knowledge of the story of these four crossings, it is proposed to consider what part preparation and surprise played in each.

The Husaini Bend Attempt.—General Maude issued his orders for this operation on the 19th of December. The attempt was made on the 20th. There is no indication that General Crocker knew anything of it before the 19th, and it is certain that the officer commanding the bridging train first heard of it when he received the actual order. It is, therefore, clear that our first essential, preparation, played a very small part.

The operation was undertaken without technical reconnaissance. The site for the crossing was about twelve miles from the cavalry camp at Bessouia. During the previous few days the cavalry had reconnoitred in the direction of the Husaini bend, and possibly patrols had actually reached the intended site, but no technical reconnaissance with a view to a crossing had been made.

* *See* "Official History of War: Mesopotamia Campaign, 1914–18," vol. iii, pp. 82–86.

† *Ibid.* pp. 149–172. ‡ *Ibid.* pp. 220–236. § *Ibid.* pp. 326–329.

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No aeroplane photographs had been taken, and practically the only information which the officer commanding the bridging train had, when he marched out on the 20th, was that the width of the river was 300 cubits. This useful fact had been elicited from an Arab by a Political Officer.

The bridging train particularly needed time for preparation as it had only recently been equipped with wheeled transport. General Maude was anxious to keep the Turks in ignorance of the existence of the mobile pontoon equipment, and the unit had only recently reached the Tigris front. The *personnel* had had no opportunity of practising with their new transport before operations began on the 14th of December.

The absence of preparation was no doubt due to General Maude's desire for surprise. He hoped that the crossing would meet with no opposition. In view of the secrecy that had been observed, both as to the operation itself and as to the existence of the mobile equipment, there seemed every hope of achieving surprise. Even had the Turkish Command thought a crossing possible, no indication had been given of the particular point on the forty miles of river between Sannaiyat and Husaini at which it might be attempted.

The column marched from Bessouia at 5.0 a.m. on the 20th. It had twelve miles to go, and the sun rose at 6.50 a.m., so the greater part of the movement was made in daylight. This daylight march seems inconsistent with the desire for surprise, but mirage and the scarcity of Turkish aeroplanes increased the chance that the movement would be unnoticed, and in any case the enemy would have had little time to move troops to oppose a crossing. Reconnaissance and more experience with the new pontoon transport would have been necessary before attempting to carry out the whole movement in the dark.

As things turned out, surprise was not achieved. Half a battalion of Turkish infantry with two machine guns and four field guns were found on the north bank in the Husaini bend. The attempt to launch the first pontoon for ferrying resulted in most of the party becoming casualties. As soon as it was realized that the crossing was meeting serious opposition General Maude ordered the attempt to be abandoned and the force was withdrawn.

It is not known what General Maude really meant to effect by this operation. It may have been meant to develop into a real crossing, or it may have been a demonstration. If it was meant to be a real crossing, perhaps, from intelligence reports, General Maude expected that the Turks would not be holding the left bank

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in the Husaini Bend, and perhaps, relying entirely on surprise, he hoped that a footing might be secured on the north bank at little or no cost, and might form the basis for further and more serious operations against the Turkish L. of C. If luck were out and the Turk were found awake in the Husaini bend, Maude probably never intended that the attempt should be pushed to serious fighting. The smallness of the force, its weakness in artillery, the tenor of the instructions and the close personal control which Maude retained over the action of the column, all point to this conclusion.

As a crossing the attempt had been a complete failure. As there had been no preparation, and surprise had failed, there could have been no other result. But the failure was not a serious set-back. If the idea had been, at small risk, to try for surprise which might give results out of all proportion to the risks run, we had lost the small amount risked, that was all. The casualties of the column amounted to fifty-four, and the Turks now knew that we possessed a mobile bridging train.

Regarded as an attempted crossing, the Husaini bend operation shows preparation and surprise as very bad partners. The reconnaissance so necessary for the one may sacrifice the other. Secrecy maintained till the last moment makes the one impossible, while it may be considered essential for the other.

The Shumran Crossing.—The success at Shumran owed something to the failure at Husaini. The hurried rush in which the preparations for the earlier operation, such as they were, had had to be completed, had impressed those immediately concerned with the vital importance of full and adequate organization before attempting another river crossing. They did get time for preparation before Shumran, and they made the most of it.

Our failure in December may also have strengthened the conviction of the Turks that a crossing was not possible. It is said that its possibility was discussed by Turkish commanders in Kut two nights before we actually crossed at Shumran, and their conclusion was that " none but a fool would attempt it."

Yet it seems doubtful whether General Maude himself realized the importance of preparation. The officer commanding the bridging train received orders from General Maude on the 16th of February to reconnoitre the river at the Shumran bend, and, though the date of the crossing had not then been fixed, he got the impression that the operation was again to be rushed.

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This impression is strengthened by the order issued to the G.O.C. III Corps on the afternoon of the 17th of February, that he was to be ready to establish a force on the left bank at any time from the night of the 18th–19th. Had the crossing been attempted on the earliest night indicated by the Army Commander, this would have given little more than twenty-four hours' notice to the Corps. Rain came to the rescue. It started raining on the 16th, and continued with such effect that no movement was possible for several days, and the river rose in high flood. Bad weather was often abused in Mesopotamia; it had played no small part in our failure to relieve Kut in the previous spring. Since Maude took command the weather had been peculiarly kind, as if to make up for its past evil deeds. Now, when in Maude's eyes it must have seemed to be turning against him, was it not really saving us from a possible disaster? Whatever the motives of the weather may have been, those who had realized the importance of preparation were not slow to take advantage of the six days which it gave them.

The character of the crossing to be attempted at Shumran differed entirely from the operation at Husaini. The attempt in December was a raid, a snatch at an outside chance. The crossing in February was a deliberate operation. Failure here would mean a very serious reverse, heavy casualties, and probably the loss of all chance of striking a blow at the Turkish communications across the river.

It is important to bear in mind this fundamental difference, because whilst in the earlier operation a good case can be made to justify the attempt without preparation, it would have been a fatal error to have attempted the Shumran crossing without time for detailed organization.

As it was, the six days' grace was fully utilized. The organization for the crossing has been well explained in articles published in the *R.U.S.I.* and *R.E. Journals*.* Volunteer rowers were collected and trained, and practice was carried out on the Hai; the organization of the beaches and the three ferries was thoroughly worked out, being placed under entirely separate control from the construction of the pontoon bridge; arrangements for moving the pontoons forward with secrecy and for guiding troops during the night approach march were elaborated; the programme of covering fire was got out and arrangements were made for guns and machine guns to move to their positions at the last moment.

Over eight hundred rowers were collected beforehand, and even

* *See R.U.S.I. Journal*, August, 1923; *R.E. Journal*, December 1923.

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these were barely sufficient, further volunteers being called for hurriedly while the crossing was in progress. Forty pontoons were used for ferrying alone, in addition to those used in the construction of the 300-yard pontoon bridge.

Preparations on this scale could not be made in twenty-four, or even in forty-eight, hours.

Turning now to surprise; there were certain natural circumstances in our favour, and other measures were taken with the definite object of deceiving.

To the doubt that the Turks already felt as to the feasibility of a crossing, the state of the river added another strong argument to support their view; the river was in flood running at six knots. Truly "none but a fool would attempt it." Prisoners from the Turkish regiment posted on the left bank at Shumran subsequently said that they had not been warned of a possible British attempt at crossing, and they had congratulated themselves on being posted to so quiet a sector.

The assault on Sannaiyat on the 17th, followed by repeated artillery action feigning renewed attack, and culminating in the successful assault on the 22nd; the carefully thought out indications of preparations for a crossing opposite Kut; the raid at Magasis; the withdrawal of our posts from the Shumran area, which the Turk was allowed to see; and the way in which our Air Force at one time allowed a Turkish aeroplane through to see what he was wanted to see, and at other times kept the air clear of his machines, all indicate the very thorough way in which measures of deception were carried out.

Here is an example of a river crossing in which preparation and surprise worked in perfect harmony. The success of the operation is historic. The success was so great that it is just as well not to belittle the difficulties.

The Crossing of the Diyala.—The physical difficulties of the passage of the Diyala were very much less. The river was about 120 yards wide, less than half the width of the Tigris at Shumran; the current was slacker. In the fortnight which had elapsed since Shumran, the Turks had retreated almost a hundred miles; they had been forced to abandon large quantities of stores and material, and had lost many prisoners. It seemed hardly likely that their fighting value could be high.

At 9 a.m. on the 7th of March the advanced guard of the III Corps reached a point four and a half miles short of the Diyala. No effective reconnaissance of the river could be made till after

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sunset. It was decided that the 38th Brigade should force the crossing that night.

What about the two essentials? Preparation; there was none; there could be none. There was no time to do more than find a spot where it would be possible to get pontoons down to the water, for the high banks made this an impossible operation in most places.

Surprise; there was none; there could be none. A pursuing force had come up with a retreating enemy. A river barred the way. There was no need to be a Moltke to arrive at the probability of an attempt to cross. The track by which the pursuing force had been advancing led straight on to the site from which the Turkish bridge had just been taken away. There the steep banks were conveniently ramped; it was inevitable that the Turks should be on the look out at that point, if they were going to watch the river at all. It was at that point the attempt was made. No, there was no surprise.

At Husaini an attempt was made relying on surprise alone, without preparation; at Shumran there was both preparation and surprise; at the Diyala there was neither preparation nor surprise, only gallantry. Gallantry there was in plenty; but gallantry alone cannot effect a crossing in face of opposition.

The attempt may have been justified on the supposition that the enemy was no more than the weak rear guard of a demoralized force, which would withdraw on the first threat of attack. To have insisted on preparation and surprise would have meant that the attempt would not have been made till twenty-four hours later. The night 7th–8th would have been used for reconnaissance; the day of the 8th would have been available for forming detailed plans, and the crossing would have been attempted on the night of the 8th–9th, probably at some point a few miles to the north of Diyala village.

Actually the second attempt near the village on the night of the 8th–9th failed again, in spite of gallantry even more splendid than that of the first night. The crossing was not actually achieved until the third night. It is quite possible, therefore, that a more deliberate attempt on the second night might really have proved the quickest way of crossing. But that is only speculation. The point to be noted is that, no matter what the gallantry of the troops, the chances of success of an unprepared crossing which does not achieve surprise are very small indeed.

The Passage of the Adheim.—The crossing of the Adheim by

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Marshall's Column on the 18th of April achieved such an easy success that its lessons might be overlooked. Actually it is an operation well worth studying as an example of successful surprise.

The 40th Infantry Brigade reached the lower Adheim on the 7th of April, and, on the 8th, the river was reconnoitred with a view to bridging, as General Marshall hoped to cross on the night of the 8th–9th and strike at the Turks west of the river. But General Maude had other plans, and the Adheim was not crossed until the 18th. The 40th Brigade was relieved in the Adheim area by the 38th Brigade which eventually carried out the crossing. There was, therefore, plenty of time for such reconnaissance and preparations as were necessary.

On the 18th Colonel Cassels's cavalry made a feint at crossing early in the morning at a ford opposite the north flank of the Turkish position. At 4.30 a.m. the 6th Loyal North Lancashire, supported by artillery, attacked across the Adheim a mile south of the cavalry. When day broke the whole attention of the Turks was concentrated on these two developments on their northern flank and their front, apparently a feint and the main attack. At 4.50 a.m. the south flank of the Turks was successfully surprised by the other two Lancashire battalions, which with complete secrecy had ferried across the Adheim within half a mile of its junction with the Tigris.

The attack progressed most successfully. The whole Turkish position was captured, and the enemy was pursued towards Samara.

In this operation surprise was attained by the second degree of deceit; it was one more example of preparation and surprise reaping their reward in success.

The Lesson of these Operations.—In these four crossings evidence has been given of the part played in bridging operations by preparation and surprise. Few will disagree that surprise is the most essential element in any river crossing. Preparation is only a degree less important. River crossings may conceivably succeed without it. With better luck the Husaini bend attempt might have succeeded. But when the possibility, under special conditions, of dispensing with preparation has been admitted, the only possible concession to a general rule has been made.

Ninety-nine times out of a hundred adequate preparations will pay better than an attempt to rush the crossing, even though it entails a certain sacrifice of time.

Between the two—preparation and surprise—there is always conflict. Preparation means that a number of officers and men must know something about the operation beforehand, and it

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becomes very difficult to prevent others, who have nothing to do with it, getting an inkling of what is afoot. To ensure surprise it is obvious that the fewer to whom the plan is divulged the better.

Similarly, for complete preparation, thorough reconnaissance is required, which increases the risk of detection by the enemy.

But although the importance of surprise is fully appreciated, the importance of preparation does not appear to be so generally recognized. General Maude himself does not seem to have thought it necessary. There is a real danger that, through regarding secrecy and surprise as synonymous terms, a commander may defeat his own ends by failing to allow the time necessary for preparation.

Secrecy is not an end in itself; it is only one means which helps towards surprise. Nor is it the only means of effecting surprise. For a week before Shumran there was little secrecy on the right bank of the Tigris; yet on the morning of the 23rd of February surprise was complete on the left bank.

Present-day Equipment.—Ten years have elapsed since Maude's campaign, and our bridging equipment has been reorganized and changed. Were similar operations to be carried out again, with our present Expeditionary Force in the place of Maude's I and III Corps on the Tigris, what would be the effect of these changes?

In every one of the four crossings which have been considered ferrying was an essential part of the operation. The old type of pontoon, open and undecked, made a passably good rowing boat and served us well.

The new pontoon, with which the Army is now equipped, cannot be used for ferrying. Closed in completely with decking, the pontoon is difficult enough to row in slack water without passengers. For ferrying across a river a quarter of a mile wide, with a six-knot current running, the new pontoon would be useless. For such a purpose rafts made of the *kapok* floats would be no better. The small useful load that they could carry and the difficulty of handling them in strong water make them quite unsuitable.

Our Expeditionary Force might collect native boats, transport them over land and use them for ferrying. In Lower Mesopotamia there are plenty of boats to be found which are not too heavy for wagon or lorry transport. But the collection of *bellums* and *mashoofs* would sacrifice secrecy. It would take time, and the training of rowers would be difficult. Far more skill is required to handle the long, narrow shell of a *bellum* or *mashoof* in a current than to row a solid pontoon; and it would not be easy to impress the wild

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Marsh Arabs to play the part of the gondoliers at the *Grave di Popodopoli*.

In crossing wide rivers ferrying must usually be the first step towards getting a footing on the far bank. Our present equipment is not suitable for this sort of ferrying, and improvization entails endless disadvantages. Our old pontoons still exist and have proved very suitable vessels for ferrying. It seems clearly worth while to keep a stock of the old pontoons in repair, and to hold them in store against the day when we may again find ourselves fighting in a land of wide rivers.

From the point of view of maintaining bridge equipment in the field it would be far sounder to expend these old-type pontoons on ferrying, which usually entails a big loss of material, than to loan service pontoons from the limited stock of the Pontoon Parks, with the probability of never seeing them again.

The bridging equipment with an army must be modified according to the type of country in which it is to operate. There is now a standard scale of pontoons, one Corps Pontoon Park being allowed for each corps of three divisions ; but this scale would not meet the needs of a situation such as confronted Maude. Even if one could reckon on the Expeditionary Force having two full Corps Pontoon Parks, the two together would only produce 532 yards of medium or 300 to 350 yards of heavy bridge. That would mean possibly two medium bridges over the Tigris, if narrow sites were found, or one heavy bridge. Either would be quite inadequate for the situation.

The new *kapok* assault bridge represents another change. Trials with this equipment have generally been confined to much smaller rivers than those in Mesopotamia. The Tigris at Shumran would certainly be too formidable a river for *kapok* floats to be of use. Further experience is needed, too, before it can be said with confidence that they would have been of value on the Diyala ; but it does seem possible that the second night's work on that river might have run a different course if *kapok* equipment had been available.

To put an assault bridge across the Diyala would have been a difficult operation. The river was wide, the banks steep and there was little cover. To have attempted to launch the bridge on the first night without careful preliminary organization could only have ended in failure. But it is conceivable that on the second night, under cover of the artillery fire which enabled the ferries to cross, a bridge might have been launched. Once a bridge was over

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the men of the Loyal North Lancashire battalion would have had a far better chance of achieving the success they deserved.

The value of the *kapok* bridge on narrow streams is well established. On wider rivers its possibilities and limitations are not yet generally known, but the difficulty of launching a bridge over a hundred yards of water is sufficiently obvious to make apparent the necessity for a well-thought-out plan. Even on narrower streams though *kapok* equipment may have reduced the time necessary for preparation, it has not done away with it.

Another change is in the pontoon transport, which has been radically altered. In General Maude's mobile bridging train the pontoons were carried on mule wagons; now pontoons are to be drawn by tractors, and *kapok* equipment will be brought forward in lorries.

It is difficult to speak precisely of the effect of this improved mobility, because the actual performance of the new vehicles would depend on the state of particular stretches of ground. But if, when the Diyala was reached, the bridging train had been easily capable of making a wide turning movement, there would have been a better chance of a plan being adopted which would have embodied surprise.

The changes of the last ten years have given us new types of equipment, have standardized that equipment and have increased its mobility. Of the value of these changes there is no question. But it should be made possible to modify the scale of equipment to meet the needs of the theatre in which operations may have to be conducted; and it is useless to imagine that the equipment does away with the need for preparation and surprise. Preparation may be shorter, surprise more easy to achieve, but they both remain essential.

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THE INDIANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY

By Lieut.-General Sir George MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O.

The Present Situation

The Indianization of the Indian Army, and the formation of an Indian Sandhurst are subjects of which a good deal has been heard during the last few years, and which have several complex aspects. It is not possible to understand them without some knowledge of the past and the ethics and facts of our rule in India. The term "Indianization" itself is awkward and something of a misnomer, but has come to be accepted. The Indian Army is entirely Indian, has not even European non-commissioned officers except that the higher cadre of officers is British, and British without exception. The term "Indianization" stands for the replacement of the British officers partly, or in the minds of zealots wholly, by Indians and that must also involve the eventual admission of Indians to General's rank. The fact that Indians have not been admissible to the ranks held by British officers during all the years that an Indian Army has existed and served with distinction, has long been commented on by the more far-seeing. For many years the Civil Services have been open to Indians and also the Medical Services with such military rank as that Service carries. Before the war a younger and forward school of thought urged that a beginning, as an experiment, should be made. The mass of Army thought was against it, and such commanding opinion as Lord Roberts was said to be against it too. At the same time, there was obviously a want of understanding of the inwardness of the situation. Here was the one class of people of India, the fighting races, with whom the British were more in sympathy than any other, who alone were to be denied any of the higher positions to which the clerkly races could aspire to in other Government employment. The situation was obviously unsound, and the only real doubt could be when some change should come. In the opinion of the younger men His Majesty's visit to India in

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1911 was obviously the occasion to announce an experiment, and an innovation of this nature. The occasion was not taken and it was not till towards the last days of the Great War when Sir Charles Munro was the Commander-in-Chief in India in the Viceroyalty of Lord Chelmsford that a commencement was made, too late to have the practical experiment of the Great War to make or to mar it.

By this time Indian politicians had begun to demand the step as a measure of political development, and were inclined to make the situation of which they had not the faintest real conception a matter for agitation.

To follow the problem in its growth a glance at the history of the rise of the Indian Army is necessary.

The Early Days of the Indian Army

The early days when the night watchmen of the first factories grew into companies and battalions, to meet the problem of disorder in India, soon passed. By the middle of the eighteenth century King's troops had arrived in India and the organization of the local troops began to take the form of Europe, trained by officers who had the experience of war on the Continent. The Indian corps, however, still had but few officers of British birth. Companies, squadrons and wings were often commanded by Indians. Even the south of India was in those days full of adventurers from the north, Arabs and Afghans and the like, who were fine soldiers and leaders. But the more bayonets were crossed with the French, the more did it appear that without a considerable number of British officers, the Indian troops would not face them and the great forces of the Indian States with which they were now called to contend. A large portion of the Army was armed and trained in imitation of the British Line, which was the best form of any army known to the Empire. It was also found that since the armies of the Indian chiefs feared the European troops, by equipping and clothing the Indians in the same way, their moral force was much increased. So there grew up the three Presidential Armies of Madras, Bengal and Bombay.

The campaigns with Haider Ali and Tippu his son, the Tiger of Mysore, still further regularized the Indian Army, and still further emphasized the need for British officers, a need which no one recognized more than the men themselves. Indeed to this day when there is any duty of danger and difficulty to be overcome the men will anxiously ask if a *sahib* is to accompany the party. So it

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has ever been. Then the demand for military education still further militated against the employment of the stout old unlettered soldier in the higher ranks, for it is almost an axiom in the East that the more the education, the less the physical courage. So the opportunity for Indians to rise to higher military status was now far less than fifty years before.

The Old Armies at their Zenith

The campaigns of Lord Lake and Sir Arthur Wellesley, 1803–1805, and those of the Marquess of Hastings, in 1817–1818, still further developed the Armies of the Presidencies in European form. In the midst of it all came the failures during the Afghan Wars to shake our confidence in the system we had so long elaborated, and the two Sikh Wars, 1845–1849, again showed us that the Army was not so good as it used to be or that it was facing a far better foe. A huge Line on the European pattern now existed which was apparently growing effete. Especially was this due to the fact that the native Indian officers were now always very old men, and men in whose appointment no selection was exercised. In the memorials on the battlefield of Chillianwallah, for instance, two of them are recorded as being over seventy. The Bombay Army, however, worked on quite a different principle. It selected its Indian officers and in the memorable series of letters and pamphlets on the subject published by such men as Henry Lawrence, Herbert Edwardes and John Jacob, the two schools of thought contended, and whereas one school urged youth and selection, the other always pointed out that it was very dangerous to encourage young Indians as leaders.

Before, however, anything could be done to reconstitute the Army the Mutiny broke out and with it the old Company's system was swept away.

The Mutiny of the Bengal Army

The problem of the present day is still bound up with the memories of the Mutiny. Practically the whole of the Bengal Army mutinied and a few units of the Bombay Army. How far good fortune prevented the whole Bombay Army from joining will never be known. But the supporters of the Bombay system of promotion by selection, were unanimous in believing that it was the efficient Indian officers who kept the men from listening to the wide-spread attempts of the seditious to get them into trouble, and no doubt they are right, but the point is a two-edged one.

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Owing to the age and inferiority of the Indian officers, the complete native officer cadre which existed was only adequate to maintain routine, and quite incompetent to lead. In no case did any leader of merit appear from the mutineer ranks of the Regular Army,* although a few of the officers of irregulars were fit to play a more prominent part.

When the Mutiny was over there was nothing left of the Bengal Army but the ruins, though the Madras and Bombay Armies, the latter comparatively small, still existed.

One point, however, had apparently been made quite clear. The " Regular " system was out of date. The " irregular " system was far more suited to the genus of the country, certainly to the men of the Punjab and frontier from whom had been raised the troops which helped so largely to put down the Mutiny.

The term " Regular " was applied to the regiment or battalion with a full nominal cadre of British officers like the British Line, with its European sergeant-major and quartermaster-sergeant and its complete duplication of the British system and economy. The bulk of the three Armies were organized on this method, and the troops were dressed in the scarlet coatee and shako which was just disappearing from the British Army when the Crimea commenced.

The irregular system was that which obtained in the irregular light cavalry and in certain of the local forces. The troops were usually dressed in a combination of British and Indian clothing. There was a commanding officer and an adjutant, and a varying number of assistants who were styled wing officers. Under this system Indian officers actually commanded their own troops and companies.

Early Attempts to Indianize

The reconstruction aimed at giving the Indian corps as few British officers as possible and developing the initiative of the Indian officers, for whom the well-known titles of *Subahdar* and *Jemadar*, both titles of prestige, were continued. In each corps there was to be a commandant with adjutant and quartermaster, and two wing commanders, a total of five with a couple of attached officers.

In the 'eighties H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught when commanding the Meerut Division, and again when Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, was anxious to start a Sandhurst for the Indian commissioned ranks. But even if the " irregular " system was to

* Subahdar Bakht-Khan of the Artillery of the Bareilly Brigade became Commander-in-Chief of the Mogul Forces in Delhi, but it was a sorry business so far as leadership went.

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endure and only a few European officers were to be in each corps, the question of the eventual career of the Indian officer still remained unsettled, and by general consent the time was not ripe even to probe it. A few direct Commissions were given to Indians side by side with promotion from the ranks, and, while Army Headquarter opinion was in favour of this and eventually extended it, regimental opinion was usually against it. The direct commissioned men were not as a rule so satisfactory for their business as the promoted non-commissioned officers who knew the routine and regimental life to a tick. But the longer headed saw that to give a Commission at the age of thirty-five was to make the non-commissioned officer contented and would bring him to the end of his career about the time that in the course of nature he was ready for pension, while the man who entered the same position at twenty would be up against a dead wall long before his energy and ambition had faded. This problem also was left unsettled.

Mention has been made of the proposal to bring Indians to a British officer's position, which was made at the time of the King's visit in 1911, and how it died away. A half-baked attempt, however, was made in 1912 when unattached Commissions carrying British titles were given to gentlemen in the "Indian Land Forces." They were almost meaningless, a few became A.D.C.'s to general officers, but none could be posted to regiments. The question of command and equality was shirked. It was too difficult for solution.

The Results of the Russian and Afghan Menace

It was not long, however, in the history of the post-Mutiny Army before exactly the same causes which towards the end of the eighteenth century brought about the regularization of the Army with a large number of British officers, were to occur again.

After the Frontier risings of 1897–1898, when for the first time tribesmen were encountered with a considerable number of modern rifles, better leading was the cry. It came as much from those who believed their men to be magnificent soldiers as from those who questioned the point. In Lord Kitchener's day the Russian menace again appeared acute. The solution again was more British officers. The Indian soldier, even the best of them, was not considered fit to meet good European troops without a large number of British leaders.* The six or seven British officers per unit of the post-Mutiny period had now risen to fourteen. But the change brought

* The Great War still further emphasized the point.

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its own defects. It was hard to keep them all busy in time of peace, and the Indian officer, despite gradual improvement in his power of training and leading men, was becoming less and less a necessary feature in his corps.

The Martial and the Un-Martial Races of India

This brings us up to the fact with which the British officer of the Indian Army and to a lesser degree the Indian civilian, are quite familiar, but which is unintelligible to those who do not know India—namely, that only a small portion of its 320,000,000 inhabitants has any martial aptitude or even any physical courage of the assertive type. Power of endurance and submission is another matter. A few thousand people from the north have always conquered the millions of the south. The heat of the south has sapped the courage of those who have abided there. Now the intellectuals of India very largely belong to the non-martial classes, men of brains whose hand can never keep the head. In the days of Moslem conquerors they found the treasury and the administrative officials through whose heads the Moslems governed and taxed.

Of the three hundred odd millions of India it is not too much to say that 3,000,000 is the maximum number of fighting men of all ages. The fighting man is the agriculturist, chiefly the yeoman farmer of a very small class. The whole Sikh nation, for instance, men, women and children, numbers less than 3,000,000. As our conquest took us farther north we found among the inhabitants an indigenous martial peasantry, excellent as soldiers but none too numerous. It soon became apparent, too, that they lost their martial qualities as the result of an English education.

The Indian Army of 1914

We may now with advantage look at the Indian Army as it stood on the outbreak of the Great War, in its development since the days when the New Model was first inaugurated.

To make the Army fit for its duties a great weeding out of the lesser breeds had to take place, and to get the best results from those which remained a system of grouping by sept and clan was carefully elaborated. Corps became either class corps, composed of one race only such as the Sikh regiments, or " class company " units such as the major portion of the Line, in which each company was composed of men of one race or caste. This system undoubtedly

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produced excellent results. Well recruited, highly trained with a particularly good cadre of British officers, the Indian Army was undoubtedly at its zenith at the commencement of the Great War, so far as the individual efficiency of its units went and of its brigades. But many as were the soldierly qualities of the various races, some excelling in one class of campaigning, some in another, according to their characteristics, the Indian regiment was never equal to a British one. It seems hardly necessary to labour this point, but at times it has been the fashion to acclaim them as far doughtier warriors than their British leaders can ever succeed in making them.

Their coming to Europe to share in the Great War was a trial which no one a few years ago would have dreamt of asking them to undergo. The services they rendered are a remarkable tribute to the system of class organization, to their own devotion, and to the British officers who were proud to lead and whom the men were eager to follow.

Unfortunately no Indians were in the position of command and responsibility usually held by British officers, and, therefore, we have little experience by which to study the problem. But it must be admitted that the case of the troops of the Indian Princes, then known as the " Imperial Service Troops," did to some extent refute, at any rate to the casual observer, the belief that an Indian could not have held the position of a British officer. Here were regiments entirely officered by Indians, modelled on our own model. The initiated would say, " Yes, but these results have only been obtained by the unremitting care of specially selected British officers who trained them, and that in the field, they had not been particularly successful unless several British officers were attached."

The British and Indian Officer to-day

It is now worth while to turn aside to inquire how it is that the British officer is so successful in his leadership, and to ask why his men follow him so devotedly. It will be found that there are many reasons and many curious features in the matter. In the first place in this great continent of contending creeds and races, with bitter hostile outlook, sometimes active sometimes latent, the impartiality of the British officer is the asset that is immensely appreciated.

Then again the marked gallantry of the British leader, leading as it were from the front, has always captured the imagination of the Indian soldier and for generations the former has earned the almost

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supernatural devotion of his men. To which must be added the power of identification with his men's interests which is such a characteristic of the British officer. The disinterested desire for their men's welfare has always been the second of the secrets. Then there is the inscrutability of the white brain to the Asiatic, even more inaccessible to them than perhaps the Indian brain is to the European.

It has already been explained how the Indian officer holds a subordinate position. It is a position of great credit and he lives in an entirely admirable atmosphere of confidence and friendship with his British officers, indeed pathetically and touchingly so. He to a great extent comes from the ranks and through the non-commissioned ranks. The Indian enlists because army service and the service of the Government are the most honourable careers he knows. He comes of an ancient stock of small land-owners and cultivators. To be a soldier is entirely honourable. To be a non-commissioned officer and a commissioned officer is still more so. But he comes to the Army largely illiterate because universal education of the peasantry is by no means a yet attained goal. Such learning as he has he often picks up, and certainly largely augments after enlistment. Being often intelligent he does pick up a good deal of simple education, and of late years the level of intelligence has much increased. He attains, as has already been explained, to commissioned rank as he is approaching middle age, and by the time his period of service is finished he is ready for rest and pension and such dignities as he may have earned. Towards the end of the Great War, partly because the anomaly inherent in the position had been more fully recognized, partly to try and eke out the supply of higher officers, certain selected Indians had been given the equivalent of British Commissions, with the British military titles. These officers had not to any great extent gone into the field. As soon as the war was over Government accepted the policy of trying to open the higher Army career to Indians and a certain number of selected lads have been sent to Sandhurst and have come out to India as second lieutenants to be posted to Indian regiments. The young officers thus appointed have done well so far as they have gone, they have been well received in their regiments and messes, they are very often boys of personal charm and always of good manners and pleasant address, and the British officers of the corps they have joined have laid themselves out to make them happy and welcome. There, however, has been considerable difficulty in finding sufficient lads willing and suitable to send to Sandhurst.

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Politicians and the Problems

It is into this state of affairs that the Indian politician has jumped with great eagerness and very little knowledge of the past of India, the hard facts of history and even the facts of to-day. But he demands immediate the Indianization of the Army as an act of what he calls justice. He clamours for an Indian Sandhurst and demands that Indians should be eligible for the highest ranks.

There are, therefore, two problems of Indianization. One the British policy of training some young Indians to come through the mill side by side with young British officers to reach to such place in the Army as their qualities may entitle them. This is a policy which is being actively, genuinely and sanely advanced, and which is obviously capable of some measure of success. This includes the complete experimental Indianization in time of selected corps. The other is the uninstructed policy of the clamouring politician who, with no knowledge of military affairs, fancies that a military career might be a pleasant one for his town-bred son, and who also demands fast and complete Indianization. It is to these people that Lord Rawlinson said, " But it has taken me forty years to be fit for my position, even if I am fit for it: how can you indianize rapidly, even supposing your young men have all the necessary qualifications?" Two hundred years, he told them, have gone to the making of the professional officer class both in the Army and the Navy and you would have it in a day.

An Indian Sandhurst and Indian Schools

The demand for an Indian Sandhurst belongs rightly to both policies. The demand is not necessarily extravagant. When demanded merely because of the desire to do away with everything British it is of course absurd, but when born of a more national desire to ascertain whether the best results will be obtained by training the boys in England or in India, the proposal deserves discussion on its merits. There are those who hold that it is essential that the young Indians should be sent to England in order to imbibe something of the spirit of " playing the game " that animates the Services. There are others who hold that not only is it too great an expense to which to put Indian parents, but also that it is not fair to expect them to send boys of that age to a strange land, among people of an entirely different faith, where they cannot be expected to be anything but strange and lonely. The committee which has

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been examining the question has examined many schools and colleges, both military and civil, in many lands and the result of its inquiries will be extremely interesting.

But the serious study of this problem has brought out into the light a remarkable fact about India, well known of course but not visible in its inwardness till this problem of officers came to be discussed. And that is that there is little school life in India as yet which has any form of character building. There is nothing similar to any form of public school in this country, nothing to fit young Indians for a struggle in a life on the European model. The General Staff in India, which is reponsible for considering such matters, has recognized this fact, and also the fact that the class from which it may be possible to get Indian officers is a restricted one. It has come to the conclusion that by far the best policy will be to try and train up the sons of the stout old yeoman farmers who furnish by way of the ranks the present type of Indian officer. To this end, as part of a war commemoration scheme, certain King George's Schools have been established to train up and form this hereditary class, and to make lads who can either fill an Indian Sandhurst or proceed to the College at Camberley. It is a most interesting and promising experiment, but will not of course satisfy the excited type of politician who wishes to see a ready-made army of officers spring from the clouds.

The Future of Indianization

From the foregoing study of the main factors contained in the problem it is possible to put together some deductions. They may perhaps be summarized as follows :—

1. There is no large class from which officers can be drawn, and it will be necessary to start the complete machinery for producing it from start to finish.

2. Assuming that a certain or a sufficient quantity of boys of suitable material can be obtained, there is no experience to show to what extent these Indians can be absorbed into regiments without seriously impairing their fighting value. The proportion may lie at fifty per cent., it may be forty, it may be sixty per cent. There is no evidence at all to show that, when it comes to leadership in war, the Indian can lead his men at all successfully, or that he will exercise any of that magic charm which is the peculiar characteristic of the British officer, or if he has any magic of his own that can replace it. Nor do we know whether he will be able to obtain the instinctive

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recognition from men of the races and creeds who make up the Indian Army to which he may be alien.

3. The whole success of the Indian Army up to the present time has depended on the wonderful influence of British leaders. Further, it may safely be accepted that the War Office is not prepared to send its troops to bolster up in the field a force which, to satisfy the demands of the ignorant and the politically-minded, may be so much reduced in efficiency as to be unreliable.

In the writer's opinion, whatever may be the policy that is decided upon, it must be looked upon in the light of an experiment of which the result can really only be tested by war. The process of Indianization should emphatically be tentative and slow, and all promotion and selection should be left entirely in the hands of the military authorities. But there are other interesting and difficult problems to be encountered. For instance, what is to be the limit of effect of the King's Commission, as distinct from that of the Viceroy? The War Office will not agree that this Commission can give command over any officers or men of the British Army. This point alone involves a problem which will eventually become acute. In years to come if the Indian can establish a reputation for reliability, opinion may change, but there are no signs of any such change at the present time.

It is not hard then to realize how the problem bristles with difficulties. One thing, however, seems certain to the writer of this article, namely—that if the Indian politician is to be allowed to have his way with the Army, and does anything to wreck the psychological influence which the British officer now has over his men, then our military machine in India will be reduced to the condition of Eastern armies of a hundred and fifty years ago.

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THE DEFENSIVE AND OUTPOST POSITIONS IN MODERN WARFARE AMONG CIVILIZED NATIONS

By Colonel H. Rowan-Robinson, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A.

The following are the paragraphs in F.S.R., vol. ii, which seem appropriate to a consideration of the defensive position in modern civilized warfare :—

A. Sec. 88, 1. "Though victory can be won only as a result of offensive action, a defensive attitude may sometimes be necessary or even advantageous. The defensive, if any offensive spirit inspires its conduct, may effectively create a favourable opportunity for resuming the offensive."

B. Sec. 89, 3. "Surprise is just as important in the defence as in the attack."

C. Sec. 90, 1. "The first requirement will be information. The air-service and the mobile advanced troops must discover the direction of movement and the strength of the hostile columns, and the force should not be deployed until the enemy's line of advance can be foreseen. A force which is kept in hand covered by the necessary protective troops is able to assume the offensive at once should a favourable opportunity offer itself . . . the method of attack likely to be employed by the enemy is an important point to be ascertained in order that the conduct of the defence may be framed to surprise the attackers."

The writer has chosen extracts in which the general principles underlying the conduct of defensive action are elucidated, but in which there is no mention of the occupation of a defensive position as a method of applying those principles.

A study of current military literature reveals a wonderment as to how a defensive position is to be held in these days of mechanical warfare. The infantry has no weapon of its own with which to deal with tanks and is not expected, therefore, to stand against the latter except behind tank-obstacles. The only hope for a successful use of machine guns is said to consist in careful camouflage, in

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the pious hope that they may escape observation until the tanks have passed and may then be able to open fire on the infantry. There is perpetual discussion as to how artillery shall be employed, and no wholly happy solution has been devised: single guns emplaced to fire over open sights, though effective when correctly sited, break up the organization and reduce the massed strength of the artillery; guns distributed in depth are of no value once the forward gun-line has been penetrated, for between attacking tanks and retiring teams or dragons and perhaps counter-attacking tanks, it will be impossible to distinguish friend from foe; no army can afford to carry ammunition in mobile warfare sufficient for barrage fire over a wide area; and, finally, the engagement by observation of a vast number of individual tanks from under cover presents no prospects of success. Tanks in the defence can naturally not make use of their valuable fire-power to strengthen that of the other arms, for they normally employ direct-fire weapons, requiring for their use exposure in stationary positions to the fire of hostile artillery and tanks. Their rôle, therefore, is one of counter-attack either before or after penetration. The former, though apt to mask fire, is the more promising, as in a broken line where confusion reigns the situation becomes quickly obscure and, even in case of success, it will be exceedingly difficult to restore the line. Finally, the ease with which encirclement can be effected by mechanical units endangers not only the slow-moving arms, but also such tanks as are committed to the defence of a position.

It seems, then, that to no arm and to no weapon of a mechanized or partially mechanized army is the defensive position suited in mobile warfare. Hence a radical change in our defensive procedure appears necessary. Where rivers, swamps, mountains and other tank-obstacles exist, the age-old forms may persist; but, in the normal country which generally furnishes the battlefields of civilized warfare, we must seek new methods.

Information is as in the old days the primary requirement. Aeroplanes and ground patrols will furnish this up till dusk, and on it the commander will develop his plan. His main body will move as little as possible by day till the opportunity for striking arises, and at the halt it will remain well-camouflaged. Only his light troops—motor cycles, "one-man" tanks, etc.—and his engineer tanks will be active; the former in observation far out on good roads which they will block when possible at suitable points in their front so as to have the lead in relative mobility; the latter preparing demolitions in rear with the object not only of delaying

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the enemy, but also confining his advance along defined approaches. At night the defender will manœuvre either to postpone the decision once more or to move to a striking position. These then are the principles on which to work: ceaseless reconnaissance, camouflage, retardation of the enemy's movements, postponement of a decision till the hour is ripe. They will not easily be followed. The fog of war, the forcible advance of a powerful enemy, ill-fortune, heavy casualties, the necessity of stopping the enemy in front of a certain line—any or all of these conditions may render the perfect execution of the task impossible; but, just as armies of to-day try to avoid being cooped up in a fortress when retreating, so must the mechanical army of the future avoid anything that savours of the occupation of a position. Except in this respect, the method of applying the principles of defensive action by the petrol-driven army does not run far counter to that employed by his muscle-driven forerunner. The one difference is, however, vital. For a mechanical force to take up a position is to discard hitting power, mobility and ability to manœuvre, and to invite envelopment and destruction. The function of the mechanized army, whether on the offensive or defensive, is to attack; only so can its essential qualities find expression.

It we could pass directly from the muscle-driven period to the petrol period, no very serious difficulty would arise in the application of the principles of defensive action. It is the intermediate period, in the elementary stages of which we stand at present, that is so difficult. We have to try and combine two mutually antagonistic processes—the occupation of a defensive position by the muscle-driven portion of the force and the flat refusal to occupy any such position by the petrol-driven portion.

The solution, if there is a solution, appears to lie in the former only occupying positions which are largely impassable to tanks or which offer great chances to guns for the destruction of tanks; and in the latter recognizing such positions as pivots of manœuvre, but refusing to be tied to them in any way except in so far as to combine with the forces holding them, from however great a distance, in the bid for victory.

With regard to the problem of the outpost position in modern civilized warfare, the following are the paragraphs in the official Training Manuals which appear to the writer appropriate to the discussion:—

A. "The security of a force and of its communications is the first responsibility of a commander." F.S.R., vol. ii, sec. 2, 2 (vi).

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B. " A force can be regarded as secure from surprise only when protection is furnished in every direction from which attack is possible." I.T., vol. ii, sec. 27, 3.

C. " The troops to whom are assigned the duties of protection to a force when halted are termed outposts." I.T., vol. ii, sec. 31, 1.

D. " The object of outposts is—
To ensure rest for the remainder of the force ;
To prevent the enemy from obtaining information ;
In the event of an attack to give warning and to gain sufficient time, at any sacrifice, to enable the main body to take up the battle position." I.T., vol. ii, sec. 31, 3.

E. " To carry out their task outposts rely on two factors :—
(i) Information ;
(ii) Resistance." I.T., vol. ii, sec. 31, 4.

F. " The actual method may be varied to meet any particular situation, so long as the principles that a force is protected against surprise, and given time to make its dispositions for defence are fulfilled." I.T., vol. ii, sec. 31, 5.

With these general principles all will agree ; it is in their detailed application—modified not only as regards any particular situation by extract F. above but also by the progress of mechanization, that opinions may differ.

The points on which it is suggested that some modification is required are contained in the following extracts :—

G. F.S., vol. ii, sec. 55, 4. " In order to resist attack, a defensive position known as the outpost position *must* * be selected."

H. I.T., vol. ii, sec. 31, 5. " To enable an outpost position to be occupied rapidly and methodically in depth a system of disposing outpost troops in piquets, supports and reserves has been evolved, the whole forming one system of defence."

I. I.T., vol. ii, sec. 31, 3. " It is desirable that the outpost position should be sufficiently far in advance of the billets or bivouacs occupied by the main body to prevent the latter, if possible, from coming under the fire of light artillery."

It is of course the advent of the mechanized army which demands a modification in our existing system of protection when at rest. Mechanization had not advanced far enough during the great war to give a clear indication of the necessity of change. Now, however, that the General Staffs of the Greater Powers are working up to movements of the nature of a hundred miles in the twenty-four hours some alteration must clearly be considered. Such mobility implies, apart from actual speed, the power of effecting a number of sudden and unexpected operations by night after aircraft have withdrawn their day-watch—long advances, wide flank-marches,

* The italics are the writer's.

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enveloping movements, all followed as a rule by attack. Even by day the suddenness with which envelopment can be initiated and executed prohibits the continuation of our existing standard methods of protection. Take any map and any example. A northern invading force occupies a town for convenience of billeting. Its outposts are placed on high ground some three and a half miles away to ensure freedom to the main body from artillery fire; they cover some two miles laterally to protect the approaches from the south, troops being entrenched and distributed in depth to ensure the necessary degree of resistance.

Roads probably converge from every direction on the town occupied by the main body. Hence the latter is open to surprise attack by mechanized units from any direction except the south. In the fight that ensues one quarter of the force will be absent on outpost duty.

If we were to change the system and to adopt an all-round defence on the same lines, we should use up three quarters of our force in protecting the fourth quarter. If we were to bring our outposts very close in, we could reduce their numbers, but we should render ourselves liable to effective area-attack by artillery fire.

What then is the solution of the problem of protection at rest in mechanical warfare?

Two solutions are suggested: The first, that the whole force, sufficiently disseminated to offer no target for artillery fire, occupies an area large enough to enable it to form for battle within its limits; that the force be divided into groups (normally the fighting or marching groups), each group being responsible for a proportion of the approaches, and all probable approaches being guarded. Each group would have to furnish its own outposts, but these need not be distant because the enemy is unlikely to waste artillery ammunition by firing into a large area; they need not be strong because they would often be mere guards to tank traps; and they would always contain anti-tank guns or tanks. If the troops in the area were grouped in diamond formation, groups not attacked could move at once to the counter-attack.

The second solution which the writer puts forward, is to quarter the main body as may be most convenient, and to detail an outpost force consisting of mechanized troops of two orders of mobility—silent motor cycles, "one-man tanks" or armoured cars—far out on all possible approaches, and to keep tanks, mechanized guns and armoured cars in a central position from which they can move to the attack when it has been located. The motor cyclist observation

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posts will fire combinations of Verey lights to indicate the arrival of the enemy and, to discourage rapidity of advance on his part, and will cross the approach with a string of light tank mines. During the night a section of guns protected by a few one-man tanks will suffice to guard each threatened approach; the bulk of the outpost troops will be held ready to deliver their attack at dawn.

The main requirements of this latter method of outpost defence are: (1) the cooperation of aircraft along the principal approach in the event of probable attack; (2) a simple and complete system of signalling between the observation posts and the central body; (3) a very careful reconnaissance before dusk of all approaches open to the enemy and their neighbourhood with a view not only to the siting of anti-tank guns, but also for a possible manœuvre by the central body over that ground at dawn; (4) the utmost use of natural tank-obstacles; and (5) the use of a simple and portable sound-ranging instrument between the observation groups, the aircraft being called upon to reconnoitre with flares in the event of definite indications as to the direction and the distance of attack being obtained.

A combination of the action outlined above together with many others that the practice of the method will suggest should fufil the requirements of extracts "D" and "E" above without in any way infringing on the principles laid down in the other extracts.

Of the two solutions suggested the former is the more applicable to existing conditions and the latter to the time when mechanization shall have made considerable progress.

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PROMOTION OF OFFICERS

By Lieut.-Colonel S. T. Lucey, M.C.

With the publication of a pamphlet entitled "Principles Governing the Promotion of Officers in the Army," issued with Army Council Instructions, No. 499 of 1926, the long-expected announcement on the subject of promotion of officers is made at last.

It will come as a surprise to many that the result of so much thought, discussion and deliberation, which is known to have been lavished on this particular problem, can be condensed into the space of a four-page pamphlet. On more mature thought, however, they will accept the fact not only with a feeling of relief but also gratitude to those in authority for following a policy of moderation in the face of so many divers opinions and radical ideas that have been aired on this question since the war.

Seldom does a military problem receive such prominence, both in and out of the Army, as has been given to this question of promotion. Starting with the slogan "Promotion by Merit"—a production of the Haldane Committee in 1922—both the Press and the Army gave vent to their opinions on our present system of promotion of officers. Every commander down to battalions and companies was invited to submit his views on a memorandum which had been drawn up at the War Office and sent out in the form of a cock-shy. From all parts of the Empire the bombardment was taken up with avidity resulting in a host of schemes, recommendations and reports submitted for the consideration of the Army Council. The task of sifting this mass of evidence was delegated to the Plumer Committee, which assembled in November, 1924.

Although the Report of this Committee was never made public outside the precincts of the War Office, its recommendations have undoubtedly proved of great assistance to the Army Council in formulating the decisions which have just been published.

A cursory examination of the pamphlet at once gives the impression that there cannot have been any very serious flaw in the system

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of promotion as it has existed up to date. This is a comfort, since it removes the occasion for drastic methods and innovations. The effect of these when applied to a delicate fabric, wherein the human factor is so closely woven, might be nothing less than deplorable.

Our present system is traditional since the days when purchase was abolished; it has stood the test of peace and war, and it was responsible for the efficient and contented corps of officers that led the Army of 1914.

Happily these facts have been recognized, and instead of introducing new methods the latest instructions are designed rather to augment the existing regulations in order to give effect to a twofold object, namely: (i) to impose a more rigid process of selection in the higher ranks; and (ii) to ensure that officers of outstanding ability may be able to reach the higher ranks of the Army at a reasonable age.

It is not new to say that promotion to the rank of colonel and above shall be "by selection," but the present regulations are judged to be inadequate in that they fail to define the conditions and qualifications which render an officer eligible for selection.

It is for this reason that definite rules have been laid down for the guidance of those who are responsible for the selection of officers for promotion.

Again, the expression "promotion by selection," or "promotion by merit," or, better than either of these, "promotion for merit," does not mean that the position which an officer has attained on the ladder of seniority will be entirely ignored. Seniority, in so much as it implies greater experience, maturity of judgment and capacity to shoulder responsibility, will always remain a dominant factor in the question of promotion—that is to say, it will generally be sufficient to select from a zone comprising the seniors of one rank to fill a vacancy in the next; but the depth of that zone will depend on circumstances and will inevitably vary. This will be the normal procedure; but the abnormal must also be provided for, and the pamphlet indicates, therefore, the possibility of accelerated promotion in the higher ranks.

Where there is selection, also must there be supersession, and it is only right that officers should be told how far their prospects may be affected.

The terms "permanent supersession" and "temporary supersession," which have been in use for years unofficially, are now included and explained in the regulations.

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Every officer at some time or other reaches that stage in his career when he is judged not only by his fitness to hold his present rank but also the one higher, and it is only then, if he be found wanting, that the question of permanent supersession will arise.

An officer who has been passed over and whose qualifications for promotion have not as yet been weighed will of course not be superseded permanently.

Again, to take the case of a major coming up for command of his battalion, the Selection Board may decide that it is not in the interest of the Service to promote him at once. The Board may arrive at this decision for reasons connected with the regiment or for those in which the officer alone is concerned. He may be near the border line, or one who, through no fault of his own, has not had sufficient experience at the moment, but who shows promise. In such a case temporary supersession is recommended, meaning that the officer will remain in his present position to be considered again for a future vacancy.

Although temporary in this sense the supersession is permanent in so far as the officer's position in the Army is concerned. If promoted later, he does not regain his original position in relation to the officer who has gone over his head.

On the other hand, it would be entirely opposed to efficiency were the senior major allowed to remain on the regimental list when once it has been decided that he will never be considered fit to command, and is permanently passed over by a junior officer in his own regiment or an officer brought in from another. He is, therefore, removed when the vacancy occurs and placed on half pay; under these conditions he can never return to the regimental list.

This procedure should not be confused with that already in force in the junior ranks, whereby lieutenants and captains are called upon to retire should they fail to qualify for promotion within a certain period after supersession.

Accelerated promotion up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel has been established in the Army for generations. The conditions and instructions, however, contained in the official regulations are totally inadequate and it is high time that these were drawn up afresh and amplified to meet the requirements of the different arms.

Hitherto, accelerated promotion has been applicable to the cavalry and infantry only. The privilege has been denied to the rest of the Army not because the regulations say so, but for the simple

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reason that no facilities existed for giving effect to recommendations. This was palpably wrong and unfair to the other arms; and the new instructions on this point mark a definite step to the good. The procedure, however, has yet to be tested and the ante-date form of promotion will doubtless cause discontent and heartburning to those who must suffer by its effect. When tied down to establishments one cannot accelerate Captain "C" without automatically retarding Captains "A" and "B" above him, and these two officers are not likely to regard "the interests of the Service" as a sufficient plea to compensate them for the blow inflicted on their own prospects. Here lies the crux of the whole problem—the balancing of these two interests; and since it has been ruled that officers must so suffer in order to provide for the more rapid advancement of their betters, it must be accepted that the interests of the Service outweigh the interests of the officers superseded. The all-important factor, then, is that those who initiate a recommendation and those who support and eventually approve accelerated promotion are satisfied that it will be for the good of the Service and not merely for the good of the officer selected.

The introduction of the ante-date method of accelerated promotion is really the only novel feature in the whole of the pamphlet. It may be found that this form of advancement affords more certain opportunities for gaining accelerated promotion in those corps where promotion is carried out on one list as compared with the cavalry and infantry, where owing to the present traditional system of regimental promotion, special advancement can only be effected as opportunities occur. It is already known that these opportunities in practice occur very infrequently, being dependent on the conditions which prevail in certain regiments at different times; while in other arms, provided that the conditions are fulfilled, there is nothing to prevent accelerated promotion taking its normal course according to the ante-date awarded.

All accelerated promotion referred to above is given in the form of advancement within the regiment or corps. There is, however, an additional means, namely, that of brevet promotion which advances an officer in Army seniority only. The announcement that brevet promotion is now to be opened to the whole Army and no longer confined to those officers who distinguish themselves on the staff alone, is most welcome and a distinct improvement on the old system. The object of brevet promotion, apart from a brevet majority, is to ensure advancement on reaching the rank of colonel (that is to say, when regimental seniority is a thing of the

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past), so that officers who have received these awards earlier in their career may reasonably be expected to come up for promotion to the rank of major-general at a suitable age.

As officers are frequently in doubt as to the value of brevet promotion, it might be as well to explain that in the ordinary course an officer is considered by the Selection Board for promotion to the rank of colonel shortly before he completes the period of four years in the rank of substantive lieutenant-colonel. If selected he is promoted in due course as vacancies occur and he enters the establishment of colonels with seniority four years from the date on which he was promoted substantive lieutenant-colonel; but if he had previously been given a brevet, then four years from the date of his brevet lieutenant-colonelcy. Further, if he had been awarded a brevet colonelcy, his seniority would naturally take effect from the date of such promotion if it is more advantageous to him.

With the extension of brevets to regimental officers, coupled with the rules for accelerated promotion already described, sufficient provision has been made for the advancement of the " outstanding " officer.

At the same time, the more exacting conditions which have been laid down and the general tendency to " tighten up " the regulations, will ensure the elimination of the " unsuitable " officer.

The remainder and the very great majority are thus left to follow what might be described—for lack of a better word—a normal system of promotion which should present, not only a sure and progressive means of livelihood up to the age of fifty to fifty-five, but also offer reasonable prospects of a career beyond that age.

One cannot disregard this aspect of the question. The best-laid schemes for selection and rejection will fall to the ground if there are not sufficient suitable officers from whom to select. The Army must be made attractive if young men of the right type are still to choose it as their profession.

There will be a general feeling of regret, then, that one glaring anomaly in our present system of promotion affecting the cavalry and infantry has not been tackled.

The evil referred to is the divergence in the length of service on promotion to the ranks of captain and major which now exists between the different regiments, and between the different arms. It is inherent to any system where promotion is restricted to short lists. The wastage in regiments is not governed by any one and the same factor. It is a matter of chance. Where the wastage is large promotion is quick, and *vice versâ*.

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Two officers who enter the Army in the same batch from Sandhurst, and who are appointed to different regiments, find themselves through no effort of their own widely separated on approaching field rank. One obtains his majority after seventeen years' service; the other, still only a captain, sees no prospect of promotion for another four years, while (for the purposes of argument) the average service is, say, eighteen and a half years.

When we come to examine the merit of these two officers, we may find that the captain in the slow promotion regiment is the superior in every respect to his contemporary in the quick promotion regiment. His capabilities as a commander and trainer are of far greater value to the Army than those of the latter, and yet he is held back, forced to serve in a subordinate position and on a lower rate of pay merely by the turn of events in his unit.

In the ordinary course of events officers serving in different regiments are not so compared, and this may be the reason why such an injudicious system has been allowed to continue so long.

It is not the fortune of war, but the misfortune of peace.

It gives rise to discontent and loss of interest on the part of the officers who are held back, and to a general feeling of uncertainty in the junior ranks—factors which militate against the popularity of the Army.

The situation is too well known both in the Army and outside for there to be any need to cite concrete examples; the only fear is that the anomaly may be lost sight of because it is so old.

The remedy is simple. There is no call for General Lists, or the grouping of regiments or any like upheavals. It could be applied to-morrow by the publication of an Army Order introducing a system of time promotion based on a maximum and minimum length of service for lieutenants and captains.

Omitting the minimum limit, which is only inserted as a safeguard, this system already operates in other arms, with satisfactory results. Why is it not applied to the cavalry and infantry, and in fact throughout the Army? The answer is—it will cost money. A rough estimate puts the annual cost at £8,000 to £10,000 in order to meet the increase in pay and allowances of those officers who are promoted in excess of establishment on reaching the maximum length of service. This is surely a small cost for removing a time-worn complaint which has no parallel in any other Service or profession.

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TO PAINT THE PICTURE

(With Diagrams)

By Lieutenant C. R. Major, The Dorsetshire Regiment

Method is the essence of successful Intelligence. Essentially is this so when dealing with the mass of information that comes to hand during active operations.

Any morning an officer may be told that, on mobilization he will perform the duties of Brigade Intelligence officer, or possibly, Branch Intelligence officer. This necessitates his carrying out similar duties during manœuvres, or divisional exercises, and as he will probably have to do this without previous experience he immediately tries to find out what his duties entail. Probably he will be given some broad principles on which to work, but it is certain that those from whom he seeks knowledge will be too busy to go into details of methods and systems.

It is the purpose of this article to give some suggestions on the method of marking maps and recording information thereon, so that when asked " to paint the picture " it may be possible to grasp readily the essentials and to give a clear summary of the situation as it stands at the moment. If this picture is drawn so clearly that sound deductions can be made therefrom, all has been done that can be asked of any Intelligence officer.

It was the interest taken by two senior officers, one of the Army, the other of the Royal Air Force, in the methods outlined below that decided the writer to prepare these notes. They are written for his brother subalterns. It would be presumption on his part to imagine that in their entirety they would interest those of higher rank.

It is intended to deal with the subject from the point of view of the Branch Intelligence officer. His duties are more comprehensive. In the main, the methods are applicable to the work of the Brigade Intelligence officer, or any officer called upon to do work requiring the upkeep of situation maps, or who is desirous of working out tactical problems on a map.

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As the work of a Branch Intelligence officer does not seem to be fully understood by the majority of junior officers, and, as this article embodies suggestions on the method in which this officer should carry out what may be termed the mechanical side of his job, it will be well to explain who and what a Branch Intelligence officer is. Briefly, he is an army officer working under " G " Branch of the Staff, who on active service is attached to each Army cooperation squadron of the R.A.F. He lives with the squadron. His task is to ensure that the General Staff gets the best information from the work performed by the R.A.F., and in turn, he passes to the officers of the squadron full information as to the military situation.

Now as regards the tools—the brushes and paints with which the form of the picture is to be made.

To contain these a strong cardboard box is required, such as jewellers use for sending articles by post. A good size is 6×8×2 inches. One of the long sides of the box should be slit at the corners, so that it can be folded down. On the inside bottom of the box seccotine an ordinary six-inch cork dinner mat, with one-third of the mat cut away (*see* diagram).




FIG. 1.—" Instrument " box.

The mat is for coloured pins and the cut side of the box for quick access to these.

It should contain :—

(*a*) Coloured pins—these should be the short pins with heads about $\frac{3}{16}$th of an inch in diameter and with stems about $\frac{5}{8}$th of an inch in length. These do not obscure a map like coloured flags. A separate colour should be reserved for each arm, both for the " enemy " and our " own " troops. They should be marshalled by colours and by forces ; (*b*) a stock of coloured pencils ; (*c*) a pair of dividers—these save endless time and are essential for measuring quickly from the scale to the map, and *vice versa ;* (*d*) map measure—the ordinary map measure, procurable from any military stationer for 5*s*., is invaluable when making calculations where those old friends " time and space " enter into the picture ; (*e*) protractor ; (*f*) magnifying glass—a good magnifying glass is useful to a Branch Intelligence officer for the study of air photographs ; (*g*) pencil compass ; and (*h*) India rubber.

Carrying, Convenience and Cost.—The completed " instrument " box is light and extremely portable. The sacrifice of a space of

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6×8×2 inches will be more than compensated for by the speed with which work can be accomplished. The cost is negligible, except for the magnifying glass.

Maps.—The question of maps has next to be considered, and a few suggestions may be useful before the question of marking up information is dealt with.

Take maps such as those issued for the Manœuvres of 1925. The reference letter of the square, printed in outline with the same




FIG. 2.—Colour shaded reference letter.

colour ink as that of the grid lines, is hard to find when working over a large area. It is helpful, therefore, to shade in colour the outlined letter with a crayon. Brown is the best colour for this purpose.

Having thus secured easy reference to the larger squares, it will now be advisable to devise some quick method of reference to the smaller squares, and coordinates.

Presumably most officers have become completely "foxed" when endeavouring to follow numerous coordinates as they are read out from operation orders: especially if the reading is at all hurried. "R.58" or "S.5375" has set them hurriedly to count the small squares. They may have gone to infinite trouble and marked in on each little square its number. This means marking in literally hundreds of figures, as there are ten times ten small squares to each large one. And as there are approximately twenty-five large squares on an ordinary manœuvre map, this entails a considerable labour; with, in addition, the fault that at the end the detail on the map is obscured by a cloud of numbers.

It is suggested that the numbering of one small square in each

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line diagonally upwards from the south-west corner, will enable coordinates to be found with speed and accuracy. Mark in Indian ink as in the diagram below




FIG. 3.—Numbering of small squares.

The village of Idmiston—W.37—is easily identified. The pin point W.3637 (the fourth mile stone) is readily found. It is 3·6 squares east and 3·7 squares north, and there are the numbers to show the square which would have been reached had the reader gone laboriously counting along first east, then north. It will be seen, with this system, that only ten figures have to be marked in instead of two hundred. But above all the detail on the map is not obscured.

The map has now been prepared for easy reference. The next thing is to elucidate matters further so that when information comes in it can be dealt with quickly.

If dealing with information from the air, it will be well to mark

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on the map reconnaissance areas, and to differentiate between areas covered by various flights. This can be done by using coloured crayons and marking the routes of the reconnaissance (if for movement along roads), or the area (if a close reconnaissance), by short bold strokes and shading a thickness on to these strokes to make them stand out from the other detail on the map. The diagram below shows on the right roads that are being watched for movement by " A " Flight, and on the left an area over which a close reconnaissance machine from " B " Flight is working. Different colours should be used for the work of different flights.




FIG. 4.—Marking reconnaissance areas.

The map now shows the outlines of the picture. To make these outlines clear and to help others who may have to study the map

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as it progresses, it is well to have a "key." The maker of the map will in this way be spared a constant flow of questions from the sundry and curious.

The key should be set out on a piece of foolscap and then pinned on to a piece of cardboard in some conspicuous place. On it should be marked any necessary details. By adding coloured pins the particulars the map is to give are effectively shown. *See* Fig. 5.



KEY.
DIV · H.Q. = White headed pin with flag
BDE. H.Q's = Flagged pin with number of Bde:
RECCE. AREAS.
1 INF. BDE: = (Green crayon)
2 INF. BDE: = (Brown crayon)
"A" FLIGHT
3 BN: R.T.C. = (Yellow crayon) "B" FLIGHT.
ENEMY INF: = (Black pin)
" CAV: = (Yellow pin)
" GUNS = (Brown pin)
OWN INF: = (Red pin)
" CAV: = (Green pin)
GUNS = (Pink pin)

FIG. 5.—Map key.

Recording Information.—It is now presumed that the Intelligence officer has prepared his map, interviewed the pilots who are to carry out reconnaissances and is ready to deal with any information that may come to hand. Presently reports come streaming in.

"0707 hours 20 enemy cavalry moving West at V.5727.
0708 hours 300 enemy infantry moving North at W.5226.

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0710 hours 500 enemy infantry moving North head W.7665 tail W.7464.
0712 hours 4 enemy guns in action Downford, W.2556."

and so on throughout the hours of daylight, or until the action is finished.

The Intelligence officer wants to get a picture of what all this means. How can he best do so? He cannot carry all these items in his head. If he merely records them in tabular form, they are still not very constructive, when, at the end of the day, he wishes to summarize his ideas for the benefit of the General Staff.

It becomes apparent that he must mark up on his map the information he receives. He must do this quickly and legibly. It must be in some form that is easily recognizable and that will not escape attention. Also, it must be remembered that whatever form the record takes it must show, at once, the following details :—

(*a*) time ;
(*b*) numbers ;
(*c*) hostile or " own " troops ;
(*d*) what arm ; whether cavalry, infantry, guns, etc. ; and
(*e*) direction of movement, or halted.

(The date is naturally that of the day on which the work is done. Information that requires to be left on the situation map for the next day is dated when the Intelligence officer makes up his evening summary.)

It is suggested that this can be done as follows :—


For example, the message timed 0707 hours, " 20 cavalry moving West at V.5727." All that the Intelligence officer has to do is to take a pin of the colour allotted to the enemy's cavalry (let this be yellow) and fix it in the reference point given. Immediately to the right of this he marks in with his blue pencil (as he is dealing with the enemy's troops it is advisable to use this colour, and red pencil for " own " troops, *vide* plate XVIII of " The Manual of Map Reading and Field Sketching 1921 ") the time and number seen, separating the two by a line which should be arrow-tipped to show the direction of movement. His record then will appear as shown :




The next message, referring to 300 infantry seen at 0708 hours

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going North at W.5226, is merely recorded in the same way, by fixing the reference point with a coloured pin (say black) and adding the other information as here shown :



The third message deals with what the R.A.F. pilots are taught is a " large " body of infantry (viz. above 400). In addition to giving the numbers, they will, therefore, give the head and tail of the column. This has to be shown, so the record would be



the butt of the line being on the reference point given for the tail.

This column may be encountered later in the day, say at 1500 hours, halted, facing west, with its head at R.5556, tail at R.5755. This additional information must be shown : namely, that the column is halted, also the way which it is facing. It is suggested that this can be done as follows :




It is not necessary to labour this subject. It becomes obvious that the last message given above, regarding the four hostile guns in action near Downford at W.2556, which are firing in a westerly direction, would merely be shown as follows :



with, say, the " V " mark at the end of the stroke to show that the trails are down.

If the battery was on the move north, they would be shown as



Other arms of the enemy can of course be dealt with as above, by having various colours allotted to them.

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As the R.A.F. are taught only to send down actually what they see in numbers, and not by squadrons or batteries, or battalions, or companies, there is no need to have separate tokens for the different formations. One colour is sufficient for infantry, another for cavalry, and so on. This makes the work much easier.

The system outlined above is simple. Explanation on paper perhaps tends to make it appear slightly complicated. In actual practice this will be found not to be the case.

General.—It is advisable for a Branch Intelligence officer to have his situation map spread on a good flat surface. An ordinary deal table, or board of fairly soft wood is suitable. If procurable a cork surface, such as a good bath mat, is best, as it grips the pins.

For a Brigade Intelligence officer the top of an ordinary tea chest, sawn across the middle, has its advantages. It is strong and can be hinged by fastening with drawing pins an old linen-backed map to the two pieces. It will then take a spread of map covering approximately twelve by twenty miles, and can be folded up and placed in a haversack when the officer moves from place to place. This is a great advantage as an Intelligence officer often has to work in the open, and in the rain. If all the pins are firmly fixed, it will be found that, even at the end of a brisk canter, they will have remained in place in the three-ply wood.

After two or three days, depending of course on the amount of information with which an officer has been called upon to deal, it will probably be necessary to take a new map into use. The old one will be too crowded with detail. Should the officer not have a good supply of maps, tracing paper can be used over his original map. His information can be marked up on this. The position of tracing paper can be kept constant by marking in setting rays, such as the cross lines of two of the large squares of the map.

It is probably best to write information as it comes to hand on the tracing paper without using pins, keeping these for the situation map when working out the evening summary.

The point may here be raised as to why use coloured pins at all. The answer is obvious. Anything raised from a flat surface can be readily identified : anything which tends to make the situation plain is to the good.

It will be found that there is time to set up maps even in mobile warfare. A staff must sit down to fight.

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FRENCH MILITARY EDUCATION AT THE *POLYTECHNIQUE*

By Major R. L. Sherbrooke, D.S.O., Assistant Military Attaché, Paris

After the late war it was suggested that the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, should be enlarged and reorganized so as to enable it to take a certain number of boys who although receiving the same education as the candidates for Commissions in the R.A. and R.E., would ultimately take up civil employment under the Government such as mining and civil engineering, woods and forests, etc. The protagonists of this idea probably had in mind the French scheme of training for future officers of the artillery and engineer services, but excellent as it may appear to be at first sight, the *Polytechnique* system has certain limitations from the British point of view.

History of the École Polytechnique

"*Pour la Patrie, Les Sciences et La Gloire*"

After the Revolution, the Convention, in 1794, passed a law authorizing the institution of a Central Training School for the technical and engineering services, to be known as the *École Centrale des Travaux Publics*. In the new school were collected the pupils of the Engineering College of Mezières, the *École des Mines*, the *École des Ponts et Chaussées*, and all candidates for any form of civil engineering.

The *École Centrale des Travaux Publics* was established in the stables, coach-houses and orangeries of the Palais Bourbon, with the special object of training candidates for the Military Engineering Services and Public Works, as well as geographers, mining engineers and naval constructors. This School was opened on the 21st of December, 1794, and the pupils, who were all day boarders, received pay as soldiers and wore the uniform of the National Guard.

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The following year the Directory changed the name to that of the *École Polytechnique*, authorized the inclusion of candidates for Commissions in the artillery, and appointed a certain General Deshautchamps to be one of the Military Directors. In 1804 Napoleon reorganized the College by giving it a military status and régime, ordered the parents of the pupils to pay for the education, and caused its principal *raison d'être* to be the production of officers for the artillery and the engineers as opposed to St. Cyr, to which place he transferred the existing military schools for officers of the cavalry and infantry.

On the site of the present school buildings, some of which date from 1738, there originally stood the religious colleges of Navarre, Boncourt and Tournay, and it was not until 1805, eleven years after its inception by the Convention, that the *École Polytechnique* was transferred from its first home in the Palais Bourbon to the existing group of buildings between the *rue des Cartes* and the *rue Monge*, and which, situated in the heart of the Latin Quarter, a stone's throw from the pantheon, resembles a small university, where the students sleep in dormitories, wear uniform, and are subject to a mild form of military discipline.

The first Director was Lamblardie, who was assisted by many celebrated savants, amongst whom were Lagrange, Prony, Monge, Fourcroy, Vauquelin and Chaptal. By another law, passed in 1799, the number of pupils was raised from 250 to 300, 150 per division; the age limit for entry was fixed at 16 to 20 years of age, and the course was made one of two years' duration. From 1798 onwards Napoleon began to take considerable interest in the School, and on the 26th of July, 1804, caused a law of reorganization to be passed by which the 300 pupils were formed into a regular military corps, although their pay as soldiers was stopped. Under the new regulation the students formed the *Polytechnique Battalion*, commanded by infantry officers, and the first military Commandant of the School was appointed in the person of General Lacuee with Colonel Gay de Vernon as second-in-command and Chief Instructor.

An instructors for the *École Polytechnique*, Napoleon accepted only the greatest savants of the day, and this tradition has been continued, for amongst the list of professors for the year 1926 are the names of many of the best known scientists and mathematicians.

A history of the *Polytechnique*, however short, would not be complete without mention of the part played in the defence of the country in 1814 by the three artillery companies of the *Garde*

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Nationale formed by the cadets of the school. These three companies, with their 28 guns drawn by post-horses, took part in the battle of Paris on the 30th of March, incurred many casualties and earned the thanks of the Government. This access of military glory was, however, short-lived, for in 1816, as a punishment for a collective act of insubordination, the School was deprived of its military status, and was placed under the Ministry of the Interior. Further, the pupils were forbidden to wear uniform, and a civilian was appointed to be Chief Instructor and Assistant Commandant. This civil administration proved unsatisfactory, and in 1822, after further acts of insubordination, the Government reconstituted the military régime under a Military Governor, assisted by a staff of five serving officers for disciplinary purposes, and the cadets were once more put into uniform.

Unlike their fellow students at *St. Cyr*, where politics have always been studiously avoided, the pupils of the *Polytechnique* appear to have had a liking for political agitation, and in the Revolution of 1830 assisted in the storming of the Babylon Barracks, losing one of their number in the process.

As a result of this manifestation, the School was placed under the Ministry for War; the Civil Governor was replaced by a General Bertrand as Commandant, and the pupils were formed into four companies, commanded by captains of the artillery and engineers.

In the riots of 1848, the students of the *Polytechnique* were on the side of the authorities and helped the Provisional Government to restore order in Paris. Twelve years later, at the outbreak of the Franco-German War, the pupils and instructors formed a battery of siege artillery, but most of the second-year students were eventually drafted to Regular batteries and engineer companies, with the rank of "auxiliary second lieutenant." The School battery with its *personnel* of professors, former pupils and young boys remained in existence for over a year and played an honourable part in the defence of Paris.

Before the investment of the city was completed, the first-year pupils had been evacuated to Bordeaux, whence they were recalled in 1871 to help the Government to quell the revolution which broke out on the 18th of March, but when it was seen that this insurrection could not at once be checked, the *personnel* of the School was moved *en bloc* to Tours, where it remained until the end of October, 1871.

With the reorganization of the French Army which followed

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the war of 1870, it was found necessary to admit a greater number of candidates for the artillery and engineer services, and in 1872 283 pupils were received as against 140 in the preceding year. The School buildings were at the same time enlarged and improved so as to accommodate a total number of 500 cadets.

From 1906 to 1912, candidates for admission to the School were obliged to do a year's military service before presenting themselves, but this regulation was cancelled in 1913, and for nearly one year, in 1914, there were three divisions present in the school.

On the outbreak of war in August, 1914, the cadets of the two senior divisions were drafted straight to artillery regiments and engineer companies for practical instruction, and after a few months' service were given their Commissions as second lieutenants. In November, 1914, a military hospital was established in the school, and no competitive examinations were held till 1916, when a course was started for candidates who had not reached military age, and for convalescent wounded belonging to the divisions whose studies had been cut short by the outbreak of war.

In 1919 the School was reopened, but only for admission of the hundreds of young artillery and engineer officers who had received direct Commissions during the war, as well as for those students whose compulsory military duties had prevented their competing for entry in the normal manner.

In 1921, the competitive examination and two years' course were finally reconstituted.

Of the pupils who passed through the *Polytechnique*, between 1914 and 1918, more than 200 were killed, and of the great military leaders, the School can claim three in the persons of Marshals Joffre, Foch and Fayolle.

Present Organization and Administration

At the head of the institution to-day is a General who is assisted by a Colonel, second-in-command, four or five Captains and some twelve warrant officers. The rest of the Staff, including the Chief Instructor, who is nearly as important as the General Commanding, are civilians. Only three hours per week are allowed for military training, including lectures and drill, riding, physical training and games, the whole of the rest of the week, except Sunday and Wednesday afternoon, being devoted to scientific, engineering, technical and mathematical subjects required for the following professions : —

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Military.	*Civil.*
Artillery.	Public Works.
Engineers.	Mining Engineers.
Aviation.	Electrical Engineers.
Tanks.	Civil Engineers.
Ordnance (Explosive and Petr. Section).	Woods and Forests.
Navy (executive).	Surveying.
Naval Ordnance Supply Corps.	Posts and Telegraphs.
Naval Hydrographic Section.	
Naval Construction Branch.	
Naval Ordnance Branch.	
Infantry.	

To enter the *Polytechnique* a pupil must now be between the ages of 18 and 22, and the course is of two years' duration. To prepare for the competitive entrance examination two or three years of very strenuous cramming in a civil *lycée* are usually required, although cases do occur where exceptionally brilliant boys have passed in after one year's study ; on the other hand, candidates who have been kept back by illness or other reasons, sometimes require four years' preparatory instruction. If a candidate is over twenty years of age, he is only accepted on condition that he binds himself to enter the permanent military Service of the country, thus becoming automatically barred from the more highly paid Civil Service and commercial appointments open to students of the *Polytechnique*. Preparatory classes for the *Polytechnique* exist in all the big *lycées* in Paris, and in the majority of the larger *lycées* in the provinces, but the *Lycée de St. Louis*, in the *Boulevard Pasteur*, has a *Polytechnique* class of over 300, and is regarded as the principal preparatory school for the Government Services, both military and civil. Each *Polytechnique* term or " promotion," as it is called in France, consists of 225 boys, and there are usually 7 candidates for every vacancy. The School year is divided into two periods, at the end of which there are examinations, written and oral. Any student failing to obtain fifty per cent. of marks in these bi-annual examinations is liable to be put back a year or removed, but the number under this last category is very small, the average being one per promotion.

For purposes of instruction, classes of from five to ten pupils are formed, but the whole promotion is assembled for certain courses of lectures.

The general lines of the education are governed by the syllabi

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of the Schools of Application into which the pupils pass on leaving the *Polytechnique*, and the subjects include: analysis, geometry, mechanics, physics, chemistry, astronomy, geography, architecture, drawing, history, literature, political and social economy, modern languages, and the theory of military tactics and strategy.

The entrance examination is considered to be on a par with that of the *École Normale*, the hardest in France.

On the place taken by the pupil in the passing out examination depends his future career, for the first sixty-five in order of merit have the choice of taking up well-paid appointments in the civil branches of the Government Services which are much sought after. Of the remaining one hundred and sixty, some sixty usually elect to enter private or commercial engineering firms, thus relinquishing any claim to subsequent Government employment. The residue, usually between a hundred and a hundred and twenty, take Commissions in the Army.

Since the war there has been no limit to the number of Commissions granted in any particular arm of the Service, but there are usually more applications for Commissions in the artillery than in the engineers or allied services. Every student passing out of the *Polytechnique* receives a Commission, either Regular or Reserve, it being obligatory for all *Polytechnicians* adopting civil careers to take Commissions in the Reserve of Officers; it follows, therefore, that every student leaving the *Polytechnique* goes to one or other of the Schools of Application for a course of military training in the arm of the Service selected. The schools of application are: (*a*) for the artillery—Fontainebleu; and (*b*) for all other arms—Versailles.

The courses at the *Écoles d'Application* for Regular officers are of two years' duration, but Reserve officers only do a one year's course, included in which are several months with a unit.

From the preceding paragraphs it will be seen that an average student has seven years' training to fit him for a Commission in the artillery or engineers: from the age of sixteen to nineteen, he undergoes a preparation course at a *lycée*; from nineteen to twenty-one he is at the *Polytechnique*; and from twenty-one to twenty-three he studies at an *École d'Application*.

Twenty years ago it was said of the *Polytechnique* that it was a close and very conservative corporation producing bespectacled scientists and mathematicians who could only think in equations, and who were anything but practical men; but, judging by recent results, these charges can no longer be maintained. Not only has the School turned out hundreds of brilliant officers including

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Marshals Joffre and Foch, but it can also claim to have produced many of the best-known professors, chemists, electrical engineers, iron masters, constructors, astronomers, statesmen, diplomats, doctors, artists and authors of the day.

The Polytechnique Association

Polytechnicians, past and present, as well as cadets in preparatory *lycées*, all belong to an Association, the object of which is the protection, advancement and succour, if in financial need, of all *Polytechnicians*.

Sources of Supply

Every year, between 900 and 1,000 candidates compete for admission to *St. Cyr*, 300 being admitted, and of this number some 150 are the sons of officers. For the *Polytechnique* the competition is much greater, and of the 225 successful candidates less than 40 are usually found to come from military families, the larger proportion being the sons of lawyers and other professional men. At *St. Cyr* in 1925, the son of a hall porter, of a warrant officer and of a *gendarme* were included amongst the successful candidates, whilst at the *Polytechnique* in the same year, there were found to be four boys whose fathers were described as peasants.

Expense

At the *Polytechnique* seventy-five per cent. of the annual cost of upkeep is paid by the State, the remaining twenty-five per cent. being defrayed by the parents of those boys who have not been successful in obtaining a bursary for the whole or part of the board and clothing expenses amounting to 6,800 francs per annum. No fee is charged for actual instructions at the *Polytechnique*. The system of bursaries is as follows :—

On successfully passing the written portion of the examination the candidate for the *Polytechnique* (or *St. Cyr*) has the right to apply for financial assistance during his two years at his military school, the application being addressed to the mayor of the district from which he comes. The mayor, assisted by the *Conseil d'arrondisement*, considers the application and forwards it, recommended or otherwise, to the Minister of War, who rarely interferes with the recommendation submitted. The application is then passed to the Council of the Military School in question, which makes the final

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recommendation regarding the amount of the bursary to be allotted. The considerations influencing the decisions of the various bodies above mentioned are the services to the State rendered by the father and the financial position of the family.

At *St. Cyr* eighty per cent. of the students apply for full bursaries, the applications of some ten per cent. only suffering a reduction. At the *Polytechnique* seventy-five per cent. of the pupils receive full bursaries.

A Comparison

To compare the two Schools is almost impossible because of the great differences that exist. At *St. Cyr* the student is steeped in military tradition and discipline; at the *Polytechnique* his chief object in life is the acquisition of scientific knowledge, and, to do this, he is left largely to his own devices. At *St. Cyr* the life is physically a hard one intended to fit future officers for the rigours of campaigning. At the *Polytechnique* the pupils' muscles are, if anything, not exercised enough, and it is on the mental training of the cadets that the whole of the energies of the staff are centred.

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MODERN PROBLEMS OF GUERILLA WARFARE

By Major B. C. Dening, M.C., R.E.

At the present time the prospects of great wars are somewhat remote. The British Empire, however, which controls the destinies of many incorporated nationalities, must at all times be prepared for outbreaks of violence of the type known as guerilla warfare, and a study of the problems of this form of warfare as they stand to-day is not without interest.

Before proceeding to the particular difficulties to which guerilla warfare gives birth, it is desirable to draw the distinction which exists between this and other methods of fighting. Guerilla warfare is not easy to define. It has been variously described as " partisan " warfare, " rebellion " and " small war," but these terms are confusing. A guerilla war is only truly such when the guerillas, or men of the lesser adversary, are never permanently formed into organized bodies, but who concentrate for particular operations and disperse equally rapidly on the completion of those operations. This is certainly the chief characteristic of guerilla warfare. The question of whether or not the guerillas wear a recognized uniform is not decisive in establishing the nature of the warfare. Generally speaking, it may be assumed that uniform will not be worn by guerillas, at any rate when not pursuing active operations, for otherwise their detection and annihilation would be inevitable.

There is undoubtedly a tendency to confuse guerilla wars with " small wars." It may be taken as an axiom that as soon as guerillas form into permanently organized bodies, the war becomes a " small war," and that until they do so, it does not. Thus, the Boer War started as a " small war " and ended as a guerilla war, whereas the recent French campaigns in Morocco and Syria have been more in the nature of " small " than guerilla wars even if the organization of the native-formed bodies has been a somewhat loose one. On the other hand, the fighting in Ireland in 1919–1921 bore all the marks of guerilla warfare pure and simple.

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In studying the guerilla wars of the past, it is remarkable how little the characteristics of this type of fighting have altered with the passage of time. Thus the cause of such warfare has inevitably been an actual or imaginary suppression of the national aspirations of a smaller race by the force of a larger one. Such wars have always been carried out with the utmost ferocity on both sides. Tactics have varied only in detail from century to century. Mobility, good intelligence, surprise and cunning, and the nature of the country have continued to play their part time after time. What is more—far more so than has been possible in the case of greater wars—with the facts of history available, it has been feasible nearly always to forecast the inevitable result of guerilla wars. This latter fact being so, it is remarkable how often one side has embarked on the struggle, knowing well what its end was likely to be. While discussing this aspect of the question, it is interesting to go back over the principal guerilla wars of comparatively modern history and to note the results of these struggles and how such results were obtained.

The ten principal guerilla wars which have taken place since 1792 are summarized in the table at the end of this article. In five of them, the victory rested with the Great Power, though in two of them only after a most protracted struggle. In two cases the result was indecisive, and in the remaining three the guerilla forces were victorious. If the causes which led to these results are examined, it is abundantly clear that where the Great Power had the means and the will to exert itself, where it employed the right tactics, unless outside intervention entered as a factor, it invariably won, and that only where the reverse was the case could the guerillas hope to win.

Where outside factors, such as the remoteness, or other entanglements, of the Great Power have come in to balance the scales, at least temporarily, in a guerilla struggle, the decision has rested to some extent upon the tactics employed by the combatants.

For the Great Power, it has been sound tactics in all cases to employ strong mobile columns. In confined territories these have worked in conjunction with fixed lines intended progressively to envelope the disaffected areas. These methods were employed by Hoche in La Vendée in 1796, and by Kitchener in South Africa in 1901–1902. In more extensive or very inaccessible territories, such as Algiers and the Caucasus, successive envelopment of the whole country has been impracticable and results have taken longer to achieve. In such cases it has been necessary to wait for the

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guerillas to provide an objective and then to strike with the nearest mobile column.

For the guerillas, the right tactics have consisted in concentrating for the attack of suitable objectives and dispersing immediately afterwards in order not to give the regular forces an objective. Where guerillas have so often failed is in not adhering to this primary principle. Success in minor actions has led them to believe themselves capable of fighting large battles, and attempts to do so have usually proved disastrous to themselves. This was the case in Spain in 1811. Again in the Caucasus, the Circassians, in the latter part of their long struggle, made the fatal mistake of acquiring artillery and attempting to fight as permanently formed bodies.

It is now for consideration whether the problems of guerilla warfare have changed, and, if so, whether the principles which have been applied to their solution in the long past still hold good to-day.

It is certain that the conditions in which guerilla warfare is likely to be fought to-day have altered. To begin with, with modern methods of communication and publicity, combined with the progress which has been recorded in the civilization of most of the Great Powers, it is inconceivable that the forces of the Great Power will be able to display that ferocity in their conduct of the struggle, whatever the guerillas may do, which has been such a potent ally in the past in the task of putting down an insurrection. The methods of the Great Power will of necessity, if not by inclination, have to be cleaner and more above board than was the case in bygone years. Otherwise such an outcry would arise as would be certain to bring about either the fall of the Government responsible or the intervention of an interested outside Power. This change is definitely a loss to Great Powers and a gain to the fomenters of guerilla troubles, for by barbarous acts guerillas can possibly compel the forces of the Great Power into reprisals and thereby weaken the case of the Great Power. Guerillas have in fact, to-day, a new weapon, political propaganda, which draws blood upon the home front of the Great Power.

Further, methods by the guerillas of conducting warfare have advanced. In former days, the object of the guerilla was to incapacitate, permanently, as many of the soldiers of the Great Power as was possible, hoping that the accumulation of pin-pricks would cause the Great Power to give way. To-day the policy of pin-pricks continues, but the nature of the prick has changed. Guerillas

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aim, where possible (and to-day every Great Power, except perhaps the U.S.A., is sensitive where expenditure is concerned), at draining the financial rather than the military resources of the Great Power. This method may be said to have been started with the Cuban insurrection of 1895, where the guerillas, realizing that Spain was very greatly dependent upon the revenue obtained from their island, concentrated their strategy and tactics upon the destruction of the chief crop of the island, the sugar crop. In this objective the guerillas were successful, and it is on record that Spain had given way to them before the threat of American intervention became real. This same object underlay the majority of de Wet's exploits in South Africa where the burning of trains, bridges and supplies was a feature of the later guerilla operations. In Ireland in 1921 the Republicans were pursuing the same ends and instructions to that effect were issued to their forces and were being carried out up to the time of the truce, as the burning of the Customs House, the main Army M.T. workshops and other Government property in Dublin at the time testify. This new line of attack may well again be a source of weakness to Great Powers, where vulnerable and valuable property is readily accessible to the civil population, for it is impossible to abandon such property and face the losses that may be entailed, and at the same time their protection ties up in guards incalculable numbers of troops or police.

In addition, the invention of bombs, automatic pistols and high explosive mines as effective weapons of attack has increased the difficulties of stopping guerilla warfare, particularly in large centres of population. These weapons are readily concealed on the person in a crowd or in endless hiding places in a city. They lend themselves to the first principle of guerilla fighting, the rapid concentration of armed force for an operation, combined with its equally rapid dispersion upon the completion of the task.

Against these advantages which guerillas now have, Great Powers have also certain advantages compared to former days. The advent of mechanical transport has added greatly to the mobility of troops in most countries, though in Ireland it was shown what could be done to reduce this mobility by systematic road cutting and destruction. The invention of wireless enables news to travel very quickly, and in future will greatly facilitate the rapid concentric advance of scattered columns when an objective has been located. The increased fire-power of small arms also enables small detachments to be more effective than was formerly the case.

On the whole, however, it must be admitted that by modern

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developments, guerilla forces have gained more than the forces of Great Powers. This being so, it behoves Great Powers to have a clear doctrine as to the action required if and when a guerilla trouble breaks out.

Obviously the first and most effective remedy to be sought by the Great Power is the removal of the main causes of grievance upon which the insurrection relies for sustenance. Unfortunately, however, it is not always possible for the Great Power to meet the desires of the local movement without in some way imperilling the existence of the Great Power. In such a case, the sooner the Great Power explains its position quite clearly and firmly defines the policy, to which it must adhere, the better for all concerned. A vacillating and weak policy is responsible for much of the trouble experienced by Great Powers in their dependencies.

When it is once decided that only force will meet the case, a definite military programme is essential. To begin with, the legal status of the Army employed requires to be defined. A form of semi-military, semi-civil control, as prevailed in Southern Ireland in 1920–1921, is quite hopeless so far as a solution of the military problem is concerned. Initially, the position of the military is that of a reserve to be used in aid to civil power. As soon as disturbances increase, however, it is essential that as early as possible the problem of the Army be simplified by the declaration of martial law. Until then the G.O.C. is hampered beyond belief and unable to undertake systematic operations.

The second step is to decide on the course of military action suitable to the theatre in which the outbreak is taking place. The disaffection may occur in one of four definite types of country:— (*a*) in a limited country, *i.e.* a country bounded by impassable features such as the sea or high mountains, and more or less generally traversable, such as Ireland or Cuba; (*b*) in a country of vast extent, which is more or less traversable, such as North Africa or South Africa; (*c*) in a country which is not generally traversable, such as the Tyrol or Malabar; or (*d*) in a thickly populated country with large cities, such as Dublin or Cairo.

Whatever the type of country, it is certain that a sound policy will be to assume the offensive at every opportunity and to employ numerous sufficiently strong and extremely mobile columns, controlled by wireless, and equipped with mechanical transport. In this connection, it is well to note the necessity for appreciating at an early stage the magnitude of the task and for supplying the necessary forces. The historical examples give proof that where

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there has been a neglect to supply a superiority of force, failure by the Great Power has followed inevitably.

In addition to the adoption of all means for increasing the mobility of the regular forces, measures should be taken to reduce that of the guerillas. In South Africa it has been stated that the resistance of the Boers might have been greatly shortened by the seizure of all horses. In Ireland a restriction was placed upon the movement of all motor vehicles, and an extension of these restrictions to bicycles would certainly have affected the mobility of the republicans.

Intelligence is, if possible, more important in this class of warfare than in any other. It is usually faced with great difficulties in that the population is often bitterly hostile and terrorized into the bargain. Military forces are, to begin with, largely dependent upon police intelligence, but this source of information should invariably be supplemented by the institution of a military Intelligence service.

Taking in turn the four kinds of country in which operations may be necessary, it is clear that in (*a*), a limited country, the work of Hoche in Brittany, and to some extent that of Kitchener in the Orange Free State, point to the desirability of a system of successive envelopment of the country. This procedure entails the use of a large number of men, with possibly miles of wire entanglements and block-houses, but, where feasible, this is probably the cheapest policy in the end. Successive belts, as combed out, require close policing. A system, under police supervision, of registering and providing with identity cards all able-bodied males left behind the advancing line, greatly facilitates subsequent control. All males of questionable character would be of course detained and interned. In (*b*), a country of vast extent, the above procedure may be practicable over limited and important portions, which have first to be enclosed by natural or artificial obstacles. Generally, however, only by means of a prolonged campaign, conducted by mobile columns of great efficiency against any objectives that offer, will guerilla warfare in such a theatre be brought to an end. A fair example of this is the history of the French campaign against Abd-el-Kader between 1830–1845. In (*c*), a country not generally traversable, the difficulties of the Great Power are less in that, although the guerillas have many impenetrable hiding places into which to disperse, the guerillas themselves are forced on to the limited communications in order to operate and to live and are in consequence more easily encountered. The short work

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which the French and Bavarians made of the Tyrolese in their restricted territory in 1809 is a classic example of the action possible in this type of country.

A thickly populated city offers to soldiers perhaps the most difficult problem of all. Here the guerillas have opportunities to make propaganda, to destroy property and to deliver attacks with great ease. The task of the Army becomes essentially a police task. It consists mainly of picking out from the thousands the few really dangerous opponents. The problem more than ever becomes one of good Intelligence. The troops must avoid fights in the streets wherever possible, for such entail damage mainly to harmless civilians. Military action is principally required in the direction of raids upon suspected localities. Raids upon the proper places will lead to captures which will point the way to further points to be raided. Such raids, however, to be successful, require, as the history of events in Ireland show, to be planned with great skill and carried out by highly trained bodies of men.

Throughout the operations, in any type of country, it has constantly to be borne in mind that the eventual object of the employment of force is to bring about a peaceful and happy condition of affairs in the country concerned. Consequently, military measures in particular require to be most carefully thought out, in order not only to be effective, but also not to leave behind upon the inhabitants impressions which cannot be readily eradicated. Hoche, who, of all the successful leaders of Government troops employed in the past upon the suppression of guerilla fighting, was probably the most successful, throughout his operations based his orders upon the necessity of pacifying as well as of subduing the people of Brittany.

In conclusion, it is safe to say that the principles upon which guerilla warfare should be conducted, whether by the one side or the other, are the same to-day as ever. The problems to which this form of fighting now gives rise are, however, different and up-to-date methods for dealing with them are necessary. From the point of view of a Great Power, military attention requires to be concentrated upon the necessity for :—

(i) the early provision of adequate forces; (ii) the early declaration of martial law; (iii) the organization of Intelligence; (iv) the employment of methods suitable to the theatre; and (v) the eventual pacification of the country.

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TABLE SHOWING RESULTS OF CHIEF GUERRILLA WARS, 1792 TO 1926.

Date.	Principal guerilla leader.	Theatre.	Great Power	Guerilla nationality.	Approx. duration.	Result.	Causes of result.
1792	Charette	La Vendée, Brittany	French Republic	French Royalists	4 years	Victory of Great Power	Enclosure of affected area ; progressive envelopment of whole country by strong posts and patrols, diplomatic measures.
1809	Hofer	Tyrol	France and Bavaria	Tyrolese	1 year	Victory of Great Power	Superiority of force, limited possibilities of escape for guerillas, *i.e.* nature of country.
1810	Bolivar	Venezuela	Spain	Venezuelans	9 years	Victory of Guerillas	Eventual exhaustion of Great Power. Extraneous support for guerillas in men and money.
1811	Juan Martin	Spain	France	Spaniards	2 years	Indecisive	Guerillas at first successful ; later merged into Spanish Army and less effective.
1830	Abd-el-Kader	Algeria	France	Arabs	15 years	Victory of Great Power	Employment of strong mobile columns.
1830	Schamyl	Caucasus	Russia	Circassians	29 years	Victory of Great Power	Superiority of force, guerillas finally employed artillery and offered objectives to attack.
1848	Garibaldi	Italy	France and Austria	Italians	12 years	Victory of Guerillas	Weak effort by Great Powers.
1895	Several	Cuba	Spain	Cubans	2 years	Victory of Guerillas	Weak effort by Great Power, threat of American intervention, lack of initiative of troops of Great Power.
1900	de Wet	South Africa	British Empire	Boer	2 years	Victory of Great Power	Superiority of force, use of block-house system, "drives," mobile columns, collection of cattle and supplies.
1919	Collins	Ireland	Great Britain	Celtic Irish	2 years	Indecisive	Lack of troops ; lack of military powers.

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"THE EMPIRE AT WAR" *

THIS volume, which concludes the series, worthily maintains the high standard of its predecessors, and is perhaps of even greater interest owing to the variety of its subject-matter. Naturally the part played by India provides the chief interest. About half the volume is devoted to India's effort. Sir Francis Younghusband, who is responsible for this part of the work, tells a straightforward story lucidly and impartially. His narrative of military operations, being based largely upon official documents, may be regarded as at least semi-official. The reader may feel assured of the accuracy of the events recorded, though he will doubtless note for himself various instances of official reticence. With the general conclusions few will be found to disagree. Sir Francis insists upon two points, first, that the administrative breakdown in Mesopotamia, which led to the fall of Kut, was ultimately due to the fact that the Indian Army was called upon to perform a task for which that Army had never been intended, viz. to carry on oversea operations on a large scale; second, that if the force actually raised by India was but a very small proportion of her population, yet she was able at the very outset of the war to take her share of Great Britain's burden, and, whilst the contingents of the Dominions were still training for the contest, India had sent an army corps to take its place in the front line in France and Flanders, and a division from India was making history in Mesopotamia, and Indian troops were mainly responsible for the protection of the Suez Canal and the Uganda railway.

It was not, however, till General Monro became C.-in-C. in the autumn of 1916 that the expansion of the Indian Army really began. For the first two years the Government had been content with making good the heavy casualties on the Western Front, in the Dardanelles, and East Africa, and enabling General Maude to start upon his victorious campaign "with his Indian battalions well up to strength." "At the end of 1916 India had not got on active service very much more than the equivalent of the Indian Expeditionary Forces put into the field at the end of 1914." General Monro promptly started a new recruiting system on a territorial basis in place of raising men from the regular military classes. A Central Recruiting Board was

* *The Empire at War.* Vol. V. Edited by Sir Charles Lucas, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press, 1926. 25s. net.

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established, the terms of military service modified, the scale of pay and pensions raised. In 1917 nearly as many recruits were raised as had enlisted during the two preceding years, and whereas during the earlier period only eight new battalions had been enrolled, by the end of 1917 the number of additional battalions had risen to over fifty. When in the spring of 1918 Imperial resources were taxed to the utmost, India nobly responded to the call for help. Between March and May another fifty battalions were raised, and this made possible the " Indianization " of the greater part of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Palestine. Of General Allenby's five infantry divisions four were " Indianized," being placed on an establishment of nine Indian to three British battalions, and three of the four divisions received an extra Indian battalion of pioneers. Two mounted divisions also were reconstituted, their brigades each containing one yeomanry and two Indian units. Thus 50,000 infantry troops were released for service on the Western Front and " a third of the cavalry and nearly two-thirds of the infantry under General Allenby's command belonged to the Indian Army."

The proportion of Indian troops in the final stages of the Palestine campaign was equal to, if not slightly larger than that in Mesopotamia. But in the latter theatre of war, for four long years the brunt of the work was borne by the Indian Army ; " three-quarters of the combatants " and most of the imported labour were supplied from India. Nearly a hundred Indian battalions were serving there at one time and another and " almost as many cavalry units as served in France or Palestine."

The East African campaign laid a further tax upon Indian resources. In August, 1914, 2,000 men were sent from India, just in time to save Mombasa and the railway. In October 6,000 followed and made the unsuccessful attack upon Tanga. When General Smuts took over the command, the Indian troops were organized into two brigades, and this formation was continued until von Lettow had been chased into Portuguese territory. Heavy drafts were required to keep these brigades up to fighting strength. For the climate was very unfavourable to men from the Indian frontier and " the sick rate of the Indian troops proved very high." In all over 30 fighting Indian units served in East Africa and " almost the whole of the transport and supplies for the British force " came from India.

Indian troops were serving in nearly every theatre of war. One battalion fought in the Cameroons, Cox's 29th Brigade won great distinction in Gallipoli, a Sikh battalion took a prominent part in the Senussi campaign, another half-battalion of Sikhs participated in the

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capture of Tsingtao, twelve battalions were sent to Salonika to replace British troops, who had been hurried to France, and though they did not arrive till after Bulgaria's surrender, as part of " the Army of the Black Sea " they marched to Constantinople and the Caucasus; a considerable Indian force was engaged in Persia, and a battalion of Ghurkas accompanied General Dunsterville to the Caspian.

The military operations in Egypt, the Sinaitic Peninsula and Palestine are told twice over in this volume, by Sir Francis Younghusband and by Lieut.-Colonel Rhys Jenkins. The two narratives serve to supplement each other, being written from different angles. The soldier's account " gives the first hand impressions of an eye-witness with special reference to topography." This topographical reference gives a special interest to his account of the fighting on and near the Canal, and of the advance to the borders of Palestine. He is chiefly concerned with the doings of the Australian and New Zealand mounted troops, and his eighty pages of narrative form an important contribution to the volume.

The internal conditions in Egypt and India before and after the war are admirably treated. In one of the most interesting chapters of the book the Editor depicts the political state of Egypt, showing how even before Lord Cromer's departure Nationalist feeling was on the increase and the demand for self-government was growing. He emphasizes the extraordinary international complications, which arose in regard to Egypt on the outbreak of war. Egypt was nominally under Turkish suzerainty, Turkey for the first three months nominally neutral, whilst the nominal ruler was absent from the country and intriguing with Britain's open and secret enemies. The presence of British troops in Egypt and the vital need of safeguarding the Canal compelled the British Government to sweep aside the fiction of Egyptian neutrality and to treat the country as already a part of the British Empire. " The country was for two days neutral both in theory and in fact, then neutral in theory, belligerent in fact, then openly belligerent against the Suzerain Power, but with the absent ruler on the side of the Suzerain Power and not yet deposed." On the 2nd of November, when war with Turkey had become inevitable, General Maxwell had assumed military control of the country and established martial law. But his next proclamation that " Great Britain takes upon herself the sole burden of the present war without calling upon the Egyptian people for aid therein " is called by Sir Charles Lucas " a rash promise." In the earlier stages of the war a genuine attempt was made to keep it. The native Egyptian force was mainly employed in the Sudan

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and only some small units of artillery and engineers participated in the defence of the Canal. But when General Murray started his offensive campaign against the Turks, Egypt found herself " drawn more and more into the main stream of the war." Egyptian troops were required to guard the ever-growing lines of communication: they were employed " to some extent in frontier fighting," and increasing demands upon Egypt were made " in the provision of human labour and of transport animals." As the demand increased a recruiting establishment was set up and Upper Egypt became the main recruiting area. At the beginning of 1916 the Egyptian Labour Corps was 3,000 strong; in 1918, 135,000 natives were being employed with the Expeditionary Force on six months' contracts. To raise the recruits demanded, the native officials in the country districts resorted at times to indirect pressure which savoured of compulsion. A like element of compulsion crept into the collections for the Red Cross, in itself a symbol not likely to appeal to a Moslem population. Another grievance with the fellaheen was the loss of their camels and donkeys. Egypt was drained of transport animals. The owners had disposed of them at a good price, but frequently found themselves repurchasing them after the war at a higher price. These and like grievances enabled the restless elements, which during the war had been driven underground, to come to the surface again, and the cry for " self-determination " grew into a national demand. The years since the war have been in Egypt years of crisis and danger. The British Protectorate has gone: the Sultan has become a King, but the problem of the reconciliation of Egyptian national independence with British strategical necessities still awaits solution.

In India the elements of disaffection had in the half-dozen years before the war been steadily growing more clamorous and violent. Sir Francis Younghusband carefully analyses the causes of unrest, one of the chief of which was the Japanese victory over Russia. Sedition had gone to such lengths that to the German onlooker, visitor or resident, it must have seemed a certainty " that if Great Britain were at war with Germany the Indians would eagerly seize the golden opportunity to throw off for ever the hated British yoke." But it was the unexpected which happened. India rallied almost as one man to Britain's side. The Native Princes were loyal to the core. The voice of educated India expressed itself in the resolution of the Legislative Council not only to give military assistance to the utmost of her power, but also to share the financial burden of the war. The decision to send Indian troops to the Western Front, for

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which the Indian Government had pressed, thrilled the fighting races, and, though the earlier enthusiasm was soon chilled owing to various causes, India maintained her forces in the field without having to resort to conscription.

The unity of purpose manifested by India came as a surprise "even to those who knew her best," and Sir Francis explains "this remarkable circumstance" as due first to the fact that the Indian is "much more easily influenced for good than for evil" and was convinced that he was fighting in a righteous cause, secondly to the affectionate disposition, which made India quick to respond to the affection which Britain feels for her; that that affection existed, however much disguised, India was convinced, because "she had seen it in our sovereigns and had rightly taken our sovereigns as representing the heart of Great Britain."

Again the unexpected happened. After the war unrest was more widely spread than before, and British prestige was lower. For this change of feeling Sir Francis finds four principal causes. The war was fought for freedom and against foreign domination. Why had its victorious issue failed to secure for India the boon which Britain had gained? The Irish and still more, because it was successful, the Russian, revolution made a deep impression on the Indian mind. The reduction of the Caliph of Islam "to the position of a petty ruler in Asia Minor" aroused agitation and resentment among the Indian Moslems. "Lastly was the cry of self-determination."

As to India's future, Sir Francis inclines to an optimistic view, hoping that the grant of self-government by successive stages will preserve India within the Empire, and that the Crown will prove an indissoluble link between the two; "only the smallest whisper is heard asking for separation from the Monarchy."

Space is found to describe the war effort of the Mediterranean Colonies, Aden, Ceylon, Malaya and the British possessions in China. Most of these chapters come from the Editor's pen, which has lost none of its old skill and charm. A fitting tribute is paid to the magnificent effort of Malaya. A description of the Cocos Islands affords an opportunity for telling the story of the *Emden's* destruction, and of the amazing odyssey of the German party left behind on Direction Island, which succeeded after many adventures in reaching Constantinople. Mr. C. T. Atkinson supplies an extremely interesting chapter on Aden, describing the little-known military operations in that Protectorate.

This series now concluded constitutes a fitting memorial to the great Empire, whose mighty effort in the Great War it has recounted.

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EXPERIENCES OF A BRITISH COMMISSARIAT OFFICER IN THE PENINSULAR WAR *

PART II

BY H. A. DALLAS

DURING the winter of 1812–1813 Wellington gradually extended his Army towards the north-west, and when active operations were resumed in the spring his left flank rested on the sea at Aveiro, fifty miles south of Oporto.

"When, therefore, the army took the field," as Dallas relates, "it marched direct along the length of Spain, having greatly outflanked the French forces which had been spread in the centre and rest of that country. The result was that the enemy were under the necessity of retreating to a point beyond that at which they were outflanked and in consequence Wellington having swept all the southern portion of Spain of the intruders, never came in contact with them until far to the north of the Ebro . . . and he utterly broke their powers at Vittoria on the 21st of June."

In the course of their march the regiments to which Dallas was attached had to cross the river Elsa, which had become swollen and very turbulent owing to recent rains. There was a ford near the British camp and this was the only way by which the force could rejoin the main body of the Army. The men waded in valiantly, most of them having to swim part of the way, and many, including Dallas himself, were carried down the stream for a considerable distance. But despite the difficulty of the crossing the troops were in high spirits.

"It is hardly possible to give any notion of the exhilarating feeling of an army full of hope and revelling in the expectation of great triumphs. . . . None of the officers ever supposed that the French army would let us pass the great river Ebro and many wagers were laid that they would make their stand there. It can easily be imagined, therefore, the joyous delight with which we found that great stream undefended, open, and free; and when we actually crossed it the rejoicing was at its climax."

* Part I. of this article appeared in the *Army Quarterly*, October, 1926.

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The French made a definite stand at Vittoria, and Dallas gives a vivid description of the charge of the 16th and 12th Light Dragoons (under Colonel Ponsonby), to which he was attached. Being a commissariat officer, there was no reason for him to be in the engagement, but, as he said, " Having sat with the officers all day, and partaken of all their anxieties, it never occurred to me to leave them then." His personal friend, Thelusson, was cut down at his side " by a cuirassier on a high Flemish horse, who with his bright shako and high red plume above it, seemed a very Goliath. . . . "

" All the armies of the French had been drawn together round Joseph Buonaparte, whom his brother had made King of Spain. Every division on these armies had ransacked Spain as they went through it, and one of the reasons why they could not make a stand before, was the immense number of baggage waggons laden with the plunder which they had robbed from churches and forced from authorities. Almost every field officer had a waggon of his own, and the General officers were specially encumbered. This vast camp of treasure had been spread over the country on the other side of Vittoria, and after the battle a great deal of it was seized and plundered by the Allies' army, and sentries were placed over some of the waggons to protect them in the names of their officers. As Lloyd and I rode out of Vittoria we came to this camp in less than a mile. . . . While we paused to look at this strange sight, there was a shout from a number of persons who were gathered in the midst of the waggons, and we presently found that the men had discovered in the crowd a waggon that had never been opened. . . . We found some men using all possible force to break open three strong iron clamps, which were secured by large padlocks."

When the wagon was at last broken open, it was found to be filled with Church plate, bags of money and loose coins. On the top of this treasure lay a mahogany box about eighteen inches by two feet. It was very heavy and under it was a large book. Dallas told the men to take this box to a shed and find out what was inside. It contained a great quantity of gold coins. One of the men, an ordnance store-keeper, suggested that there was no use in counting shares, and that the best way would be to give round a handful of the coins to each. He came first to Dallas and poured a double handful of gold into his vacant holster.* There seems to have been nothing unusual in this appropriation of treasure by the finders, and it certainly could not have been restored to its lawful owners. Nevertheless, when the man came back to Dallas with another

* With a brother officer of the 16th Dragoons, Dallas counted out the gold coins which had been poured into his holster, and found they amounted to nearly £400. He immediately sent £250 to his father, who at that time was in straitened circumstances, and with the remainder he bought two more horses.

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smaller handful of gold, the latter did not accept it, but suggested that the book might be given to him as the remainder of his share of the find. By a very remarkable coincidence this book proved to belong to General Villatte, who commanded the French forces opposite to the Isla de Leon in the siege of Cadiz. It contained his private maps and interesting details concerning the siege, every battery and every defensive position being correctly shown and the General's plans for dealing with them being set out. Dallas sent the book as a present to General Graham who commanded the defence " as a token of gratitude for his kindness to me. . . . The offering was fully appreciated and very kindly received."

There is an interesting sequel to the finding of the wagons and cases of booty left behind by the French after the battle of Vittoria. One of these wagons was labelled " Le Lieutenant-Generale Villatte." When Napoleon escaped from Elba and the British Armies again took the field, Alexander Dallas was appointed Assistant Commissary-General in charge of the 3rd Division which was under the command of Lieut.-General Charles Victor Alten. When our victorious troops marched into Paris after the battle of Waterloo the headquarters of this Division was at Passy. An officer of the Quartermaster-General's department told Dallas that he regretted to inform him that the billet assigned to him was both the worst and the best in the place. It was a handsome château on the borders of the Seine, but entirely devoid of all furniture. When Dallas arrived in this house he found that it belonged to Lieut.-General Villatte. A servant was in charge and Dallas told him to show him all the house—every room was bare. At the end of a long gallery on the upper storey there were steps leading to attics under the roof. The servant suggested that there was no need to go any higher, but Dallas insisted on mounting the steps and came upon a locked door at the top. He ordered the servant to open this door, but the man replied that he had not got the key. The record continues :

" I told him that I had the key with me, for that my boot was strong enough to break down the panels ; upon which he fumbled among his bunch of keys and finding the right one admitted me to the *atelier*. The spare windows of the roof were closed with wooden shutters ; the opening of one, however, was enough to expose to view all the furniture of the house, that had been safely lodged in this hiding place. I ordered the servant to follow me into the rooms that I chose to occupy, and to bring down all the furniture that was necessary to make that suite of apartments comfortable. I then charged him with a message to his master, who was in Paris, giving myself a sounding title likely to suit the French

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ear. He was to say that the *Ordonateur en Chef de la troisième Dévision de l'Armée anglaise* was billetted upon his house; that I had been present during his siege of Cadiz, and also at his defeat in the battle of Vittoria; that I was well acquainted with his manner of taking quarters in his march through Spain; and that, without following his example, I only required that he should have a suite of apartments properly furnished for me, for which I gave him three days; during which he would find me at the Hôtel des Etrangers in the Rue Vivienne. On the following day a card was left at the hotel bearing the name of Lieut.-General Villatte. On the day after an officer called on me, bringing me a most polite message from General Villatte, assuring me that everything should be done for my comfort, and that the porter had orders to serve and obey me in all things. I accordingly took possession of my capital quarters at Passy."

After the battle of Vittoria Sir Robert Kennedy, the Commissioner-General, placed Dallas in charge of the whole brigade, two regiments of cavalry and the horse artillery; this was of course a token of appreciation of his past services, but it involved greater responsibility and greater labour, and Dallas states that he often tired out four horses in one day's work.

The day before the battle of Vittoria, King Joseph had sent off a convoy of treasure along the great military road that led by Irun into France round the base of the Pyrenees. It was decided that an attempt should be made to intercept this convoy before it got out of Spain, but, in view of the start which the French had obtained, this could only be done by traversing a pass over the mountains which no military force had ever before attempted.

"On the very height of it," writes Dallas, "there was a natural tunnel nearly half a mile long, by which the highest rock was pierced. This tunnel in the pass of San Adrian divided the provinces of Alava and Guipuzcoa. It was at once determined that the cavalry should find their way over this pass with a certain number of light infantry, all under the command of Sir Thomas Graham. It was hardly possible to conceive a more interesting march than this. We set forth in high spirits, and presently found the track very uneven, and therefore very uncomfortable, but we mounted onwards in good hearts. In some of the way there were little precipitate descents, and when upon these occasions anybody dismounted a laugh arose, and at last it became a feeling that nobody would ever dismount. This produced a great deal of fun, and a great deal of daring. I have seen horses slide down a few yards of a sharp angle on their haunches and a tumble was the occasion of a great shout. After a while we got up into the clouds, which wetted us through with rain which was going to fall below; and when we got above them in the bright shining of the sun, we could trace the rain which was deluging the valleys. When we came near the town of Villa Franca, our feelings were greatly excited by seeing the rear of the convoy passing along the road as fast as they could, and the French troops which guarded it bringing

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on the map reconnaissance areas, and to differentiate between areas covered by various flights. This can be done by using coloured crayons and marking the routes of the reconnaissance (if for movement along roads), or the area (if a close reconnaissance), by short bold strokes and shading a thickness on to these strokes to make them stand out from the other detail on the map. The diagram below shows on the right roads that are being watched for movement by " A " Flight, and on the left an area over which a close reconnaissance machine from " B " Flight is working. Different colours should be used for the work of different flights.




FIG. 4.—Marking reconnaissance areas.

The map now shows the outlines of the picture. To make these outlines clear and to help others who may have to study the map

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as it progresses, it is well to have a "key." The maker of the map will in this way be spared a constant flow of questions from the sundry and curious.

The key should be set out on a piece of foolscap and then pinned on to a piece of cardboard in some conspicuous place. On it should be marked any necessary details. By adding coloured pins the particulars the map is to give are effectively shown. *See* Fig. 5.



KEY.
DIV · H.Q. = White headed pin with flag
BDE. H.Q's = Flagged pin with number of Bde:
RECCE. AREAS.
1 INF. BDE: = (Green crayon) "A" FLIGHT
2 INF. BDE: = (Brown crayon)
3 BN: R.T.C. = (Yellow crayon) "B" FLIGHT.
ENEMY INF: = (Black pin) OWN INF: = (Red pin)
" CAV: = (Yellow pin) " CAV: = (Green pin)
" GUNS = (Brown pin) GUNS = (Pink pin)

FIG. 5.—Map key.

Recording Information.—It is now presumed that the Intelligence officer has prepared his map, interviewed the pilots who are to carry out reconnaissances and is ready to deal with any information that may come to hand. Presently reports come streaming in.

"0707 hours 20 enemy cavalry moving West at V.5727.
0708 hours 300 enemy infantry moving North at W.5226.

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0710 hours 500 enemy infantry moving North head W.7665 tail W.7464.
0712 hours 4 enemy guns in action Downford, W.2556."

and so on throughout the hours of daylight, or until the action is finished.

The Intelligence officer wants to get a picture of what all this means. How can he best do so? He cannot carry all these items in his head. If he merely records them in tabular form, they are still not very constructive, when, at the end of the day, he wishes to summarize his ideas for the benefit of the General Staff.

It becomes apparent that he must mark up on his map the information he receives. He must do this quickly and legibly. It must be in some form that is easily recognizable and that will not escape attention. Also, it must be remembered that whatever form the record takes it must show, at once, the following details :—

(*a*) time ;
(*b*) numbers ;
(*c*) hostile or " own " troops ;
(*d*) what arm ; whether cavalry, infantry, guns, etc. ; and
(*e*) direction of movement, or halted.

(The date is naturally that of the day on which the work is done. Information that requires to be left on the situation map for the next day is dated when the Intelligence officer makes up his evening summary.)

It is suggested that this can be done as follows :—


For example, the message timed 0707 hours, " 20 cavalry moving West at V.5727." All that the Intelligence officer has to do is to take a pin of the colour allotted to the enemy's cavalry (let this be yellow) and fix it in the reference point given. Immediately to the right of this he marks in with his blue pencil (as he is dealing with the enemy's troops it is advisable to use this colour, and red pencil for " own " troops, *vide* plate XVIII of " The Manual of Map Reading and Field Sketching 1921 ") the time and number seen, separating the two by a line which should be arrow-tipped to show the direction of movement. His record then will appear as shown :




The next message, referring to 300 infantry seen at 0708 hours

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going North at W.5226, is merely recorded in the same way, by fixing the reference point with a coloured pin (say black) and adding the other information as here shown :



The third message deals with what the R.A.F. pilots are taught is a " large " body of infantry (viz. above 400). In addition to giving the numbers, they will, therefore, give the head and tail of the column. This has to be shown, so the record would be



the butt of the line being on the reference point given for the tail.

This column may be encountered later in the day, say at 1500 hours, halted, facing west, with its head at R.5556, tail at R.5755. This additional information must be shown: namely, that the column is halted, also the way which it is facing. It is suggested that this can be done as follows :




It is not necessary to labour this subject. It becomes obvious that the last message given above, regarding the four hostile guns in action near Downford at W.2556, which are firing in a westerly direction, would merely be shown as follows :



with, say, the " V " mark at the end of the stroke to show that the trails are down.

If the battery was on the move north, they would be shown as



Other arms of the enemy can of course be dealt with as above, by having various colours allotted to them.

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As the R.A.F. are taught only to send down actually what they see in numbers, and not by squadrons or batteries, or battalions, or companies, there is no need to have separate tokens for the different formations. One colour is sufficient for infantry, another for cavalry, and so on. This makes the work much easier.

The system outlined above is simple. Explanation on paper perhaps tends to make it appear slightly complicated. In actual practice this will be found not to be the case.

General.—It is advisable for a Branch Intelligence officer to have his situation map spread on a good flat surface. An ordinary deal table, or board of fairly soft wood is suitable. If procurable a cork surface, such as a good bath mat, is best, as it grips the pins.

For a Brigade Intelligence officer the top of an ordinary tea chest, sawn across the middle, has its advantages. It is strong and can be hinged by fastening with drawing pins an old linen-backed map to the two pieces. It will then take a spread of map covering approximately twelve by twenty miles, and can be folded up and placed in a haversack when the officer moves from place to place. This is a great advantage as an Intelligence officer often has to work in the open, and in the rain. If all the pins are firmly fixed, it will be found that, even at the end of a brisk canter, they will have remained in place in the three-ply wood.

After two or three days, depending of course on the amount of information with which an officer has been called upon to deal, it will probably be necessary to take a new map into use. The old one will be too crowded with detail. Should the officer not have a good supply of maps, tracing paper can be used over his original map. His information can be marked up on this. The position of tracing paper can be kept constant by marking in setting rays, such as the cross lines of two of the large squares of the map.

It is probably best to write information as it comes to hand on the tracing paper without using pins, keeping these for the situation map when working out the evening summary.

The point may here be raised as to why use coloured pins at all. The answer is obvious. Anything raised from a flat surface can be readily identified : anything which tends to make the situation plain is to the good.

It will be found that there is time to set up maps even in mobile warfare. A staff must sit down to fight.

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FRENCH MILITARY EDUCATION AT THE *POLYTECHNIQUE*

By Major R. L. Sherbrooke, D.S.O., Assistant Military Attaché, Paris

After the late war it was suggested that the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, should be enlarged and reorganized so as to enable it to take a certain number of boys who although receiving the same education as the candidates for Commissions in the R.A. and R.E., would ultimately take up civil employment under the Government such as mining and civil engineering, woods and forests, etc. The protagonists of this idea probably had in mind the French scheme of training for future officers of the artillery and engineer services, but excellent as it may appear to be at first sight, the *Polytechnique* system has certain limitations from the British point of view.

History of the École Polytechnique

"*Pour la Patrie, Les Sciences et La Gloire*"

After the Revolution, the Convention, in 1794, passed a law authorizing the institution of a Central Training School for the technical and engineering services, to be known as the *École Centrale des Travaux Publics*. In the new school were collected the pupils of the Engineering College of Mezières, the *École des Mines*, the *École des Ponts et Chaussées*, and all candidates for any form of civil engineering.

The *École Centrale des Travaux Publics* was established in the stables, coach-houses and orangeries of the Palais Bourbon, with the special object of training candidates for the Military Engineering Services and Public Works, as well as geographers, mining engineers and naval constructors. This School was opened on the 21st of December, 1794, and the pupils, who were all day boarders, received pay as soldiers and wore the uniform of the National Guard.

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The following year the Directory changed the name to that of the *École Polytechnique*, authorized the inclusion of candidates for Commissions in the artillery, and appointed a certain General Deshautchamps to be one of the Military Directors. In 1804 Napoleon reorganized the College by giving it a military status and régime, ordered the parents of the pupils to pay for the education, and caused its principal *raison d'être* to be the production of officers for the artillery and the engineers as opposed to St. Cyr, to which place he transferred the existing military schools for officers of the cavalry and infantry.

On the site of the present school buildings, some of which date from 1738, there originally stood the religious colleges of Navarre, Boncourt and Tournay, and it was not until 1805, eleven years after its inception by the Convention, that the *École Polytechnique* was transferred from its first home in the Palais Bourbon to the existing group of buildings between the *rue des Cartes* and the *rue Monge*, and which, situated in the heart of the Latin Quarter, a stone's throw from the pantheon, resembles a small university, where the students sleep in dormitories, wear uniform, and are subject to a mild form of military discipline.

The first Director was Lamblardie, who was assisted by many celebrated savants, amongst whom were Lagrange, Prony, Monge, Fourcroy, Vauquelin and Chaptal. By another law, passed in 1799, the number of pupils was raised from 250 to 300, 150 per division; the age limit for entry was fixed at 16 to 20 years of age, and the course was made one of two years' duration. From 1798 onwards Napoleon began to take considerable interest in the School, and on the 26th of July, 1804, caused a law of reorganization to be passed by which the 300 pupils were formed into a regular military corps, although their pay as soldiers was stopped. Under the new regulation the students formed the *Polytechnique Battalion*, commanded by infantry officers, and the first military Commandant of the School was appointed in the person of General Lacuee with Colonel Gay de Vernon as second-in-command and Chief Instructor.

An instructors for the *École Polytechnique*, Napoleon accepted only the greatest savants of the day, and this tradition has been continued, for amongst the list of professors for the year 1926 are the names of many of the best known scientists and mathematicians.

A history of the *Polytechnique*, however short, would not be complete without mention of the part played in the defence of the country in 1814 by the three artillery companies of the *Garde*

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Nationale formed by the cadets of the school. These three companies, with their 28 guns drawn by post-horses, took part in the battle of Paris on the 30th of March, incurred many casualties and earned the thanks of the Government. This access of military glory was, however, short-lived, for in 1816, as a punishment for a collective act of insubordination, the School was deprived of its military status, and was placed under the Ministry of the Interior. Further, the pupils were forbidden to wear uniform, and a civilian was appointed to be Chief Instructor and Assistant Commandant. This civil administration proved unsatisfactory, and in 1822, after further acts of insubordination, the Government reconstituted the military régime under a Military Governor, assisted by a staff of five serving officers for disciplinary purposes, and the cadets were once more put into uniform.

Unlike their fellow students at *St. Cyr*, where politics have always been studiously avoided, the pupils of the *Polytechnique* appear to have had a liking for political agitation, and in the Revolution of 1830 assisted in the storming of the Babylon Barracks, losing one of their number in the process.

As a result of this manifestation, the School was placed under the Ministry for War; the Civil Governor was replaced by a General Bertrand as Commandant, and the pupils were formed into four companies, commanded by captains of the artillery and engineers.

In the riots of 1848, the students of the *Polytechnique* were on the side of the authorities and helped the Provisional Government to restore order in Paris. Twelve years later, at the outbreak of the Franco-German War, the pupils and instructors formed a battery of siege artillery, but most of the second-year students were eventually drafted to Regular batteries and engineer companies, with the rank of "auxiliary second lieutenant." The School battery with its *personnel* of professors, former pupils and young boys remained in existence for over a year and played an honourable part in the defence of Paris.

Before the investment of the city was completed, the first-year pupils had been evacuated to Bordeaux, whence they were recalled in 1871 to help the Government to quell the revolution which broke out on the 18th of March, but when it was seen that this insurrection could not at once be checked, the *personnel* of the School was moved *en bloc* to Tours, where it remained until the end of October, 1871.

With the reorganization of the French Army which followed

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the war of 1870, it was found necessary to admit a greater number of candidates for the artillery and engineer services, and in 1872 283 pupils were received as against 140 in the preceding year. The School buildings were at the same time enlarged and improved so as to accommodate a total number of 500 cadets.

From 1906 to 1912, candidates for admission to the School were obliged to do a year's military service before presenting themselves, but this regulation was cancelled in 1913, and for nearly one year, in 1914, there were three divisions present in the school.

On the outbreak of war in August, 1914, the cadets of the two senior divisions were drafted straight to artillery regiments and engineer companies for practical instruction, and after a few months' service were given their Commissions as second lieutenants. In November, 1914, a military hospital was established in the school, and no competitive examinations were held till 1916, when a course was started for candidates who had not reached military age, and for convalescent wounded belonging to the divisions whose studies had been cut short by the outbreak of war.

In 1919 the School was reopened, but only for admission of the hundreds of young artillery and engineer officers who had received direct Commissions during the war, as well as for those students whose compulsory military duties had prevented their competing for entry in the normal manner.

In 1921, the competitive examination and two years' course were finally reconstituted.

Of the pupils who passed through the *Polytechnique*, between 1914 and 1918, more than 200 were killed, and of the great military leaders, the School can claim three in the persons of Marshals Joffre, Foch and Fayolle.

Present Organization and Administration

At the head of the institution to-day is a General who is assisted by a Colonel, second-in-command, four or five Captains and some twelve warrant officers. The rest of the Staff, including the Chief Instructor, who is nearly as important as the General Commanding, are civilians. Only three hours per week are allowed for military training, including lectures and drill, riding, physical training and games, the whole of the rest of the week, except Sunday and Wednesday afternoon, being devoted to scientific, engineering, technical and mathematical subjects required for the following professions : —

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Military.	*Civil.*
Artillery.	Public Works.
Engineers.	Mining Engineers.
Aviation.	Electrical Engineers.
Tanks.	Civil Engineers.
Ordnance (Explosive and Petr. Section).	Woods and Forests.
Navy (executive).	Surveying.
Naval Ordnance Supply Corps.	Posts and Telegraphs.
Naval Hydrographic Section.	
Naval Construction Branch.	
Naval Ordnance Branch.	
Infantry.	

To enter the *Polytechnique* a pupil must now be between the ages of 18 and 22, and the course is of two years' duration. To prepare for the competitive entrance examination two or three years of very strenuous cramming in a civil *lycée* are usually required, although cases do occur where exceptionally brilliant boys have passed in after one year's study ; on the other hand, candidates who have been kept back by illness or other reasons, sometimes require four years' preparatory instruction. If a candidate is over twenty years of age, he is only accepted on condition that he binds himself to enter the permanent military Service of the country, thus becoming automatically barred from the more highly paid Civil Service and commercial appointments open to students of the *Polytechnique*. Preparatory classes for the *Polytechnique* exist in all the big *lycées* in Paris, and in the majority of the larger *lycées* in the provinces, but the *Lycée de St. Louis*, in the *Boulevard Pasteur*, has a *Polytechnique* class of over 300, and is regarded as the principal preparatory school for the Government Services, both military and civil. Each *Polytechnique* term or " promotion," as it is called in France, consists of 225 boys, and there are usually 7 candidates for every vacancy. The School year is divided into two periods, at the end of which there are examinations, written and oral. Any student failing to obtain fifty per cent. of marks in these bi-annual examinations is liable to be put back a year or removed, but the number under this last category is very small, the average being one per promotion.

For purposes of instruction, classes of from five to ten pupils are formed, but the whole promotion is assembled for certain courses of lectures.

The general lines of the education are governed by the syllabi

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of the Schools of Application into which the pupils pass on leaving the *Polytechnique*, and the subjects include: analysis, geometry, mechanics, physics, chemistry, astronomy, geography, architecture, drawing, history, literature, political and social economy, modern languages, and the theory of military tactics and strategy.

The entrance examination is considered to be on a par with that of the *École Normale*, the hardest in France.

On the place taken by the pupil in the passing out examination depends his future career, for the first sixty-five in order of merit have the choice of taking up well-paid appointments in the civil branches of the Government Services which are much sought after. Of the remaining one hundred and sixty, some sixty usually elect to enter private or commercial engineering firms, thus relinquishing any claim to subsequent Government employment. The residue, usually between a hundred and a hundred and twenty, take Commissions in the Army.

Since the war there has been no limit to the number of Commissions granted in any particular arm of the Service, but there are usually more applications for Commissions in the artillery than in the engineers or allied services. Every student passing out of the *Polytechnique* receives a Commission, either Regular or Reserve, it being obligatory for all *Polytechnicians* adopting civil careers to take Commissions in the Reserve of Officers; it follows, therefore, that every student leaving the *Polytechnique* goes to one or other of the Schools of Application for a course of military training in the arm of the Service selected. The schools of application are: (*a*) for the artillery—Fontainebleu; and (*b*) for all other arms—Versailles.

The courses at the *Écoles d'Application* for Regular officers are of two years' duration, but Reserve officers only do a one year's course, included in which are several months with a unit.

From the preceding paragraphs it will be seen that an average student has seven years' training to fit him for a Commission in the artillery or engineers: from the age of sixteen to nineteen, he undergoes a preparation course at a *lycée*; from nineteen to twenty-one he is at the *Polytechnique*; and from twenty-one to twenty-three he studies at an *École d'Application*.

Twenty years ago it was said of the *Polytechnique* that it was a close and very conservative corporation producing bespectacled scientists and mathematicians who could only think in equations, and who were anything but practical men; but, judging by recent results, these charges can no longer be maintained. Not only has the School turned out hundreds of brilliant officers including

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Marshals Joffre and Foch, but it can also claim to have produced many of the best-known professors, chemists, electrical engineers, iron masters, constructors, astronomers, statesmen, diplomats, doctors, artists and authors of the day.

The Polytechnique Association

Polytechnicians, past and present, as well as cadets in preparatory *lycées*, all belong to an Association, the object of which is the protection, advancement and succour, if in financial need, of all *Polytechnicians*.

Sources of Supply

Every year, between 900 and 1,000 candidates compete for admission to *St. Cyr*, 300 being admitted, and of this number some 150 are the sons of officers. For the *Polytechnique* the competition is much greater, and of the 225 successful candidates less than 40 are usually found to come from military families, the larger proportion being the sons of lawyers and other professional men. At *St. Cyr* in 1925, the son of a hall porter, of a warrant officer and of a *gendarme* were included amongst the successful candidates, whilst at the *Polytechnique* in the same year, there were found to be four boys whose fathers were described as peasants.

Expense

At the *Polytechnique* seventy-five per cent. of the annual cost of upkeep is paid by the State, the remaining twenty-five per cent. being defrayed by the parents of those boys who have not been successful in obtaining a bursary for the whole or part of the board and clothing expenses amounting to 6,800 francs per annum. No fee is charged for actual instructions at the *Polytechnique*. The system of bursaries is as follows :—

On successfully passing the written portion of the examination the candidate for the *Polytechnique* (or *St. Cyr*) has the right to apply for financial assistance during his two years at his military school, the application being addressed to the mayor of the district from which he comes. The mayor, assisted by the *Conseil d'arrondisement*, considers the application and forwards it, recommended or otherwise, to the Minister of War, who rarely interferes with the recommendation submitted. The application is then passed to the Council of the Military School in question, which makes the final

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recommendation regarding the amount of the bursary to be allotted. The considerations influencing the decisions of the various bodies above mentioned are the services to the State rendered by the father and the financial position of the family.

At *St. Cyr* eighty per cent. of the students apply for full bursaries, the applications of some ten per cent. only suffering a reduction. At the *Polytechnique* seventy-five per cent. of the pupils receive full bursaries.

A Comparison

To compare the two Schools is almost impossible because of the great differences that exist. At *St. Cyr* the student is steeped in military tradition and discipline; at the *Polytechnique* his chief object in life is the acquisition of scientific knowledge, and, to do this, he is left largely to his own devices. At *St. Cyr* the life is physically a hard one intended to fit future officers for the rigours of campaigning. At the *Polytechnique* the pupils' muscles are, if anything, not exercised enough, and it is on the mental training of the cadets that the whole of the energies of the staff are centred.

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MODERN PROBLEMS OF GUERILLA WARFARE

By Major B. C. Dening, M.C., R.E.

At the present time the prospects of great wars are somewhat remote. The British Empire, however, which controls the destinies of many incorporated nationalities, must at all times be prepared for outbreaks of violence of the type known as guerilla warfare, and a study of the problems of this form of warfare as they stand to-day is not without interest.

Before proceeding to the particular difficulties to which guerilla warfare gives birth, it is desirable to draw the distinction which exists between this and other methods of fighting. Guerilla warfare is not easy to define. It has been variously described as " partisan " warfare, " rebellion " and " small war," but these terms are confusing. A guerilla war is only truly such when the guerillas, or men of the lesser adversary, are never permanently formed into organized bodies, but who concentrate for particular operations and disperse equally rapidly on the completion of those operations. This is certainly the chief characteristic of guerilla warfare. The question of whether or not the guerillas wear a recognized uniform is not decisive in establishing the nature of the warfare. Generally speaking, it may be assumed that uniform will not be worn by guerillas, at any rate when not pursuing active operations, for otherwise their detection and annihilation would be inevitable.

There is undoubtedly a tendency to confuse guerilla wars with " small wars." It may be taken as an axiom that as soon as guerillas form into permanently organized bodies, the war becomes a " small war," and that until they do so, it does not. Thus, the Boer War started as a " small war " and ended as a guerilla war, whereas the recent French campaigns in Morocco and Syria have been more in the nature of " small " than guerilla wars even if the organization of the native-formed bodies has been a somewhat loose one. On the other hand, the fighting in Ireland in 1919–1921 bore all the marks of guerilla warfare pure and simple.

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In studying the guerilla wars of the past, it is remarkable how little the characteristics of this type of fighting have altered with the passage of time. Thus the cause of such warfare has inevitably been an actual or imaginary suppression of the national aspirations of a smaller race by the force of a larger one. Such wars have always been carried out with the utmost ferocity on both sides. Tactics have varied only in detail from century to century. Mobility, good intelligence, surprise and cunning, and the nature of the country have continued to play their part time after time. What is more—far more so than has been possible in the case of greater wars—with the facts of history available, it has been feasible nearly always to forecast the inevitable result of guerilla wars. This latter fact being so, it is remarkable how often one side has embarked on the struggle, knowing well what its end was likely to be. While discussing this aspect of the question, it is interesting to go back over the principal guerilla wars of comparatively modern history and to note the results of these struggles and how such results were obtained.

The ten principal guerilla wars which have taken place since 1792 are summarized in the table at the end of this article. In five of them, the victory rested with the Great Power, though in two of them only after a most protracted struggle. In two cases the result was indecisive, and in the remaining three the guerilla forces were victorious. If the causes which led to these results are examined, it is abundantly clear that where the Great Power had the means and the will to exert itself, where it employed the right tactics, unless outside intervention entered as a factor, it invariably won, and that only where the reverse was the case could the guerillas hope to win.

Where outside factors, such as the remoteness, or other entanglements, of the Great Power have come in to balance the scales, at least temporarily, in a guerilla struggle, the decision has rested to some extent upon the tactics employed by the combatants.

For the Great Power, it has been sound tactics in all cases to employ strong mobile columns. In confined territories these have worked in conjunction with fixed lines intended progressively to envelope the disaffected areas. These methods were employed by Hoche in La Vendée in 1796, and by Kitchener in South Africa in 1901–1902. In more extensive or very inaccessible territories, such as Algiers and the Caucasus, successive envelopment of the whole country has been impracticable and results have taken longer to achieve. In such cases it has been necessary to wait for the

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guerillas to provide an objective and then to strike with the nearest mobile column.

For the guerillas, the right tactics have consisted in concentrating for the attack of suitable objectives and dispersing immediately afterwards in order not to give the regular forces an objective. Where guerillas have so often failed is in not adhering to this primary principle. Success in minor actions has led them to believe themselves capable of fighting large battles, and attempts to do so have usually proved disastrous to themselves. This was the case in Spain in 1811. Again in the Caucasus, the Circassians, in the latter part of their long struggle, made the fatal mistake of acquiring artillery and attempting to fight as permanently formed bodies.

It is now for consideration whether the problems of guerilla warfare have changed, and, if so, whether the principles which have been applied to their solution in the long past still hold good to-day.

It is certain that the conditions in which guerilla warfare is likely to be fought to-day have altered. To begin with, with modern methods of communication and publicity, combined with the progress which has been recorded in the civilization of most of the Great Powers, it is inconceivable that the forces of the Great Power will be able to display that ferocity in their conduct of the struggle, whatever the guerillas may do, which has been such a potent ally in the past in the task of putting down an insurrection. The methods of the Great Power will of necessity, if not by inclination, have to be cleaner and more above board than was the case in bygone years. Otherwise such an outcry would arise as would be certain to bring about either the fall of the Government responsible or the intervention of an interested outside Power. This change is definitely a loss to Great Powers and a gain to the fomenters of guerilla troubles, for by barbarous acts guerillas can possibly compel the forces of the Great Power into reprisals and thereby weaken the case of the Great Power. Guerillas have in fact, to-day, a new weapon, political propaganda, which draws blood upon the home front of the Great Power.

Further, methods by the guerillas of conducting warfare have advanced. In former days, the object of the guerilla was to incapacitate, permanently, as many of the soldiers of the Great Power as was possible, hoping that the accumulation of pin-pricks would cause the Great Power to give way. To-day the policy of pin-pricks continues, but the nature of the prick has changed. Guerillas

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aim, where possible (and to-day every Great Power, except perhaps the U.S.A., is sensitive where expenditure is concerned), at draining the financial rather than the military resources of the Great Power. This method may be said to have been started with the Cuban insurrection of 1895, where the guerillas, realizing that Spain was very greatly dependent upon the revenue obtained from their island, concentrated their strategy and tactics upon the destruction of the chief crop of the island, the sugar crop. In this objective the guerillas were successful, and it is on record that Spain had given way to them before the threat of American intervention became real. This same object underlay the majority of de Wet's exploits in South Africa where the burning of trains, bridges and supplies was a feature of the later guerilla operations. In Ireland in 1921 the Republicans were pursuing the same ends and instructions to that effect were issued to their forces and were being carried out up to the time of the truce, as the burning of the Customs House, the main Army M.T. workshops and other Government property in Dublin at the time testify. This new line of attack may well again be a source of weakness to Great Powers, where vulnerable and valuable property is readily accessible to the civil population, for it is impossible to abandon such property and face the losses that may be entailed, and at the same time their protection ties up in guards incalculable numbers of troops or police.

In addition, the invention of bombs, automatic pistols and high explosive mines as effective weapons of attack has increased the difficulties of stopping guerilla warfare, particularly in large centres of population. These weapons are readily concealed on the person in a crowd or in endless hiding places in a city. They lend themselves to the first principle of guerilla fighting, the rapid concentration of armed force for an operation, combined with its equally rapid dispersion upon the completion of the task.

Against these advantages which guerillas now have, Great Powers have also certain advantages compared to former days. The advent of mechanical transport has added greatly to the mobility of troops in most countries, though in Ireland it was shown what could be done to reduce this mobility by systematic road cutting and destruction. The invention of wireless enables news to travel very quickly, and in future will greatly facilitate the rapid concentric advance of scattered columns when an objective has been located. The increased fire-power of small arms also enables small detachments to be more effective than was formerly the case.

On the whole, however, it must be admitted that by modern

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developments, guerilla forces have gained more than the forces of Great Powers. This being so, it behoves Great Powers to have a clear doctrine as to the action required if and when a guerilla trouble breaks out.

Obviously the first and most effective remedy to be sought by the Great Power is the removal of the main causes of grievance upon which the insurrection relies for sustenance. Unfortunately, however, it is not always possible for the Great Power to meet the desires of the local movement without in some way imperilling the existence of the Great Power. In such a case, the sooner the Great Power explains its position quite clearly and firmly defines the policy, to which it must adhere, the better for all concerned. A vacillating and weak policy is responsible for much of the trouble experienced by Great Powers in their dependencies.

When it is once decided that only force will meet the case, a definite military programme is essential. To begin with, the legal status of the Army employed requires to be defined. A form of semi-military, semi-civil control, as prevailed in Southern Ireland in 1920–1921, is quite hopeless so far as a solution of the military problem is concerned. Initially, the position of the military is that of a reserve to be used in aid to civil power. As soon as disturbances increase, however, it is essential that as early as possible the problem of the Army be simplified by the declaration of martial law. Until then the G.O.C. is hampered beyond belief and unable to undertake systematic operations.

The second step is to decide on the course of military action suitable to the theatre in which the outbreak is taking place. The disaffection may occur in one of four definite types of country:— (*a*) in a limited country, *i.e.* a country bounded by impassable features such as the sea or high mountains, and more or less generally traversable, such as Ireland or Cuba; (*b*) in a country of vast extent, which is more or less traversable, such as North Africa or South Africa; (*c*) in a country which is not generally traversable, such as the Tyrol or Malabar; or (*d*) in a thickly populated country with large cities, such as Dublin or Cairo.

Whatever the type of country, it is certain that a sound policy will be to assume the offensive at every opportunity and to employ numerous sufficiently strong and extremely mobile columns, controlled by wireless, and equipped with mechanical transport. In this connection, it is well to note the necessity for appreciating at an early stage the magnitude of the task and for supplying the necessary forces. The historical examples give proof that where

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there has been a neglect to supply a superiority of force, failure by the Great Power has followed inevitably.

In addition to the adoption of all means for increasing the mobility of the regular forces, measures should be taken to reduce that of the guerillas. In South Africa it has been stated that the resistance of the Boers might have been greatly shortened by the seizure of all horses. In Ireland a restriction was placed upon the movement of all motor vehicles, and an extension of these restrictions to bicycles would certainly have affected the mobility of the republicans.

Intelligence is, if possible, more important in this class of warfare than in any other. It is usually faced with great difficulties in that the population is often bitterly hostile and terrorized into the bargain. Military forces are, to begin with, largely dependent upon police intelligence, but this source of information should invariably be supplemented by the institution of a military Intelligence service.

Taking in turn the four kinds of country in which operations may be necessary, it is clear that in (*a*), a limited country, the work of Hoche in Brittany, and to some extent that of Kitchener in the Orange Free State, point to the desirability of a system of successive envelopment of the country. This procedure entails the use of a large number of men, with possibly miles of wire entanglements and block-houses, but, where feasible, this is probably the cheapest policy in the end. Successive belts, as combed out, require close policing. A system, under police supervision, of registering and providing with identity cards all able-bodied males left behind the advancing line, greatly facilitates subsequent control. All males of questionable character would be of course detained and interned. In (*b*), a country of vast extent, the above procedure may be practicable over limited and important portions, which have first to be enclosed by natural or artificial obstacles. Generally, however, only by means of a prolonged campaign, conducted by mobile columns of great efficiency against any objectives that offer, will guerilla warfare in such a theatre be brought to an end. A fair example of this is the history of the French campaign against Abd-el-Kader between 1830–1845. In (*c*), a country not generally traversable, the difficulties of the Great Power are less in that, although the guerillas have many impenetrable hiding places into which to disperse, the guerillas themselves are forced on to the limited communications in order to operate and to live and are in consequence more easily encountered. The short work

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which the French and Bavarians made of the Tyrolese in their restricted territory in 1809 is a classic example of the action possible in this type of country.

A thickly populated city offers to soldiers perhaps the most difficult problem of all. Here the guerillas have opportunities to make propaganda, to destroy property and to deliver attacks with great ease. The task of the Army becomes essentially a police task. It consists mainly of picking out from the thousands the few really dangerous opponents. The problem more than ever becomes one of good Intelligence. The troops must avoid fights in the streets wherever possible, for such entail damage mainly to harmless civilians. Military action is principally required in the direction of raids upon suspected localities. Raids upon the proper places will lead to captures which will point the way to further points to be raided. Such raids, however, to be successful, require, as the history of events in Ireland show, to be planned with great skill and carried out by highly trained bodies of men.

Throughout the operations, in any type of country, it has constantly to be borne in mind that the eventual object of the employment of force is to bring about a peaceful and happy condition of affairs in the country concerned. Consequently, military measures in particular require to be most carefully thought out, in order not only to be effective, but also not to leave behind upon the inhabitants impressions which cannot be readily eradicated. Hoche, who, of all the successful leaders of Government troops employed in the past upon the suppression of guerilla fighting, was probably the most successful, throughout his operations based his orders upon the necessity of pacifying as well as of subduing the people of Brittany.

In conclusion, it is safe to say that the principles upon which guerilla warfare should be conducted, whether by the one side or the other, are the same to-day as ever. The problems to which this form of fighting now gives rise are, however, different and up-to-date methods for dealing with them are necessary. From the point of view of a Great Power, military attention requires to be concentrated upon the necessity for :—

(i) the early provision of adequate forces; (ii) the early declaration of martial law; (iii) the organization of Intelligence; (iv) the employment of methods suitable to the theatre; and (v) the eventual pacification of the country.

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established, the terms of military service modified, the scale of pay and pensions raised. In 1917 nearly as many recruits were raised as had enlisted during the two preceding years, and whereas during the earlier period only eight new battalions had been enrolled, by the end of 1917 the number of additional battalions had risen to over fifty. When in the spring of 1918 Imperial resources were taxed to the utmost, India nobly responded to the call for help. Between March and May another fifty battalions were raised, and this made possible the " Indianization " of the greater part of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force in Palestine. Of General Allenby's five infantry divisions four were " Indianized," being placed on an establishment of nine Indian to three British battalions, and three of the four divisions received an extra Indian battalion of pioneers. Two mounted divisions also were reconstituted, their brigades each containing one yeomanry and two Indian units. Thus 50,000 infantry troops were released for service on the Western Front and " a third of the cavalry and nearly two-thirds of the infantry under General Allenby's command belonged to the Indian Army."

The proportion of Indian troops in the final stages of the Palestine campaign was equal to, if not slightly larger than that in Mesopotamia. But in the latter theatre of war, for four long years the brunt of the work was borne by the Indian Army ; " three-quarters of the combatants " and most of the imported labour were supplied from India. Nearly a hundred Indian battalions were serving there at one time and another and " almost as many cavalry units as served in France or Palestine."

The East African campaign laid a further tax upon Indian resources. In August, 1914, 2,000 men were sent from India, just in time to save Mombasa and the railway. In October 6,000 followed and made the unsuccessful attack upon Tanga. When General Smuts took over the command, the Indian troops were organized into two brigades, and this formation was continued until von Lettow had been chased into Portuguese territory. Heavy drafts were required to keep these brigades up to fighting strength. For the climate was very unfavourable to men from the Indian frontier and " the sick rate of the Indian troops proved very high." In all over 30 fighting Indian units served in East Africa and " almost the whole of the transport and supplies for the British force " came from India.

Indian troops were serving in nearly every theatre of war. One battalion fought in the Cameroons, Cox's 29th Brigade won great distinction in Gallipoli, a Sikh battalion took a prominent part in the Senussi campaign, another half-battalion of Sikhs participated in the

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capture of Tsingtao, twelve battalions were sent to Salonika to replace British troops, who had been hurried to France, and though they did not arrive till after Bulgaria's surrender, as part of " the Army of the Black Sea " they marched to Constantinople and the Caucasus; a considerable Indian force was engaged in Persia, and a battalion of Ghurkas accompanied General Dunsterville to the Caspian.

The military operations in Egypt, the Sinaitic Peninsula and Palestine are told twice over in this volume, by Sir Francis Younghusband and by Lieut.-Colonel Rhys Jenkins. The two narratives serve to supplement each other, being written from different angles. The soldier's account " gives the first hand impressions of an eye-witness with special reference to topography." This topographical reference gives a special interest to his account of the fighting on and near the Canal, and of the advance to the borders of Palestine. He is chiefly concerned with the doings of the Australian and New Zealand mounted troops, and his eighty pages of narrative form an important contribution to the volume.

The internal conditions in Egypt and India before and after the war are admirably treated. In one of the most interesting chapters of the book the Editor depicts the political state of Egypt, showing how even before Lord Cromer's departure Nationalist feeling was on the increase and the demand for self-government was growing. He emphasizes the extraordinary international complications, which arose in regard to Egypt on the outbreak of war. Egypt was nominally under Turkish suzerainty, Turkey for the first three months nominally neutral, whilst the nominal ruler was absent from the country and intriguing with Britain's open and secret enemies. The presence of British troops in Egypt and the vital need of safeguarding the Canal compelled the British Government to sweep aside the fiction of Egyptian neutrality and to treat the country as already a part of the British Empire. " The country was for two days neutral both in theory and in fact, then neutral in theory, belligerent in fact, then openly belligerent against the Suzerain Power, but with the absent ruler on the side of the Suzerain Power and not yet deposed." On the 2nd of November, when war with Turkey had become inevitable, General Maxwell had assumed military control of the country and established martial law. But his next proclamation that " Great Britain takes upon herself the sole burden of the present war without calling upon the Egyptian people for aid therein " is called by Sir Charles Lucas " a rash promise." In the earlier stages of the war a genuine attempt was made to keep it. The native Egyptian force was mainly employed in the Sudan

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and only some small units of artillery and engineers participated in the defence of the Canal. But when General Murray started his offensive campaign against the Turks, Egypt found herself " drawn more and more into the main stream of the war." Egyptian troops were required to guard the ever-growing lines of communication : they were employed " to some extent in frontier fighting," and increasing demands upon Egypt were made " in the provision of human labour and of transport animals." As the demand increased a recruiting establishment was set up and Upper Egypt became the main recruiting area. At the beginning of 1916 the Egyptian Labour Corps was 3,000 strong ; in 1918, 135,000 natives were being employed with the Expeditionary Force on six months' contracts. To raise the recruits demanded, the native officials in the country districts resorted at times to indirect pressure which savoured of compulsion. A like element of compulsion crept into the collections for the Red Cross, in itself a symbol not likely to appeal to a Moslem population. Another grievance with the fellaheen was the loss of their camels and donkeys. Egypt was drained of transport animals. The owners had disposed of them at a good price, but frequently found themselves repurchasing them after the war at a higher price. These and like grievances enabled the restless elements, which during the war had been driven underground, to come to the surface again, and the cry for " self-determination " grew into a national demand. The years since the war have been in Egypt years of crisis and danger. The British Protectorate has gone : the Sultan has become a King, but the problem of the reconciliation of Egyptian national independence with British strategical necessities still awaits solution.

In India the elements of disaffection had in the half-dozen years before the war been steadily growing more clamorous and violent. Sir Francis Younghusband carefully analyses the causes of unrest, one of the chief of which was the Japanese victory over Russia. Sedition had gone to such lengths that to the German onlooker, visitor or resident, it must have seemed a certainty " that if Great Britain were at war with Germany the Indians would eagerly seize the golden opportunity to throw off for ever the hated British yoke." But it was the unexpected which happened. India rallied almost as one man to Britain's side. The Native Princes were loyal to the core. The voice of educated India expressed itself in the resolution of the Legislative Council not only to give military assistance to the utmost of her power, but also to share the financial burden of the war. The decision to send Indian troops to the Western Front, for

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which the Indian Government had pressed, thrilled the fighting races, and, though the earlier enthusiasm was soon chilled owing to various causes, India maintained her forces in the field without having to resort to conscription.

The unity of purpose manifested by India came as a surprise "even to those who knew her best," and Sir Francis explains "this remarkable circumstance" as due first to the fact that the Indian is "much more easily influenced for good than for evil" and was convinced that he was fighting in a righteous cause, secondly to the affectionate disposition, which made India quick to respond to the affection which Britain feels for her; that that affection existed, however much disguised, India was convinced, because "she had seen it in our sovereigns and had rightly taken our sovereigns as representing the heart of Great Britain."

Again the unexpected happened. After the war unrest was more widely spread than before, and British prestige was lower. For this change of feeling Sir Francis finds four principal causes. The war was fought for freedom and against foreign domination. Why had its victorious issue failed to secure for India the boon which Britain had gained? The Irish and still more, because it was successful, the Russian, revolution made a deep impression on the Indian mind. The reduction of the Caliph of Islam "to the position of a petty ruler in Asia Minor" aroused agitation and resentment among the Indian Moslems. "Lastly was the cry of self-determination."

As to India's future, Sir Francis inclines to an optimistic view, hoping that the grant of self-government by successive stages will preserve India within the Empire, and that the Crown will prove an indissoluble link between the two; "only the smallest whisper is heard asking for separation from the Monarchy."

Space is found to describe the war effort of the Mediterranean Colonies, Aden, Ceylon, Malaya and the British possessions in China. Most of these chapters come from the Editor's pen, which has lost none of its old skill and charm. A fitting tribute is paid to the magnificent effort of Malaya. A description of the Cocos Islands affords an opportunity for telling the story of the *Emden's* destruction, and of the amazing odyssey of the German party left behind on Direction Island, which succeeded after many adventures in reaching Constantinople. Mr. C. T. Atkinson supplies an extremely interesting chapter on Aden, describing the little-known military operations in that Protectorate.

This series now concluded constitutes a fitting memorial to the great Empire, whose mighty effort in the Great War it has recounted.

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EXPERIENCES OF A BRITISH COMMISSARIAT OFFICER IN THE PENINSULAR WAR *

PART II

BY H. A. DALLAS

DURING the winter of 1812–1813 Wellington gradually extended his Army towards the north-west, and when active operations were resumed in the spring his left flank rested on the sea at Aveiro, fifty miles south of Oporto.

"When, therefore, the army took the field," as Dallas relates, "it marched direct along the length of Spain, having greatly outflanked the French forces which had been spread in the centre and rest of that country. The result was that the enemy were under the necessity of retreating to a point beyond that at which they were outflanked and in consequence Wellington having swept all the southern portion of Spain of the intruders, never came in contact with them until far to the north of the Ebro . . . and he utterly broke their powers at Vittoria on the 21st of June."

In the course of their march the regiments to which Dallas was attached had to cross the river Elsa, which had become swollen and very turbulent owing to recent rains. There was a ford near the British camp and this was the only way by which the force could rejoin the main body of the Army. The men waded in valiantly, most of them having to swim part of the way, and many, including Dallas himself, were carried down the stream for a considerable distance. But despite the difficulty of the crossing the troops were in high spirits.

"It is hardly possible to give any notion of the exhilarating feeling of an army full of hope and revelling in the expectation of great triumphs. . . . None of the officers ever supposed that the French army would let us pass the great river Ebro and many wagers were laid that they would make their stand there. It can easily be imagined, therefore, the joyous delight with which we found that great stream undefended, open, and free; and when we actually crossed it the rejoicing was at its climax."

* Part I. of this article appeared in the *Army Quarterly*, October, 1926.

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The French made a definite stand at Vittoria, and Dallas gives a vivid description of the charge of the 16th and 12th Light Dragoons (under Colonel Ponsonby), to which he was attached. Being a commissariat officer, there was no reason for him to be in the engagement, but, as he said, "Having sat with the officers all day, and partaken of all their anxieties, it never occurred to me to leave them then." His personal friend, Thelusson, was cut down at his side "by a cuirassier on a high Flemish horse, who with his bright shako and high red plume above it, seemed a very Goliath. . . ."

"All the armies of the French had been drawn together round Joseph Buonaparte, whom his brother had made King of Spain. Every division on these armies had ransacked Spain as they went through it, and one of the reasons why they could not make a stand before, was the immense number of baggage waggons laden with the plunder which they had robbed from churches and forced from authorities. Almost every field officer had a waggon of his own, and the General officers were specially encumbered. This vast camp of treasure had been spread over the country on the other side of Vittoria, and after the battle a great deal of it was seized and plundered by the Allies' army, and sentries were placed over some of the waggons to protect them in the names of their officers. As Lloyd and I rode out of Vittoria we came to this camp in less than a mile. . . . While we paused to look at this strange sight, there was a shout from a number of persons who were gathered in the midst of the waggons, and we presently found that the men had discovered in the crowd a waggon that had never been opened. . . . We found some men using all possible force to break open three strong iron clamps, which were secured by large padlocks."

When the wagon was at last broken open, it was found to be filled with Church plate, bags of money and loose coins. On the top of this treasure lay a mahogany box about eighteen inches by two feet. It was very heavy and under it was a large book. Dallas told the men to take this box to a shed and find out what was inside. It contained a great quantity of gold coins. One of the men, an ordnance store-keeper, suggested that there was no use in counting shares, and that the best way would be to give round a handful of the coins to each. He came first to Dallas and poured a double handful of gold into his vacant holster.* There seems to have been nothing unusual in this appropriation of treasure by the finders, and it certainly could not have been restored to its lawful owners. Nevertheless, when the man came back to Dallas with another

* With a brother officer of the 16th Dragoons, Dallas counted out the gold coins which had been poured into his holster, and found they amounted to nearly £400. He immediately sent £250 to his father, who at that time was in straitened circumstances, and with the remainder he bought two more horses.

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smaller handful of gold, the latter did not accept it, but suggested that the book might be given to him as the remainder of his share of the find. By a very remarkable coincidence this book proved to belong to General Villatte, who commanded the French forces opposite to the Isla de Leon in the siege of Cadiz. It contained his private maps and interesting details concerning the siege, every battery and every defensive position being correctly shown and the General's plans for dealing with them being set out. Dallas sent the book as a present to General Graham who commanded the defence " as a token of gratitude for his kindness to me. . . . The offering was fully appreciated and very kindly received."

There is an interesting sequel to the finding of the wagons and cases of booty left behind by the French after the battle of Vittoria. One of these wagons was labelled " Le Lieutenant-Generale Villatte." When Napoleon escaped from Elba and the British Armies again took the field, Alexander Dallas was appointed Assistant Commissary-General in charge of the 3rd Division which was under the command of Lieut.-General Charles Victor Alten. When our victorious troops marched into Paris after the battle of Waterloo the headquarters of this Division was at Passy. An officer of the Quartermaster-General's department told Dallas that he regretted to inform him that the billet assigned to him was both the worst and the best in the place. It was a handsome château on the borders of the Seine, but entirely devoid of all furniture. When Dallas arrived in this house he found that it belonged to Lieut.-General Villatte. A servant was in charge and Dallas told him to show him all the house—every room was bare. At the end of a long gallery on the upper storey there were steps leading to attics under the roof. The servant suggested that there was no need to go any higher, but Dallas insisted on mounting the steps and came upon a locked door at the top. He ordered the servant to open this door, but the man replied that he had not got the key. The record continues :

" I told him that I had the key with me, for that my boot was strong enough to break down the panels ; upon which he fumbled among his bunch of keys and finding the right one admitted me to the *atelier*. The spare windows of the roof were closed with wooden shutters ; the opening of one, however, was enough to expose to view all the furniture of the house, that had been safely lodged in this hiding place. I ordered the servant to follow me into the rooms that I chose to occupy, and to bring down all the furniture that was necessary to make that suite of apartments comfortable. I then charged him with a message to his master, who was in Paris, giving myself a sounding title likely to suit the French

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ear. He was to say that the *Ordonateur en Chef de la troisième Division de l'Armée anglaise* was billetted upon his house; that I had been present during his siege of Cadiz, and also at his defeat in the battle of Vittoria; that I was well acquainted with his manner of taking quarters in his march through Spain; and that, without following his example, I only required that he should have a suite of apartments properly furnished for me, for which I gave him three days; during which he would find me at the Hôtel des Etrangers in the Rue Vivienne. On the following day a card was left at the hotel bearing the name of Lieut.-General Villatte. On the day after an officer called on me, bringing me a most polite message from General Villatte, assuring me that everything should be done for my comfort, and that the porter had orders to serve and obey me in all things. I accordingly took possession of my capital quarters at Passy."

After the battle of Vittoria Sir Robert Kennedy, the Commissioner-General, placed Dallas in charge of the whole brigade, two regiments of cavalry and the horse artillery; this was of course a token of appreciation of his past services, but it involved greater responsibility and greater labour, and Dallas states that he often tired out four horses in one day's work.

The day before the battle of Vittoria, King Joseph had sent off a convoy of treasure along the great military road that led by Irun into France round the base of the Pyrenees. It was decided that an attempt should be made to intercept this convoy before it got out of Spain, but, in view of the start which the French had obtained, this could only be done by traversing a pass over the mountains which no military force had ever before attempted.

"On the very height of it," writes Dallas, "there was a natural tunnel nearly half a mile long, by which the highest rock was pierced. This tunnel in the pass of San Adrian divided the provinces of Alava and Guipuzcoa. It was at once determined that the cavalry should find their way over this pass with a certain number of light infantry, all under the command of Sir Thomas Graham. It was hardly possible to conceive a more interesting march than this. We set forth in high spirits, and presently found the track very uneven, and therefore very uncomfortable, but we mounted onwards in good hearts. In some of the way there were little precipitate descents, and when upon these occasions anybody dismounted a laugh arose, and at last it became a feeling that nobody would ever dismount. This produced a great deal of fun, and a great deal of daring. I have seen horses slide down a few yards of a sharp angle on their haunches and a tumble was the occasion of a great shout. After a while we got up into the clouds, which wetted us through with rain which was going to fall below; and when we got above them in the bright shining of the sun, we could trace the rain which was deluging the valleys. When we came near the town of Villa Franca, our feelings were greatly excited by seeing the rear of the convoy passing along the road as fast as they could, and the French troops which guarded it bringing

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up the rear. . . . As soon as we were seen winding down the mountain a desultory fire was set up and it became at last a complete race: but alas! the road was so arranged that although we were beside them for a considerable distance and receiving and responding to their firing, we could not reach the road until the rear of the French had gained a distance. They turned and fired just as they entered Tolosa and shut the gates against us. It was now getting dusk. A great stand was made at the gates, and a great effort was made to force them; this, however, only succeeded when the French column had got such an advance as that the rear guard was withdrawn, and the people opened the gates. As we went in, there were shouts of rejoicing. In a very few minutes candles were exhibited in every window in the main street. The people came out of their doors with jugs of wine, offering it to the men, and expressing the greatest joy that we had come to save them from the French. This battle of Tolosa, as it may be called, closed the campaign as the remnant of the enemy made good their retreat into France over the Bidasoa and destroyed the bridge, leaving only the fortified city of San Sebastian in their possession on the Spanish side."

During the investment of San Sebastian the cavalry was not required, and men and horses were quartered in the towns and large villages of the Pyrenees. The 16th Light Dragoons had the town of Usurbil allotted to them. It is situated in one of the most beautiful valleys of Northern Spain. The town is entirely surrounded by high mountains; a rapid mountain torrent, the Deva, rushes through the valley far below it, and on the opposite side of the valley rises a lofty and almost perpendicular mountain which acts as a rampart to the valley for about three-quarters of a mile. For the whole of this distance a large notch had been hewn out of the rocky wall to form a road for carts and horses; this was the only way of approach to Usurbil. The breadth of this rude road was about seven or eight feet and on this the constant passage of bullock carts had made two deep ruts. As the rock had been hewn out in a curve a tall man on a big horse had to take care of his head. There was no fence on the river side, but a parapeted bridge crossed the Deva about the centre of this path, and this took the traveller to the town. To this retreat many of the Spanish residents in San Sebastian retired when the French closed the gates and the town was besieged.

Dallas was dining with a friend at Usurbil and intended to remain the night there when the order arrived for his brigade of cavalry to move the following morning and it was thus necessary for him to return at once to his brigade.

"It was a very tempestuous night in August, rain falling in torrents, and not a ray from either moon or star—dark as possible; nothing but

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duty would have made me undertake a journey of five miles on such a night; but there was a duty to do, and therefore against the remonstrances of my friend I mounted my horse and set forth on my way. I had to walk my horse all the way, as it was extremely difficult to discern the broad road as far as it went. A well-known house which stood at the corner of the turning to the right which went to Usurbil, made me not miss that turning, but when after some short distance, I came to the enclosure of the valley and the beginning of the notch road, I confess I paused for consideration. My first thought was to dismount and lead my horse, but we had acquired a general feeling never to dismount in danger, as I have already shown when we went over the pass of San Adrian. And besides it was in fact safer to be in the saddle than to be leading a horse in such a pass on such a night, so dark—so very dark—so I kept my seat and my horse walked on the path. As I could not perceive the distinct line of the precipices on my right at the bottom of which the swollen Deva was thundering as it leaped over great masses of stone, I used my left hand to feel the course of the rock in order to keep straight, and as the natural feeling must have led me to keep my bridle rather tight on the near side, I found the horse several times slip into the rut. All this made me very cautious in my going and very slow too, so that I fancied I must have reached the well-known bridge before I actually came to it. I shut my eyes to enlarge the pupils and gazed to the right until at last I saw, or thought I saw, the bridge. Having at length convinced myself of this I urged my horse forward, but he refused to go. I thought at first that I must have been mistaken, and gazed and gazed again, but when an image is strongly impressed upon the mind, the eye discerns the same image in the dark and the more you gaze, the more you seem to see it. I became fully convinced that the bridge was immediately before me, and I made efforts to urge my horse onwards. The spur had no effect, and so I drew my sword and struck him with the flat of it on the flank. While I was in this position and beginning to get excited, suddenly the whole heavens were lighted up by a broad flash of brilliant lightning, brighter from the back ground of black clouds over which it rose. This sheet of brightness was as a scroll on which the forked lightning dashed across. . . . My horse was standing with his head quite over the precipice, his hoofs could have been but a few inches from its brink, and the same light which showed me the depth into which I was striving to leap, showed me also the bridge, some twenty yards on, over which I passed in safety to my quarters. . . . I thanked God. . . . I desire earnestly to give glory to God for His preserving mercy to me on the 15th August, 1813, in the passage of the bridge of Usurbil."

The siege of San Sebastian was the culminating episode in the war in Spain and one of the most interesting. An attempt was made to carry the place by assault. The first attempt failed; then the breach was considerably widened, and the 31st of August was fixed as the day for the second assault. There were two breaching batteries on opposite sides of the river Urumea; and from a high

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hill behind one of these batteries Dallas was able to watch the whole operation.

" It would be hard," he writes, " to describe the feelings with which I saw a Portuguese regiment ford the river, carrying their muskets over their heads amid showers of grape-shot, or those which thrilled me as our own regiments marched through the trenches and rushed from the last zigzag on to the breach. The whole of the extensive mass of rubbish which constituted the ascent of the breach was promptly covered with our troops; and after a little while instead of proceeding, we saw them all lie down upon the breach. Now the suspense and anxiety were intense."

The enemy had made a deep and broad ditch on the other side of the breach and had filled it with impediments which made it impossible to effect an entrance. At the extreme right of the breach was a passage, but the opening was defended by a small battery called a curtain. In order to silence this curtain, our guns had to fire over the heads of the troops advancing to the assault. The officer commanding the attacking battery undertook to silence the French guns, and Dallas watched the British shot in rapid succession skimming over the heads of our men only about two or three feet above them. The passage had been mined by the enemy and there was a magazine standing near the French battery; one of our shots struck this magazine, which exploded and blew up the mine underneath. This explosion caused a good many casualties among the attacking troops, but the remainder gallantly rushed the breach. It is not necessary to give details of the fight that followed before the French were completely driven out of the citadel. But they had ignited tar barrels before their withdrawal, and for seven days and nights the fires flared in the city and all the houses except seventeen were consumed.

After the British Army entered France, Dallas received further promotion and had more interesting experiences. The last narrow escape which he records was entirely due to his own rashness. When he found himself at Boulogne, within a few miles of the spot where his family were residing on the other side of the Channel, he was so eagerly impatient to see them that, although it was blowing a hurricane, he went straight to the quay to hire a fishing boat to take him across to Dover. After much persuasion he at last engaged two men, for an exorbitant sum, to run the risk of crossing the Channel. The wind though very boisterous was in their favour, and, in spite of the remonstrances of people on the quay, they started at 2 a.m. The seas washed repeatedly over the

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light fishing boat and the danger was considerable, but the party reached England in safety.

When Napoleon escaped from Elba, Dallas was again on active service; he was present at the battle of Waterloo and accompanied the Allies in the march to Paris.

In 1820 he decided to be ordained to the ministry in the Church of England, and to this work, to which he believed himself to be called, he devoted the rest of his life, carrying into it the loyalty to duty, the talent and endurance which had been so eminently displayed in his military career. He was Rector of Wonston (Hants) for forty years and died in 1869.

(*Concluded.*)

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A PRISONERS OF WAR CAMP

By J. M. MacLennan, late Captain H.L.I. and A. E. Corps

It was towards the end of 1916 that I was ordered to proceed (as Kipling remarks, one is never by any chance permitted to "go" in either Service!) as adjutant to a Prisoners of War Camp in the north of Scotland, and as few people, either in or out of the Army, knew anything of the working of these camps, it may be interesting to raise a corner of the curtain now.

The situation of the Camp in which I served was an ideal one. It lay on the crest of the spur running west from Inverness and commanded a truly magnificent view to the east, to the north, and to the west. Below us, on the other side of the silver strip of the Beauly Firth, lay the green and fertile Black Isle, while beyond lay the great Bens of Ross and Sutherland, overtopped by the massive bulk of Ben Wyvis. Behind rose the silent hills and the open spaces, "the free hill and the glooming glen," and on every side lay scattered an inexhaustible store of beauty and grandeur, what Goethe so aptly described as the living, visible garment of God. There was something in the unruffled calm of nature which made war seem a petty and childish thing and very far away.

Our Camp was a small one, a working camp of two hundred prisoners engaged in wood-cutting, a detachment of the great parent camp at Stobs, near Hawick, where there were about 5,000 of our temporary guests in residence. The Camp staff consisted of three officers, the Commandant, myself, and an interpreter, together with the sergeant-major, and two provost-sergeants who divided the work between them, one being in charge of the work in the woods, and the other being responsible for the compound. The guards were found by the Royal Defence Corps, the successors of the pre-war National Reservists, and were under the charge of one of their own officers. A good many of these men were of the Chelsea Pensioner type, and while the spirit was willing enough the flesh was woefully weak.

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With the exception of the Mess, the Camp buildings consisted of the ordinary Army huts. The prisoners, or " P/Ws " as they were usually referred to, had seven living huts, together with the usual Camp offices, kitchen, hospital, and stores, the whole surrounded by a barbed wire fence twelve feet high. Sentry boxes were built at a height of six feet above ground, and were reached by a wooden stair-way in the rear. There was one at each corner of the compound and main Guard Room with two cells at the gate. The Guard buildings were practically identical with those of the prisoners, except that they had no hospital, men of the Guard being treated, when necessary, at the military hospital in Inverness.

The Royal Engineers had laid on an excellent water supply, and lighting in the huts was supplied by oil lamps. The compound was illuminated at night by half a dozen acetylene gas flares which showed up everything almost as clearly as daylight. The Germans were rather scared at first in case their Zeppelins bombed the place under the impression that it was a factory of some sort; but they were told they could either " like it or lump it " and we heard no more complaints. Fortunately we had no visits from aircraft, although I heard later that at least two German camps in France had been bombed and several of the prisoners killed or wounded. The poetic justice of it rather appealed to me.

With the interior economy of the Guard the Camp staff had little to do, and so long as the necessary guards were found and did their work, we never interfered. In our O.C. Guard we were particularly fortunate. A cheerier, more helpful colleague it would have been hard to find.

It will probably sound strange to many to hear that with the interior working of the compound we interfered but little either, yet such was the case. Under their Camp Captain, a *feld-webel* or sergeant-major, the prisoners were responsible for everything inside their own camp, and it says much for their system that it was a very rare occurrence for the Commandant or myself to offer any criticism.

The usual day's work did not vary much. Breakfast was at 7.30 a.m., and the working parties paraded at 7.45 a.m. By 8 o'clock, or shortly afterwards, they had started work. In the woods each squad numbered six men under one of their number as foreman. Their work consisted of cutting, peeling, snedding and stacking. The work was hard, and it was easy to note the difference between some of the trained Bavarian wood-cutters and those who had not tried the work before.

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These squads were paid on a piece-work basis, and the weekly pay-sheet formed a very good barometer of the work done. According to regulations a " P/W " who is employed must be paid at the ordinary rate of working pay of the British soldier. When I arrived at the Camp I found that the prisoners were working on the third rate of one penny per hour, and I speedily came to the conclusion that the output was not what it ought to be. The Germans knew they were paid a penny every hour whether they cut two trees or twenty, so why cut more than two? It was human nature, of course, but it did not pay the country. The Commandant and I accordingly worked out a scheme of piece-work by which the men were paid so much per tree cut and so much per foot peeled and stacked. The wily German was somewhat annoyed at first, but he was given no choice in the matter. In the end, when he found that he could make considerably more money in the course of a week, he began to put his back into it, and the output grew by leaps and bounds.

Our scheme was criticized on the score of giving the Germans so much money; but personally I took the view that it was better to pay them more and get more out of them. The country wanted the wood badly, and the wood was not forthcoming under the old system. Under the new system we got a great deal more work done with far less trouble. It was quite amusing to see how rapidly the lazy man of the squad became the most unpopular man in it.

As I have said, the weekly pay-sheet was an excellent chart of the work done. The professional wood-cutters from Bavaria earned, under the new system, from three to six times what some of the other squads earned in a week. When I left the Camp the record was held by a squad of six Bavarians who had earned close on £6 in a week, or very nearly £1 per man. As against that, however, some squads could not earn what they had been getting under the old system of payment.

A sawmill was established outside the Camp, and many of the bigger trees were cut up on the spot. The men employed here were all practical sawyers, with a first-class engineer in charge of the engine-house.

To transport the wood to the station we built a light bogie railway from the farthest point of the wood down to Bunchrew, and a loading party at the station transferred the wood to the trucks as it arrived. An effort was made later to run a ropeway to Lentran, but, from what I heard, it did not appear to have been a success.

The nearer squads came in for a light meal about 1 o'clock, and

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every one ceased work at 5 p.m., when they had the chief meal of the day. Those who were working farthest from the Camp had a haversack ration with them, and so lost no time through coming in.

The ration question at this time had its amusing, as well as its serious, side. Most of us remember the tremendous newspaper campaign that went on concerning the way P/Ws were overfed and underworked, and for a time it was almost unsafe to show one's face in Inverness. How far the newspaper campaign was propaganda work I cannot say, but I do know that a great deal of it was misleading, to say the least of it. I know that I should not have cared to tackle the work the P/Ws did on the food they got. A man was allowed 9 ounces of bread (about two or three slices) and 4 ounces of hard biscuit per day; 4 ounces of meat, which included bone, three times per week, with 10 ounces of salt herring or 2 ounces of Chinese bacon on the other four days. What Chinese bacon was I never discovered, but it certainly did not look appetizing. They got an ounce of oatmeal and an ounce of cheese per day, but these could be increased to two ounces on the medical officer's recommendation. An ounce of sugar, an ounce of rice, half an ounce of margarine, quarter of an ounce of tea and the same of salt, together with a pound of potatoes, completed the scale.

Most people will be prepared to admit that there was no great danger here of overfeeding, and my batman, one of the prisoners, told me that sometimes the men who did not smoke were so hungry that they could not sleep at night.

The prisoners had their own canteen in the compound, but in the matter of food it did not help them much. All articles containing meat of any kind, sugar, jam, butter, or the like were prohibited. An exception was made in the case of horse-flesh and liver sausage, which were purchased from a firm in Glasgow, but everything else which was at all scarce was rigorously excluded. The chief sales consisted of tobacco and cigarettes.

The majority of the men got parcels, and these helped them considerably. Unfortunately it took so long on the road for the parcels to reach them (usually about five or six weeks), that much of the food was bad when it arrived. Bread, potatoes, beet sugar, and German tobacco (poisonous stuff) formed a considerable portion of the contents.

All letters and parcels were, of course, censored by the interpreter, but this task was practically a sinecure with us.

The Office staff consisted of one British clerk and two or three German assistants, all good workers and excellent English speakers.

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In fact, most of the assistance required by the staff was found by the P/Ws. The Guard had few enough men for their own duties, and it relieved matters considerably to employ P/Ws when we could. Both the Mess staff and the batmen were Germans, and I am afraid some of our visitors were very dubious about our employing a German cook. They were sure we would be poisoned some day!

I was rather interested to find how much keener the Germans were to pick up our language than our men were to learn German. The majority could make themselves understood, and many, so far as accent went, might have been taken for Scotsmen. Several carried small pocket dictionaries about with them, and hunted up each new word they heard.

There was a very laughable incident over the language question on one occasion. We had a visit from some ladies of a Prisoners' Aid Society, and one of the ladies, who seemed to pride herself on her command of German, held forth at great length to one of the P/Ws. He evidently could make little of it, and after she had repeated her remarks two or three times, he said in fluent English, "Pardon me, madam, if you will speak English, I will understand you better!" He had been a clerk in a big London office, Whiteley's I think, for several years. I am afraid I was to blame in not telling her earlier.

In Camp the routine was much the same as in barracks. The Camp Captain came over to the Orderly Room each morning at 10 o'clock for orders. All routine matters concerning P/Ws were handed over to him to be dealt with, and he returned with everything complete when the Commandant held his Orderly Room at mid-day. This was usually a matter of form, as it was seldom there were any prisoners to be dealt with. At 11 a.m. I had the ordinary barrack inspection, accompanied by both sergeant-majors, British and German. Most of the rest of the day was taken up with office work. A soldier has a fair number of forms, from his attestation form to his regimental conduct sheet, but Heaven preserve me from ever again dealing with P/W forms! Each of them had almost sufficient to paper his hut!

The P/W huts were models of neatness and cleanliness. Each hut had two orderlies, and the best men seemed to be picked for the work. Everything inside the huts was spotless. The kitchen, however, was my particular pride. Some of our regimental cookhouses are not just as clean as they might be, and the cooks are very often the dirtiest-looking sweeps in the regiment, so that the contrast

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was all the greater. Everything shone like the proverbial new pin, and the cooks were always in spotless white duck, complete even to the cap. The cooking was typically German, tasteful, well-cooked and well-served, and not a scrap was wasted.

The relations between ourselves and the prisoners were of the best. A certain amount of irritation was at times, of course, unavoidable on both sides, but matters soon came back to normal. Only twice was there an escape, and in each case it was done, not to get away, but as a means of drawing attention to a disagreement inside the compound. The men, with few exceptions—and these were speedily weeded out—were decent, kindly fellows, grateful for a kindness, and very willing to help. They were, indeed, very like the best type of our own men, and, once we had tested them, we allowed them a certain amount of freedom, more so perhaps than the strict letter of regulations laid down, but never once was our trust abused. They were more sentimental on the surface, and had a simple, childish vein that was not apparent in our men.

Some amusing stories could be told of the P/Ws and their escort, but one must suffice. I have remarked that many of the Guard were old men, and there were many for whom the work was obviously too heavy, but there was no help for it; we simply had to carry on with the men at our disposal. I had gone along to the sawmill one afternoon about the time the working parties were coming in, when I saw the station party coming up minus their escort, but with one of the Germans—rather a large, fierce-looking gentleman—carrying a rifle over his shoulder. I did not know them so well at this time, and visions of a guard having been murdered, and a subsequent attack upon the staff, flashed across my mind. I found, however, that it was merely a case of the escort being tired out, so they had wheeled the old man along in their hand-cart—where he had fallen sound asleep—and the prisoner had carried his rifle for him!

The P/Ws found their recreation in music and handwork. They were all very fine singers, and their Choral Society was well worth listening to, while it goes without saying that many were instrumentalists of no mean order, and the camp orchestra was as good as one can hear in any first-class theatre. The Camp Captain was organist in one of the big German cathedrals, and was a particularly fine pianist and violinist. I managed to arrange several concerts for the Guard during the winter, and I received a great deal of help from him. We were also much indebted to Mr. Roderick Macleod, the great Gaelic tenor, who several times brought out a concert party from Inverness for the Guard.

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They had a strong amateur theatrical society, and many of them showed high histrionic talent. Particularly fine were some of their Christmas plays, through most of which ran a strong religious vein.

All their entertainments finished up with the famous *Deutschland über Alles*, and I noticed that every man sang every verse. I could not help wondering how many of our men could sing every verse of our National Anthem ?

Quite a number of the men spent their evenings making toys and nick-nacks, which for the most part were purchased by the men of the Guard. Some of them, of course, were toy-makers in civil life, but even so their work was marvellously good. For delicate, intricate work, done not under the best conditions, I question if it could have been beaten in the most up-to-date factory. It was here that they displayed the German temperament—careful, methodical, and painstaking.

The P/Ws did not display the same love of games that our men did, although several of them were very good " Soccer " players. One corporal had played several times for Germany in international matches, and had played against both Celtic and Rangers in their Continental tours.

As regards the war, the prisoners' attitude in general was very much against it. We had, of course, none of the real Prussian " sabre-rattlers," and so a much truer appreciation of the German attitude towards the war could be arrived at. The men were quite convinced that the war was the worst thing that could have happened to Germany, and even then could see the political and commercial ruin that was looming in front of their beloved fatherland. The general impression was that, had the Kaiser and the Prussian military party had patience, Germany would have been supreme in another half-century. The result was that the Kaiser was most unpopular. Much to my surprise, the Crown Prince and Hindenburg were their popular idols. Hindenburg I could understand, but I must admit that their feelings towards the former were surprising, until I began to find that there were wheels within wheels, and that there was a side to the Crown Prince's character of which we in this country were ignorant.

Although somewhat weary of captivity—the majority were 1914 or early 1915 prisoners—they were all, with two exceptions, quite glad to be where they were. The exceptions were two youngsters, boys of the upper wealthy class who served as probationary *feldwebels* for a year before being given a Regular commission, and so becoming members of the military caste. Like a good many of

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our own youngsters, they saw only the heroic side of war, and were very sick at being out of it all The older men took the view that it was better to be a live prisoner in Scotland than a dead soldier in France.

My life there was an interesting experience, and gave me an insight into—and, I must admit, an admiration for—many things in the German character, and much that I learned stood me in good stead a year or two later when I found myself stationed on the Rhine. That our method of dealing with the prisoners was appreciated I also found out. I had the good fortune to meet the mother of one of my P/Ws when on outpost duty on the edge of the Neutral Zone, and the good lady simply " mothered " me during my stay there—a clear case of " Cast your bread upon the waters."

Before I went to the Camp I, like a great many more of my countrymen, was prejudiced against the German. But in the Camp, it was my fortune to make several good friends among the enemy, some of whom I have met, and enjoyed meeting, since hostilities ceased.

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THE CASE FOR THE 3·7 HOWITZER (SHAFT DRAFT) AS THE CLOSE SUPPORT WEAPON IN THE ARMY

By Captain J. A. H. Gammell, D.S.O., M.C., R.A.

The Need for a Close Support Weapon

Artillery in order to provide support for infantry must be supplied with: (i) information; (ii) observation; (iii) rapid and reliable communication between O.P. and gun; and (iv) sufficient immunity from hostile fire to enable (*a*) the gun to move into position, and when in position, to be served efficiently; and (*b*) an adequate supply of ammunition to be maintained.

Information and observation can be obtained by means of officers' patrols, liaison officers and F.O.Os. who can go wherever infantry can go. Telephone and visual cannot be relied upon as a means of establishing in a few minutes communication over distances greater than a few hundred yards. If guns are to be sited sufficiently far back to give them reasonable immunity from hostile fire, time must be available to organize a system of telephone and visual communication.

The necessary time for the organization of signal communications should be available in the following circumstances: (i) in carrying out the general artillery plan for a coordinated attack; (ii) in defence; and (iii) in a withdrawal.

In the writer's opinion, so long as the artillery of a division is composed entirely of 18-pdrs. and 4·5 hows., rapid and reliable communication, combined with reasonable immunity for gun and ammunition supply, cannot be secured in normal circumstances in the following types of operation:

(i) *The Period of First Contact, when the Infantry is checked by the Enemy's Advanced Troops.*—During this stage of a battle, time is the most important factor because in order to help the advance of the infantry, fire must be brought down quickly. The second important

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factor is that the artillery fire should be accurate. Area shoots from distant O.Ps. near the guns are not what is required.

Information and close observation will probably not be difficult to obtain, but time will only permit of a short line of wire, say 300 or 400 yards (flags or lamps cannot always be used), and voice control is desirable. Assuming the O.P. area to be within 300 yards of the leading infantry, this limits the possible gun positions to an area from 500 to 1,000 yards behind the leading infantry, and a range to the target which may be well under 1,000 yards.

Questions of crest clearance at once rule out the employment of the 18-pdr., unless it is to be brought into action in the open. The 4·5 how. is much more suitable, but 6-horse teams invite the enemy's artillery fire controlled by air observation, and are also very vulnerable if exposed to small arm fire through an error in battery leading.

(ii) *During all Stages of a Coordinated Attack.*—The general plan of an offensive operation will include an artillery programme for the bulk of the artillery. To supplement this general work of the artillery, infantry brigade and battalion commanders must have under their direct control some artillery to deal with definite obstacles, such as machine guns, which check the advance of the troops locally.

As in the case of first contact, to which attention has already been drawn, time and accuracy are again the vital factors to be considered. Information and observation will usually be more difficult to obtain owing to the confusion of battle, and communications and movement may be more difficult owing to the greater volume of small arm and artillery fire. There will, however, be a considerable amount of movement of troops and transport in the area of the reserve companies.

It is to be noted that in a coordinated attack the attention of the enemy's infantry will be concentrated to a considerable extent on our leading infantry, and his artillery will be chiefly concerned with counter-battery work and the movement of formed bodies of reserves. His artillery aeroplanes will not be able to deal with the movements of small parties in rear of the leading companies.

Given existing limitations of means of communication, the area in which the close support guns must be located will be similar to that given in (i) above.

(iii) *When exploiting a Successful Attack.*—In an operation of this nature the conditions will be similar to those given in (i) (first contact with the enemy).

Assuming that the problem of close artillery support cannot be

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solved, at any rate in the near future, by any new methods of communication, and leaving out for the moment the question of anti-tank defence, it is possible to deduce from the above the requirements which are essential for the close support weapon: (1) It must have high angle fire if the best use is to be made of the cover provided by the ground, and if short communications are to be possible. (2) It must be capable of being maintained within the area 500–1,000 yards in rear of the leading infantry (*i.e.*, it must be sufficiently inconspicuous to avoid observation from the air and to avoid offering a favourable target to small arm fire at effective range). (3) It must be capable of shooting at ranges as short as 500 yards. Taking only the front of the unit under the orders of which it will be working, it should have a range of 2,000 yards (*i.e.*, from 1,000 yards behind its own infantry to 1,000 yards beyond them). But the value of enfilade fire on the front of a neighbouring unit is so great that another 1,000 yards is desirable, giving a total range of 3,000 yards. (4) The ammunition with which it is to be supplied in terms of weight must be limited, but considerable material and moral effect is required and the shell burst should not be less than that of an 18-pdr. The smoke effect should be superior to that of the present 18-pdr. smoke shell. (5) In view of the small targets which will often be engaged, the limited amount of ammunition which will be available and the close proximity of the infantry to the targets, accuracy of fire is essential. The 100 per cent. zone up to 2,000 yards should not exceed 100 yards. In this connection it must be borne in mind that the effect on accuracy of small errors in laying for line, wear of equipment and variations in ammunition is far greater at long ranges than at short ones. In practice, therefore, improvements in wireless will not entirely solve the problem, since to produce close support fire as accurate as that of the present 3·7 how. at 1,000 yards, the 100 per cent. zones of the present 18-pdr. and 4·5 equipments would have to be reduced by at least 50 per cent.

It is now necessary to consider how far the 3·7 how. fulfils the above requirements.

It is a high angle weapon with five charges; it is a good smoke-producing weapon; it has the necessary standard of accuracy; and its range and shell-power are above the minimum standard required. The question as to how far it is immune from hostile fire is one which its critics can only answer according to their experience gained in the last war and their anticipations as to the conditions of the next.

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The introduction of shaft draft has reduced the minimum number of men and animals (exclusive of battery staff) required to bring a 3·7 how. into action with 24 rounds of ammunition, from 21 men and 11 animals to 10 men and 4 animals.

If it is agreed that the zone in which the close support weapon will work will normally be 500–1,000 yards behind the leading infantry, it would seem that a howitzer drawn by a single mule, or two mules in tandem, 30 rounds of ammunition on a half limber, or 8 rounds on a pack mule, are not unreasonable propositions. It was seldom in moving warfare that infantry pack animals, company limbers and machine-gun limbers were not to be found in an area lying between company and battalion headquarters. With good leading, guns should get into the area in which they are required without coming under the direct fire of the enemy's machine guns or other automatic weapons.

It is to be borne in mind that the factors of observation and cover tend to cancel out one another. If the country is open and lacking in cover, observation will be good, and it will be unnecessary, therefore, to bring the gun far forward. If, on the other hand, the country is close and observation difficult, it will be possible to move the gun forward under cover.

The 3·7 how. in draft is admittedly not so handy as a weapon of equivalent weight designed to work in draft only, but the possibility of using pack is an advantage even in a European country, while a transporter of the Martel type, which seems the next step, would solve the transport difficulty.

So far the writer has considered the 3·7 how. solely as a close support weapon, but its other attributes must also be taken into consideration. Its additional range, for instance, makes it a valuable addition to the divisional artillery for the ordinary tasks of artillery in attack, defence or withdrawal, and although it is not a suitable weapon for the protection of the leading infantry against tanks, it is, nevertheless, a useful auxiliary anti-tank weapon, with a considerable rate of fire and good moral effect.

From an administrative point of view it is very undesirable to introduce another weapon into the artillery if it can be avoided. India's requirements on the North-West Frontier and ours in Palestine and Mesopotamia would not, it is suggested, be met by a weapon having only the characteristics set out in this article for the ideal close support weapon. Greater range, shell-power and pack transport are the requirements needed in these possible theatres of war. If a new weapon were introduced at home, the arrangements

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for reliefs and drafts for British pack batteries abroad would have to be changed and officers and men would have to learn to handle yet another weapon.

For support of infantry, a mortar needs the same information, observation, communication and immunity from hostile fire as a gun or howitzer, and, if it is employed as a close support weapon, it also needs the special attributes which have already been described.

So far as regards high angle fire, a mortar is as good, perhaps even better, than a howitzer. But when it comes to the question of its immunity from the enemy's fire in the forward area, it must be borne in mind that its weight when carried complete would be more than a man could carry, and that it would require, therefore, an animal or transporter of equivalent power. When a weapon has to be split up into man-loads and assembled for action, the risk of its failure in action is necessarily increased. A mortar detachment could not be much smaller than a gun detachment and there would appear to be no appreciable saving of *personnel* or transport required for ammunition supply as compared with the 3·7 how.

As regards range, it seems doubtful if a range up to 3,000 yards (combined with the necessary weight of shell and accuracy) could be obtained with an unrifled weapon, without increasing the weight by an elaborate bed plate or increasing the time of getting into action by the necessity for preparing emplacements.

As regards shell-power, in the case of a mortar a higher proportion of the weight of the projectile can be high explosive or smoke. In this respect a mortar is at an advantage as compared with the 3·7 how., but as regards accuracy, it appears that an unrifled weapon must be at a disadvantage when compared with a rifled weapon.

Owing to its limited range, a mortar would be of small value as an artillery weapon in country where little cover was available. It is of limited value in defence and of little use in a rearguard action, nor could it undertake normal artillery tasks in the attack. Its efficiency as an anti-tank weapon would certainly be less than that of a 3·7 how.

In this connection the question arises—who is to man a mortar? If this weapon can only be employed in the limited rôle of close support, it appears wasteful to man a mortar with highly skilled artillery *personnel*. On the other hand, the infantry battalion, with the early prospect of having an anti-tank weapon added to its establishment, is surely not in a position to be supplied with yet another weapon for which it must find specially trained *personnel*.

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A weapon cannot be employed continuously in the forward area and maintain its efficiency. Flexibility is, therefore, a great advantage. Cases will arise when close support can be carried out by sections of 4·5 how. and 3·7 how. batteries kept back to do some of the work of the 4·5 how. batteries. But in defence, the short range of the mortar will necessitate its employment in the forward area, whereas 3·7 hows. can be sited farther back to carry out similar tasks with equal efficiency.

To maintain the same standard of efficiency, therefore, more batteries of mortars would be required than would be the case with the 3·7 how.

Further, if the divisional artillery in defence can be strengthened by an efficient weapon, it will often be possible to free a proportion of 4·5 howitzers for counter-battery tasks or offensive action elsewhere.

The chief advantage of the mortar undoubtedly is cheapness of manufacture, both of weapon and ammunition, but as a close support weapon it does not appear to have any real advantage over the 3·7 how., while as a general artillery weapon it is obviously inferior.

We possess in the 3·7 how. a weapon which, though perhaps unnecessarily powerful, seems to meet all the requirements of close support, and, in addition, to be capable of fulfilling other important rôles which increase the power of the divisional artillery. It also meets the needs of our Colonial responsibilities.

Should we not be wise to be content for the moment with the weapon we have got, concentrate on what is the real problem—movement—and replace the mule with the less vulnerable and more efficient mechanical transporter ?

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"THERE WAS AN OLD DEY OF ALGIERS"*

By F. J. Hudleston, C.B.E.

Probably many readers of the *Army Quarterly*—at all events all those of riper years—have a vivid recollection of that nursery classic, "Reading without Tears," which contains that wonderful word-picture of a quiet, peaceful, domestic interior: "The Fat Cat sat on a Mat eat-ing a Rat." M. Esquer's book can best be described as "Military History with Chuckles." It is a very careful, detailed account of the events which led up to the expedition against Algiers in 1830 and of the military operations which ended in the capture of the town and the discomfiture of that infamous Dey who has been immortalized in a well-known (but never printed) Limerick. But, in addition, the author has a sense of humour which, if not rare with military historians,† is at any rate rarely displayed by them in their writings.

Perhaps the most comic figure in the whole story is the British ambassador in Paris, Lord Stuart de Rothesay. Greville says of him (1828): "Lord Stuart de Rothesay is sent back to Paris, though personally obnoxious to the King and universally disliked." He seems to have been rather a nonentity. In the Dictionary of National Biography you will find the lives of such minor characters as Grimaldi, Peter the Wild Boy and Martin Tupper, but there is no mention of this nobleman.‡ Great Britain was naturally opposed to the Algiers adventure. The Mistress of Gibraltar and Malta was, like Pope's Atticus, not at all anxious to have "a rival

* *Les Commencements d'un Empire. La Prise d'Alger*, 1830. *Par G. Esquer. Paris, E. Champion.* 1923.

† There are exceptions. An eminent living military historian, writing of the Northern Army at the outbreak of the American Civil War, says: "The rank and file were almost entirely composed of Irish and Germans . . . the non-commissioned officers and men almost to a man stood by the Union and refused to desert—their paymaster." This is a form of patriotism that Mrs. Micawber would have heartily applauded.

‡ He was a grandson of the third Earl of Bute, the Jack-boot who owed his rise to the fact that it once, in 1747, rained at a race-meeting and Frederick Prince of Wales wanted somebody to play cards with. Bute was summoned from the course, played his cards well (or perhaps ill) and his fortune was made by the patronage of the Prince.

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near the throne" in the Mediterranean. Early in March, 1830, her ambassador in Paris was instructed to remonstrate, but he proved to be a very poor mouthpiece. Wellington said of him that he did not trouble to find out if the French ministers understood him or to be sure if he understood what they said to him. The latter part of this charge seems painfully true. The Minister of Marine, d'Haussez, when the British "milor" threatened that Great Britain would not allow the expedition to take place, calmly remarked in language which would have given another famous naval administrator, Sir Joseph Porter, K.C.B., an apoplectic fit, "*La France se fout de l'Angleterre.*" Fortunately, Lord Stuart de Rothesay does not appear to have been acquainted with—shall we say idiomatic?—French, or the *mot de Cambronne*. Charles X was equally crushing but less forcible. When the ambassador repeated his threat to him, His Majesty replied, "*Monsieur l'ambassadeur, tout ce que je puis faire pour votre Gouvernement, c'est de n'avoir pas écouté ce que je viens d'entendre.*" The Paris press made rather pointed allusions to the hypocritical jealousy of a Power which had acquired India and the greater part of Burma, and Great Britain did not do more than remonstrate. Which has happened on other occasions. The Duke of Wellington, guessing wrong for once, prophesied that in any case the undertaking would come to horrible grief.

Preparations were now vigorously set in hand. The Minister of War, Bourmont, was chosen to command the expedition, that Bourmont who early on the 15th of June, 1815, left his division and joined Louis XVIII, and of whom Napoleon wrote, "*Bourmont s'est conduit bassement: je n'aurais jamais dû l'employer.*" The appointment was not popular. The light-hearted soldiery at Toulon composed and sang a lyric—

"*Alger est loin de Waterloo*
On ne déserte pas sur l'eau;
De notre général Bourmont
Ne craignons point la désertion."

The other general officers were so selected as to satisfy the old army and the new army, and the services of supply were entrusted to Baron Denniée, presumably to satisfy the "*Paris qui s'amuse*" where he was a well-known and eccentric figure, a *farceur* whose engaging conversation derived an additional charm from a slight stutter. He made himself the patron of the artists who accompanied the expedition and in their honour opened many a case

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discreetly labelled "*chlorure désinfectant*" which, however, always proved to contain (*Ciel!*) excellent wine. Even odder characters were to be found in the Corps of Interpreters, which consisted of soldiers of fortune—or of misfortune—of all nationalities from the Levant. Among those who volunteered mention is made of a delightful creature a M. Bourquin, who gave as his qualifications that he was "*homme libre et non militaire.*" There were, moreover, a number of artists and writers, some filling official posts, others on the look-out for "local colour." Of the foreign military and naval attachés special mention is made of Capt. Maunsell, R.N.,—"*son petit chapeau rond, sa claymore et sa froide bravoure ne tardèrent pas à le rendre populaire.*" The *Dépôt de la Guerre* drew up what we should call a Military Report on Algiers, which was so thorough that it included extracts from the weighty William Robertson, "Historiographer to H.M. for Scotland," dealing with the Emperor Charles V's expedition against Algiers in 1541.

There were also many letters "from the front" as actors (and actresses) say, *i.e.* from the general public. Many of these contained suggestions not of a very helpful nature. A certain M. Percevaux *fils* proposed that the van of the army should consist of convicted criminals: "*Familiers avec le crime, ils ne reculeront pas de l'exercer sur leurs semblables: un poignard, arme du traître, doit leur être confié.*" M. Esquer dryly adds, "*D'ailleurs on les ferait marcher devant des canons chargés à mitraille.*" Another gentleman, a café proprietor of Marseilles who "*exerçait depuis longtemps ce métier avec honneur*" applied for a vessel which he undertook to equip as a floating café "*pour l'utilité de l'armée*" and also for the benefit of any civilians who might like to follow the operations from the sea at a cost of 15 francs a day. One fine morning the Minister of Marine received a visit from a very important person, the gallant, if eccentric, Sir Sidney Smith of the British Navy, "*un homme capable de toutes les folies*" according to Napoleon. He was accompanied by two porters carrying an enormous basket. This proved to contain a number of little wooden boats, horses and oxen, on a Noah's Ark scale. The British admiral proceeded to show the astonished Minister d'Haussez, at considerable length and no doubt with many a "belay" and "avast there," possibly also emitting strange vows that his wood-work might be shattered, how landing operations ought to be conducted. Thus did Sir Sidney, whether he meant to do so or not, amply avenge the "*gros mot*" mentioned above. Another Englishman, always anxious to be in the thick of it when casual fighting was in sight in any quarter of the globe,

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next offered his services and advice. This was the much-wronged Cochrane, better known as Earl of Dundonald. He offered the French Government—the fact is perhaps not generally known—his mysterious secret method of reducing a fortress which was again considered during the Crimean War. Cochrane wanted two millions and his offer ended, appropriately enough, in smoke.

Bourmont left Paris on the 21st of April and, reaching Marseilles on the 25th, was greeted with a serenade "*Au choix de notre maître, amis, rendons hommage.*" This may seem a trivial incident to mention, but it goes to show that, however much one may admire French literature, French art, French wit and love, France in general (including, like Mr. Snevellicci, the female population,*), we shall never understand Frenchmen. The converse holds true. Colonel Bramble and his odd passion for "Valse Destiny," as rendered by the gramophone, must have seemed equally fantastic to the average Frenchman.

At Toulon there was an elaborate rehearsal of the disembarcation and 150 men were landed, we are told, in 6 minutes. On the other hand, when the expedition started, it took five days to embark the 4,000 horses that accompanied it. This would not have done for Sir Sidney, let alone "the Dook." The expedition set sail, but lingered a considerable time at Palma (Majorca) chiefly owing to the vacillations of Admiral Duperré, who was not on the best of terms with Bourmont. Duperré seems to have been possessed of a certain philosophic detachment: when a ship signalled to the flag-ship she would get the reply, "*A demain! on a le temps de dire ce qu'on veut.*" He was worried also by the "futile and incoherent conversation" of Denniée. However, they got under way at last and, on the 13th of June, the disembarcation began on the peninsula of Sidi-Ferruch.

M. Esquer gives a detailed and lively account of the fighting which ended in the fall of Algiers on the 5th of July. His narrative is studded with diverting anecdotes. He tells us how many of the staff "*ployaient sous le poids de livres et de cartes*"; he also relates a pathetic tale of an aged, ragged Arab who entered the French lines and was cross-examined by General Loverdo, who ended the interview by offering him some money. The proud Child of the Desert refused it and "*porta la main à ses haillons comme s'il voulait en tirer de l'argent pour le donner à son interlocuteur.*" This—in modern journalese—"superb gesture" caused considerable merriment in the French camp.

* "I love them, and they love me."

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When Algiers fell the French found in it treasure amounting to 55 million francs; the expedition cost 43,500,000 francs. Bourmont got his *bâton*, the Admiral was made a peer, France laid the foundations of her colonial empire in North Africa—and Charles X, having learnt nothing and forgotten nothing, retired to Holyrood Palace to meditate, in that somewhat draughty spot, upon the strange mutability of human affairs.

One hopes that Baron Denniée resumed his pleasant life in the cafés of Paris, where one can imagine him entertaining many a round-eyed Desdemona of the Opera with terrible tales of "The Anthropophagi and men whose heads Do grow beneath their shoulders." He would have done this admirably, except that he would probably have called them "Anthro-pop-pop-pop-pophagi," which would have made them sound even more alarming to dear little Desdemona.

All interested in what used to be called "Conjunct Expeditions," and any one who wishes to learn how the dry bones of history can be polished by wit and humour, should read M. Esquer's valuable and entertaining work. He describes himself on his title-page as "*archiviste-paléographe*." I should like to add that I never before met with an archivist with so keen and Strachey-like a sense of humour as M. Esquer.

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DE FREYCINET'S PLAN

DECEMBER, 1870

(*With Map*)

By Colonel G. M. Orr, C.B.E., D.S.O., Indian Army (retired)

In the October issue of the *Army Quarterly* there was an interesting article by Major Richardson, entitled "The People's War in France, 1870–1871."

In his brief reference to Bourbaki's campaign in the east of France, Major Richardson pointed out that "the whole move was originated by de Freycinet and concurred in by Gambetta, with the object of turning the Prussian left in France, relieving Belfort, and destroying the Prussian communications." The point is that de Freycinet did not originally intend Bourbaki to relieve Belfort before striking at the German single line of communications.

The full story, which is to be found in the French Official History of the War, of the inception, and of the subsequent changes, of this plan is full of interest. It is a story unsurpassed as an example of misdirection of war by a civilian Minister, and of interference with a commander in the field. As such it is well worth study even in these days when highly trained military advisers are at the service of democratic States.

The actual French Government was in Paris, but unlimited powers had been delegated to Gambetta to organize and to direct *la defense nationale en province*. Gambetta in his turn appointed de Freycinet as Chief of the Military Cabinet. Born in 1828, de Freycinet's profession became that of a mining engineer; from 1858 to 1862 he had, however, been traffic manager of the Southern Railway, and had won a reputation as an organizer. On joining the Government at Tours he at once set about the reorganization of the existing elements of a War Office. His chief assistants were General Loverdo, who combined the functions of an Adjutant-General as regards mobilization with those of a Chief of the General Staff as regards training and operations, and a General Thomas, who was a sort of Director-General of Ordnance. The Quartermaster-General's duties fell to M. Ferot, lately at the head of the Western Railway administration. M. de Freycinet, however, placed little reliance on the advice of the soldiers and chose rather to rely on his

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own ideas, aided by those of a somewhat remarkable young man named M. de Serres, who was his secretary. M. de Serres had been a railway engineer in Austria. His real name was Wieczsflinski, and he was under thirty years of age. How he came to be serving France the writer has been unable to discover.

The situation with which this military cabinet was faced at the beginning of December was critical. During the first days of December the attempts both of the Army in Paris to break out, and of the Armies of the Loire at Orleans to relieve the besieged capital, had failed disastrously. As a result of the heavy fighting round Orleans, which ended in the occupation of that town by the Germans on the 4th of December, the French Army was in retreat in two directions, the XVI and XVII Corps under Chanzy moving westward while the XV, XVIII and XX went south and south-east. By the 12th of December these latter Corps had concentrated round Bourges and had come under the command of Bourbaki. It was only the insistence of Gambetta which prevented Bourbaki from continuing the retreat. Immediately investing Paris were eight German corps and two cavalry divisions. To the north Manteufel had one corps facing Briand's force of 20,000 men at Havre and one corps and a cavalry division near Amiens opposing Faidherbe's 43,000 men. To the south Prince Frederick Charles and the Grand Duke had four and a half corps and two and a half cavalry divisions a little west of Orleans in touch with Chanzy's two French corps, while half a corps and half a cavalry division watched towards Bourges. The daily life of the German forces round Paris depended on a single line of communications which ran through Nancy and Chalons. For its protection to the north was one division near Mezieres; to the south was another division approaching Chatillon-sur-Seine en route for Auxerre, where it was to link the German force at Orleans with the force at Dijon. At Dijon there was the Baden division, a Prussian brigade and a cavalry brigade, together forming a corps under Von Werder shortly to be increased by another (reserve) division. Belfort was invested by a reserve division. The French forces in the south consisted of Bourbaki's three corps at Bourges, Garibaldi's "Army," 12,000 strong, at Autun, Cremer's division, 10,000 strong, at Nuits, and two divisions in process of formation at Lyons.* Langres was held by the French, and at Besançon was a garrison of 10,000 armed men.

It seemed that, whatever part the other forces in France played, it must be with an army gathered from the south that the next blow

* These two divisions were to form the 24th Corps.

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must be struck. The question was in what direction should the blow fall? Previous to the disaster of Orleans the intention had been for the French Army of the Loire to advance directly on Paris. A similar move, now, with a force reduced in numbers and shaken in moral, whose line of advance would be within easy striking distance of Prince Frederick Charles, was doomed to failure. Yet this was the course which Gambetta, at Bourges, forced on Bourbaki, although as a concession a detour via La Charité on Montargis was agreed to. On the 18th of December Bourbaki issued his orders for the move to begin next day. The same morning M. de Freycinet at Bordeaux heard of the plan from Gambetta.

M. de Freycinet, however, had quite different ideas as to a line of operations for Bourbaki's Army, and at 11.40 a.m. telegraphed to Gambetta that he, too, had a plan which he and his friend de Serres had thought out, and that he was sending de Serres with a letter * of explanation. De Freycinet's plan was briefly this: The XVIII and XX Corps were to be moved by rail to Beaune and, joining with the forces under Garibaldi and Cremer, were to retake Dijon. The XV Corps was to be used to cover this move and to protect the arsenal at Bourges. Meanwhile, 45,000 men could be assembled at Besançon from Lyons and elsewhere; and Dijon retaken, the whole mass of over 100,000 could then move against the vital line of communications. Chanzy in the west was to be relied on to keep the German forces opposed to him occupied long enough to prevent them from interfering. The result would be that the sieges of Paris, Belfort and the northern fortresses would be raised automatically.

M. de Serres arrived at Bourges on the morning of the 19th just before Bourbaki took leave of Gambetta, and, although Gambetta actually read the letter before Bourbaki left him, he said no word to the General of its contents. After Bourbaki's departure Gambetta and de Serres argued about the merits of their respective plans, the former adding that the march to Montargis had already begun and it was too late to change. M. de Serres, however, persisted and finally Gambetta said, "Overtake Bourbaki, and, if he accepts your plan, I agree to it too." M. de Serres lost not a moment and overtook Bourbaki at about 5 p.m., seventeen miles east of Bourges. At 6 p.m. de Serres was able to send off a telegram from an office five miles distant saying "matter arranged." It appears that in the short time—about half an hour—during which de Serres was with

* The complete text of this letter appeared for the first time in the French History of the war. The plan which it disclosed, fraught with such consequences through the manner in which it was carried out, has been subjected to a detailed criticism in that admirable history.

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Bourbaki, de Serres had not shown Bourbaki the letter from de Freycinet, but had unfolded the plan in his own words. Unfortunately, M. de Serres himself had not grasped that the essence of Freycinet's plan was that once Dijon was taken the whole Army should strike at the communications, whereby the sieges of Paris and Belfort would be raised automatically. Bourbaki gathered that after capturing Dijon his objective was to be Belfort, and that not until after the siege of that place had been raised was he expected to move against the line of communications; and, further, that his line of operations was then to be via Langres. Thus not only was he prepared to waste valuable time by going some ninety miles eastward, keeping a parallel course with the German line of communication at a distance of eighty miles from it, but he was also to retrace his footsteps for some seventy-five miles before striking north. It was conclusively proved, both by Bourbaki's evidence and that of his chief staff officer in the inquiry after the war, that de Serres himself had misinterpreted de Freycinet's plan. Bourbaki may well have thought, on the 19th of December, that the retaking of Dijon was quite enough to think about at that time, and that it was no use worrying about the rest of the plan. Gambetta in his evidence implied that by temperament and inclination Bourbaki was only too willing to move east rather than north—to the circumference of the storm circle rather than to its centre. One must, perhaps, remember that Bourbaki's recent career laid him open to the suspicion of being half-hearted in the cause of the Republic. Born in 1816 he was the son of a Greek colonel, and during the Crimean War had commanded the Algerian troops. In the war with Austria he had commanded a division. When hostilities broke out in 1870 he was in command of the Guard Corps, with which he was shut up in Metz; then came the incident of his being allowed by the Germans to leave Metz in order to visit the Empress in England, and of his not being allowed to return to Metz; and, then, he had been moved from the command of the Army of the North to that of the East. It may well have been that Bourbaki had no confidence in his untrained and heterogeneous collection of troops. But the truth would appear to be that he was a man of weak character and no talent, and was incapable of rising to such a situation. It will be found that it was M. de Serres who virtually commanded the Army of the East—and it will be remembered that M. de Serres had failed to grasp the real intention of his master's plan.

Gambetta was apparently much impressed by M. de Serres and forthwith gave him unlimited powers to arrange matters and even

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to relieve the Commander-in-Chief of his duties when he felt inclined. De Serres interpreted his powers in such a way that he began by giving orders in all directions; but this brought down on him a rebuke from de Freycinet and a reminder to mind his own business, which lay only with Bourbaki. A difference of opinion now arose between Gambetta and de Freycinet as to the extent of Bourbaki's command. A compromise was arrived at by which Garibaldi, with his "Army of the Vosges," was to be independent of Bourbaki, but, when requested by Bourbaki, was to cooperate with him. Affairs at Bourbaki's own headquarters were not simplified by his aide-de-camp, Lieut.-Colonel Leperche, arrogating to himself the functions of the Chief of the Staff with whom Bourbaki was not on good terms.

As soon as M. de Serres had got Bourbaki's acceptance to the change of plan, he busied himself with the arrangements for moving the XVIII and XX Corps and a brigade of the XV Corps by rail to Chagny and Chalon,* while at the same time the newly-formed XXIV Corps was to be moved from Lyons to Besançon. On the 20th, Bourbaki's Army continued its march eastward. Orders reached the XX Corps on the 21st of December in time for it to concentrate near Nevers in order to commence entrainment that night, but the XVIII Corps did not get its orders till after it had begun its change of direction from La Charité northward. Eventually, entrainments began in the early hours of the 22nd. Altogether sixty-two battalions, thirty-one squadrons and twenty batteries were moved and the movement over a hundred odd miles was not completed till the 29th of December. The movement was further complicated by a change in the orders for detrainment consequent on the news, on the 27th, that Dijon had been evacuated. Meanwhile, de Freycinet had informed Bourbaki that he required to know every evening the exact positions of his troops, so that he might (if necessary) send him instructions for the morrow's operations. At the same time he telegraphed to de Serres that no decision was to be taken without his (de Freycinet's) approval. In fact, all operations were to be directed from the War Minister's office.

During the afternoon of the 28th of December Bourbaki sent two despatches to de Freycinet which show clearly what his idea of his next move was. He intended, under cover of Cremer and Garibaldi to the north, to move on Vesoul. At midnight de Freycinet agreed.

* The transportation of these corps by rail for a distance of a hundred to one hundred and thirty miles has provided a standing example of the misuse of railways in war.

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It was from this moment that de Freycinet's original plan assumed a new shape; and it should be noted that de Freycinet acquiesced in the alteration. De Freycinet further added his congratulations on the good feeling that existed between Bourbaki and de Serres who, he said, was in a position to give him very useful advice. Such advice was, however, in no way to embarrass Bourbaki's decisions for which he alone was responsible. This was a contradiction of de Freycinet's previous order that all decisions were to be subjected to his own approval.


Here we will leave the self-sacrificing troops of France, bivouacking in the snow, partially clothed, ill-equipped, absolutely untrained; and at their head a General, very conscious of his Army's shortcomings, egged on to action and yet interfered with in all his operations by an ex-mining engineer in an office miles away, and by another civil engineer at his elbow, in whose pocket was authority for disgracing him at such time as he pleased.

Reference has been made to the untrained and heterogeneous nature of Bourbaki's troops. An Order of Battle of the Army of the East shows it to have been composed of battalions which may be tabulated under the names *de ligne*, *de marche*, *mobiles* and *mobilisés*.*

To appreciate the value of these various units it is necessary to go somewhat into detail. *Régiments de ligne* were formed of the Regular battalions brought over from Algeria. *Régiments de marche* were formed by combining the two companies left at their depôts by each of the three battalions of a regiment which had originally gone to the front. The six depôt companies thus became a 4th battalion, and by combining three of these battalions, a *régiment de marche* was formed. To understand the *mobiles* and *mobilisés* one must go back to the various attempts to form a Territorial Army as part of the organization of the French Army for war. In 1868 Marshal Niel had brought out his scheme for a second line army—the *gardes mobiles*. All men between the ages of seventeen and forty who were unmarried or widowers without children and who had not been taken for the active Army or, being taken, had obtained substitutes, were liable to service for five years. Exceptions, however, were numerous and training consisted of fifteen daily drills. Each *department* was to find so many companies, battalions, etc., according to its population, but there was no fixed strength and some battalions were 2,000 strong. Very little had been done by 1870, nor had the Ministry of War given any thought to the manner

* The table at the end of this article shows how many of each were in the Army of the East.

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in which these units were to fit into the war organization of the Army. Thus the outbreak of war found everything in a state of chaos. At first it was decreed that second-line brigades and even divisions should be formed of battalions of *mobiles*, but it will be found that in Bourbaki's Army brigades consisted of units of *mobiles* and *de marche* in nearly equal numbers. The *mobilisés* were those units of the *garde nationale* which volunteered to serve in the field forces. The majority of the *garde nationale* units which held to their privilege of not serving outside their own commune formed the garrisons of forts under the name of *garde nationale sédentaire*. The *garde nationale* was the outcome of a law passed in 1851 establishing the principle of universal service. Exceptions to service were innumerable and units were organized territorially by communes, outside of which they were not to serve unless they volunteered.

The greatest weakness of all these corps lay in the recruitment of officers. The companies and squadrons of the *régiments de marche* were officered by men long since retired, but who returned with the rank in which they had left, by warrant officers of gendarmerie, and by officers of the Navy and Marines. Prior to September, 1870, the officers of the *garde nationale* had been drawn from the pensioned list and nominated by the Emperor, but there was so much dissatisfaction in the ranks that the government of national defence decreed that units should elect their own officers. Generals of divisions were also given powers to grant commissions and to make promotions to any grade. In fact, where nothing had been foreseen every conceivable means had to be brought into play to fill the officer ranks, and then trust to luck that men would become leaders because they were put to lead.

TABLE SHOWING THE CONSTITUTION OF BOURBAKI'S ARMY AND OTHER FORMATIONS IN THE OPERATIONS IN THE EAST.

	Battalions.				Squadrons.	
	De ligne.	De marche.	Mobiles.	Mobilisés.	De ligne.	De marche.
15th Corps	9	25	19	—	24	12
18th Corps	6	20	15	—	—	16
20th Corps	—	7	26	—	8	4
24th Corps	—	6	15	6	—	8
Cremer's division	—	6	7	—	—	—
Garibaldi and detachments	—	—	—	87	—	—

Corps of *Francs-tireurs* and *éclaireurs* are omitted.

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GEOGRAPHY AND MILITARY HISTORY

(With Sketch Map)

By Captain R. J. Wilkinson, O.B.E., Indian Army.

In an article published in the *Army Quarterly* some little time ago * an anonymous writer made certain criticisms deprecating the value of military history as a study for the young officer.

If when he states that the accounts of the tactics of Cæsar or the battle of Custozza are of no value, he means that a mere recital of facts is unlikely to help as a guide to the next war, he is right; but the point he misses is that it is not facts, or the narrative of the doings of particular units which are of value, but the illustration which they afford of the principles of war.

Many military histories also seem to miss this point; the narrative is set down in all its baldness and it is left to the students with the aid of F.S.R. to extract the lessons to be learnt.

The principles of war, as laid down in F.S.R. vol. ii, sec. 2, are eight in number, and those who have undergone examinations for the Staff College or promotion will remember that the questions asked on military history almost entirely deal with principles—"Captain Attaboy" is not expected to have a detailed knowledge of the doings of the 2nd Northshire Regiment in a particular campaign, neither is he asked to describe its tactics, but to give examples of such and such a principle of strategy or tactics from a given campaign.

In F.S.R. it is stated that "Among the more important of the factors to be considered by every commander when forming his plans are: Time, space, relative strength and moral, training, ground, weather, armament, communications and general resources," and again, that "to make sound deductions from experience, reflection and comparison are absolutely necessary."

We arrive, therefore, at the conclusion that when studying military history the soldier must have in his mind the following main questions: (i) what were the factors affecting the situation? and (ii) what principle of war was illustrated (or violated)?

* *See* "The Practical Value of Military History," *Army Quarterly*, October, 1924.

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In order also to benefit by his reading, a military student must reflect and compare; sound deductions can be made from the experience of others as well as from our own.

Among the many factors affecting the situation one of the most important is "ground," *i.e.* the topography of the terrain. It has been said that fifty per cent. of tactics lies in the use of ground, and we are forced, therefore, to the conclusions that: (i) full value from the study of military history can only be obtained if we understand the geography of the country in which the campaign is fought; (ii) a knowledge of the topographical factor is necessary in order to appreciate the tactical situations brought out in the history; and (iii) knowledge of the campaigns of history can only be applied under similar geographical and topographical conditions.

Few military histories have sufficient maps, panoramas and photographs to enable the student to visualize the ground.*

Whilst, however, pressing the geographical factor in history and the absolute necessity for a thorough knowledge of the geography and topography of the country in which we propose to operate, or the military history of which we intend to study, it should also be borne in mind that all the accumulated experience of history has been embodied in the training manuals. In fact, it may be said that the teaching of the art of war resolves itself into showing how its principles should be applied under given geographical conditions, *e.g.* bush warfare, desert warfare, mountain warfare, etc.

We cannot separate history and geography. For example: a commander elects to accept battle at a certain place because its topography is suitable to the defence. He awaits the enemy at the mouth of a defile because this topographical feature will force that enemy to adopt a vulnerable formation. He attacks the enemy's right flank because the enemy's line of communication tends towards that flank, or because there is the best covered approach on that flank. Armies on the march follow the course of a river because of watering facilities. So we come, from the obvious conclusion that warfare is largely influenced by the geographic factor, to the perhaps less obvious one that military history is geography clothed in incident, and I am not sure that a better name for it would not be "military historical geography."

As an example of the importance of the topographical factor in the study of war, take the battle of Shaiba as described by General Moberly.

* The student is recommended to read Baden-Powell's "War in Practice" (chapter iv, on the use of ground).

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" The British entrenched camp at Shaiba—over three and a half miles in circumference—was situated with its rear face on the edge of the flood area and its western face on a slight elevation, on about the centre of which stood the walled serai known as Shaiba Fort. The defensive perimeter consisted of an irregular line of trenches behind wire entanglements and its northern and southern faces were bent back to the flooded ground. The main features in the position besides the fort were a brick kiln sixty feet high, known as Kiln Fort, and a salient just south of the fort, known as South Salient.

" The ground to the north-west of the camp was slightly undulating, open and treeless, except for a grove of small palm trees and three houses with walled gardens a few hundred yards from the British trenches ; while beyond these, at about nine hundred yards distant from the perimeter, was a small hillock known as North Mound.

" Westward and south-westward, the ground, treeless but covered in places with stunted bushes, sloped very gently in scarcely perceptible undulating folds upwards for some two miles. Here a ridge, which was roughly parallel to and only about ten feet higher than the western face of the Shaiba entrenchment, was marked at its southern extremity by the watch tower of Zubair, a prominent landmark some four miles distant from Shaiba Fort. The only other outstanding feature was a hillock known as South Mound, about half-way between Shaiba and the Watch Tower. Westward from the ridge the ground sloped downward, still in slightly undulating folds, to the Barjisiya Wood. The wood lay in a slight depression, and beyond it the ground rose gradually in a featureless plain.

" To the south and eastward, between Shaiba and Zubair, there was a slight depression and the ground was broken by a number of small hillocks and several small groves of tamarisk trees. The ruins of Old Basra, the city of Sindbad the sailor, lay east of Zubair on the edge of the flooded area. Both Zubair and Old Basra were distant about three miles from Shaiba Fort."

With this and the account of the battle which follows we ought to be able to apply the principles laid down in General Baden-Powell's " War in Practice."

Nature of Country.—Slightly undulating, otherwise open but here and there stunted bush.

Field of Fire.—Limited owing to the undulations ; good, however, for the Turks in front of Barjisiya woods, owing to the ground sloping upward for about 800 yards to the sky-line.

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ing near Shaiba

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To Face p. 396

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Cover.—Moderately good, owing to the undulations and the scattered bushes.

Observations.—For the higher command and the artillery, good, but restricted by mirage.

Obstacles.—The British rear and the Turkish left were protected by the floods.

Line of Retreat.—(*a*) British, good, in so far that it lay at right angles to their position; but bad, as it lay across the flooded area to Basra. (*b*) Turkish, good, in that it was remote from their exposed right flank and protected on the left flank by the floods; bad, in that it lay almost parallel to their position.*

Tactics employed.—Frontal attack, owing to a turning movement round the Turkish left being prevented by the floods, and round their right by large numbers of Arabs who could not be clearly seen in the mirage.

Note.—It is for consideration whether better use could not have been made of the mounted arm by sending the cavalry round the Turkish right to Shwaibda. †

In spite, however, of the important influence of geography and topography on strategy and tactics, it cannot be denied that the successful commander is he who regards the nature of the terrain purely as a help or a difficulty, as the case may be, and either takes advantage of the help or surmounts the difficulty.

But the fact remains, nevertheless, that after moral and the character of the commander, the most important factor affecting any situation is "ground." The principles of war remain the same, but the method of applying them must be influenced by the topography of the field of battle.

* *See* Hamley's "Operations of War," Part III, chapter ii.
† *See* sketch at end of the article.

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ECONOMY AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FIGHTING SERVICES

By Major C. F. Stoehr, O.B.E., R.E.

There is evidently an increasing dissatisfaction in Parliament about the relations between the three fighting Services, and a growing idea that more could and must be done to decrease their cost without reducing their efficiency. At the same time, it is clear from the debates on the Estimates that there is much misconception about the consequences of certain proposals that have been made, and the resulting difficulties are not appreciated. For instance, it has been suggested that a considerable saving could be made if there were only a single recruiting branch, and it certainly does seem wasteful for each Service to have its own recruiting office and *personnel* in the same town. Other branches for which unified services have been suggested are medical, lands, contracts and chaplains.

Suppose, however, that a unified branch for recruiting were to be started the first question that would arise would be: to whom will its director be responsible? He certainly cannot be responsible simultaneously to the Second Sea Lord, the Adjutant-General, and the *Personnel* Member of the Air Council. His responsibility must be undivided.

One possible solution would be to form a separate Ministry to deal with all the unified services, on the analogy of the Ministry of Supply in the Great War; and in the case of another great war it certainly would be of considerable advantage to start with a single recruiting branch which could be easily expanded into a Ministry of National Service, and a single contracts branch to form the nucleus of a Ministry of Supply; in time of peace, however, the disadvantages are considerable. The time taken to give a decision, often great even when one department alone, such as the War Office, is concerned, would be still further increased. Local control over the unified services would be lost and personal touch almost certainly weakened. And while this might be of minor importance in the case of lands, recruiting or contracts, which do not concern the

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daily life of the troops, it would be a very serious matter in the case of the Medical Service. The medical officer of a unit or the senior medical officer of a station could not be made responsible to its commander, but only to his own departmental head; and while the senior medical officer of a station which contained only one Service might be put under the orders of its commander to the same extent as is an Air Force unit which is attached to the Navy or Army, even this would not be possible in the case of a medical officer who was responsible for the health of units of more than one Service. Finally, the already large number of Ministers would be further increased.

If, as most people will probably think, this solution is undesirable, the only apparent alternative is to create a Minister of Defence to whom the heads of the unified administrative services could be responsible. But no Minister of Defence could control these services directly. The number of subordinates which any man can control efficiently is strictly limited, and the Minister of Defence could only control the administrative services either through a Defence Council, modelled on the present Service Councils and administering all three fighting Services—the ultimate solution advocated by Sir Frederick Sykes *—or through a subordinate Minister, leaving the existing Service Councils as at present. A properly working Defence Council would solve the difficulties both of coordination and of unifying the administrative work which is common to the three Services; but, whatever may be the merits of such a Council and the ultimate possibility of obtaining it, its formation in the near future is impracticable, by reason both of the resistance which any attempt to do so would meet and of the lack of *personnel* at present trained to fill it. The other solution, though practicable, would do little towards removing the objections previously raised.

The truth is that economy in the Services may be pursued on three different and quite unconnected lines. The first and probably most fruitful is to ensure that there shall be no overlapping of functions, *i.e.* that every task which may have to be done in war is prepared for by the Service, or combination of Services, which can perform it most economically. This is the primary duty of the Vice-President of the Committee of Imperial Defence, whose present position may be likened to that of a conciliator in an industrial dispute. The next steps in the direction of coordination which appear desirable are to lessen the causes of dispute by making the Plans and

* *See* "Reduction of Armaments, Economy and Imperial Defence," by Major-General Sir Frederick Sykes, G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G., M.P., *Army Quarterly*, April, 1926.

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Operations Staffs of the three Services work together, and to turn the conciliator into an arbitrator with the authority to give binding decisions. The second method is to eliminate waste inside each Service, and this is the line on which the Colwyn Committee is believed to have worked. The third is to reduce administrative duplication and overlapping; and, as shown above, any attempt to do this by unification would, in the opinion of the writer, lead to great difficulties and disadvantages. It does not follow that no economies in this direction are possible, but it implies that each case must be considered on its own merits. For instance, it might be practicable to form a Service lands branch in some existing Ministry; to have only one hospital at each station, working under whichever Service is most strongly represented there; and to form a combined recruiting office for each area, with representatives from each Service, and a common staff of clerks whose work would be distributed as required by the senior officer on the spot. It may be remarked here that the reduction in number of men belonging to the higher grades which may be obtained by a system of unification is not necessarily an economy, for, if the plums in any profession are insufficient, that profession will either not attract, or will fail to retain, its due proportion of the best brains.

The object of this article is not to put forward any particular solution of the problem of Service economy, but to point out the difficulties in the way of unification of the common administrative services and the general lines on which economy may be sought. If all members of Parliament would bear in mind these difficulties and general principles, there might be a clarification of ideas, less diversity of opinion, and, consequently, a greater chance of the present dissatisfaction producing useful reforms.

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NOTES ON FOREIGN WAR BOOKS

THE most important books of the quarter are General von Moser's review of the war, the two German official monographs on Verdun and Caporetto, and General von François's " Tannenberg."

WESTERN FRONT

General von Moser describes his pamphlet, *Das militärisch und politisch Wichtigste vom Weltkriege* (" The most important military and political matters of the world war," *Stuttgart, Belser, 2 marks*), as a lecture. Its sixty-two printed pages must have taken over three hours to deliver, but it is an extraordinary clever epitome of the main factors, and could hardly have been made shorter.

He begins by examining the various reasons advanced for the loss of the war: (1) The battle of the Marne; to this he replies that General Joffre had lost the battle of the Frontiers, the Russians lost Tannenberg, without losing the war, and the Germans won many a great battle after the Marne. (2) Verdun; but the Allies failed in many great offensives. (3) The collapse of Germany's Allies; but did not the Serbians, Rumanians and Russians also collapse? (4) The stab in the back; can it be said that the Germans were victorious in 1918? Did the stab in the back begin the defeat? Was not the Socialist action more of the nature of slow poisoning?

He argues that the causes of the great disaster were rather insufficient preparations for a great war; lack of cooperation between the Government and the Reichstag; the failure of both home and foreign diplomacy; and the lack of a leader of genius, neither Moltke, nor Falkenhayn, nor Ludendorff-Hindenburg, in his opinion, reaching that level. Later, he states that Ludendorff was only a " battle-captain," * but he considers Conrad von Hötzendorf a really great commander, hampered by only having an imperfect instrument in the Austro-Hungarian Army.

* In the *Army Quarterly*, October, 1925, he was called " sergeant de bataille."

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There are many complimentary remarks in reference to the British Army. It ought to have been completely destroyed before it could develop into a million-army:

"As a field of young corn, struck by a hailstorm, never ripens to bear fruit, so should the British Army have been overwhelmed in 1915 by a flood of hail and battles, strengthened in its frightfulness by the just hate of the British which filled every German heart."

In 1917 and later he states that the Supreme Command "threw against the British all that the Western Armies still possessed of good divisions." The exit of Mr. Asquith from power he thinks was as dangerous a blow to the Central Powers as the death of the Emperor Franz-Joseph.

In 1916 he considers that the German Western Armies

"were bled white in a far higher degree than the French in the six-month soul and body destroying battles against fortified positions in the hell of Verdun."

The unexampled drum-fire, numerical and material superiority of the Allies at the fearful battle of the Somme did the rest.

The year 1917 was not the success that it looked. The U-Boats did not stop the arrival of the Americans, the Eastern Armies were useless for fighting in the West, the Western Armies, "tired to the bones and their nerves deeply shattered," and political troubles at home were beginning. But it was the last chance of success, as Cambrai and Caporetto gave opportunities.

German diplomacy completely failed; the three Chancellors were merely painstaking officials. In 1918 no one insisted on Belgium being given up as a road to peace.

In 1918 the Germans were not fit to fight a defensive battle; an offensive was the last chance. And it was rightly made against the British, "since 1917 not only politically but militarily the most obstinate and most dangerous of Germany's enemies." He ascribes the failure to Ludendorff's lack of genius, not to the possession of genius by the generals of the *Entente*.

All hope of a reasonable ending to the war disappeared when Ludendorff demanded an armistice and the Chancellor failed to rouse the people to resistance. The Kaiser was not equal to his task, and in 1918 was as good as thrust aside. President Wilson is described as a super-Shylock.

If Germany is to rise again—and a nation of sixty millions cannot be repressed—she must away with political and social strife,

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and return to the virtues of pre-war days with the old German and the war-German Army as a model.

The *Reichsarchiv* proposes to record the details of " the tragedy of Verdun " in three monographs, of which the first, one of the best and most interesting compilations it has yet issued, is entitled, *Die Tragödie von Verdun*, 1916, *Theil I. Die deutsche Offensiveschlacht* (*Oldenburg*, *Stalling*, 4 *marks*). It deals with the preliminaries and the first four—critical—days of the battle.

The decision to attack at Verdun is not discussed, and for Falkenhayn's appreciation the reader is referred to his book. As early as the 29th of December, 1914, the German Crown Prince had proposed the resumption of his operations against the fortress, which had so miserably failed in September of the same year, and this, no doubt, was not without its influence on Falkenhayn, who was very much of a courtier. However, in place of the twenty-five divisions asked for in the Crown Prince's appreciation, he could only provide twelve, with two more later for operations on the west bank of the Meuse. The final draft of the plan which the Prince and his Chief of the Staff, General Schmidt von Knobelsdorff, put forward

" was only for a by-main-force accelerated capture of the fortress by surprise against the north-east front, with only three corps each of two divisions and one infantry brigade."

The monograph suggests that the Prince must have been thinking that Verdun was as easy to take as Liége, Namur and Maubeuge had been in 1914, and failed to appreciate that his proposed line of attack was overlooked from the unattacked north-west sector :

" Warning voices were raised, particularly in this regard, but the plan was adhered to, on account of a considerable over-estimate of the effect of the artillery that it was proposed to deploy . . . it was the first of the German great *matériel*-battles."

Not only did the general plan excite mistrust, but the details provoked objections. For once the operation orders are given, for, as it is said, they contained " the germ of failure." The first two paragraphs run :

" (1) On the morning of the 12th of February [the date was later altered to the 21st], the bombardment of the French positions will be begun on the whole front of the fortress in accordance with ' Orders for

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the employment of the artillery and trench mortars.' During the bombardment the attacking troops of the corps, that is, in

Sector A ..	.. ..	VII Reserve Corps
„ B ..	.. ..	XVII Corps
„ C ..	.. ..	III „
„ D ..	.. ..	XV „

will be so disposed that they will suffer the minimum losses possible from it.

" (2) At 5 p.m. on the 12th of February in Sectors A to C thin skirmish lines will feel their way forward against the 1st line of the enemy and take possession of it. These skirmish lines will be supported by liquid-flame and hand-grenade parties. If they succeed in setting foot in the 1st enemy line, endeavour must be made to reconnoitre the second French line in order to obtain accurate data for the renewed artillery bombardment next morning."

* * * * * *

The divisional and regimental commanders do not seem to have been concerned at the half-heartedness of the instructions, but, convinced of success, wished to know what they were to do when they got possession of both first and second lines. To this question, the monograph says, no answer was vouchsafed. Perhaps the Crown Prince was less sanguine.

Bad weather made it impossible to attack on the 12th of February, as originally ordered: it was not until the 21st that the weather improved, and meantime the troops, inadequately housed, suffered both in health and spirits, and were physically worn out before they went into action.

The first day did not bring even the very limited success expected " according to plan." Though the VII Reserve and XVII Corps gained their objectives, the III, the celebrated Brandenburg Corps, at night was back at its starting points, and French artillery fire drove the Crown Prince from his advanced headquarters. Later in the day he did his best to confuse matters by, at 4.30 p.m., 5.40 p.m. and 6 p.m., removing the ban on unlimited advance and ordering the three corps by telephone " to take everything to-day," " to get as far as possible forward," and " to try to take the second trench." Truly a wonderful way of commanding an army. " The second day of the attack against Verdun also ended with results far behind what was expected." The VII Reserve Corps again did well; the XVII Corps could not take Caures Wood,

" in spite of all heroic courage; the left division of the III Corps was still in front of the French second line, and the right division, though it reached this line, was so battered that it could not be allowed to exhaust its powers entirely by attacking a new position unprepared for assault."

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And frost at night brought " horrible suffering, especially to the wounded lying in the open."

The third day, after heavy losses, only put the Germans in possession of " the enemy's complete first position." The fourth day brought some easy successes, " victory was still possible," but the troops were becoming exhausted, and the Crown Prince sent up no reinforcements to clinch matters. The fifth day, though Fort Douaumont, empty of defenders, was entered, was a day of heavy losses and failure. Contrary to legend, most of the artillery had been moved forward; but crowded together in two main " nests " in valleys, it suffered severely from the French long-range guns, as our Allies have always claimed, and its cooperation failed.

What the monograph calls an " unedifying contest " has apparently arisen in Germany as to who had the honour of first entering the undefended Fort Douaumont: careful historical inquiry has elicited that the original official reports were incorrect, and that one of the officers given credit for it is not so entitled. We are warned that the same mistake occurred later at Fort Vaux. So the so-called " stormer of Douaumont " who obtained Germany's highest order for his supposed act, is deposed.

Stimme aus der Front. Bülow's Vormarsch, Rückzug und Rettung seiner und der I Armee (" A voice from the front. Bülow's advance, retreat and saving of his own and the First Army "), by Edmund Fürst von Wrede (*Bamberg, Hübscher*, 1*s*.), is, as its title indicates, a defence of General (later Field-Marshal) von Bülow, the original commander of the German Second Army. It is the work of an ardent partisan. Prince von Wrede states that he saw Bülow many times during the months of the war, and, although he had a slight stroke in the spring of 1915, in 1914 he was, contrary to rumour, fit and well. The only new point made is that by the time that the Germans reached the Marne they were thoroughly exhausted, and only the fittest were still in the ranks. The saying of one soldier to another is quoted: " The French needn't be frightened of us any more; we have been marched ' *kaput* ' " (smashed, finished, done).

Bülow had a difficult position between the First and Third Armies: " Kluck stormed ahead (thinking only of himself); Hausen hung back . . . the Supreme Command let the reins completely drop."

Prince Wrede also discusses why Falkenhayn was selected to succeed Moltke, and Kluck, Bülow and Hindenburg passed over. The main reason advanced is that:

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" All three were men with hard, uncomfortable personalities, difficult to get on with, of strong will and without consideration for the feelings of others. They were inconvenient, as Schlieffen had been. The Supreme Command, without a Chief, the Military Cabinet and G.H.Q. preferred a skilful, witty and ambitious man like Falkenhayn, who exactly fitted in with their ways."

The *Militär Wochenblatt* of the 11th of September, 1926, draws attention to an article in the *Schweizerischen Monatschrift für Offiziere aller Waffen und Organ für Kriegswissenschaft* (July and August, 1926) on the higher German appointments in 1914, written by the Swiss military author, Dr. Bircher, a surgeon who is also a lieutenant-colonel in the National Army. He finds another reason for the loss of the war in the fact that the officers principally concerned in the decision to retire from the battle of the Marne were sick and ailing. Moltke had serious heart disease; Bülow sclerosis of the arteries; Lauenstein, his chief of the staff, " Basedow's disease with heart-disturbance "; Hentsch, gallstones and melancholia. Such a state of affairs might be serious in the British Army; but in the German, where the younger staff officers notoriously make the decisions and do the work under the merely nominal assent of the old gentlemen who have the titular commands, it is hardly a valid excuse of defeat. Even Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch, a man of fifty, took two young officers with him on his celebrated motor trip, which settled the fate of Germany.

The *Militär Wochenblatt* also reprints from a medical journal a full account of Moltke's state of health by the doctor who treated him at Karlsbad. It is not advanced that Stein, Moltke's Deputy-Chief of the General Staff, was ill, or that Prittwitz, who was defeated in East Prussia, was indisposed, or that Kluck, beaten at Mons, Le Cateau and the Ourcq, was sick.

La Verité sur la perte des Hauts de Meuse et de Saint-Mihiel en Septembre 1914 (*Paris, Chiron*, 4.50 *francs*), by Lieut.-Colonel Bize, ex-Chief of the Staff of the 75th Reserve Division, which was driven off the Hauts de Meuse and lost the St. Mihiel bridge, is a document of first authority, backed up by copies of orders, but, unfortunately, without a map.

On the 17th of September, French G.Q.G. directed General Sarrail (commanding the Third Army) to recover from the Second Army the Reserve Divisions (65th, 67th and 75th) lent to it, and on the 19th, with the VIII Corps sent to him, " to drive back under

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the guns of Metz the enemy detachment still in Woevre." He did not use the VIII Corps, merely reconnoitred, and in the evening of the 19th sent the VIII Corps eastwards to St. Ménehould, leaving the 75th Reserve Division (less one regiment) covering a front of 36 miles on the Hauts de Meuse.

On the 21st, outflanked on both sides by an advance of two German corps, it was driven back. But even then the French Army commander considered the attack a bluff. On the 22nd, three divisions, 12th, 40th and 67th (Reserve), were, however, hurried up and fought a defensive action, but it was too late. On the 24th, the 149th Brigade (75th Reserve Division) was driven over the river at St. Mihiel, and on the morning of next day the Fort des Romaines was captured and Verdun invested on the eastern side.

La Défaite militaire de l'Allemagne en 1918 (*Paris, Berger-Levrault, 22 francs*), by Lieut.-Colonel Paquet, shows, offensive by offensive of 1918, how the fighting strength of the German Armies was reduced by *usure* until they could fight no longer. Various reasons contributed to the German defeat, but *usure* was the preponderant one. The author served in the 2nd (Intelligence) Bureau of the French G.Q.G., was attached in 1918 to the Intelligence Branch, General Staff of British G.H.Q., and has had access to official records.

He starts with the assumption that for the offensives of 1918 Ludendorff had at his disposal 192 divisions plus an effective reserve of 850,000 men; that is 400,000 men of the 1919 class, 250,000 convalescents, men put back from earlier classes and released tradesmen, and 200,000 wounded and sick of November, 1917–February, 1918, likely to rejoin in March or April. Then, after giving the dispositions, density of troops and execution of the attack, he shows after each offensive the actual number of divisions engaged, reliefs which took place, the number left in the line. Thus, between the 21st–24th March, 1918, 58 of the 75 divisions engaged had been used and 22 were actually relieved; on the 31st of March, when 81 divisions had been engaged, there were 135 in the line and 55 in reserve, of which only 24 were fresh. Carefully noting which divisions were engaged more than once in a battle, he averages the losses.

After working through all the German and Allied offensives, he finds that in the Amiens and Lys offensives the Germans lost 450,000 plus 250,000 on the other fronts, that is 700,000, reducing

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the central reserve to 150,000. By anticipating part of the 1920 class and bringing in convalescents, about the end of May before the offensives of the Aisne and Rheims, the total rose again to about 512,000 men; but these reserves were inferior in number and quality to those on the 21st of March.

The Aisne and Rheims offensives cost 550,000 men, plus losses on other fronts, making a total of 660,000. The depôts were down to 239,000, and men of two months' training were being sent to the front. The losses of July were 220,000, but by calling up more of the 1920 contingent, the depôts rose to 474,000.

Now the Allied offensives began, and serious losses, especially in prisoners, were experienced. On the 1st of September the number of divisions was down to 162, the losses of August having been 209,000. The losses in September were 300,000, and the depôts had only 306,840, just enough to replace them, and 600 battalions had been broken up and many had only three companies. On the 1st of November the reserves, mainly convalescents, numbered 121,000, plus 395,000 recruits of the 1920 class, boys of 17 to 18. The French at this time had 927,000 available, including nothing later than the class 1917.

French calculations put the net loss of the Germans in 1918 at 945,000, those of the *Statistisches Jahrbuch* of 1921–1922 make them 885,711 (gross 1,498,138). Thus, 900,000 is a fair figure to take. By the same system the Allied net loss is put at 949,000.

There are forty maps and sketches, and some general remarks on the leading and strategy.

ITALY

The *Reichsarchiv* monograph, *Der Durchbruch am Isonzo* (The Break-through on the Isonzo), *I Teil* (*Oldenburg*, *Stalling*, 4 ***marks***), describes the preparations for the battle known to us as Caporetto and the first four days of the fighting. The compiler is General Krafft von Dellmensingen, the Chief of the Staff to the German general, Otto von Below, who commanded the Fourteenth Army, which played the main part. More than this, as representative of the Supreme Command, he had visited the ground and drawn up the report on which the decision to take the offensive was made. The volume is therefore of more than usual interest, and is much above the average even of German military historical work.

Driven from their last prepared position by the Italians in the eleventh battle of the Isonzo, the Austro-Hungarians were forced

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back into a wild mountainous region, where a new position could only be slowly developed by blasting trenches out of the rock, and organizing ropeway communications. They could not face another offensive where they lay; they must go back a long way, or forward to their old defences, and they naturally called on their German Allies for advice and assistance. On the 29th of August, 1917, General von Waldstätten, the senior assistant of the Austrian Chief of the Staff, appeared at German G.H.Q. with a scheme for an offensive which should break the front at Tolmein, go as far as Cividale and then roll up the Isonzo front. Ludendorff, involved in the Passchendaele fighting, could only provide 6 divisions, but he sent General von Krafft, who had led the Alpine Corps in the Rumanian campaign, to examine the situation. The latter, in view of the fact that Ludendorff was sending 6 of his best divisions, and of the state of Italian moral, whilst duly setting forth the difficulties of the enterprise in a report which is given in the text, agreed that an offensive offered good chances of success. The Austrians had retained a small bridgehead across the Isonzo at Tolmein, and this provided an opening whence the attack could be launched; but mountain equipment and pack animals were necessary. A panorama of the bridgehead—there are many excellent photographs in the book—shows a hilly rather than a mountainous country, the summits varying from 1,500 to 3,500 feet above sea-level, and considerably less above the valley. Ludendorff, whilst not failing to realize the difficulties, on the 8th of September agreed to a combined offensive. There was little time for preparation before the winter came on.

The monograph admits that it is easier to hide troops in hilly country than on a plain; but, thanks largely to the fact that the Italian aviators never crossed the crest of the Julian Alps, the 12 divisions for the offensive were assembled and made their approach marches, and all the 300 batteries were got up into position, without being discovered by the Italians.

General Krauss's group of 5 divisions was assembled in the valley of the Drau, west of Klagenfurt, General von Below's Fourteenth Army, of 7 divisions, in the valley of the Save, around Laibach and Krainburg. Roads and communications were improved, and, as in Falkenhayn's passage of the Rother Thurm Pass in Rumania, the troops were moved to the front on a time-table contrived on the block system of a single-line railway, with proper crossing places and signals. The guns were got up during the whole period of preparation, mostly by hand and by night, and were then

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left in battery covered up and watched only by sentries. For the infantry seven night marches were required; they took no vehicles, but machine guns, ammunition, medical equipment, means of illumination, hand grenades, signalling apparatus and rations were carried on the man or on pack animals; each division was therefore divided into three echelons, fighting troops, fighting train and baggage. Confusion and blockings which occurred towards the end of the movement were resolved by the rapid retirement of the enemy.

The artillery registered during the six days' approach march, the adjoining Austrian Armies firing heavily to disguise the operation. The bombardment was begun by a four-hours' gas shelling, 2 to 4 a.m., followed by a general bombardment for one hour, in which the trench mortars had great effect.

As is well known, all went according to plan, the attacks at the two extremities of the front selected, at Flitsch and Tolmein, broke in and secured the ground between them, and the whole Italian front gave way. The poor stand made is ascribed by the monograph to doubtful moral and obvious tiredness of the war:

"Already a few hours after the beginning of the fight troops fled from the front leaving their Army. Cries of 'The war is over, I'm for home,' were heard."

Truly, as in 1864, 1866 and 1870, German laurels were won against indifferent adversaries.

Altre Pagine sulla Grande Guerra (*Milan, Mondadori*, 15 *lira*), by Marshal Cadorna, contains four interesting papers of first-rank authority. The first deals with the plans drawn up by the Italian General Staff, previous to his succeeding General Pollio as Chief of the General Staff, for the case of Italy joining Germany and Austria against France and dispatching troops by railway to the Rhine front. The second describes the preparations made during the war in view of the possibility of Germany violating Swiss territory. The third is concerned with events in Libya during the war when the Italian columns were defeated and the whole territory, except parts of Tripoli and Khoms, was lost and had to be reconquered after the armistice. The fourth paper deals with Italy's participation in the Allied campaign in Salonica, and the expedition to Albania, when 100,000 men were locked up and made no contribution to winning the war.

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Russia

Tannenberg. Das Cannae des Weltkrieges (*Berlin, Deutscher Jägerbund, 3 marks*), by General von François, is a singularly clear account of the battle and its preliminaries by the general who had the greatest share in the victory.* It supplements an earlier military account by the same author in his book *Marneschlacht und Tannenberg*. It is illustrated by good sketch-maps and a number of excellent photographs taken during the battle—the Russian trenches, it appears from them, were straight and without traverses. One photograph, taken ten years afterwards, on the 24th of August, 1924, shows the principal officers who took part. François, very properly, is seated in the centre between Field-Marshals von Hindenburg and von Mackensen.

The book begins with a brief account of Hannibal's Cannæ, with a diagram, describes the opening situation in August, 1914, and then passes on to the first battle in East Prussia, that of Gumbinnen. Here the author makes it evident, although he does not notice the fact, that there were all the elements of a Cannæ prepared: the Germans and Russians met frontally; Mackensen's corps in centre was beaten and began a retirement; François's own I Corps on the left was successful, and on the enemy's flank; Below, with the I Reserve Corps, was in a position to envelop the other flank; a cavalry division was available to move round to the Russian rear. Instead of accepting the Cannae gambit, Prittwitz, the Army commander, decided on a general retirement to the Vistula, and thus lost an easy opportunity of beating Rennenkampf before turning against Samsonov. General von François has, nevertheless, a high opinion of Prittwitz, and knew him well, having been Chief of the Staff to Hindenburg when the latter commanded the IV Corps and Prittwitz had a division in it. He thinks that he had an attack of mental depression when the news of Samsonov's advance against the XX Corps, left to stop progress from the Warsaw direction, arrived almost simultaneously with the reports of Mackensen's failure at Gumbinnen; and that he took too seriously General von Moltke's last words to him in Berlin: "Don't be driven from the Vistula, keep the Army intact, in case of extreme need abandon the ground east of the Vistula."

* It will save reference to a map in reading this review if it is remembered that East Prussia, east of the Vistula, was 160 miles across and about 100 miles from north to south, that Warsaw lay 80 miles to the south of the centre of the southern boundary. Rennenkampf's Army entered East Prussia from the east, and Samsonov's from the Warsaw direction. Leaving the XX Corps and details to stop the latter, the remainder of the German Eighth Army faced Rennenkampf.

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Prittwitz, under the influence of some of his staff, plucked up courage again, dropped his idea of retreating to the Vistula, and, at 9.30 p.m. on the 20th, ordered the I Corps and 3rd Reserve Division by rail to the assistance of the XX Corps, whilst the XVII Corps (Mackensen) and I Reserve Corps (Below) marched westwards by road, covered by the cavalry division. As François says, the battle front was already set when Hindenburg-Ludendorff arrived on the 23rd. And what happened afterwards was done in despite of the great pair.

Owing to muddles on the railways—which delayed the arrival of the troops in other instances also—François's Corps was late in reaching the right (south) flank of the XX Corps. Ludendorff, nevertheless, ordered it to attack, although it was still short of three-quarters of its field artillery, all its heavy guns, and all the ammunition columns. François wisely disobeyed, and waited until he had concentrated. In the midst of his initial success, Ludendorff ordered him to assist the XX Corps, which was in trouble. This corps, after a formal objection, had, with Goltz's fortress division, obeyed Ludendorff's orders literally, with the result that its 41st Division had been beaten back with a loss of 2,400 men and 13 guns, and Goltz was caught in flank. The situation was restored by the independent action of Morgen's 3rd Reserve Division. François was meantime pushing detachments eastward to close the exits of the great forests in which two Russian corps were involved, and seize the road centres at Neidenberg and Willenberg. He was now informed by Ludendorff that "All depended on the I Corps," and ordered north-eastward *into* the forests! François again departed from his instructions, and continued to move eastward, and succeeded in blocking the exits across the frontier. Thus two elements of a Cannae were available: disaster in the centre and complete success on one flank. On the other flank the arrival of Mackensen and Below and the spreading out of their corps across the Russian rear was delayed by fighting with a detached Russian corps, contradictory orders, lack of cooperation, and a scare that considerable other Russian forces were approaching. Against François a strong Russian relieving force did come from the south, but he held on to the exits, and it drew off. In the event, Mackensen did not close the ring on the eastern side, and Ludendorff, at midnight on the 29th, reported by telephone to the Supreme Command:

"Battle is won. Pursuit will be continued to-morrow. The surrounding of two Russian corps will NOT now succeed (*wird wohl nicht mehr gelingen*),"

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and he issued orders for the collection of troops to move north against Rennenkampf. But François's corps was in the right place, and of the 92,000 men and 350 guns captured, it was responsible for 60,000 men and 231 guns. On turning to the official German war record, *Schlachten und Gefechte*, one finds that François did not suffer as severely as General Lanrezac for being right when his superiors were wrong: he was not removed from his post, but, except for a month's command of the Eighth Army in October, 1914, he remained a corps commander until July, 1918, when he disappears. In his book he merely tells a plain story, and makes no criticism or complaint; it is the reviewer who has emphasized the points of the narrative.

An article by General Noskov, formerly Quartermaster-General of the Russian Third Army, which appeared in the *Militär Wochenblatt* of the 11th of August, 1926, adds some new information about Tannenberg. The general has read the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, and conversed about the battle with the officers of the staffs of both Samsonov and Rennenkampf. There was no ill-feeling between the two leaders, as is often asserted. The blame for lack of cooperation lays with General Jilinski, who had both their Armies in his Group. He merely disapproved or approved of the proposals Samsonov and Rennenkampf made, and gave no orders to ensure cooperation. It was not until the battle had begun on the 26th of August, after a visit of the Grand Duke Nicholas, who had become alarmed, that Jilinski grasped the seriousness of the situation. The Army leaders could not make up for Jilinski's failure.

In excuse of Rennenkampf's not pushing on, it is stated that he had no aeroplanes and no idea where the Germans were. The sending of important messages by wireless, unciphered, is admitted, and it is claimed it was due to necessity for haste. In a similar position the German troops at Brziny (Lodz) sent unciphered messages, which General Noskov says he himself read.

AUSTRIA

L'Autriche et le Hongrie pendant la Guerre (*Paris, Félix Alcan, 40 francs*), by Bertrand Auerbach, is a most interesting and complete summary of the history of the Austro-Hungarian Empire from the opening of hostilities until the fall of the monarchy. Practically

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every book of importance on the subject seems to have been consulted. Besides the bibliography, there is an index of persons mentioned, with a brief description, *e.g. Erdödy (Comte) officier d'ordonnance de l'Empereur Charles*, which will be invaluable to students.

The author considers that the collapse of Austro-Hungary is explained by its internal difficulties, the perennial struggle between Germanism, Magyarism, and the -isms of the seventeen nationalities composing the old Empire, quenched in 1914 for a moment by the general animosity against Serbia. The Army and its commanders, and the various campaigns and the relations of the German and Austro-Hungarian staffs are described, but three-quarters of the 620 pages are devoted to events after the death of Franz-Joseph: interior politics, the dismissal of Conrad von Hötzendorf, Seidler's ministries, Czernin as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the preliminaries of the divorce of Austria and Hungary, the Polish question, the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bukarest; the food crisis, the Princes of Parma scandal; the scheme to obtain a separate peace, the Imperial manifesto, the end of dualism and the advent of personal union, and the military collapse.

It is a pitiful story of the downfall of an Empire until 1914 always friendly to the British Empire, but which got into bad company and was made a tool of.

Under the auspices of the Carnegie Institute of International Peace, in the series dealing with the Economic and Social History of the War, Dr. Joseph Redlich of Vienna, an ex-Minister, has published *Oesterreichische Regierung und Verwaltung im Weltkriege* (Austrian Government and Administration in the World War), Yale University Press, 8*s*. 9*d*.

The general line he takes is that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was built up under absolutism and bureaucratic centralization, for war a dictatorship was contemplated, and as long as Franz-Joseph lived this was practically carried out; parliamentary interference was excluded, the Army high command ruled the civil population, and the civil authorities lost influence, but the Empire held together. With the accession of the Emperor Karl, the influence of the military leaders lessened, attempts were made at a "political" control of the war, the war-dictatorship idea gradually weakened, the Government lost authority, and the anti-dynastic agitation gained in force. The recognition of the rights of minorities and self-determination did the rest. The moral is most clear that

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a nation under an autocracy or dictatorship has far greater hope of success in war than a democracy.

Under the title of *Österreichs Artillerie im Weltkriege*, 1914–1918 (Austria's Artillery in the World War, 1914–1918), *Stockerau, Hlavka*, 9 *gn.*, three fascicules of a history of the units which belonged to the Austrian artillery have appeared, but take the story no further than the autumn of 1914. They have been prepared from the official archives by the staff of the *Brigade-Artillerie-Abteilung Niederösterreich No.* 3. In a framework of the general history of the campaign, the fortunes of the artillery units are followed, but without a great amount of detail. The book would seem designed to give to the artillery some idea of the events in which they took part, of the scope of which they must have been ignorant at the time.

Serbia

Colonel F. Feyler of the Swiss Army, who has already published two volumes on *La Campagne de Macedonie*, 1917–1918, has gone back to the early period, and issued *Les Campagnes de Serbia*, 1914 *et* 1915 (*Paris : Jean Budry*). It deals in 133 pages with the three unsuccessful Austrian offensives in 1914, and the invasion of Serbia in 1915, and the retreat to the coast. The information has been derived directly from the Serbian G.H.Q. and headquarters of formations, besides published Austrian sources. The book is illustrated with sixteen beautiful photographs of the ground fought over. There are sketch-maps.

General

Das Ende des Ringens (The End of the Struggle), written by a retired colonel of the Netherlands Army, J. C. van der Belt, in German, and published by *Mittler & Co., Berlin*, 5 *marks*, is a German-coloured summary of the events of 1917 and 1918, a piece of propaganda of the most barefaced sort. The treatment of Germany is compared to that of Captain Dreyfus. The German Army is never beaten in the field, but Germany is strangled by propaganda, hunger-blockade, and superior numbers! It is possible to agree with the author on only two points, viz., that the Serbian generalship in 1914, when the Austrian invaders were driven out, was excellent, and that Jutland was not a German

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victory—he calls it an attempt to break the blockade that failed. There appears to be no Dutch edition of this hackwork.

En Missions Speciales. Mémoires d'un agent des services secrets de l'Entente, by Ch. Lucieto (*Paris, Berger-Levrault*, 9 *francs*), whether fiction or a genuine account of espionage and counter-espionage during the war, is full not only of interest as a romance, but contains much useful instruction. As the copy under review is marked the " 34th thousand," the book, in any case, seems to be a " best-seller." It purports to present the notes of a man whose identity cannot be revealed, but who accomplished such exploits during the war that his name is legendary in the secret service.

The organization of the German Secret Service, with its political, military and naval branches, is described at length, and its methods of obtaining information and getting it out of France exposed. One invisible ink employed required four re-agents applied in a definite order to develop writing done with it. Messages by means of advertisements and written on cigarette papers and postage stamps were detected. One ingenious German agent painted in oil over his reports and for some time managed to get his pictures out by sending them to a dealer in Switzerland. The adventures of Irma Staub are related at length ; from her portrait, she was not the beauty she was reputed to be. She claimed to have reported the manufacture of the tanks ; but the information she obtained was not believed by the expert officer detailed to investigate it. On the first appearance of tanks he was given permission to shoot himself! Mata-Harny's portrait exhibits her as a plain stout woman.

There is an account of the infernal machines, explosive pencils, etc., which the Germans tried to plant in France, going to the length of floating an electro-chemical company to undertake munition work for the national defence. Sooner or later all the Germans agents were tracked down in France, as in England, and many of them shot after due trial.

There are fifty-one illustrations : photographs of documents and portraits, which give an air of verisimilitude to the book. Its low price is remarkable.

Les Fabrications de Guerre en Allemagne, 1914–1918 (*Paris, Berger-Levrault*, 5 *francs*), by Lieut.-Colonel A. Gavard, will be found useful by those interested in the subject who cannot wade through the lengthy volumes of Generals Schwarte and Wrisberg, which have been reviewed in these pages. Colonel Gavard was for

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six years after the war employed in the Factories and Manufacture Section of the Inter-Allied Armaments Sub-Commission in Germany, and has special knowledge of German material and munitions.

Dividing his pamphlet under these two headings, he exhibits the efforts made and the results accomplished by the principal manufacturers in respect of guns, trench mortars, small arms, machine guns, transport vehicles; shell, powder, explosives, S.A.A., grenades; and finally deals with the supply of metals and with exports.

The figures for material and munitions are colossal. To show the increase in manufacturing power, the output of machine guns, for example, for periods about the middle of each year, 1915, 1916, 1917 and 1918, is given. The figures per week are 153, 322, 2,169 and 2,838. In the ten months February to December, 1917, 94,659 were completed—over 300 a day! The mobilization programme contemplated that 15 field guns per month would be required; by May, 1916, 1,500 a month were being made.

Want of metal did not hamper the Germans. By never using a rare metal when a common one would suffice, as *Ersatz*, by intensive exploitation of the mines, sequestration at home and in occupied territory, and conversion of manufactured articles, sufficient reserve was accumulated to continue the war into 1919. To take copper, Germany's normal production was 2,000 tons a month: she increased this slightly by about 200 tons. The Serbian mines of Bor yielded 2,000 tons a month towards the end of the war; from Bulgaria from 1917 onward about 4,000 tons a month was extracted; whilst 91,000 tons were obtained in the three years' period 1915, 1916 and 1917 from articles requisitioned at home or seized in occupied territory, even the great bell of Cologne Cathedral being taken by the military authorities in 1918. In spite of all this, and production rising from 46,131 tons in 1914 to 79,789 in 1916 (after which it fell off slightly), there was available only about one-half the amount of copper required, and steel and other metals had to be used as substitute in many articles: driving bands, fuses, fixed ammunition cases and cartridge cases.

There is no list or contents, and an index is lacking.

Les Conditions géographiques de la Guerre. Etude de géographie Militaire sur le front français de 1914 *à* 1918, by Robert Villate, *capitaine d'infanterie breveté, docteur ès lettres* (*Paris, Payot*, 35 *francs*), is a most valuable work, designed to show that "ground is a factor in warfare that it is impossible to neglect." The various

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chapters deal with geology, especially as regards mining and digging deep dug-outs, the volume published by the Institution of Royal Engineers, " Geological Work on the Western Front," being made much use of; the influence of relief, in which the reverse slopes and the fight for observation are discussed; water courses and inundations; woods and forests, as regards cover, defences and supply of timber; towns and villages, as defended points and resources; roads and railways; and meteorology and weather. The final chapter shows how topography determines the lines of invasion. There are seventy-three illustrations and maps, and an extensive bibliography, and the author has had access to official records.

Another section of the German geological account of the theatres of war has been published, describing South-East Macedonia and Asia Minor: *Die Kriegsschauplätze, 1914–1918, geologisch dargestellt. Südostmazedonien und Kleinasien* (*Berlin, Borntraeger*, 15 *marks*), by Prof. Ersmannsdoerffer and others. It has seven maps and seventeen diagrams. Sections previously issued dealt with Alsace, Lorraine, between Meuse and Moselle, Verdun, Argonne and Champagne, Central Balkans.

The Carnegie Endowment has published three more monographs, which are mentioned here as valuable and authoritative sources of information on the subjects to which they refer. The three are: *Les finances de guerre de la France* (15 *francs*); *Les Dépenses de guerre de la France* (20 *francs*); and *La Main-d'Œuvre Etrangère et Coloniale pendant la Guerre* (8 *francs*). The last deals with the North African, Indo-Chinese, Malagasy and Chinese, and foreign white labour employed in France.

Older Campaigns

The campaign of Wagram has been set for the entrance examination to the French *École Supérieure de Guerre*. This has had the result that General Camon has published a study entitled *La Manœuvre de Wagram* (*Paris, Berger Levrault*, 5 *francs*), in which he brings to notice and discusses the more important criticisms of which this campaign of Napoleon has been the subject. A valuable feature of the pamphlet is the list of French books on the operations of 1809, amongst them General Buat's 1809—*de Ratisbonne à*

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Znaim; General Bonnal's *La Manœuvre de Landshut;* Commandant Saski's *Campagne de* 1809 *en Allemagne et en Autriche* (published by the *Section Historique de l'État-Major*, the third volume ending with Essling); and General Pelet's *Guerre de* 1809.

The Staff College, Camberley, on the initiative of the late Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, took up the study of the American Civil War of 1861–1865, more than thirty years ago. The official *Revue Militaire Française* writes in May, 1926, this war *trop longtemps oubliée, est maintenant à l'ordre du jour* at the *École Superieure de Guerre*, and one of its professors, Lieut.-Colonel Daille, has published some of his lectures on it under the title of *Deux leçons de la guerre de Sécession* (*Paris, Berger-Levrault*, 8 *francs*). He has selected the campaign of Gettysburg and Grant's operations in 1864 for study, as holding more important lessons for the French Army than the events of the earlier period, when neither adversary was fully organized or trained for war. In the Gettysburg campaign is exhibited the effect of the gradual exhaustion of the Confederate forces reacting on Lee's strategy and forcing him to a course of hasty and desperate action. In the Wilderness—Spottsylvania—Cold Harbour fighting of 1864 is seen the exact opposite: Grant with superior numbers and equipment, was able to attack his adversary when and where he liked, to keep him incessantly engaged and gradually to wear him down. Colonel Daille is inclined to think that if certain politicians had read an account of the four years' struggle in the United States, they would not have been so much at sea in the conduct of the German war.

Correction

In reviewing Captain Ritter's book *Der Luftkrieg*, in Volume XII, No. 2, of July, 1926, page 415, a mistake was made in attributing to the author himself an opinion adverse to a separate air force, which was quoted from another writer and actually with disapproval. Captain Ritter, as other portions of his book show, is convinced of the advantage of an independent air force.

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REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF RECENT BOOKS AND ARTICLES ON MILITARY SUBJECTS

Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914–1918. By Field-Marshal Sir WILLIAM ROBERTSON, BART., G.C.B., G.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., D.S.O. London: Cassell & Company, Ltd. Two volumes. £2 10s.

The relations existing between the soldiers and statesmen who are responsible for the conduct of war must always be of the utmost importance to the nation; for it is upon their ability to work together that the chances of victory must largely depend. It is well, therefore, that Sir William Robertson has decided to describe the war organization of this country and her Allies during the Great War and to explain his views as to the kind of organization which is required in the future. As Chief of the Imperial General Staff from December, 1915, to February, 1918, Sir William is better qualified to form an accurate judgment than any other living soldier; he is dealing with matters with most of which he was intimately connected, and he has the advantage of being able to quote from official papers, the use of which he fully justifies. It is not surprising, therefore, that his book is not only of great interest but is of real importance as an original contribution to the military and political history of the war, while the ability with which documents prepared by him and his staff are drafted, the lucidity of the narrative and the skill with which his illustrations are embroidered into the thread of the book should make it appeal to all who are interested in the problems of the war.

"Regarded as a general proposition there can be no question that with us . . . the supreme control in war must be civil. There must be a central point of union from which authority can be exercised over all departments alike. That point must be the Cabinet, or such portion of it as may be determined, or the Prime Minister."

On this question Sir William Robertson feels no hesitation—a Minister of Defence in time of war he considers would be valueless as his authority could not be made sufficiently extensive. He continues:

"The function of the civil chief . . . is to appoint the naval and

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military chiefs, avoiding like the plague all idea of balancing suspected inefficiency in these officers by seeking a second opinion from others. If they fail to obtain his confidence they should be replaced not supplemented by those who have it."

So far as our Army is concerned, this military chief must be the C.I.G.S. He alone should be responsible for furnishing the Cabinet with advice on military matters and for giving the orders necessary for executing the policy when approved by it.

These, in fact, are the powers that Sir William Robertson with Lord Kitchener's assent claimed on his appointment. The position was a novel one. Never before had Grand Headquarters in any war been centred at the seat of Government, and not until General Pétain became Chief of the General Staff at Paris nearly two years later was a similar position created elsewhere.

Almost at the same time the general control of the war was vested in the War Committee of the Cabinet—later the War Cabinet —on lines recommended by Sir W. Robertson at an earlier date. The conditions postulated by him as essential for success were thus in principle secured; but how practical difficulties in unified command nevertheless continued to arise is clearly shown in his book.

The great advantage, however, which was secured by the change is demonstrated by reference to the previous chaotic state of affairs. Practically the whole of the existing General Staff at the outbreak of war went to France and Lord Kitchener appears to have placed little confidence in, and still less responsibility upon, the new General Staff that was hastily improvised.

He himself was too much occupied in his gigantic task of forming the new armies to devote himself to the work of planning and carrying through a clearly thought out military policy. It was not surprising that in these circumstances general confusion reigned.

"While the Secretary of State for War was aiming at decisive results on the Western Front, the First Lord of the Admiralty was advocating the seizure of the Dardanelles and Constantinople; the Secretary of State for India and the Indian Government were conducting a campaign in Mesopotamia; the Secretary of State for the Colonies was concerned with operations in various parts of Africa; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer was impressing upon his Cabinet colleagues the strategical advantages to be gained by transferring the main British military effort from the Western Front to the Balkan Peninsula. A more deplorable state of affairs can surely never have existed in the conduct of any war."

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In order to illustrate the disastrous effects of this bewildering lack of central control, Sir William Robertson goes fully into the evidence on the origin and organization of the Gallipoli and Mesopotamia campaigns, and shows how General Staff advice was either not obtained or ignored. Moreover, he brings out clearly the futility of expecting to obtain a satisfactory, final decision in any but the chief theatre of war. Nothing in fact is more apparent than the almost universal conviction of responsible soldiers that success could only be attained by supreme effort in the West as opposed to the desire of many members of the Cabinet for a " Way round to Victory."

His account of the different attitudes of Ministers on military matters when he himself became Chief of the Staff is interesting. Mr. Bonar Law usually hesitated to override military advice, and Mr. Asquith

" was always ready in bad times as in good to support and encourage the army and its leaders in the execution of the tasks assigned to them. From a military standpoint the chief defect in the management of the war during his Premiership was the continuance of the traditional system of collective Cabinet responsibility for all Government action taken."

On the other hand, Mr. Lloyd George as War Minister

" displayed but little sympathy towards the various Commanders-in-Chief with the exception of General Maude, the only general who could yet produce a decisive victory, and he listened with sceptical impatience to any explanations of the difficulties with which these officers had to contend. He preferred his own strategical ideas to those of the General Staff, and of administrative work which seemed to bore him he left as much as possible to be done by the Under-Secretary of State, Lord Derby."

In the Cabinet Committee on War Policy, too,

" the procedure followed . . . was . . . unique. . . . Instead of being received as a military chief, the accuracy of whose views, so far as they were military, were not in dispute, I was made to feel like a witness for the defence under cross-examination, the Prime Minister appearing in the dual capacity of counsel for the prosecution and judge."

The result Sir W. Robertson shows was that although far greater cohesion than before was possible, the new powers of the C.I.G.S. did not finally solve the problem of unified control. To them he attributes the military achievements of 1916, and largely to their neglect the disappointments of the following year. For not only did Mr. Lloyd George and other Ministers continue to resuscitate

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plans previously rejected by the General Staff and by the War Cabinet, but they also neglected, when insisting upon their pet schemes, to calculate their effect on previously approved policies. To these difficulties and to the connection between such problems as shipping, home defence and man-power, with the relationship of soldiers and statesmen, several very interesting chapters are devoted.

Even harder to solve were the problems of inter-Allied Command. The good understanding shown between the French and British Commanders-in-Chief at the beginning of the war could hardly suffice in the place of organized control when it became clear that the war would be of long duration. Moreover, the exhaustion of the French after the Verdun defence and the disappointment of many at the results of the battle of the Somme united to cause friction between the Commanders-in-Chief and their respective Governments. Ministerial intervention was inevitable, and indeed necessary, in order to formulate a common war policy—the form it took we are shown was often unfortunate.

The history of the subordination of Haig to Nivelle is given at length, and a justifiable grievance is expressed that the British officers were not consulted before placing the Army for which they must continue responsible under the direction of a foreign chief

" having no experience in the direction of High Command, and whose optimistic views of the coming campaign were shared by no responsible soldier in the British Army and by few or none in the French."

But when the " Technical Advisers " to the " Executive Committee " were appointed, and when the British representative of the Allies was made independent of the responsible military adviser to the Government, Sir William Robertson shows plainly that the plague of divided control had still not been avoided.

Governments and War. By Major-General Sir F. MAURICE, K.C.M.G., C.B. Heinemann. 8*s.* 6*d.* net.

This is one of the most important military books that have appeared of recent years, and one which deserves the close study of every individual, soldier or civilian, who has his country's welfare at heart. It deals, as its title indicates, with the relation between policy and strategy in wartime; between the Government which directs the war, and its servants, the military leaders who conduct it. The book abounds in thought-provoking matter and interesting suggestions which should at least help to focus public attention on this vital question, the solution of which has been generally

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recognized as peculiarly difficult in democractically-governed countries, but which nevertheless, if not solved, may well disastrously affect Great Britain's fortunes when next she goes to war.

The first part of General Maurice's book is devoted to a consideration from a historical point of view of the conduct of war by a democratic Government. He draws his examples from the American Civil War, since, in his opinion, we are too close to the Great War for our information to be complete or our judgment impartial. He then studies first of all the relations between Jefferson Davis, the President of the Southern Confederacy, and his two principal military lieutenants, Joe Johnston and Lee ; and next those of Lincoln with McClellan and with Grant. His conclusions are that Davis, with whom a little knowledge was in truth a dangerous thing, never got the best value out of either of his military advisers, because he neither laid down a clear policy for them, nor allowed them to do their own work without interference ; while Lincoln, after a series of unsuccessful experiments with McClellan, finally devised, on Grant's appointment to supreme command, a sound system which brought victory to the North. This system was that Grant had the military control of all the Union Armies to plan and carry out his campaign at will ; Halleck, the Chief of Staff at Washington, acted as channel for correspondence between him and Lincoln ; and the latter's rôle was that of supporting his General, supplying him with what he required, and controlling and coordinating the national effort for the attainment of the object of the war.

From this historical argument General Maurice passes on to what will probably be for most people the most interesting portion of his book—the discussion of what would be the ideal system for the conduct of war by a democratic Government such as our own. He considers it necessary for such a system to be thought out and laid down before the outbreak of hostilities, if it is to be useful when war comes. It must clearly define, for the benefit of all concerned, the respective functions and powers of the statesman and the soldier, and the degree of control to be exercised by the former over the latter. The lack of such a prepared system has in the past cost us heavily in money and lives, and this gap in our preparations for war must be adequately filled before war comes upon us again. In this contention few soldiers at any rate will disagree with the author ; but when he comes to the question of the ideal system which he thinks should be established, he is on more debatable ground. Briefly, he disapproves of War Councils and War

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Cabinets of statesmen with soldiers in attendance, which he considers too slow-working and clumsy, and he suggests that as in the American Civil War Lincoln was his own War Cabinet, so in any future war our Prime Minister should assume a sort of temporary dictatorship, and take over sole responsibility for the conduct of the war. Advising him would be the three Chiefs of Staff, who would also be responsible for the carrying out of the tasks allotted to their respective Services. This General Maurice states to have been the practice of Chatham in the Seven Years' War, and he believes that we cannot do better than follow this excellent example. But it must not be forgotten that Chatham was by no means guiltless of the sin of trespassing on the legitimate province of the soldier; and also that he was brought to power actually in time of war, when our fortunes were at a low ebb, and was promptly discarded when the danger had passed. Is it conceivable that a proposal to give any Prime Minister, however able and popular, a dictator's powers even in the most extreme case of public necessity, would ever be passed by a British Parliament unless and until that dire necessity arose? Doubts such as these, however, in no way detract from the great interest and value of the book, which should appeal to all those who are responsible in any way for the well-being of this country—that is, to every intelligent voter and certainly to every thinking soldier.

All the World's Aircraft, 1926. Compiled and edited by C. G. GREY. Sampson Low. 42*s*.

This somewhat belated issue of this invaluable work, brought up to date more or less to the end of July of this year, is easier to handle and contains at the same time more information than any of its predecessors. Perhaps the most heartening fact which emerges from a survey of the aircraft of the world, is the wide and growing popularity of British aero engines. Aeroplanes and seaplanes, civil, military and naval, are in many continental countries equipped with British engines, the reliability of which has been emphasized by some notable long-distance flights during the year. The general public have had ample opportunity to follow the splendid civilian achievements, but the Service flights have attracted little attention. It is gratifying to find the more important of them set out here, the most noteworthy, perhaps, being the 14,000-mile journey, led by Wing-Commander C. W. H. Pulford, from Cairo to Cape Town and back via Cairo to England. This flight was made on four

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Fairey D111 biplanes fitted with the 450 horse-power Napier "Lion" engine.

The types of aircraft in use in the Royal Air Force are set out in some detail, and a close study of the sections wherein the performances of these types are analysed, will give a pretty shrewd idea of the combative air-strength of this country. It is stated that the Royal Air Force is being steadily re-equipped, and that the last of the war-time designs will soon be no more. Many navies, including our own, are experimenting with the launching of aircraft by catapult from the decks of ships. In this sphere, the Italian and American navies have had notable success. All the material is in this book for a further study of the progress of civil aviation at home, and of civil and military aviation in all the countries of the Empire, and when this is considered and the fact of our engine predominance in many foreign markets is remembered, the most dismal critic must agree that the air position of this country is splendidly sound and is now firmly based for future expansion.

Two foreign sections of this work are particularly interesting this year. They are those dealing with France and Russia. The French authorities, it is stated, refused information, but the French section seems, nevertheless, to be singularly comprehensive, a fact for which tribute is paid to Major W. E. de B. Whittaker and to M. Henri Bouché. The *Aéronautique Militaire* is still an arm of the French Army administered as is any other arm of the Service. The tactical unit, the *escadrille*, is weaker than the British squadron. Its establishment, according to its duties, provides for from eight to ten first-line aeroplanes. The Army has a total of 135 *escadrilles*. The French naval Air Service is similarly an arm of the Navy. The naval *escadrille* has an establishment of from 12 to 15 aeroplanes or seaplanes, according to type, but although a Bill sanctioning 50 naval *escadrilles* and a number of airship units, was submitted to the French Parliament more than three years ago, little progress in the building up of the new units seems to have been made.

The Soviet authorities have a lively appreciation of the military value of aircraft, and talk of an Air Fleet that will be the most powerful in the world. However that may be, the fact remains that great strides have been and are being made. An intensive internal propaganda has gone on side by side with the construction of many up-to-date military aerodromes. There are to be bases for seaplanes along the Baltic, Black and Caspian Seas. The fruits of this keen enthusiasm for the air are worth watching. The book is well illustrated and well produced.

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The Armies of the First French Republic and the rise of the Marshals of Napoleon I. The Armée du Nord. By the late Colonel RAMSAY WESTON PHIPPS, formerly of the Royal Artillery. Oxford University Press, London: Humphrey Milford. 1926. 18*s.* net.

A very distinguished leader was once asked by a zealous young officer which campaigns could most profitably be studied. "All," replied the great man with decision, "from the struggle between Cain and Abel down to the latest affair on some frontier." It is evident, therefore, that, apart from its inherent interest, the history of the great *Armée du Nord*, which is dealt with in this volume, must find an honoured place in the library of every efficient regiment.

After his retirement from the Regular Army the late Colonel Ramsay Phipps devoted, for forty years, all the time that was not taken up in many public duties, to the study of the Napoleonic era of war; and at his death he left a quantity of typescript dealing principally with the lives of Napoleon's Marshals, the greater part of which had been carefully revised and checked. The book that is now published, under the editorship of his son, Colonel Charles Phipps, is issued as a first instalment of, and introduction to, the rest of the work; and as the editor points out is intended to be "a history of men and of the times they lived in rather than a critical study of military operations." It is presented to the public in the hope of eliciting opinion, or advice, as to the line that a second volume should follow.

There are, as Colonel Ramsay Phipps admits, certain "inconveniences, not many I hope, of my system of following the history of each army separately." There are some also in the system of dealing with the history of an army as a background to the lives of the Marshals to be, who in most cases were subordinates not protagonists in its campaigns; for the greatest interest lies naturally in the actions of the men in high authority in the *Armée du Nord* who did not become Marshals, such as Dumouriez, Dampierre, Custine, Kilmaine, Houchard, Pichegru, not in those of the lower ranks. A clear picture, however, is given of the circumstances in which the future Marshals who were in the *Armée du Nord* served their apprenticeships. And the reader sees that, from 1791 to 1794, the Army was fully impregnated with the unrest of the revolutionary period, that no one's position was secure from hour to hour, that indiscipline and its inevitable accompaniment of the predominating influence in the ranks of the wordy cowards were rife, and that

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without tact, foresight, a cool head, and an aptitude for judicious intrigue, promotion was unlikely to be obtained. The Army, however, by mere association had improved considerably, as the British found at Turcoing, even before the first *amalgame* in 1795; when the old Regular units of the Monarchy, "the stay on which the army rested," and the newly-raised volunteers of the National Guard, who up to that time had been kept separate, were grouped much in the same way as was done in 1917 in the British Armies in France.

There is a popular impression, which was strongly voiced at one period in the Great War of 1914–1918, that Napoleon's Marshals owed their rise to their brain-power. This is not borne out by the details given in Colonel Phipps' careful book, for it is shown that brains must be associated with many other qualities if they are to be of use in war. Whether the future Marshals had brains or not the reader must judge, but there can be no doubt that the ten or eleven of them—there were twenty-five in all—who rose from the ranks, and the five who were civilians before the revolution, were remarkable men. Two of them, for instance, became kings, and Jourdan went from private in four years to the command of an army of 104,000 men.

The *Nord*, says Colonel Phipps, "was not a good school for commanders. Although Bernadotte, Murat, Davout, Mortier, and Ney served for a time in this army, it was Jourdan, Macdonald, with Moreau (who emigrated and was not a Marshal) who were the commanders trained in the Nord, and "their faults may be attributed to it . . . for a general who has seen bad tactics and worse strategy win the day is less likely to find the way to success." This may be so, but surely a few years' service cannot produce inherent qualities like "overdaring mixed with unnecessary caution and depression," but they may, of course, be developed by association and training.

The book has a useful index. The maps are clear, but might with advantage be mentioned in the text. One or two names of places are spelt differently in the maps and text, and, in map 2, the Roer is shown as flowing past Huy, whereas it is the Meuse which does so.

Secret and Confidential. By Brigadier-General W. H.-H. WATERS, C.M.G., C.V.O. London: John Murray, 1926. 18*s.* net.

When the publication of "Secret and Confidential" matter no longer denotes "indiscretion" it sometimes loses flavour, as in the

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case of General Waters's journey to Central Asia in 1894, and perhaps also in the lengthy account of how he was prevented, in 1905, from rejoining the Russian Army in Manchuria and what followed on this incident. Nevertheless so clever a man, although he calls himself " a very ordinary person," and wonderful linguist, who was behind the scenes both during the twenty years before the Great War and also while it was in progress—the frontispiece is a photograph of " The author with the Emperor of Russia, September, 1916 "—must have much that is of interest to relate. And General Waters tells his story well in spite of a habit of making digressions, and although he seems at times to have taken in earnest what perhaps was said in jest.

Other people may have had a " great pull " at headquarters, but General Waters very often managed to get what he wanted, and, in the teeth therefore of the objections of the officer commanding the battery in which he was serving, he succeeded in 1891 in joining the Intelligence Division of the War Office. After various adventures in obtaining information—a good story is told of the fate of the copies of a report on the possibility of forcing the Dardanelles—he was appointed in 1893 to be military attaché at St. Petersburg; the appointment being made at the instance of Lord Rosebery, the Foreign Secretary, who " defeated the whole of the British Army led by the Duke of Cambridge." On his way to Russia General Waters met the late Colonel Repington in Berlin, whose opinion of the Germans and their Army was, he says, altogether perverted by " a good deal of beer drinking " which " did not agree with him." The consequence, it seems, was serious, for Colonel Repington, who in 1913 had a great reputation, then wrote in *The Times* that " the German Army could by no possibility endure a campaign for more than six months because the physique of its beer-drinking officers would not be able to stand the strain for any length of time. . . . Sir John French, Grierson and others of great influence shared this view: their personal prejudices and ambitions had blinded them to facts."

General Waters thoroughly enjoyed his tour of duty in Russia, although he got into trouble for advocating that the British and Russians should have a coterminous frontier in Asia. After a brief period of service in the field in South Africa, he went for three years to Berlin as military attaché, but has comparatively little to say in regard to his experiences there. In 1904 he left the Army, but, as he was too valuable to be lost, he was soon afterwards reinstated, and was one of the British officers who was attached to the Russian

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forces during the Russo-Japanese war. As a result of what he then saw a scheme for national service in Great Britain was drawn up, but was not accepted. " When the crash came, in 1914, my scheme, put forward nine years previously was adopted in hot haste. . . ." In 1906 he was appointed to command the British troops in North China, but in 1910 retired for the second time. General Waters was employed again in 1914, and in 1916 was for a time the senior British military representative at the headquarters of the Russian armies. On his return to England his fears of a revolution in Russia induced him to write directly in 1917 to the Emperor, " for the time was getting on and my anxiety about Protopopov's policy had in no way diminished "; but apparently the letter did not reach the Emperor.

The author's statements cannot remain unchallenged that: " the certain invasion of Belgium (in 1914) had either been overlooked or dismissed from account before the war came "; and that " it was just chance which power (Germany or France) would be the technical aggressor " in entering Belgium. If credit may be given to the writings of Generals Berthaut, Dupont and Lanrezac, the invasion of Belgium was not overlooked; and General Palat sums up the matter when he says: " *On ne différait guère que sur l'extension du mouvement allemand, les uns croyant qu'il serait limité à la Meuse, les autres admettant qu'il se prolongerait à l'ouest.*" As regards the invasion of Belgium by the French, it may be pointed out that their strategical concentration was at any rate not at all well adapted for doing so, and it appears that: " *l'idée maitresse du général-en-chef était l'offensive par le Haut-Rhin* . . ." and not in Belgium.

Camp and Chancery in a Soldier's Life. By Major-General Sir Leopold Swaine, K.C.B., C.M.G. London: John Murray. 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

Those who can pick up Sir Leopold Swaine's " sequence of stories " without finding something of interest, amusement, and also instruction, wherever they begin to read, must be hard to please; for, in a career of extraordinary variety even for a British soldier, he met, and in some cases knew intimately, many of the men and women who made history in the last years of the nineteenth century.

Some idea of the scope of General Swaine's stories will be gathered when it is stated that, after about a dozen years of regimental duty, he was chosen in 1870 to work among the French prisoners of war in Germany for the British Royal Red Cross. He

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was then, for a couple of years, an adjutant of Volunteers. Next he was for about six months a special service officer in Cyprus; then for seven months he was military attaché in St. Petersburg; next military attaché in Constantinople, and, while holding this appointment, was, in 1881, one of the international commission that supervised "the new frontier delimitation between Turkey and Greece." General Swaine was with Lord Wolseley in 1882 in Egypt as Military Secretary; was military attaché in Berlin from 1883–1889, except when in 1884 he again accompanied Lord Wolseley as Military Secretary during the expedition that attempted to relieve Khartoum. And, after commanding a battalion, he was for a second time military attaché in Berlin from 1892–1896.

Officers who are curious to hear of the ways in which intelligence can be obtained will find good examples in the manner in which General Swaine learned of the proposed advance of the Russians to Merv in 1879; and how he got information in 1880 in regard to the feasibility of disembarking a force on the Gallipoli Peninsula. There are many characteristic anecdotes of the Kaiser William II; and there is a ghost story in regard to the great Field-Marshal Count von Moltke, who was seen fully dressed—why are ghosts dressed?—some hours after his death. And British pride will be flattered by the tale how the Duke of Edinburgh refloated a large liner, which had gone aground in the Kiel Canal when it was opened in 1895.

India under Lord Ellenborough. Edited by Sir ALGERNON LAW. John Murray. 10*s.* 6*d.*

Fourscore years have passed since Ellenborough, after two years of office, in which he brought to a successful conclusion three wars, for only one of which he was himself responsible, was recalled by the Court of Directors. His nephew considers that Whig calumnies have so poisoned the well of truth, that Ellenborough's great work in India has not yet received full recognition. Accordingly, he has now edited "a selection from the hitherto unpublished papers and secret despatches" of his uncle, adding an introduction dealing with certain points of his administration and several appendices. Some of the documents are of first-class importance, *e.g.* Ellenborough's letter to Lord Ripon, President of the Board of Control, on his recall, a detailed reply to the charges of the Directors; the minute on the Gwalior disturbances, in which he laid down the principles which should govern the relations of the paramount Power to a dependent State; and the despatch to the

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Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, justifying his policy in regard to Scinde. Ellenborough was keenly sensitive to the danger which threatened British rule in India from the Punjab after the death of Runjeet Singh. He saw that the conflict would be "not for empire only, but for life." The condition of the Army made him anxious to postpone the issue at least till November, 1845, and by the annexation of Scinde he aimed at "substituting the Indus for the Ganges as the line of military communication between England and the N.W. Provinces."

A memorandum and a letter of the Duke of Wellington to Ripon, included in this volume, prove that the Cabinet was far from approving Ellenborough's recall, but in the face of the Court of Directors' decision was virtually helpless.

That Ellenborough brought his fate upon himself by his lack of tact is obvious criticism, but his independent attitude was deliberately adopted. His experience as President of the Board of Control had convinced him of the necessity of terminating the Company's share in the administration of the country. Fourteen years after his recall he attained his object.

The American Civil War. By DAVID KNOWLES. Clarendon Press, Oxford. *7s. 6d.*

This brief sketch of "the causes, characteristics, personalities and consequences" of the Civil War will serve in many respects as a useful introduction to further study of the subject. It is well written in a flowing and graphic style, which helps to communicate to the reader the author's enthusiasm for his theme. His treatment of the causes is scrupulously fair to both sides, and, in spite of his sympathy with the best features of Southern civilization, he admits that politically the South was wrong and secession a fatal error.

His personalities are four: Lee, Lincoln, Jackson and Grant. The first two are the protagonists in the drama, Lee, "the greatest soldier of his day," bearing on his shoulders the fortunes of the Confederacy but robbed of success by Jackson's untimely death and because "he was perpetually thwarted by Davis"; Lincoln, the one man who saved the Union and made the abolition of slavery immediately possible. In praise of Lincoln he waxes dithyrambic, seeing in him the ideal democratic statesman of the ages. "Lincoln is unique, because almost alone among statesmen he went far to bridge the space that lies between strength and sympathy." This is finely said and affords food for thought. Jackson and Grant

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necessarily fall into the second place. Jackson is the master tactician, but with flaws in his character, which would have disqualified him as Lee's successor. To Grant and his policy of attrition rather less than justice seems to be done.

The broad outlines of the war and its chief characteristics are clearly and fairly set forth, but it can hardly be accepted that in the Kentucky-Tennessee area " the Confederates had on the whole gained ground " during the first two years of fighting. It is when the author comes to deal with military operations in any detail that he ceases to be a safe guide. He has but an imperfect acquaintance with military organization and continually misapplies the terms " division " and " brigade." Sometimes it is an army corps which he calls indifferently by either name. The student will be sadly misled, when he reads how Thomas's "single division" put up a magnificent fight " against the whole of Bragg's victorious army " at Chickamanga, and the picture of " Early's brigade " threatening Washington is almost grotesque. In his account of battles extending over more than one day the author through excess of condensation is apt to convey a false impression. In " the Seven Days " reference is made to Jackson's failure to help A. P. Hill in the opening of the attack, but no allusion is made to his fatal delay three days later at White Oak Swamp. In the Chancellorsville campaign Sedgwick is barely mentioned. Consequently, the full significance of Lee's manœuvres is missed. For some mysterious reason Howard's Corps, which Jackson surprised, is placed on Hooker's left. Mr. Knowles makes other strange mistakes. Jubal Early was not killed in the last days of fighting round Richmond. Atlanta did not " fall into Sherman's hands a few days before the attempt in the Crater at Petersburg " but a full month later. Lee did not march down the Shenandoah Valley to invade Maryland in 1862. It was not D. H. Hill, but his namesake, who temporarily succeeded to Jackson's command at Chancellorsville.

It is matter for regret that errors of this kind should have been allowed to mar a work which is otherwise of distinct merit and whose value is increased by an excellent though limited bibliography.

Imperial Defence, 1588–1914. By Colonel J. F. C. FULLER, D.S.O. Sifton Praed. 3*s*. 6*d*. net.

In this little volume of about one hundred pages Colonel Fuller, whose pen seems seldom to be idle, looks back on the past, and narrates in a brief form, suitable for soldiers who have little time to spend on reading, the growth of Imperial defence up to the outbreak

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of the Great War. The British Empire he finds to be based on five principles: domestic peace, the balance of power, security of frontiers, command of the sea, and Colonial self-government. He then shows how in our history these principles were recognized or ignored, and the consequences of such recognition or neglect on the fortunes of British arms in our various wars, from the defeat of the Armada to what he calls "the climax of unpreparedness" on the eve of the Great War. As for the outlook for the future, the author declares in his conclusion that by our acceptance of the creed of self-determination and our entanglement in the League of Nations and in the Washington Treaty, we have already abandoned all five of the principles on which our Empire has in the past been built up, and have as yet found no others to replace them. We should be wise, he considers, to act as we did in 1815: get behind our sea-wall—which, be it noted, is by no means so effective a protection now as then—and establish on a firmer footing than ever the British League of Nations—our Empire. The book is within its limits as good reading as any of the author's works, and affords much stimulus for thought on a subject which has been much in the public mind during the recent Imperial Conference.

A Greater Than Napoleon—Scipio Africanus. By Captain B. H. LIDDELL HART. Blackwood's. 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

The grounds on which Captain Liddell Hart, one of the most prominent of the modern school of military writers, bases Scipio's claim to a place among the greatest soldiers in history are his threefold greatness as a general, as a man and as a statesman. As a general Scopio showed, according to Captain Liddell Hart, "a unique understanding of war in its three spheres—mental, moral and physical, and of their interplay, and successfully translated this understanding into effective action," in a manner unrivalled either by Alexander or Cæsar in ancient, or by Napoleon in modern, times. His private character combined all the personal domestic virtues of the Roman with the love of civilization and culture of the Greek. He was, as an earlier biographer said, "greater than the greatest of bad men, and better than the reputed best of good men." As a statesman he raised Rome from a mere second-rate Power to be the mistress of the whole Mediterranean world, and this he achieved not by the absorption, but by the control, of the peoples he had conquered, by the formation not of a Roman Empire, but of a Roman confederation. For him, in fact, the true end of war was a more perfect peace. These far-reaching claims Captain Liddell

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Hart endeavours to substantiate by an exhaustive and admirably-written narrative of Scipio's career, which, if it can hardly be said conclusively to prove the writer's claim to his hero's preeminence over Napoleon, at least serves to establish Scipio as a very great soldier and a very great man.

Memoirs of Sergeant Bourgogne, 1812–1813. PETER DAVIES. 10*s*. 6*d*. *net*.

As Mr. Fortescue says in his introduction to this authorized translation of Sergeant Bourgogne's memoirs, the older volumes of military reminiscences, purporting to be the authentic experiences of non-commissioned officers and men, should be used with the greatest caution; while those of officers do not always go much less adorned with fiction. But there is no doubt at all that he is right in claiming that Bourgogne's book bears the unmistakable stamp of truth. This is so even in his inaccuracies, or rather his over-accuracy, as when he insists on the exact degree of temperature, or the exact number of corpses, or the exact date: all is merged in his obvious straining after truth.

As a story, this diary can hardly be beaten; and few indeed are the military heroes in fiction who are worth Picart of the Grenadiers of the Old Guard and Sergeant Grangier of the author's regiment, the Fusilier-Grenadiers of the Imperial Guard. It is also invaluable as a study in the psychology of soldiers; and no one, ruminating on the nature and needs of discipline, could find better material than its artless and authentic evidence. In this connection Mr. Fortescue is perhaps a little severe in quoting, as testimony to the absence of discipline, the fact that within an hour of halting in Moscow, in spite of orders against "leaving the camp," the place was filled with every delicacy that could be plundered. The regiment was marched to the Place du Gouvernement: "we were told that the regiment was to camp, and that no one . . . was to absent himself. . . . We went to the houses in the Place asking for food and drink, but as we found no one in them we helped ourselves." In such circumstances "the houses in the Place" allowed the thin edge of a distinction to be inserted between the spirit and the letter of the order; the lesson is rather against that most fruitful cause of friction in all the affairs of war—insufficient clearness in the framing of orders. It is true that the discipline of the *Grande Armée* was very different from that of British ways of thinking; but, as Mr. Fortescue is careful to point out, our own variety has proved as breakable in disaster—notably in the retreat to the Ems

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in the winter of 1794–1795. "Human nature," as he says, "is human nature; and there is little difference in the main characteristics of all soldiers, male and female, at all times, of all races."

Whether for the historian, the regimental student of men, or the lover of true adventure, the value of this simple epic of suffering and heroism and disaster, of selfishness, of rapacity, of the breakdown of discipline side by side with the triumph of the military spirit, of the hold on his troops of him who was sufficiently designated for them by the words *l'Homme* and of the incomparable Ney, is enhanced and completed by the dozen admirable lithographs from the exquisite drawings of Faber du Faur. This lieutenant in Ney's cavalry, a complete stranger to Bourgogne, made his original sketches on the spot, and finished them soon after the campaign's close. Were the drawings by the same hand as the writing they could not have illustrated more perfectly this terrible story. Together they make a book which above all makes the reader understand—a book to buy and to keep.

Gallipoli To-day. By T. J. PEMBERTON. Ernest Benn. 10*s*. 6*d*. *net*.

The purpose of Mr. Pemberton's book is to give such a picture of Gallipoli and its cemeteries and memorials as may take the place of a personal pilgrimage, since very few of those bereaved in the campaign can make one; and he also intends it for the information of a younger generation, less bitterly read in the deeds and deaths commemorated.

He gives a clear description of the topography, and follows it with an account of the progress of the work of the Imperial War Graves Commission, which finished its labours by the autumn of 1924, and with a chapter designed to supply local colour to the topographical account. The rest of the book is a more detailed description of the various cemeteries and monuments; and a full account of the unveiling of the New Zealand memorial on Chunuk Bair contains the order of the service and the text of Sir Alexander Godley's address. With over sixty excellently reproduced photographs the book is well fitted for its pious object of providing a vicarious pilgrimage. It is to be regretted that General Sir Ian Hamilton, in his short introduction, should strike a jarring note of recrimination concerning matters in which controversy has by no means confined adverse criticism to the quarters to which Sir Ian directs it.

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Journal of the Society of Army Historical Research. Vol. V., No. 22. October to December, 1926. Sir W. C. Leng & Co., Sheffield. 6*s*.

This number is considerably larger than usual. A dozen very interesting prints, dating from 1689 onwards, are reproduced from an article in " The Print Collector's Quarterly " by Colonel C. de W. Crookshank. Captain Philip Browne's Fontenoy letters are completed on his regiment's return to England in February, 1746, and deal chiefly with the purchase of his captaincy. Sir Thomas Fairfax's account of the northern fighting ends at Marston Moor; and another interesting diary is started—that of Major Thomas Downman, R.H.A. (April, 1811, to August, 1812), a great diner-out, who speaks feelingly of Wellington's lack of feeling. An especially interesting article in this very fully illustrated number (there are two large maps and twenty-five illustrations) is Colonel Field's on the Army uniforms and weapons portrayed in a stained glass window in Farndon Church, Cheshire (1643). The " Notes, Questions and Replies " are also very interesting—the account and print of a review by the Prince Regent of 20,000 Volunteers at Wimbledon in 1811 may be instanced.

The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Chronicle, 1925. Eyre and Spottiswoode.

The 43rd departed for the Rhine in January, 1925, and the 52nd is still in India, so these records of the Regiment contain more variety than those of the previous year. In Germany the 1st Battalion was well to the fore in all sports, although the cricket grounds are spoken of disparagingly. Both Battalions provide a short account of manœuvres from the strictly regimental viewpoint. The 2nd Battalion summarizes its experiences upon the Indian frontier, whilst the Depôt describes two excellent runs with the Bicester and a very successful torchlight tattoo.

It is interesting to learn that no action is to be taken with regard to preparing a history of the Regiment in the late war, seeing that the war numbers of the Chronicle are available. Meanwhile, General Higgins is contributing war narratives to the new Regimental Journal and the work of filling the gap in the proceeding with the pre-war history has been put in hand.

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Notes on the Campaign in France, 1914. From the beginning of Hostilities to the end of the Battle of the Marne. By Lieut.-Colonel A. KEARSEY, D.S.O. Sifton Praed & Co. 3*s*.

Covering as it does the period selected for next year's Promotion Examinations and for the Army entrance examination of R.M.C. cadets and Territorial and Special Reserve officers, this little book is intended as an aid to those preparing for either of these ordeals. The notes may well enable students who lack such guidance to work upon a definite plan. But there is no reference to the books which should be studied, and much of the tabulated information here presented is better sought in the first volume of the Official History.

International Law. A Treatise by L. OPPENHEIM, M.A., LL.D. Vol. II., Disputes, War, and Neutrality. 4th edition, edited by ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, C.B.E., LL.D. Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd. 42*s*.

The war volume of the late Professor Oppenheim's standard work was first published in 1906 and revised by him for a second edition which appeared in 1912. The third edition, edited by Mr. Ronald E. Roxburgh, came in 1921. In again bringing the text up to date Dr. McNair has had to take cognizance of many fresh activities of the League of Nations and such important international treaties as those of Washington, 1922, and Lausanne, 1923. So it is no matter for surprise that over seventy pages have had to be added to the text. The establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice is responsible for twenty of these. Furthermore considerable re-casting has been inevitable, but, as the editor says, if any reader wants " the author's *ipsissima verba* " he must consult the second edition and examine the third in the light of Mr. Roxburgh's preface.

Though this work can hardly be of much practical value to the soldier, a dip into it may cause him to wonder when, if ever, the " Manual of Military Law " will be brought up to date.

A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918. By Major R. EVANS, M.C., *p.s.c.* Sifton Praed & Co. 12*s*. 6*d*.

We can thoroughly recommend this book. The author states in his preface that to try to deal with a four years' war in a book of 135 pages is to lay oneself open to criticism. In this case there can be little adverse criticism. He has succeeded in giving a history of

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the campaign in a manner that will make the book useful and interesting to all. The difficulties and problems which faced the commanders are fully discussed, the various actions are described shortly but clearly, and the author's criticisms are sound and impartial. His reflections on the campaign in the last chapter are interesting and well thought out. There are four good maps, which make the work of following the narrative easy.

The Chinese Army as a Military Force. By LAWRENCE IMPEY. Tientsin Press. 12*s.* 6*d.*

This is a second and enlarged edition. The author writes from first-hand knowledge as he was with Marshal Wu Pei-Fu's Army for a considerable time. He describes in detail the various arms and administrative reviews of the Army and comes to the conclusion that, if well handled, the Chinese soldier would be first class. There is a short account of the Civil War of 1925 in North China. It is hard to follow the narrative of the operations as the only maps are two " sketch " maps with no scale or explanation. There are numerous photographs which are interesting.

Imperial Military Geography. By Captain D. H. COLE, M.B.E. 3rd edition. 396 pp. and index. Sifton Praed & Co. 10*s.*

That Captain Cole's book has been found of value to the military student is amply proved by the fact that a third edition has become necessary less than two years after its first appearance.

The book has been considerably enlarged and revised. There is a new chapter dealing with the climates of the Empire. Among other alterations are a description of Great Britain, an account of the modern States of Arabia and a description of the northern and north-eastern frontiers of India. There are some very useful new maps.

The chapter on the Gateways of India seems to be inaccurately named. " India " by itself would be sufficient and more accurate. Some of the marginal headings also seem to need revision, for instance, the notes on the fighting races of Africa could as correctly be entitled " The peoples of Africa."

The spelling of place names, notably on the Middle East map on page 318, does not always follow the generally accepted spelling, *e.g. Sherghat* for *Shergat*. It is suggested that the next edition should follow the R.G.S. spelling.

The bibliography at the end of each chapter is extremely useful

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as also are the appendices at the end, which deal with constitutions and governments of the dominions and colonies.

The index might with advantage be revised. At present it is very largely a gazetteer. The author should try to index the next edition on broader lines and with a view to probable questions likely to arise in the mind of the young officer studying for a military examination. It would be useful if the index contained references to the marginal headings, for instance.

Except for the small defects pointed out above this is an extremely valuable contribution to the literature of military geography and no military library should consider itself complete without a copy. A very good point is that the author keeps off politics and personal bias.

History of the Maratha People. By C. A. KINCAID, C.V.O., I.C.S. and RAO BAHADUR D. B. PARASNIS. Vol. III. From the death of Shahu to the end of the Chitpavan epic, 1715–1818. Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

This is the third and last volume of a book which gives a thrilling account of the glorious history of the Maratha Empire from the earliest times to its conquest by the forces of the Honourable East India Company. As the Authors say the book is mainly written for Indian readers, otherwise one might be tempted to criticize the somewhat confusing recital of Indian names.

The history of the Marathas is one of continuous warfare and the reader is inclined to wonder how or when the peasantry found time to cultivate their land; yet we are told that when the Peshwa surrendered in 1818 the British took over a prosperous country.

There is no doubt that the Marathas have a history of which any nation with the fighting spirit might well be proud, for, in addition to a magnificent empire in the Deccan, they at one time were the dominant Power in India, holding even Delhi and the Mogul Emperor in fief.

It is of interest to the soldier to note that it was not until the Marathas began to abandon the guerilla tactics of which they were masters in favour of European tactics which required lines of communication that their military power began to decline. Conversely, had the Marathas been less militarily minded and more given to peaceful pursuits, they might never have come up against the English Company and incurred the penalty of annexation.

Gallant though they were in battle, campaigns seemed quite as

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frequently to be won by bribery and treachery as by actual fighting. The following typical quotation illustrates this : " This (Daulatabad) was stubbornly defended by the commandant until he, too, was won over by the payment of a lakh and a half and a jaghir of thirty-five thousand rupees a year." Any one reading this book cannot fail to notice the extraordinary similarity between strategy of the Maratha leaders and that of the present-day Chinese War Lords who only use their troops to back up their diplomacy. The policy seems to be first of all to try and induce one's adversary to retire or change sides by promises and bribes and only in the last extremity to fight the obdurate remnant.

So far as the rank and file were concerned, in their fighting spirit and their tactics they closely resembled the Scottish Highland clans in their wars with England, and that they have not lost this fighting spirit is amply proved by the prowess of the Maratha regiments in the Great War.

The book throws some interesting light on the history of British India as also on that of many present-day Indian states. Mr. Kincaid was in the Indian Civil Service and writes, therefore, with considerable authority. That the book is carefully written is proved by the imposing bibliographical list at the beginning. It is a pity that the publishers made the mistake of binding in the first chapter in duplicate, but this hardly detracts from the value of the book.

An interesting and possibly a controversial quotation is " Clive now set himself to imitate the French methods of training Indian soldiers. Fired by his spirit and subjected to strict discipline the English sepoys soon became the equal of the French."

The index to personal and place names at the end will make the book useful to students and other seekers after information.

Aerial Surveying by Rapid Methods. By B. MELVILL JONES and Major J. C. GRIFFITHS. Cambridge University Press, 1925. 16*s.* net.

" The main purpose of this book is to discuss the possibilities of aerial photography as a means of surveying and mapping the earth, and to describe a series of experiments made by the authors at Cambridge."

This is probably the most valuable contribution to the literature of aerial surveying that has yet been published. In a fair and well-reasoned foreword Professor Melvill Jones describes how the book came to be written and pays tribute to all those who cooperated in

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its production, stressing his great sense of loss at the untimely death of his distinguished collaborator, Major Griffiths, who met his death, as the result of a flying accident, before the actual writing of the book.

As Captain Hamshaw Thomas, who writes the preface, says,

"One of the characters of the modern world is its dependence on maps. . . . Those who live in a small country like England, which has been accurately mapped in great detail, can scarcely realize the difficulties and drawbacks of life in a country whose maps are of an imperfect description. . . . Moreover in some places forests, mountains, or other difficulties render the task of surveying ground detail almost impossible."

It is in such countries as are indicated above that aerial survey becomes of very great value. The North-West Frontier of India is a case in point where the mountainous nature of the country and the hostile attitude of the indigenous population render ground survey expensive, difficult and dangerous.

"In all forms of aerial surveying which are required to give anything more than a series of disconnected views of the ground, two problems have to be faced; it is necessary—

"(1) To cover the ground with photographs which leave no gaps between them;

"(2) To construct a true map from the photographs."

The second problem involves difficulties which are being steadily overcome by scientific development, and it is now possible to construct a map from air photographs by means of a machine known as an Autocartograph.

The first problem, however, contains so much of the human factor as to make it much the more difficult of the two. If a series of aerial photographs are to be of any use to the cartographer, it is essential to have: (i) pilots and observers experienced in this kind of work; (ii) machines of high ceiling and steady platform; and (iii) the latest and best instruments, e.g. cameras and aids to navigation. It is necessary to realize, also, what a large amount of preliminary work can and must be carried out on the ground before the survey machine takes the air. It is, of course, absurd to suppose that any pilot can go up and take photographs from which reliable maps can be made. To take a useful strip of photographs the machine must be flown straight and level. It must also be flown over a definite line from one mark to another. Moreover, this process must be repeated in overlapping parallel lines until the required area is covered. If the pilot is inexperienced in aerial survey work,

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his attempt at photographing an area will result in a patchwork of curved strips with gaps in the mosaic which will have to be filled in by subsequent flights, thus adding to time and cost.

Broadly speaking there are two methods of carrying out an aerial survey, one, the " mosaic " method which, as described above, aims at covering a definite area (say, one hundred square miles) with strips of overlapping vertical photographs, and the other, known as the " navigational control " system, in which the area is photographed in strips at a definite interval, say, ten miles, the machine using a multiple-lens camera which takes both vertical and oblique photographs simultaneously. One of the objects of the obliques is to enable the position of the camera in space to be plotted and hence the position of the features shown in the verticals.

For an aerial photograph to be of any use to a surveyor, it must obviously show a point or points which have been or can be easily identified. It is necessary, therefore, for a certain amount of resection to be carried out on the ground either before or after the photographs are taken. The points thus found are known as " control points."

The " navigational control " system obviously requires fewer control points than the mosaic method and seems, therefore, more suited to the survey of wild and undeveloped countries such as the North-West Frontier of India.

The book under review contains much useful and practical information on the subject of equipment, procedure and training, while the conclusions reached are admirably summed up in the final chapter.

In the hope of making the book interesting to, and readable by, others besides the technical expert, all mathematical discussions have been relegated to a series of appendices, of which the conclusions only have been brought into the main text.

Aerial survey work is not so far classed under these activities which help to make an " ace " and is not likely, therefore, to attract the " dashing " pilot. At the same time, it cannot be denied that the importance of maps in war, especially in the class of small war in which the British Army so often finds itself engaged, is becoming more and more recognized. It is therefore safe to say that a considerable proportion of such aircraft as may be detailed for Army cooperation will be required to do photographic work, to assist the Survey officers, either to supplement an existing map or to assist in the mapping of unsurveyed country.

Professor Melvill Jones's book fills a long-felt want and one

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ventures to hope that it may be studied by every R.A.F. officer who is interested in this useful but non-spectacular side of his profession. Omitting the appendices and chapters IV and VII, the book could also usefully be read by regimental and staff officers interested in the subject of maps and survey.

The Dorsetshire Regimental Quarterly. Vol. I., No. 1, June, 1926. Dorchester: Printed by Henry Ling, High East Street.

This is a Quarterly for all Dorset men and men of the Dorsets, and its object, to quote the words of Major-General Sir A. Chichester commanding the Dorsetshire Regiment, who supplies a foreword, " is to bring not only all ranks of the Dorsetshire Regiment into closer touch with each other by the inter-communication of news, but also to keep retired officers, N.C.O.'s, and men in touch." The object is a wholly desirable one, and, if subsequent numbers are as good as the first number, there is no doubt of its attainment. In addition to news of the doings of the various battalions, Regular and Territorial, and notes from the Depôt, there are some short stories, including " The Burning of the ' Sarah Sands ' " by Rudyard Kipling, and other items of interest. The Quarterly is well printed and illustrated.

The Die-Hards in the Great War. By EVERARD WYRALL. Vol. I. 1914–1916. Harrison & Sons. 10*s.* 6*d.*

During the Great War the Middlesex Regiment expanded to no less than forty-six battalions, of which twenty-six saw active service. Their battle honours show that there was hardly a campaign, and very few general actions, in which the Die-Hards were not represented; and, needless to say, the proud tradition of the Regiment was fully maintained.

To prepare a detailed chronicle of such an important period would be a formidable task; in numbers—whether counted by heads or units—the Regiment grew to the size of an army of older wars. A series of battalion histories would best do justice to the achievements of the Die-Hards, and, perhaps, their Colonel, General Sir Ivor Maxse, had this thought in mind when writing his commendation of the present work. He appeals for records of personal experiences with the Regiment in action—" written for soldiers, not a war correspondent's journalese for printing in a newspaper "—and promises to preserve such as are sent to him and to make them available for lectures on Regimental history.

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This appeal comes none too soon, for private letters, notes, diaries, and so forth are easily forgotten, destroyed, or mislaid. On the other hand, one may assume that the war diaries and other official documents from which this volume is mainly compiled are in safe enough custody and will be easy of consultation for many years to come.

Mr. Wyrall has accomplished something of note in tracing the careers of so many battalions from the outbreak of war to the end of 1916 in less than 330 pages of text. He has a curious idea of the mentality of the British soldier, but, following his usual plan he faithfully reproduces the official narratives and as faithfully renders a negative report when these sources of information fail him. However, he includes a few striking quotations from the original accounts of eye-witnesses and for these the reader will be grateful. Incidentally, it may be noted, that the 27th Division, formed of Regular troops withdrawn from overseas garrisons, is referred to by the author as a New Army formation.

The maps have been carefully prepared, and there is an excellent index which is invaluable for reference to individual battalions.

Conflict and Quest. By FRANCIS SEYMOUR STEVENSON. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 10*s*. net.

Indirectly this curious book might be the means of much pleasure, to a reader with the time and temperament for following up its constant references to the byways of doctrinal history and the fascinating ramifications of the story of the Christians in Lebanon, of the facts and fancies of which Mr. Stevenson knows a lot. For the rest, this "poetic narrative of love, adventure, achievement, and quest" is romanticism run wild and lost in haziness. The story, whether of the Palestine Campaign or the hero's love affair, is the slenderest possible, and told at astonishing length. The argument for a Western reunion on the pattern of the Uniate Churches is even hazier, and entirely misses the point. The author rambles on and on through 859 Spenserian stanzas, to meet whose rime-demands he resorts to a fantastic medley of archaism, colloquialism and poeticized circumlocution. As some measure of the last: it takes the lady a whole canto of fifty-one stanzas to decide whether the happy day shall be St. Philip's, St. Simon's, St. George's, St. Mark's or St. John's. Praise be, the bridegroom understood the niceties involved:

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He knew wherefore she named St. Simon's Feast,
And felt beholden; yet in Western lore
Was naught concerning this; alone in East
The tales anent his life on Britain bore.
For Paul, Aristobulus, Joseph, more
The West was witness. True, Eusebius wrote
That some Apostles came to Britain's shore;
Yet passage found he none that names did note.
For England's sake to choose that date, were too remote.

Where so much labour has been, it is painful to have to write that in all the 7,831 lines there is not a line of poetry, a sign of original thought, a vivid image or a suggestion of reality; all the more painful because this sentimental book is written with disarming naivety and artlessness.

ARTICLES IN REVIEWS

Blackwood's Magazine, October, 1926. "A Greater than Napoleon," by Captain B. H. Liddell Hart.

An account of Publius Cornelius Scipio.

The Contemporary Review, October, 1926. "Cyrus the Great," by Brigadier-General Sir Percy Sykes, K.C.I.E., C.B., C.M.G.

The Cornhill Magazine, October, 1926. (1) "Makik: A Soldier in the Desert," Part I, by Major Hubert Young, C.M.G., D.S.O. (2) "The Two Sieges of Bhurtpur (1805 and 1826)," by Major-General Sir George MacMunn, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., D.S.O.

The Edinburgh Review, October, 1926. "Air Problems of the Empire," by Major-General Sir F. H. Sykes, G.B.E., K. C.B., C.M.G., M.P.

The National Review, October, 1926. (1) "Higher Control in War," by Lieut.-General Sir Gerald Ellison, K.C.B. (2) "The Gallipoli Campaign—A Personal Reminiscence," by Captain Wilmot P. M. Russell, M.C.

The Nineteenth Century and After, October, 1926. "The Progress of War," by Colonel J. F. C. Fuller, D.S.O.

Blackwood's Magazine, November, 1926. "The Baptism of a Battery," by Brigadier-General Cosmo Stewart.

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The Cornhill Magazine, November, 1926. "Makik: A Soldier in the Desert," Part II.

The Nineteenth Century and After, November, 1926. (1) "The Martial Resources of Soviet Russia," by Hector C. Bywater. (2) "Army Training in the United Kingdom," by Major-General Sir George Aston, K.C.B. (3) "Lord Cardigan's Vindication," by Lieut.-Colonel F. E. Whitton, C.M.G.

The Contemporary Review, December, 1926. "Napoleon's Youngest Marshal [Suchet]: A Centenary," by Percy Cross Standing.

The National Review, December, 1926. (1) "Soldiers and Statesmen—Statesmen and Soldiers," by L. J. Maxse. (2) "'Braddock's Defeat,' 1755," by A. G. Bradley.

LIST OF BOOKS RECEIVED

"India Under Lord Ellenborough." Edited by Sir Algernon Law. Published by John Murray. 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

"The British Navy in Adversity." By Capt. W. M. James, C.B., R.N. Published by Longmans, Green & Co. 25*s*. net.

"All the World's Aircaft. 1926." Compiled and edited by C. G. Grey. Published by Sampson Low. 42*s*. net.

"A History of the Black Watch in The Great War, 1914–1918." Vol. II, Territorial Force; Vol. III, New Army. Edited by Major-Gen. A. G. Wauchope, C.B. Published by The Medici Society, Ltd. 7*s*. 6*d*. per volume.

"The American Civil War." A Brief Sketch by David Knowles. Published by Oxford University Press. 7*s*. 6*d*. net.

"La Grèce aux côtés des Allies, 1916–1918." By Col. Bujac.

"Secret and Confidential." By Brig.-Gen. W. H.-H. Waters, C.M.G., C.V.O. Published by John Murray. 18*s*. net.

"Camp and Chancery in a Soldier's Life." By Major-Gen. Sir Leopold Swaine, K.C.B., C.M.G. Published by John Murray. 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

"Memoirs of Sergeant Bourgogne, 1812–1813." Published by Peter Davies, Ltd. 10*s*. 6*d*.

"Oppenheim's International Law." Vol. II, Disputes, War and Neutrality. Fourth Edition. Edited by Arnold D. McNair, C.B.E., LL.D. Published by Longmans, Green & Co. 42*s*. net.

"Northants Record Society." Vol. III, Musters, Beacons, Subsidies, etc., in the County of Northampton, A.D. 1586–1623. Edited by Joan Wake. With an Introduction by John E. Morris, D.Litt., Litt.D. Printed by T. Beaty Hart, Ltd., Kettering.

"Gallipoli To-day." By T. J. Pemberton. Published by Ernest Benn, Ltd. 10*s*. 6*d*. net.

"The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Chronicle, 1925." Compiled and edited by The Chronicle Editorial Committee. Published by Eyre & Spottiswoode, Ltd.

"History of the 35th Division in The Great War." By Lieut.-Col. H. M. Davson, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A. (retired). Published by Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd. 21*s*.

"Imperial Defence, 1588–1914." By Col. J. F. C. Fuller, D.S.O. Published by Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd. 3*s*. 6*d*. net.

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" Notes on the Campaign in France, 1914." By A. Kearsley, D.S.O., O.B.E., *p.s.c.* Late Lieut.-Col. General Staff. Published by Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd. 3*s.* net.

" A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia, 1914–1918." By Major (temp. Lieut.-Col.) R. Evans, M.C., *p.s.c.*, Royal Horse Guards. Published by Sifton Praed & Co., Ltd. 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

" The Chinese Army as a Military Force." By Lawrence Impey. Published by Tientsin Press, Ltd., Tientsin. 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

" Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914–1918." By Field-Marshal Sir William Roberston, Bart., G.C.B., C.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., D.S.O. Published by Cassell & Co., Ltd. 2 Vols., the set 50*s.* net.

" A Greater than Napoleon—Scipio Africanus." By Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart. Published by William Blackwood & Sons, Ltd. 12*s.* 6*d.* net.

" My Army Life." By Lieut.-Gen. The Earl of Dundonald, K.C.B., K.C.V.O. Published by Edward Arnold & Co. 21*s.* net.

" The Naviators." By E. F. Spanner. Published by Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 7*s.* 6*d.* net.

" The Writing of History." By The Hon. Sir John Fortescue, LL.D., D.Litt. Published by Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 2*s.* 6*d.* net.

" The Annals of the King's Royal Rifle Corps." Vol. III. By Lieut.-Col. Lewis Butler. Published by John Murray. 30*s.* net.

" Imperial Defence: A Book for Taxpayers." By Stephen King-Hall. Published by T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd. (Ernest Benn, Ltd.). 9*s.* net.

" Common Mistakes in the Solution of Tactical Problems and How to Avoid Them." By Brevet Lieut.-Col. A. B. Beauman, D.S.O., *p.s.c.* Published by Hugh Rees, Ltd.

" The Military Genius of Abraham Lincoln." An Essay by Brig.-Gen. Colin R. Ballard, C.B., C.M.G. Published by Oxford University Press. 15*s.* net.

" The Sherwood Rangers Yeomanry in the Great War, 1914–1918." By Major H. Tallents, D.S.O., T.D. Published by Philip Allan & Co., Ltd. 10*s.* 6*d.* net.

PARLIAMENTARY NOTES

House of Lords

A debate took place on the 1st of December, on the subject of Territorial Army recruiting. The debate was initiated by *Lord Templemore*, who pointed out that in September, 1925, the Territorial Army was below its establishment by 38,048, the deficiency in officers amounting to 1,795. He made several practical suggestions, aimed both at raising in the public estimation the status of the force and also at encouraging employers and headmasters of schools to assist in supplying recruits. He also alluded to rumours of further reductions in both the Regular and Territorial Armies in next year's estimates. The discussion broadened out into a consideration of the military strength of the country, and the *Earl of Midleton* drew attention to the reductions that had already been made, notably in artillery, and criticized the size and expenditure on the non-combatant staff of the War Office. *Viscount Haldane* reminded the House that the Territorial Army, being a short-service force, had large reserves who would rejoin on emergency. He compared the relative states of the Army in 1906 amd 1913, and stated that it should

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not be beyond the powers of the War Office to maintain the Territorial Army in a satisfactory condition both as regards organization and numbers. He did not agree with the suggestion that the Director-General of the Territorial Army should become a member of the Army Council on the grounds that his true duties lay in other directions. The *Under-Secretary of State for War* reviewed the strength of the Regular and Territorial Armies, and stated that the latter, though short in numbers, had reached a very high level of efficiency. With regard to the rumours of further contemplated reductions, he stated that consideration of next year's Estimates had only just been begun and no decision whatever had been made on that subject.

House of Commons

Egypt and Sudan.—On the 10th of November, in reply to a question by *Sir Frederic Wise*, the *Financial Secretary to the War Office* stated that the establishment of British troops in Egypt and the Sudan for 1926 was approximately 12,400, the estimated cost being £2,677,800. The corresponding figures for 1913 were 6,300 and £643,127.

Aeroplane Service (Egypt and India).—On the 11th of November, in reply to a question by *Sir H. Brittain*, the *Under-Secretary of State for Air* stated that, unless some unforeseen difficulty arose, the fortnightly aeroplane service between Egypt and India should commence operation at the beginning of January, 1927, in accordance with the agreement with Imperial Airways, Limited.

Civil Aviation (Subsidies).—On the 15th of November, in reply to a question by *Sir H. Brittain*, the *Secretary of State for Air* informed the House that the sum allocated in the Air Votes for the development of civil aviation for the current year was £462,000. In addition £362,000 was being spent on airship development, largely for civil aviation purposes. Comparable figures for France and Germany were approximately :

France, 78,175,000 francs.
Germany, 24,661,500 marks.

The actual subsidies to civil aviation companies were :

Great Britain, £167,000.
France, 59,500,000 francs.
Germany, 8,371,500 marks.

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M'GREGOR BANK FAILURE.—On the 17th of November, in reply to a question by *Capt. W. Benn*, the *Secretary of State for War* stated that he was unable to consider the question of any addition to the grant already made by the Government towards the loss incurred by members of His Majesty's forces as a result of the failure of the M'Gregor Bank.

BETHNAL GREEN GUARDIANS.—On the 18th of November, in reply to a question by *Lieut.-Colonel Sir Frederick Hall*, the *Minister of Health* stated that in view of the good prospects open to boys joining the Services he much regretted the decision of the Bethnal Green Board of Guardians not to allow any boys under their control to join any of the Services. Boys who had been formally adopted by the guardians were subject to their control up to the age of eighteen, and he could not intervene. The guardians had no right or power to interfere with the wishes of such boys after that age.

MACHINE-GUN CORPS.—On the 23rd of November, in reply to a question by *Viscount Sandon*, the *Secretary of State for War* announced that it was not proposed to reform the Machine-Gun Corps, but that methods of increasing the machine-gun strength of the Army were under consideration.

ROYAL AIR FORCE (ACCIDENTS).—On the 29th of November, in reply to a question by *Captain W. Benn*, the *Secretary of State for War* informed the House that in cases of fatal accidents it had been arranged that no communiqué should be issued for twenty-four hours, in order to render it reasonably certain that relatives will have received the telegram notifying the casualty before seeing a report of it in the Press. He hoped that the Press would abstain from publishing reports of flying accidents with or without names until the communiqué had been issued.

On the 1st of December in reply to a question by *Colonel Day*, he stated that during the twelve months ended the 22nd of November, 1926, there has been 54 fatal accidents in the Royal Air Force. There was no ground for believing that the older types of machine still in use were more liable to accident than the more modern " post-war " types.

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